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
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
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37.
908.







CHRISTIAN MODES
OF
THINKING AND DOING;
OR,
THE MYSTERY
OF THE
KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST:

THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED, AND RECOMMENDED

IN TWO PARTS;

1, OF THE SUBJECT,

2, ——— RELATIONS

OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

BY THE REV. JOHN PRING, B.A.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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TO CORRECT

- Page 11, l. 27, *for* does, *read* doing.
21, l. 7, *after* more, *read* real.
59, l. 34, *for* compliment, *read* complement.
62, l. 10, *for* are, *read* as.
143, l. 11, *for* obstruction, *read* abstraction.
172, l. 5, *for* warning, *read* waning.
224, l. 9, *for* name, *read* names.
263, l. 26, *for* than, *read* that.
288, l. 2, *after* in, *read* good.
312, l. 8, *for* its, *read* their.
334, l. 21, *after* love, *read* a :
381, l. 16, *for* too, *read* two.
387, l. 33, *for* therefore, *read* therefrom.
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CHRISTIAN MODES
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INTRODUCTION.

"UNTO YOU IT IS GIVEN TO KNOW THE MYSTERY OF THE KINGDOM
OF GOD."—MARK iv. 11.

THE works of the Creator are all important in themselves : he has nothing in his store that is not worth having. But to the greater part of these works their own importance is hidden, as the price of its jewels to a cabinet : one class only has the privilege to feel it, to desire its increase, to promote it by all means, and as "lively stones" (Pet. I. ii. 5) to work with the Builder of the world in its own structure and edification. These "are labourers together with God" (Cor. I. iii. 9) : they not only have a feudal property in their own existence, like other animals, but are of a rank also to yield him a *reasonable* service ; by which their importance is doubled, and they are elevated into an order above the rest, the service of which is either instinctive or mechanical. For all things serve Him : every created thing is subservient to the majesty of the Creator ; things lifeless and mute, as well as living and intelligent. "The sun knoweth his going down", (Ps. civ. 19,) "Yea, the stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times ; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow observe the time of their coming." (Jer. viii. 7). "The birds of the air, the beasts of the field, and the fishes of the sea ; even that leviathan, whom he has made to take his pastime therein"

(Ps. civ.) ; these wait all upon Him. All nature acts and must act with nature's God as it is actuated by him. Action is life, and without action there is no describable existence : action is life, and in the height of action is the importance of being.

But there are two sorts of action, as there are two sorts of life ; one desultory and quotidian, like the life of a beast ; the other progressive and well defined, like that which a man ought to live. It would be straining the point, to aver that a man cannot live except he live in this manner ; but this is how he ought to live : and the advantage of so living appears to be generally acknowledged among civilized nations by their devotion to every line of life that social dependence admits of, or human ingenuity can devise ; insomuch that, when we consider the variety of occupations in full exercise among us at once and how they are all interwoven with each other, and all appear to lean on each other's support, we are at a loss which to admire, the spirit and resource of any particular class, in making itself necessary to so many others, or the effect of its wants and weakness in depending on so many more ; while, with respect to the wisdom of divine Providence in contriving, counterpoising, and directing so vast a system as appears in the aggregate of the moral department, we are not so much at a loss how to admire that, as how to admire it sufficiently.

For even among the savage tribes there is something like a regular part going on, though not so divided, nor consequently so well performed, nor of the same political importance, as that which is combined in a more perfect state of society. With them every man almost is a hunter and a warrior ; a house and boat builder ; an armourer ; a furrier, and a cook : every one acts for himself, no one needs another's assistance. But from this individual ability there only results a general insignificance. The body is never so badly served as when the eye can say unto the hand, I have no need of thee ; and again, the

head to the feet, I have no need of you (Cor. I. xii. 21). For while every member of the community is all-sufficient, they all together are insufficient for the purposes of the community: so that the continuous life of a savage is but one remove from the desultory life of a brute; yet only by this one degree may be proved the advantage of such continuity; since, by means hereof, through one thing and another, man is enabled, even in a savage state, to maintain his allotted superiority "over the fish of the sea and over the fowls of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Gen. i. 28). In a civilized state, this advantage is further proved: when, leaving the competition with inferior animals to those next above them, man strives with man for superiority and precedence through a chain of internal relations. But the great proof of all, and the severest trial of human ability, or of that which God has ever conceded to mankind, is furnished from another quarter: the principal competition is not simply human, or between man and man only; nor yet in any common calling, whether civil, ecclesiastical, or military, that can be thought of, but in something more spiritual now to be communicated, if it please the Almighty Proposer. And although it may seem nugatory to communicate a thing that ceases to exist in one respect as soon as it is communicated; yet supposing it to fructify in ceasing, like grain upon sowing, the communication may be worth making. "Behold then I shew you a mystery" (Cor. I. xv. 51); as St. Paul says, and more particularly, as he also says, "the mystery which was kept secret since the foundation of the world began: but now is made manifest, and by the scriptures of the prophets according to the commandment of the everlasting God made known to all nations for the obedience of faith" (Rom. xvi. 25, 26): that is, for moral conduct founded on a principle of obedience to the will of God.

For a mystery, as the expression is here understood and warranted to signify, will necessarily include practice

with faith, or a superstructure as well as foundation; together, modes both of thinking and doing with the distinguishing circumstance of secrecy or peculiarity for its essential character or the boundary between this and other terms of similar import; as science, learning, information, &c., on the one hand; and art, craft, calling, profession, (considered as a livelihood or means of subsistence,) &c., on the other. Of the two parts, v. g. theory and practice or thinking and doing, of which it consists, a mystery will partake most in general of the latter; as appears by many valuable mysteries, which seem to be exercised not only without reflexion, but even without the presence of this faculty in their conductors or agents, as the mystery of building with superior symmetry and convenience by certain birds and quadrupeds, the wonderful mystery both of building such habitations for themselves and storing them richly too with inimitable food by bees and other insects, and the still more wonderful mystery of a symmetrical society and government both in wandering and abiding observed among various tribes of the brute creation; exemplifying altogether what we often find among human beings, theory without reflection; and shewing the possibility, if not the fact of almost every class of animals having its peculiar system or mystery. For although these animals have their eccentricities as well as we; yet are they so casual, that they seldom amount to a breach of the system which their instinct prescribes. And although likewise among civilized men even the thinking and doing of great numbers is systematically uncertain, being governed, as they say, by chance, but in fact by the lawless principle which is such an enemy to system, yet in almost every nation of the earth, whether civilized or not, there is something like a general system owned and asserted by the majority however it may be practised or observed, presenting in this case, what is not found in others, a variety of systems for one class of creatures. And these varying systems are usually denominated either from the individual

teachers by whom they were compounded, or from the gross communities by which they are practised or professed; as the Christian and Mosaic, the Jewish and heathen.

From what has just been observed it will appear, that the principal distinction of mysteries is into natural and moral: and among moral mysteries the mystery of a kingdom is one of the highest kind that can be mentioned, comprehending both the theory and practice of government, or a practical knowledge and enlightened practice of the same in whatever department it may be, and especially whether natural or moral, together with its relations or bearings, and the accidents also to which it is liable, and of which it is susceptible.

There is nothing in nature, or above, or besides, that was ever thought on, nor any thing that was ever deduced therefrom by art, but what belongs to theory, and may be a subject of practice. Even practice itself belongs to theory, and theory may be a subject of practice, as likewise practice itself; since it is the part of practice either to describe, try, consider and believe or confute the one, or to alter, improve, and encourage or discourage the other. Theory is practice superhuman extending to the works of man; practice, the exercise of human faculties extending to the works of God. And thus it happens interchangeably, that as the works of art often have a tendency that is not within the control of the artist, but belongs to theory, or the practice of that pure Intelligence who has the supreme direction of cause and effect; who makes by seeing and creates by volition; so things which are not within the control of any artist, besides the tendency of his performance, as the immutable order of nature, for example, are still objects for practice in some shape or other: if we, subjects, cannot change their nature, we may their destination perhaps; or, if we cannot change their destination, we may comprehend; or if we cannot comprehend, we may consider it at any rate. And such

are the parts, viz., theory and practice, as of other mysteries, so particularly of the mysteries of kingdoms : they are in short the secrets of government. If a mystery of this sort be not one of the highest kind, whether we regard the dignity of the subject, or its important results, there is no higher that men can be intrusted with, or of which they can have any conception.

I. For if we look first into the mystery of the natural kingdom, where the invisible *Sovereign* of the world animates, sustains, and perpetuates the endless variety of creatures which his Almighty Word has originated, we shall find more glories there than we know how to admire sufficiently, and more food for contemplation than the longest life and most craving appetite could exhaust, even if theory was all our business upon earth. Indeed the pursuit of nature, if it spring from proper motives, v. g. from a love and esteem of its object, not only is a source of sweetest delight, but will also prove both a dutiful tribute to the wisdom of its Author, and a profitable speculation for the pursuer as a means of contracting and assimilating him to that all-good and gracious Being, who is said to rejoice in his works (Ps. civ. 31).

But the Creator has not formed men to be passive spectators only in this ample theatre, neither has he formed so many creatures, whether animate or inanimate, for the support, comfort, and delight of human existence, without leaving men a share of employment wide enough to connect them with the great undertaking, and to encourage an interest therein. If we have animals, fruits, and vegetables allotted for our use, we must be at the expense of rearing and cultivating them ; if flowers, trees, and shrubs for our delight as well, we must be at the pains to assemble and arrange them ; if the face of nature is beautifully varied to our eye, the eye has not only to survey, but to superintend it, and see to its improvement. So that by deigning to take a species that he made lower than the angels, (Ps. viii. 5,) as his auxiliaries in the mystery of na-

ture, its Almighty Lord has given to them a part for practice as well as for theory in this beautiful and sublime department; crowning them so far with glory and worship.

II. It is not, however, in the department of nature alone, that men are so crowned and virtually acknowledged. There are likewise in the department of God's providence crowns of every description and magnitude, which he is graciously pleased to bestow on those whom he vouchsafes to take for his coadjutors therein. He has crowns for the fathers of families, as well as for the fathers of nations; crowns for the servants of one, and for the ministers of the other; crowns for their children, and crowns for their subjects; a crown for each of all who discharge their parts or governments with fidelity in whatever sphere or station he may be pleased to require them: which is to each a crown of righteousness here, and of glory hereafter. Such are the mysteries of kingdoms or governments simply considered.

In composition of parts, whatever any individual can either think or do in or concerning any art, craft, or station, will also be a part of the general mystery of the kingdom to which it belongs, in the same manner as all that he can either think or do in or concerning any art, craft, or station belonging to the kingdom is a part of the mystery of such art, craft; or station. Therefore, to comprehend *the mystery of the Kingdom of God in Christ*, it is necessary to be acquainted with its theory or doctrine generally, and with its practice as far as we have to do with it; or with the *Christian modes of thinking and doing* theoretically in general, and practically as far as we may be concerned. For the sake of this acquaintance we ought previously to have some general conception of the kingdom itself and of the mystery of the kingdom. "And without controversy great is the mystery of godliness" (Tim. I. iii. 16).

The mystery of the kingdom of God in Christ is the mystery of godliness complete. It was born in the maturity of the

world by a divine conception : and when it appeared, both the abortive mysteries of the gentiles declined and were lost in the vanity of their origin like so many shining meteors, and the prophetic light of Israel faded before it like a morning star in the heavens before the majestic rising of their grand luminary. For " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things " (Heb. i. 1, 2) : and the drift of all that he said or did upon earth was, to inculcate both by example and precept the mystery which is now honoured with his name. We call it Christianity ; and the entire scope or essence of the same, whether it be called Christianity or the mystery, will amount to this effect, v. g. " God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself " (Cor. II. v. 19).

In this duly studied and practised we shall find a mild interest and a safe, a never failing nor deceiving interest : we shall find all that we can desire for the satisfaction of our minds, the comfort of our souls, and the improvement of our eternal condition : we shall find the counterpart of its divine original, who is the light and the life of man, " a teacher come from God " (John iii. 2) ; and that expressly for the purpose of disseminating the mystery upon earth ; to open a communication between the inhabitants of this lower world and the higher intellectual orders above ; to initiate mankind into a participation and enjoyment of the heavenly treasures which flow from the infinity of their bountiful Creator, raising them to a communion with God and angels, and fitting them for the same by means of the common interest, employment and support afforded in this general undertaking. " I am the bread of life, (said he,) he that cometh to me shall never hunger ; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst " (John vi. 35) ; and experience proves the truth of his assertion : experience therefore proves that his mystery is true, since the soul approves and can desire nothing be-

yond it. For the joy of the Christian institution has been known to swallow up that of every other as soon as it was felt, like Aaron's rod swallowing up those of the sorcerous Egyptians (Exod. vii. 12); it ravishes like a "hidden treasure," or "a pearl of great price," on their discovery (Mat. xiii. 44, 45), as our Saviour after his manner compares the same: which may be said because it is very likely to happen—and then, if our feelings may prove any thing for religion in general, they will prove most decidedly the advantage of the Christian beyond every other as well as beyond every other possession. For it goes directly to the heart, and converts its affections from earth to heaven, as a graft converts the vegetable juice from sour to sweet, there is nothing earthly nor sensual belonging to it; nor any thing tending to the pitiful, base and discordant purposes for which a sensual life is, distinguished. "The wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be intreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy" (Jam. iii. 17), says St. James.

Then carrying this experience forward from our own bosom and own inward sensations to the world around us; if we consider the happy influence of the Christian institution, or of the mystery of the kingdom of God in Christ on the genius and morals of a nation, we shall perceive that it has there also the same advantage over others as in its private operations, and that generally as well as individually the more Christian any people are, the more virtuous, the more intelligent, and of course the more happy. "Righteousness exalteth a nation" (Prov. xiv. 34), says the wise man; and Christianity, we know, has exalted the nations that profess obedience to it above all the nations upon earth: of all religious institutions therefore Christianity must be the true or most righteous. It is the basis of true morality, a source of the highest wisdom, a guide to unalloyed happiness, and the staff of our political as well as our individual existence. For thus one might

reason—true morality is the only bond of society, and true religion the only bond of morality: hence it may be always remarked, that where true religion is wanting, there morality; where morality, there civil union; and where civil union, of course there can be no society, to say nothing of personal government and consistency—which cannot exist without some fixed principles, being good ones too.

And if ever this religion, mystery or heavenly wisdom, or rather its profession, has been adopted merely as a cloak to earthly ambition, or as an instrument to serve the insatiable avarice of some who really mind the present state more than the future, whatever they may pretend; who have no higher view in life than that of making “provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof” (Rom. xiii. 14); who calling themselves *spiritual persons* too perhaps, still prove themselves to be carnal by their practice, and while they would be thought the followers of Christ in their fashion, are wholly addicted to the service of Mammon; who making a great account of the mystery in appearance, decidedly undervalue it in all their transactions, preferring what they can get by any other means before the wisdom to be gained by this, and others for the sake of that; as if it was an honour to be near the possession of wealth; cringing, caballing and oppressing continually in the true spirit of their flinty tyrant - - - all this only proves, that they are not as spiritual as the calling they profess. If they are polluted, it is pure; if they are turbulent, it is peaceable; if they are hot and vindictive, it is gentle and forgiving; if they are selfish and spiteful, it is liberal and beneficent; if they are respecters of persons, the mystery makes no distinction; if they are hypocrites in what they profess, it is not their profession that makes them hypocrites. Their profession, if duly cultivated, would make them first pure like itself, then peaceable, gentle and easy to be intreated, without partiality and without hypocrisy; kind to every one without exception, if not without distinction,

plain, upright, and sincere in all their dealings ; it would make them good friends, good subjects, honest men, and worthy to be trusted in any relation.

Therefore when a suitable practice accompanies its profession (which ought to be well looked after) the mystery must indeed be highly conducive to the first object of every wise government, as tending to the prosperity of that general, sure, and interminable union of which such government is a constituent part by the order of divine Providence. So that a Christian, or a professor of the mystery, to be a bad subject, or bad in any relation, must be at the same time a great hypocrite. For a man cannot address himself sincerely to the Author of that profession or mystery, saying, "Thy kingdom come" (Mat. vi. 10), who retains in his heart any principle that is repugnant to good order, and the best interests of society. And this mystery, while it upholds the dignity, and as one should say, the sanctity of government, will appear to be also admirably calculated by its constant preference for the lower orders of society, or the outcasts of Israel (Ps. cxlvii. 2), as the Psalmist calls them, to improve the worth of the subject, with which its honour is identified, and to preserve a rational liberty and equality among them ; that is to say, such an equality as does not admit of one half of the human species being like brutes and wild beasts to the other : but that every man does as he would be done by, the lowest should have the importance of men, and be looked on as such by the highest.

For benevolence is the essential spirit of this divine institution ; benevolence breathes in every property and particular thereof : it pervades the whole subject, and gives to it that simplicity of purpose, that uniformity of character, that were a man desired to say in one word, what is the Christian institution, or the mystery of the Kingdom of God in Christ ? he might say, It is love or benevolence : as if asked again, What is love ? he might say, "God is love" (John I. iv. 8). The mystery is there-

fore divine, being one with God. Its spirituality, truth, wisdom, benignity, and other celestial properties all emanate from that source; and all the natural effects of the mystery directly tend to prove it: they all directly tend at once to prove its divinity, and to make it an institution not only becoming the excellence of its Author, and intitled to our highest veneration, but a blessing to creatures of every degree, from angels in heaven and saints upon earth, to novices who are but just emerging from the abyss of human imperfection and ignorance.

For this mystery is not a concern of private individuals merely, nor only of public characters of any degree, nor of men only, nor of angels, but of God himself with angels and men, whether public or private; the same being all equally related to it, though in different ways. If, e. g., we have the happiness to partake of this divine institution in any measure, we are related to the same as depositaries; and to beings far above ourselves, as partakers of the mystery with them and bearing the same relation to the mystery as they. And if we have the further honour and happiness of communicating this, or any other "good and perfect gift" to our fellow men, we may then be deemed to be joined in the same relation with their first bestower, though in an inferior degree, and as children of our father which is in heaven (Mat. v. 45). "For every good and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (James i. 17).

To be placed in a relation with the Supreme Being, though in ever so humble and inferior a degree, and if it be but in part too is most flattering to human nature; it is truly a crowning of the same "with glory and worship" (Ps. viii. 5). It can be but in part that a man or any other being can enjoy this relation, for among the higher relations of the mystery He stands alone. He is its only Author: in this relation He has neither partner nor peer. There may be workers in the mystery together with God,

though "it is the same God which worketh all in all" (Cor. I. xii. 6.): but there cannot be joint authors with Him; notwithstanding some would flatter themselves that their inventions deserve to be ranked with his, and others would even go the length of preferring their own creation to God's, substituting some idle offspring of their own brain perhaps for his most glorious mystery. Some perhaps have no objection to the mystery with a few of their improvements: while others, not content with this, must also daub God's workmanship with their untempered mortar (Ezek. xiii. 10); and, with others, nothing less than a thorough reformation will make it tolerable. Whereas, if the mystery admitted of any improvement or reformation, it is not likely that its Divine Author would leave this part to any human operation. For he says, "I am the Lord: that is my name; and my glory will I not give to another, neither my praise to graven images. Behold the former things are come to pass; and new things do I declare" (Isai. xlii. 8, 9). The most that God has done himself in the way of reformation has been to keep the richest part of the mystery as it were in reserve for ages; until the fulness of the time was come which St. Paul speaks of; when "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4, 5).

The new part or dispensation which was brought forward on that occasion, may be called a reformation or improvement on the old; but was in effect more like a regular expansion, as we observe in the bursting of some long expected flower in its season, by which the glorious elaboration of the same is maturely disclosed. The ministers employed under this dispensation are engaged by its Author "as workers together with him" (Cor. II. vi. 1); being conservators, guardians, and dispensers of the Mystery—and nothing more, it might be observed; if the title of stewards given to them by the Holy Ghost did not

preclude the parties from every shadow of an equality or partnership with God in this important concern. For they are not intitled lords or masters, lessees or inheritors, much less Princes of the covenant (Dan. xi. 22), but literally *Stewards*; and that in different passages of the New Testament, as e. g., first by our Saviour (Luke xii. 42); next by St. Paul (Cor. I. iv. 1; Tit. i. 7), and also by St. Peter (Pet. I. iv. 10). But this, and the forementioned terms as well, are all terms that any one may be proud to deserve, and worth aspiring after; as they clearly imply a rate of dignity that is not natural to men, they being only objects or pupils of the Mystery, before they come to be first adepts therein, and next ministers and stewards, or dispensers of the same. But if any will be always hearing of this institution, and never practising it, like men beholding their natural faces in a glass (Jam. i. 23): or if they are content to be governed or otherwise benefited by the Mystery, through its stewards or dispensers, without carrying forward the obligation they receive to the benefit of others; if, in short, they are always to be taught in the Word, and never to teach; always to be governed by it like children, and never to govern by it so much as their own households; or to receive the blessing of it daily from above as their daily bread, without diffusing or endeavouring to diffuse the same around them—then are they not related to the Mystery in any perfect degree, but as very underlings, or like apprentices; and no great proficient either, seeing it requires one part as well as the other. “Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap” (Gal. vi. 7): “he which soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully” (Cor. II. ix. 6). If a man will devote his means, gifts and resources heartily and judiciously to any good mystery, and is only blessed at the same time with tolerably fair opportunities, he can hardly fail of deriving from it all the good that he proposes to himself: but if he will not strive for that good, that good will not come to him.

And with respect to the evidence of these assumptions ; if it be asked on what grounds, or on what authority any one ventures to regard and assert the Mystery of the Kingdom of God in Christ as so beneficial a concern, and a source of so many first rate advantages ?—(for it is a very likely thing to stagger the venal multitude, is the idea of a mystery or calling, the profits of which are as real as invisible, and may not be computed by any sterling medium)—and how may the Mystery be known to deserve these encomiums ?—the answer is obvious, try it. For the thing is self-evident : a perfect system can need neither proof nor comment, as it proves and explains itself. Only try it, therefore, and see, if you do not find in its present return an earnest of future recompence.

For there is such a part as trying the Mystery, also as accepting, feeling and approving ; too often likewise as forgetting and foregoing the same after it has been learned and accepted : and, worst of all, there is such a part too as retaining the Mystery, or its profession at least, only to make a wrong use of it. It is not for one man to judge another in this respect, or what may be any one's motive for accepting and professing the Mystery, or what passes for such with him ; whether it may be fashion or credulity, or the love of wonders on one hand ; or a divine impression, force of truth, irresistible conviction on the other—they only who feel and are governed by any of these motives can tell ; and not they either sometimes. But it may be fairly surmised, that both the motives and their followers or entertainers are agreeable to the objects of their choice : where righteousness and truth are the objects, it is not to be doubted that God and his Holy Spirit are the movers, and the followers—children of God. “ For (says the Apostle) as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God ” (Rom. viii. 14). But where, on the other hand, folly and impiety are the objects of such choice, its motive must be either the world, or he who rules the fashion of the world—“ the prince of the power of the air,

the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience" (Eph. ii. 2) ; and, it may be added, their children, "the children of this world" (Luke xvi. 8) ; "who are taken captive by him at his will" (Tim. II. ii. 26).

And so likewise with regard to the abandonment or rejection of the Mystery after it has been accepted ; whether this may proceed from levity or mature judgment, from the apostate's being wiser than he was, or not so wise, better or not so good, it is not for others to determine. It seems however a curious instinct in the human race, to be so fascinated as they are with new things, or things new to them, and that merely for their novelty : as on the other hand they are equally liable to be disgusted with old things, or things old to them, merely on account of their familiarity. It is fair to consider this habit as instinctive, for being most unreasonable, and consequently common to most ; being in no subject or matter perhaps more observable than in the science of divinity, and in the Mystery of the Kingdom of God. Hence the impetuosity with which novices in such matters are apt to run into the first scheme of the sort,—be it true or false, wise or absurd, that comes home to their imagination : hence the indifference with which the wisest scheme is entertained after it begins to be familiar, if it was not before, and the ease with which some realities perhaps, as well as many illusions, are successively abandoned by the heedless enthusiast. "Wisdom crieth without ; she uttereth her voice in the streets ; she crieth in the chief place of concourse ; in the openings of the gates ; in the city she uttereth her words saying, How long ye simple ones will ye love simplicity ? and the scorers delight in their scorning ? and fools hate knowledge ? Turn you at my reproof : behold I will pour out my Spirit unto you : I will make known my words unto you " (Prov. i. 20, &c.).

Levity, caprice, enthusiasm, or its affectation, are highly reprehensible in relation to a matter of so serious importance ; but, as before intimated, nothing after all is so bad

as a sober abuse of it : this fact, to every sincere judgment, must appear the worst of all, because it is a much lighter offence to have nothing to do with an institution that deserves all our attention and ability, even after we are pledged to it, than to continue and make a corrupt use of the same : which must certainly be nothing at all, or too good for such a use.



CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER I.

INCIDENTALS.

1, 2. Name and Notion.—3. Birth and Station.—4. Place and Habitation.—5. Money, Stock, &c.—6. Dress.—7. Diet.—8. Intelligence, Records, &c.—9. Rights, Dues, &c.—10. Duties, Liabilities, &c.—11. Opportunity, Necessity, Impossibility.—12. Calling, Trade or Profession.—13. Instruction, Example, Advice.

“All are yours.”—COR. I. iii. 22.

I. THE word Kingdom is formed of two other words, “King” and “Dome”; that denoting a political degree, and this the doom annexed to it. For there are dooms of various degrees, and not only of degrees, but of sorts likewise, particularly two, the personal and material; relating, one to a man’s own condition, the other to that of his rank, estate or circumstances. And of either of these two sorts there are also some varieties; as *first*, of the personal, freedom and thralldom: *next*, of the material, kingdom, and others.

II. The kingdom of God, in general, is found to denote that boundless sphere which he whose part it is, to make the “weight for the winds, and he weigheth the waters by measure” (Job. xxviii. 25); to mix up properties, whether material or immaterial, in whatever forms, quantities and proportions he may see fit,—and to doom his

fate as well as sphere and jurisdiction to every creature—has doomed to himself by the word of creation; and in which he still dooms inevitably the general course of all that he has created, *having made originally all things for himself*. This kingdom is not described by space; it does not depend on locality; numbers have nothing to do with it: its beginning and extent are in the centre and to the circumference of all that is, according to that expression of the Psalmist, “The Lord hath prepared his seat in heaven, and his kingdom ruleth over all” (Ps. ciii. 19). Among other items, this earthly planet, the world which we inhabit, is one in the kingdom of God, or in the Creator’s doom, and celebrated accordingly by the Psalmist, where he says, “The earth is the Lord’s, and all that therein is, the compass of the world, and they that dwell therein. For he hath founded it upon the seas, and prepared it upon the floods” (Ps. xxiv. 1, 2). His throne he has placed in the moral and intellectual department: but every creature in the three kingdoms of nature is also subject to his dominion, and has its part assigned from him; the fowls of the air, though they neither sow nor reap; the lilies of the field, though they toil not (Matt. vi. 26—28); and even the salt of the earth, if it be only good for the dunghill (Luke xiv. 34, 35), however remote its sphere of operation from the seat of government.

Therefore, as the sovereign himself is intitled King of kings, so his sphere or doom may be intitled a Kingdom of kingdoms; since it includes not only all the kingdoms on earth, but also those of earth and heaven, or the kingdoms of nature and intellect as well. The latter, however, v. g. the kingdom of intellect, seems to be that which is ordinarily understood as the kingdom of heaven, or of God; and most likely on account of its pre-eminence over every other sphere or aspect of the kingdom. For here is the centre of business to all that is, the metropolis of the universe, the fountain of human interests especially, and of all the affairs of human life, whether present or to

come : here all the great concerns between God and man are transacted ; here is agitated the important question of empire, and here the main strife between good and evil lies ; hence rolls the tide of war : and on this invisible theatre is decided the contest for the crown of life—a struggle for heaven by the inhabitants of the earth much more than one that we read of*.

But heaven and earth are not the only departments of this universal kingdom : it takes in another likewise, according to the Psalmist, where he beautifully avers, “ If I climb up into heaven, thou art there : if I go down into hell, thou art there also. If I take the wings of the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me ” (Ps. cxxxix. 7—9). Every part of the universe is equally subject to God’s power and observation, though some are more particularly blessed with his auspicious presence, (as may be seen by their works or productions,) and some are far enough from him, “ though he be not far from every one of us ” (Acts xvii. 27), namely as his children (Ib. xvii. 28), because the distance is in nature, and not in locality. For the region of guilt being spiritual, is yet farther from God than the region of innocent matter ; but he rules it over the wicked. And though earth is the proper fee, doom or dependence of the kings of the earth, so that they cannot rule any thing but earth, for spirit and intellect are above their jurisdiction ; yet God also rules the earth over them, as he rules both heaven and hell over their superiors, and with a very different sway from that which belongs to any earthly king, or chemist either, who is also a king of the earth. And whereas the same kingdom of God is founded in a certain line or dynasty, commencing with the First-born as usual, we name it likewise after that, namely as the kingdom of God in Christ ; who exemplifies at once both the King, the Kingdom, and also the intermediate

* The fabulous war of the giants.

government in himself. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things" (Rom. xi. 36). "Of him", meaning of the same constituents of which he partook, a sample of which is soon to be enumerated; "through him," by the divine power here manifested in the same constituents; "and to him," the said power and constituents united as one object or presence; "are," consist, result from, and belong to; "all things," not only the creatures or combinations known to us upon earth, but others not known, of whatever nature, quality or description in earth or elsewhere.

When we name the kingdom of God in Christ, therefore, we mean his kingdom as we apprehend it on earth particularly, and generally all beyond it, the *terra incognita*, as we may say, of that kingdom. The idea of such a kingdom comprehended and incarnate, may seem like the idea of a mountain in a nutshell: yet with God the same is very possible; as possible as the comprehension of one shell in another, or of his own indivisible presence in any thing as well as in every thing. The kingdom of God incarnate by Christ must needs be owned an humble specimen of the province above defined: humble, however, as it may be, a man can give no higher specimen of the same, than such kingdom affords, with the help of selection and amplification. For these two are the utmost bounds of his invention: he can give no idea of any new principles, of any that he does not perceive in himself. If men had been angels instead of men, the kingdom would have been represented to them in an angelic form perhaps, whatever that may be; but, as the matter stands, if any of us should pretend to shew the kingdom in that form for a specimen, he could not exhibit a grain of goodness different from what his own nature and experience afford. He might indeed pick out all the light properties that are usually mingled in a human composition to shew an heavier sample than ordinary; but he could not assign any properties to angels essentially different from

what he has or might have himself in some share or respect; and purely for this reason, because he has no idea of any other. And on the other hand, as human nature presents the highest sphere in which the kingdom of God can be exhibited to human conception, so there is found no other nature too low to share it with this, there being no principle in any, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral, that is not in man. This, with his higher affinities above-mentioned, will make the kingdom of God in man equivalent with the kingdom of God, as far as man is able to conceive it.

Therefore, conceiving this kingdom in its proper latitude, we cannot strictly sever between it and any other intellectual kingdom, suppose that of Antichrist, e. g.; as in the natural department we can, generally, between the animal and vegetable, and more particularly between the animal and mineral kingdoms. For the kingdom of God in Christ is the kingdom of intellect in intellect: *imperium in imperio*, and not *abs*, nor yet *absque*; concurrent, and not distinct. The character accordingly given of the kingdom, in divine revelation, is steady and consistent, and remarkably precise; shewing and foreshewing too, in every kind of language, the procession of that perfect order emphatically styled, in prayer as well as narration, *The Kingdom of God*, by one medium after another to the farthest extent of creation. There are two ways or courses particularly in which the said order may be traced, and is in that authority, v. g.,

I. OF PRINCIPLES.—II. OF COMBINATIONS.

I. For the way of principles, the first appearance of this order, according to the said authority, is in intellect (Prov. iii. 19, &c.); then it appears in spirit (Ps. xxxiii. 6); then in matter, forming by such means, first, the spiritual and intellectual, next the visible or material world (Ib. cxxxix. 6), and equally ruling throughout *by itself*, i. e., not one part by another, as the material by the spiritual, and the spiritual

by the intellectual; but every part by itself, the order aforesaid; as will be hereafter more particularly explained.

II. In the way of combinations, the same order still holds on; one combination, whether kind or individual, continually ruling and spreading by different mediums, both spiritually and corporeally: as 1. spiritually; God the Word by God the Holy Ghost incarnate in Christ, descending to the apostles by his spirit, and so through the real church, the same again in the professing, a sort of halo or vapour belonging to it, the atmosphere of the church; and this halo, vapour or atmosphere, in the vast expanse of intellect: 2. Corporeally, by a seed of Abraham in the *house* of David, the house of David in the *tribe* of Judah, the tribe of Judah in the *family* of Jacob; and, to be short, the family of Jacob in the *posterity* of Adam, according to promise (Gen. xxii. 18), as Adam himself in the earth.

It is evident how, by all these means employed regularly in succession, "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself" (Cor. II. v. 19). And this intromissive order being rightly understood will serve to explain many particulars relating to the kingdom that were otherwise unintelligible; as expecting and praying for its arrival, when the kingdom is here already; praying for that which belongs only to God, and he is determined not to part with (Isai. xlii. 8) on the one hand: as also praying for that, a part of which we should rather decline, and a part be frightened at on the other. It will also account for the disowning of one part of the kingdom, by Christ, its universal sovereign, in the first place, as where he says, "My kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36); his limiting the same, in the second place, to a little flock, as where he says, "Fear not, little flock: for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom" (Luke xii. 32); and lastly, his throwing it open to all comers, as in the parable of the net cast into the sea (Matt. xiii. 47), which is indeed a most happy illustration of the subject

in two respects; first, in respect of the fish—in a net—in the sea, resembling the intromissive order of the kingdom just mentioned; and next in respect of the promiscuous multitude comprised in the net, by which, as before intimated, the universality of the kingdom is likewise supposed.

But on the first consideration of this, or of any other object in particular, we apprehend what are generally called its two sides, v. g., inside and out; but which, if considered with attention, would be found to signify only perceptible and imperceptible, or known and unknown, or obvious and inferential, constituents—the imperceptible, unknown and inferential being a reality inferred from the perceptible, known and obvious; as St. Paul intimates, when, speaking of the most obvious and, at the same time, most unknown object in the universe, he says, “The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead” (Rom. i. 20),—meaning that these supreme constituents are seen as it were by the medium of reason and inference. So the inside and outside of a subject, or its matter and mode, or essence and presence are fundamentally, or as we say, *in substance*, only one and the subject is only one, however many our imagination or perception might make of it. Yet we find a convenience in retaining this distinction, and in understanding the particulars of a subject to be primarily divided thereafter into two species, which we call essential and characteristic; or into two parts, matter and mode.

It does not accord with the objects of a practical discussion, or of a discussion, however, that should be more practical than theoretical, to plunge all at once into metaphysical details on such topics as substance, essence, and presence, being so many different shades of the subject; or so many types, varieties, or conditions of which every subject is capable. But it will be useful

to remember, that as subjects are supposed to consist either of acts or accidents, according to their active or passive foundation, they divide themselves accordingly into two classes; these forming the incidental, and those the constituent; to be separately considered in accordance with the method here adopted; which is, to proceed always inversely, looking on the outside first as aforesaid, and taking due care always to name every object as nearly as may be in the order of observation, incidentals first, and then constituents—from the last of the first to the first of the last.

Incidentals are every thing that belongs to a subject without composing or making any part of it—every thing that is laid on a subject, or given, or attributed to it, and every thing that happens, or is happening to the same; instead of entering into corporeally and helping to compose it, or proceeding or happening from or by it; which, on the contrary, turns to constituents. There are many sorts of things belonging to a subject, without entering into, or helping to compose it; such as name and notion generally; also with man, the subject of the kingdom—birth and station, place and habitation, with others of the kind, besides those above mentioned, which do not affect the identity of the subject either by their presence or absence: for if they are present, the subject will be neither greater nor less, nor better nor worse, nor yet if they are absent. Such are the two sorts of properties, v. g., incidental and constituent, belonging to subjects in general, and to man, the subject of the kingdom, in particular: of whose incidental properties, or briefly *incidentals*, here follow a few examples in the order of their standing or observation.

§ 1. 2. As nominal and ideal subjects stand before real, therefore in respect of the observer, being like ambassadors between him and them, they are properly the two first sorts of incidentals to be regarded. Indeed, it may be said of these subjects, that they not only belong to the kingdom, which is the property of incidentals, but also

form a larger, if less solid, portion of it than all the substantial ingredients of the same that we know of put together. For upon an average, there are perhaps ten times as many names as substances, or things, within the sphere of our animadversion, and ten times ten thousand times more notions.

It is just that these two titles, *Name* and *Notion*, should stand together in their enumeration; as they often occur together in application, and both for the same reason, v. g., that neither of them is found very often of sufficient importance to deserve a separate notice or consideration distinct either from the other, or from the subject to which it relates. For one mode of existence is as susceptible of discussion as another,—names and notions as much so as persons and things, and with all the same specification of particulars. Even nothing itself may be talked of as well as any thing. But in general the notice or consideration of these shadows is merged in that of the realities to which they relate or belong: on a very few and very particular occasions only it may be worth while to give them a distinct consideration. For shadows they really are, although some things of most serious importance, whether for good or evil, in the vulgar estimation, are founded upon them; as may be observed, when that class of incidentals, or that improvement on this shall come to be considered.

§ 3. Of similar importance to the subject, and its acquaintance, is another kind of incidentals, and another foundation for characteristics: which, if incidentals were to be enumerated in the order of seniority, ought to have been mentioned before the preceding; but as they are enumerated in the order of observation, name and notion have taken the lead of *Birth*, and of its usual adjunct, *Rank* or *Station*, which is here appended to it; as being a very intimate, if not necessary companion of the same. And in the same manner either of these, i. e., of rank, birth and station, is often used in the construction of the others, to wit, of name and notion, at present; as it was in the first

instance, when “the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and blessed them, and called their name Adam, (i. e. earth,) in the day when they were created” (Gen. ii. 7; v. 2), also Son (John I. iii. 1), also Creature (Gen. i. 27). So according to David, “children and the fruit of the womb are an heritage and gift that cometh of the Lord” (Ps. cxxvii. 4), and according to what is said of Obed, David’s grandfather’s mother, Ruth, “The Lord gave her conception, and she bare a son” (Ruth iv. 13).

He who made the first man, also made the second by his means: he who made man male and female, also made them human and divine. As thou formedst the first man of the dust of the ground, and breathedst into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul (Gen. ii. 7) particularly; so “thou hast made me (even me, at this distance of time) as the clay; hast poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese; thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinews” (Job x. 9—11): and after all hast begotten me again to new life, who was dead in trespasses and sins, by the same medium of thy Breath or Holy Spirit. And though we attribute to mankind the part of procreation; it is not an original act, nor so expressed; but its continuance or repetition, like the continued productions of nature, as we call them, to which this act is never attributed. For the incidental called birth or descent, with respect to man, the proper subject of the kingdom, stock or sort with respect to inferior animals, and race or pedigree with respect to both, whether it be considered in the gross or in detail, as the birth of the kingdom, or birth in the kingdom; as birth of the kind, or birth of individuals; must be the same in both cases, if traced from the beginning, since there can be no other beginning for any individual of a monogeneous or single-headed race, than there is for the whole, whatever may be his pedigree, or intermediate beginnings.

§ 4. The next incidental, while it presents some-

thing like a more substantial property for a subject than its name and notion, or simple recognition, is also subservient in most cases to the effect of designation as well as the last mentioned place and habitation; it being hard to identify such an endless multitude of subjects as there are in the kingdom, or to complete their merest notion without referring to their place and habitation, as well as to their sphere and birth in addition to their common name or designation. This property of a subject is put next to birth and station, therefore, because it agrees with the forementioned plan or method of proceeding inwards with their enumeration, from the remotest to the most intimate topics of the kingdom of God incarnate. Thus we consider next to his name and notion, station, birth and such like,—the outer shell of the soul or essential man,—the *Habitation* inclosing his frail body under all circumstances, whether he be dead or alive, generally some time of the day, but chiefly by night in the former case. For whether dead or alive the man must have his habitation for a season: and human vanity is as profuse sometimes in expense on the shell of the former as of the last mentioned. This we may consider first, as coming first between a man's immaterial incidentals and himself: considering as next his portable property, (i. e. portable for a time,) whether it consist in actual comforts and conveniences, such as money, stock, &c.—dress and diet, literary stuff and records, with other things of the kind; or else, in a plain right to such things. The whole of this is generally denominated personal property; and its particulars, not properties; as the particulars of the kingdom, or of man, its principal subject on earth, are denominated; but kinds of property, a very proper distinction between the subject or foundation, and its apparatus or incidentals, between the domestic and foreign property of the kingdom. For all that *belongs* to a man may be regarded as foreign property; habitation and the rest, as well as his name and notion.

But a man's place or habitation is different from the

place or habitation of man generally speaking, his particular and artificial from his general and natural habitation. By nature man is a tenant of the earth in common with many other animals; *fellow lodgers*, we may call them, in this great house. But not content with the apartments which nature assigned him like the rest, man has been at considerable pains in making habitations for himself; building, planting, fencing and fortifying the same at no inconsiderable cost of nearer and clearer property, i. e. of domestic or constituent. But what should have occasioned the application of *real* to a sort of property that a man can hold only for his life, or for a short time after, is hard to conceive; unless it be that we find a greater fixation or stability attending this sort of subject than some others, though not in its relation of property to the subject. And even then it may be questioned, whether the distinction of *fixed* and *portable* property would not apply more correctly to lands and linen, or to houses and eatables, than *real* and *personal*. However, let that be real which the world has so ordained; and let it be owned, that some habitations are pretty and pleasant; yet taking into consideration, at the same time, some other habitations which the debtor, the criminal, and the captive can tell of, we must needs own that the thing itself is naturally indifferent as well as incidental,—an essential, but no constituent. For if there is indeed one habitation that we all desire, we do not all, nor any of us, seem in much haste to occupy it, nor yet very apt to think of that habitation either so much as we ought. And, what shews still further the incidentality of the subject, namely, an habitation; as when living, men are often assimilated herein, without being assimilated at the same time, either in their qualities or their enjoyments; but wise men and unwise, happy men and miserable are living together, continually sharing in the same house, the same room, the same bed; so, when dying, a man has taken leave of this transitory scene, and can be no longer either happy or miserable in

it, his remains may moulder as conveniently with a beggar as with a prince by his side; and under a plain green sod, as under a marble tomb.

§. 5. It may be questioned, whether a man's *Money*, though of a figurative importance only, be not more nearly related to him than his habitation, as long as he lives. For that we may carry about with us, as we do other things, if we have not too much of it; but this we cannot. And at the same time, our money has also the advantage of being more communicable, like our thoughts and words; though not often so freely communicated, and particularly as the latter, if it be often more desirable. Indeed, when we recollect what hands a piece of money may possibly pass through, and to what base purposes it may have been applied before it solicits our acceptance, we are almost ready to spurn it from us, or to shrink from the infamous guest. For that which goes forth in industry, and may take a turn in the walks of charity, will soon turn aside into the paths of vice and vanity: the thief and the prostitute, the false swearer, the murderer and the parricide, will each have received and misapplied it perhaps in succession, as well as the fop and the buffoon; and now it comes to try what sort of use we shall make of it. But before the shining metal with its royal semblance was presented to our consideration, we should like to have had it returned to the mint and cleansed from its many pollutions.

And what, after all is this highly favoured, shining subject, which we can receive with more allowance than the frail child which it has holpen to seduce? It is not better than a piece of paper in this application, however important it might have been in the hands of a skilful artificer. It is a mere check for the ordinary accommodation of those who cannot write: by which means one man draws upon another continually for his commodities or service; as e. g. the tenant upon his landlord for the use of an estate; and the landlord again on his builder,

butcher, baker, tailor and others, for his house, meat, bread, clothes, &c. So that one hardly knows how to call a piece of gold or silver, Property: it is a mere *order* for something; and the rich are subject to it as well as the poor, and in an equal if not greater proportion. For the more orders of this kind any man issues, the more he is liable to receive. The value of these orders must be regulated too by the necessities of life: and it is rather an advantage to the country when they are depreciated; as it sends many idlers to live in the most neglected, and consequently cheapest neighbourhoods, where their presence is most wanted.

As for the scarcity or abundance of the circulating medium with any subject, whether it be a nation or an individual, that is another property, and of quite another description, being a characteristic instead of an essential like this to which it relates, and comparative instead of positive, as this is: therefore, deferring such points to their proper head, let us continue our enumeration of essential incidentals, considering the next article of such foreign property that we meet in our way to the subject, being of course a degree nearer to the same.

§ 6. *Dress* therefore is not only nearer to the subject than either of the kinds of property before mentioned, but must also be regarded as more important in itself than its medium—money, &c., and more essential to human comfort than a fixed habitation, v. g. the inner shell, more than the outer: so that we find it easier to dispense with this than with that; or, if need were, to lie under a hedge, than to go naked. At the same time, as there are still many tribes among the sons of Adam, who gladly dispense with one, living like the happy birds, *sub diu*, or in woods and thickets, and too many individuals who are obliged to dispense with both kinds, being houseless and naked; however conducive a dry house and warm clothing may be to human comfort in some cases, in none can they be considered so near or essential as some other kinds, there

being some that the subject cannot dispense with on any terms, or in any situation.

§ 7. For after the exterior covering of the body, by which is meant dress, should be mentioned, as nearer or more intimate and consequently more important, the interior covering, which is *Diet*. And even this, however taken and assimilated, will never become any thing more, i. e., more than a sort of covering to the body, or plating as we may call it to the metal of which the body is composed. It is like the dress of particles, and as apt to be overcharged as the general or exterior covering of the body; because neither the law of nature, nor the laws of man, nor the example of the world will teach moderation in this respect. Therefore while diet ranks with dress and habitation as a remote property, it certainly is at the same time one of greater necessity and deserving rather more concern than these. For if men can endure the privation of clothing less than that of a covering over head, the privation of food is less to be endured than either; as, without making any part of a man, it comes nearer to him than they, and may be regarded as the connecting link between his foreign and domestic properties, or kinds of property.

For considering the constituents of the body as domestic property, the food by which they are replenished and excited or increased will not seem far from an identity with them, v. g. with the constituents of the body, or of the outer man; although it is far, it is very far from any thing like a constituent of the spirit or inner man, and not suffered by our Lord to rank even with the animal life, which is its lowest ingredient: though it helps to replenish our veins, it is not in his estimation to be regarded as any part either of the human machine or of its general effect. "Therefore I say unto you (says he) take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than *meat*, and the body than raiment?" (Mat. vi. 25).

§ 8. To food for the body, which is so necessary

both to the material and also to a part of its spiritual nature, should be added another incidental that is not less important as food for the mind and soul, and frequently also as a medium to bodily food; that is, the provision or materials for our intellectual and spiritual nourishment embodied in various forms, and taken by various channels or faculties—in writing, in speaking, in typifying, delineating—by the eye, by the ear, the apprehension, memory, imagination, fear, sympathy, and many other means. Therefore books, maps, instruments; as well as lectures, operations, exhibitions, and literary opportunities of every sort; also correspondences, videttes, spies, diplomacies, &c.; in short, every source of *Information*—like-wise every species of evidence and *Record*; every useful precedent, with every affecting narration, and every instructive example in writing—that is, the whole of a man's literary stuff and every other means of information and sympathy, with all that he can command or procure relating either to this world or to the world to come, belongs to this class of incidentals: the rule or doctrine of his secular mystery will belong to this class as well as the mystery of the kingdom of God in Christ. It is a man's store of mental provision, and as such might have been enumerated under the head of stock, though it is here distinctly mentioned, as it deserves.

And if this distinction be due in doctrine, another will be still more due in practice, which is not always sufficiently regarded; v. g., between matter of feeling, observation or intelligence in the heart and in the closet, in fact and in possibility, in fruition and in possession; for the first mentioned sort of property, though still incidental in effect, is more like constituent than the last; being digested or transmuted into pleasure or regret, as well as learning, knowledge, skill, &c., and as different from that, as meat in our veins, from meat in the entrails or even in the cupboard. It seems necessary to make this distinction; because there seem to be persons in the world who can think

they have feelings and information or intelligence for every part of it in themselves, if their shelves only happen to be well loaded with the means or materials for those acquisitions, or, as it may be said, with the treasures of literature.

These are records of other men's labour and ingenuity, but not of the purchaser's: and the value of such records must depend on the use that is made of them. More important than what concerns any private estate, more important than what relates to any kingdom on earth, are the information and records of the kingdom of God in Christ and of our interest in the kingdom which are found in its gospel: "Whereby (says St. Peter) are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature" (Pet. II. i. 4). But these records must be read and well digested in order to nourish; they must be studied and acquired to swell the intellectual frame; and they must be practised if they are ever to establish the same. And if the intellectual frame be not nourished and kept up by such proper aliment, it will starve and go back. For the mind and soul either growing or declining continually like the body, will each require its proper food like that. As the body requires its meat and drink, the soul will likewise its occasions of feeling, and the mind its occasions of thinking; which are their proper diet, v. g. of each respectively. And considering what enters the mind and soul in this manner and to this effect—what an host of objects it is, and of mere incidental existence—will reduce the seeming dimensions of our united kingdom, as much as even the subtracting of its assimilated materials in the manner aforesaid can subtract from the dimensions of its nearest province in the body. It is well to have an idea of what may constitute and what appertain only to each: thus it will appear, how no sort of information or intelligence, not even in the mystery of the kingdom, can be any other than an incidental until it has been identified

with its subject by practice — when, “he being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed” (Jam. i. 25).

By information and intelligence of the actions and designs of other men, whether past or present, thus applied, we extend our own mental domain as it were with a slice of their consciousness; which may seem a great matter: but how much greater a matter must it be, to learn the ways of God; and, as St. Paul says, to “have the mind of Christ” (Cor. I. ii. 16): which may also be had indeed, as far as it is proper. For “the secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and unto our children for ever, THAT WE MAY DO ALL THE WORDS OF THIS LAW” (Deut. xxix. 29); and (it may be added) so fall or appertain as a welcome acquisition to Him whose knowledge, like His power, admits of no extension, being infinitely older than its rational objects with all their thoughts, works, and occasions; as the Psalmist felt when he said, “O Lord, thou hast searched me out, and known me: thou knowest my down sitting and mine uprising; thou understandest my thoughts long before” (Ps. cxxxix. 1). But what will he do with those shadows of intellect, which have not the substance of practice? whose goodness is as a morning cloud; and, as the early dew, it goeth away (Hos. vi. 4). Whatever will he do with all his refuse?

§ 9. Also the *Rights* and *Expectations* of a man, or of any other member of the whole kingdom of God, objectively considered, are a part of his and its incidental property: our rights and expectations being of two sorts, v. g. temporal and eternal; in the former of which we are joined by the brute creation, and in the latter by beings at present superior to ourselves. For brutes too have their preconceived rights and expectations as well as ourselves, and will not tamely allow their walks to be invaded: and if angels have not theirs, they have at least abundant room

for them between their own perfection and that which admits of no increase; but without the same room as inferior candidates, it may be presumed, for contention.

And hereupon another distinction of rights and expectations may also be conceived; v. g. into peaceful and litigious, corresponding with the eternal and temporal kinds before mentioned; the latter being one that men are always fighting and contending for, but the former never disputed, or never openly at least. For it cannot be denied, that men's eternal rights and expectations are also liable to be secretly undermined as well by intellectuals of their own order as by others of a more formidable description; any more than it can be said, that such eternal rights and expectations, or those who enjoy such blessings, are never envied by those who have lost them.

Our rights and expectations generally rank as personal property, and therefore a place is here assigned them among properties of that sort, rather than a place among others that will soon be enumerated, to which they also belong in another view. All the wrongs in the kingdom too are incidental property as well as the rights, if considered as these have been, wherever they may happen to alight; on some who are able to stand up for themselves, or on some who are not—on the rich, the powerful, the vindictive; or on the widow, the fatherless, the meek, and others; as many there are, who have no heart to stand up for themselves, nor any one to stand up for them lower than the great head of the intellectual kingdom or confederacy.

§ 10. Also every *Duty* and every *Liability* will be a part of our incidental property, with every sort of obligation and responsibility that may attach to the subject. For as on the one hand the kingdom will have its property and rights accruing, so on the other hand its obligation and responsibility proceeding, and as much incidental to itself as those, also just as due to their object on the authority of our Saviour's declaration "unto whomsoever

much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more" (Luke xii. 48). Whatever may have been given to some men, they do not seem to think that more will be required of them than of horses *subjectively*; i. e., considering themselves as the subjects or debtors: but *objectively*; i. e., considering themselves as the objects or claimants, they can find that there are such incidentals as are here spoken of, v. g., such as duty, liability, and the rest. And indeed it may be hard to mention any incidental, that is more pressing or harder to get rid of. For what is a liability to punishment but guilt? or what is liability to err generally, but human nature? or what is responsibility for the same, but a partnership debt that must needs be accounted for some how or other? For if an evil principle be the source of evil deeds, evil deeds have also a certain tendency to strengthen the evil principle: and how can any man hold himself innocent before God, who does what in him lies, to strengthen the hands of God's enemy by a series of uncongenial or ungodly deeds. Of guilt and responsibility of that sort we are not now to consider; but it may be said generally of the whole subject of liability, that it is nearly constituent: and still more so is duty, as standing in the place of that which would be a most valuable constituent, if we should be happy enough to enjoy it.

Being, however, so nearly constituent is one reason why the subject of duty does not need to be here particularly insisted on: the same being well expressed in general by righteousness in substance; its practice, by fidelity; and its particulars by the particulars of the same, of which a deal may be said. And considering this agreement, it would not be impertinent to call such liabilities as duty, obligation, and such like, by the name of prospective righteousness: of which, as the liability or incumbency is more general, so is it more lasting than many may suppose. For it will survive its object in many cases, attach-

ing to the remains and even to the memory of the deceased. And often when a friend or relative is departed this troublesome life, a survivor may feel himself bound in duties to the same, which before, to his present sorrow, he was not sufficiently aware of; he may find enough to look back on, enough to reproach him, enough to kindle an heart-rending flame of repentance: how much more hereafter towards the prime, the great, the general and ultimate object of every duty, and of every regret, for duty ill paid!

Liabilities of an official and commercial kind are also duties for the most part, but not always: e. g. whatever services a man may be justly liable to will be so many duties; and so are his debts, as much as his just demands to others, and all incidentals to him. Perhaps it may be questioned whether debts have not too decided a character to rank with essentials even of the incidental class or kind, and whether they should not be considered as even worse than poverty: but there are good debts as well as evil enough to shew their natural indifference. There is, e. g. the debt of love, a pleasing debt, which our Saviour teaches, and his apostles recommend, and our forefathers used to cultivate by short reckonings*. "Owe no man any thing but to love one another" (Rom. xiii. 8), says one of the forementioned apostles: and his advice is highly appropriate not only to friendships, but to the commonest transactions in society; and would be particularly so in times like the present; when so many of us owe money and other things before-mentioned, perhaps as well as love, and do not think much perhaps of paying either.

§ 11. The three next properties which are here associated; v. g. *Opportunity*, *Necessity*, *Impossibility*, may seem very dissimilar, and are so in effect, the first being directly and the second indirectly opposed to the last mentioned: for impossibility is the very antithesis to op-

* They say, "short reckonings make long friends".

portunity, and also the limitation of necessity. But this opposite relation is what intitles these three incidentals to a joint consideration. And besides that, between the two first mentioned there is also an agreement in the way of comparison which may be enough to warrant this association: necessity being a step beyond opportunity, and opportunity one towards necessity. For opportunity must concur with necessity, to make it real: without this no undertaking can be necessary; it is an impossibility, and impossibilities cannot be wrought by any compulsion.

Necessity is the voice of God: and as such should always be cheerfully obeyed, when he speaks in this manner. It is not to be supposed, that God should ever enjoin impossibilities, or any general incommmodity either; except in the way of chastisement, and by the sufferer's own procuring: but with the divine favour it may prove an happiness sometimes to be urged and directed by necessity; as it not only saves us the trouble of deliberation, but (what is more) the chance of error too. And yet necessity is what few of us like while present; though we may afterwards own its divinity, judging by the consequence.

In one respect necessity is universal; in another, partial only; it is universal, inasmuch as all things have their limits; but partial, in that within the course of necessity there is a certain space allowed for the operations of its subjects. This is their loose latitude; to the extent of which they will be allowed to play the fool, and to injure others: but no farther; as we may learn from that inspired apologue, the story or example of Job—over whose person the great lover of mischief was allowed a certain dominion, but none of any consequence over either his principles or his life (Job ii. 6). Necessity is a broad line; in which the human, and other orders of intellectuals likewise, perhaps, may wander as the planets wander in their common orbit; deviating from side to side con-

tinually, but never departing from the broad line in which they are propelled.

§ 12. Considering the particulars of the last mentioned incidentals will lead us to another sort, concurring or co-incident with opportunity, and in a civilized state for the most part also as necessary ; being that of a *Trade, Calling, or Profession* : which may also be considered either as an employment or an opportunity. As an employment, when exercised this article will rank among constituents ; but simply considered, or considered as an opportunity unemployed, only among incidentals ; making thereby a deduction from the existence of the subject. So the great mystery under consideration may be ; and too often, unfortunately, is, like some neglected trade or profession, more an opportunity than an employment, more an incidental than a constituent. Yet ; as a man's trade or profession, whether spiritual like the mystery or temporal like any part that he performs in subservience thereto, is supposed to be his employment—that in which he rules, administers, creates, and finds his importance, it will be accordingly so considered.

§ 13. The last sort of incidentals belonging to the kingdom that deserves to be mentioned, and also most particularly as being nearest home, or most intellectual, consists in such articles as these, v. g., *Instruction, Example, Advice*. The good or evil and importance of these is indeed beyond calculation : if good, it is not in the power of one man to confer upon others any greater obligation, though others are not so likely to thank you for these incidentals, or for one of them at least, as for almost any one of the before mentioned, because they, and this one in particular, would seem to cost the donor so little : but a qualification either to teach or to advise is not procured sometimes without an extraordinary sacrifice of health and fortune ; and, to be a good example in his generation, a man must have grace likewise, which no sacrifice or cost of either health or fortune will be able to ensure. When

grace however is given to this end, and its receiver shines accordingly as an example to others in every good work, he will do more for society and for himself, than one who bestows all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned besides (Cor. I. xiii. 3). For the benefit of an example in these and the like particulars only must be partial and imperfect: but of an example that was generally good the benefit would be as universal, if men were only more alive to it; and a store of advice at hand, to be drawn upon when necessary, would be like money put to the exchangers, which might be reclaimed when needful with usury, if the currency in wisdom were as well understood as currency in coin. But the understanding does not seem to have so much to do with this matter, as sympathy. For it is observable, that weak men of every degree, from highest to lowest, are proportionably fond of weak counsellors, preferring accordingly the advice of their equals to that of their superiors. So the reception of our advice will generally depend on the party, liking, or affinity of its object more than upon its own merits; and one fool may persuade another very easily to what no wise man could ever have persuaded him to, if he would. But sometimes they who are richest in counsel are most niggardly in dispensing it; while, on the contrary, the poorest shall be the most prodigal, as it happens by the holders of wealth: which may be one great cause of its general disesteem.

It may seem inconsistent to ascribe to the Kingdom of God in Christ the property of such things as those above-mentioned, and especially of such as money, meat, and drink; which every man almost considers as the exclusive property of his own race, a race of coiners, butchers, and brewers. And if we look into Scripture, we shall there also find this property claimed by another, being one who is styled "the Prince of this world," "for that is delivered unto me, (says he) and to whomsoever I will I give it" (Luke iv. 6): as he really seems to do, like one who had a very great share not only in the property of ALL THAT,

but likewise in its very worst use; v. g., to bribe and corrupt with it; to kindle strife, wars, seditions; to puff up one, mislead another, overthrow others, and chastise them all with his golden rods. It may seem inconsistent therefore on either account, to ascribe the property of such things as the essential incidentals aforesaid to the Kingdom of God in Christ. But on a further examination it will appear, that however justly he or they, i. e., the prince of this world or its human inhabitants, may challenge some right to these things, their full property and free application must belong to the Head of the kingdom and Author of all its essential properties and kinds of property, of the highest that can be conceived, as well as the lowest of those already mentioned.

But the greater part of mankind will seem to be aware of only one sort of property, and that the least constituent: which they however call their substance; dividing the same into two species, which they call real and personal. And according to their view of the subject, that property which is farthest from a man, or from the centre of his existence, may be the most real, as a freehold estate, e. g., which he never saw perhaps; and likewise many sorts of property shall be regarded as personal which the man never touched, and which never touched his person: but of these properties which are really personal; as strength, agility, and the like, they shall have no idea as such; and still less of the more spiritual and intellectual, which are the really real. If however men would be at the pains of considering, they might find thus much; they might find, that the only real property of a man, that which one man may be said to have and to hold independent of others, consists in his inward motions and sentiments; or, that our spiritual and intellectual properties are the only real and certain property that we can boast, if any. All other property is either incidental in its nature, or such as cannot be kept wherever it may attach; to the physiognomical, or to any other assemblage

or department—and often any other person's but the reputed owner's. Beauty, e. g., in the natural, and dignity in the moral expression, whose real property are they ; or whose the resemblance to some great person? the person's who attributes such properties, or the person's to whom they are attributed? From the discrepancy with which they are attended one should judge them to be the property of those by whom they are attributed: they are the creatures of their imagination ; and in many cases do not go any farther than the part where they are supposed to begin, than the heart or the head in which they are conceived.

It is true indeed, that there may be, and usually is, a communication of human property of every kind supported in the species ; v. g. of spiritual and intellectual, or really real, as well as of physiognomical and corporeal, or really personal ; and likewise of those species which they call personal and real, whereby different communities are formed: as civil and political communities are formed by the communication of what is called real and personal property ; domestic, by the communication of what is domestic property, as well as of what is so called ; social, philosophical, religious and other sentimental communities, by the communication of social, philosophical, religious and other kinds of feelings and sentiments, or real property on the above definition. The object of such communication being often partial, and rather tending to exclusion, the property of the matter communicated, be it wealth, or power, or skill, or science, or any thing else, may seem to be rendered hereby more whole and secure ; as the essence of property consists in its peculiarity, and what one cannot keep, more may : and so the monopolies of ideas may be set up as well as monopolies of silk and salt, having all things common within their limits, like the first Christian community (Acts iv. 32), and no chance of disturbance. But it may be well to remember, that a man's property consists, not in what he is pleased to communi-

cate, but in what he is able to withhold: and (with all deference to the wisdom and equity of governments) in no country of Christendom, which should be the freest part of the earth, is there any sort of property that a man can withhold from other men if he would, or that he can keep and call his own, besides his inward and uncommunicated sentiments. These he is only obliged to share with higher beings: no other man can have any share in them, or any control over them. Therefore these are a man's real freehold property so far as regards other men; though with regard to higher beings, and to God in particular, they are personal and precarious. We have nothing proper or peculiar with respect to God: but with respect to other men, thank God! we have. He may seize upon a man's sentiments, tear them from his heart, and put others in place of them: an angel may do the same with God's permission; may put himself there if he likes, or fill the heart with all sorts of fancies and chimeras, strewing it all over with lies as thick as a sowing of tares (Mat. xiii. 24, &c.): but still we shall have something in our heart that we can call our own, and keep against all the world. God knows my inmost thoughts, no doubt: angels may know them; but no other man shall, nor be able to come near them, if I do not choose—much less, to sway or revolutionize them.

There can be no doubt then, which may be the real, lasting, and constituent property of the heavenly kingdom; that which the world calls property, or that which has just been proposed for it. "The prince of this world," as he is called, may challenge for himself all its fleeting treasure (John xii. 31.; Luke iv. 6.; John I. ii. 17, &c.), as before observed; and he may rule its incidentals generally, by their means, also its very constituents, to a certain extent: for, if glory, power and such other incidentals are fleeting, their image and effect will remain however, long after they are gone by; though not for good unto those who drink too deeply of them: and if they (the image and

effect of such incidentals) do not become by habit constituents of the kingdom, they will become at least very troublesome inmates. It is very evident, that no subject with material properties can enter the kingdom of heaven in substance, but only by its notion or image; and how this may be, it is also worth while to consider, but not here. It will be shewn in another chapter how notions are related to their subjects, and how through or by means of such relation the notions of earthly objects, and even of others more foreign, may enter into and constitute portions of the kingdom of heaven; but at present it must suffice if enough has been said to shew, that such objects are not constituents with those to whom they appertain.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER II.

CONSTITUENTS.

1. Accidents.—2. Properties.—3. Elements.—4. Parts.—5. Contents or Individuals.—6. Periods or States.
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“No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning unto the end.”—ECCLES. iii. 11.

FROM the confines of the kingdom, the sandy desert of fortune, as it may be called, we enter by what may be called its frontiers or outskirts; being in fact the lowest order of its constituents. But first it will be right to pause, and take a general idea of the subject in the distance, where it is first discerned. The power of abstracting its objects as fast as they are collected, in which the apprehension or inner sight corresponds with the outer, is convenient for all who think much, and especially for the scholar, as it enables him to be something more than “a walking library,” however such a fabric may be prized. For the largest library that was ever collected would not comprehend the tenth part of the ideas that are amassed very frequently in the course of one man’s reading and experience: and consequently, what such a one would seem to require is, not to multiply words without knowledge (Job xxxv. 16), so much as to find a good selection of ideas for use, and a good mental method, or “walking index,” by which such selection and use may both be promoted; avoiding at the

same time such illusions as the power or faculty of abstraction would naturally create, if it was not corrected continually by judgment and experience. This part duly performed would save us the trouble of unseating the phantoms that we have been multiplying and seating instead of facts on the ledges of the brain, and of creating after our wont objects which nature or fact never created, or which have no place in nature, but only in the observer's perception ; as we make a silver orb of the moon, e. g., at one time ; another time, an orb of gold ; though in fact it be neither, any more than the earth is ; but diversified probably with brown, and green, and red ; as well as with yellow, and white—with brown valleys, green meadows, and red deserts ; as well as with shining cliffs and white topped mountains.

But a regular condensation of knowledge from the minutest particulars to a point, is more like what a continued abstracting by maps of the minutest features of the earth to such a scale as should be less than the palm of one's hand would make, if it were possible.—And if so much as that be not possible, it is still possible enough, to take a general map in your hand, and turn by its direction to more particular ; from these again to others, and so on by one zone after another continually, until you arrive at the spot you were seeking, and are enabled not only to investigate the particulars of the same, but also to comprehend its relations on every side.

If instead of the slow process of reason, men were gifted with the rapid faculty of intuition ; which flies over the magnitude of a subject in an instant, and in the same instant dissects it and penetrates like lightning into its minutest recesses, it is by this *nearing* method that we should proceed, and if we liked, to survey the riches of the Kingdom of God and perambulate the wonderful walks of Omnipotence. Or if on the other hand, a being endowed with that sublime faculty should descend from the glorious region of the divine presence to the ~~spot that~~ we mortals inhabit, which is but as a silver stud in the

throne of the Most High, it is thus that he would observe the earth and its inhabitants, with a particular view perhaps to their most interesting business, the honour and worship of the Creator. First, e.g., should be seen where "he hath made the round world so fast, that it cannot be moved" (Ps. xcvi. 10), with its relative position among the heavenly host. Then piercing its atmosphere or firmament, he views the distinction of land and sea; of valleys, woods, and mountains. Approaching still nearer, he scans the fair lot of God's inheritance. And now the praises of the great congregation salute his ear. He almost thinks himself at home. And even the peaceful hermitage with its withered recluse are not overlooked. Then soaring again above the earth, he passes with different feelings over the unfortunately wide domain of ignorance and superstition: to which, if aught of the kind should invite his attention in these dreary abodes, again descending, he pursues the route of his inquiry for flocks in the desert, for handfuls of believers among hosts of infidels; and their lonely shepherd too is not one of the least interesting objects of his sublime perception. "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation!" (Isai. lii. 7). He notes the shepherd's manner, at once sedate and diligent—his look, serious, but not austere—his whole exterior, in short, placid as a summer evening, and modest as the gloom of twilight. Nor stops he at the exterior, but by the aid of that intuitive faculty, we may suppose, will carry forward his researches to the inner man: and here the view expands before him, over an heavenly champaign; and beams of righteousness descending on a faithful heart, present a glorious sight to the admiring traveller, who might long to see so fair a province reunited to its parent state, as much as ever any saint himself could long to be "absent from the body, that he might be present with the Lord" (Cor. II. v. 8).

It is possible to conceive an ampler scope of observation than the seraph's, if we think of THAT ALL-SEEING EYE to which all things are present at once in their minutest existence, and even before they begin to exist: while ourselves, to see a thing only from beginning to end, or from end to beginning, are fain to take our stand as it were in the midst, and select accordingly, after that we have formed our abstract. Thus with regard to the subject before us, v. g., the kingdom of God in Christ; an abstract is first made of the particulars to be hereafter recited, which abstract we call a mystery: then another abstract of the mystery, which we call a subject. And this, v. g., the abstract subject, is a thing that ought to be slightly surveyed or comprehended, before we look into particulars; as in a survey extraordinary of the earth, like that above supposed, first, its atmosphere would be observed, and then its substance.

A subject then is one of four principal parts; subject, object, medium, end, which there are in every relation, and may therefore be considered either absolutely or relatively.

1. Absolutely considered, *a subject* itself is of all subjects the most abstract and indefinite, applying equally to every thing. So that, if one should be asked, What is a subject? it might be answered, Every thing—whatever you can mention: and a better definition of the subject could not perhaps be given. But whatever one can mention is specifically nothing: it is an immense blank, if one blank can be more so than another. And though we pretend to define a subject, yet truly nothing can be more indefinite: it is like grasping the air, when we try to apprehend it; 'tis emptiness—'tis nothing: and yet in this nothing, whatever it may be, is contained every thing that ever was, or is, or can be thought of. For if there be many things that were never thought of, there will also, as before observed, be many thought of that never were. The definition of a subject therefore is beyond that

of being. Every being is really a subject, and so nominally is more than every being : for nothing itself will be a subject, as much as any thing, being formed of nothing. Being is a subject formed of something, v. g., of acts by acting ; as speech, its representative, is formed of words by speaking ; acting is its source, and acts are its simple constituents. The constituents of a subject, taken collectively, are the same with its substance or self ; taken separately, with its ingredients : and the basis of all will consist in acts or accidents ; in acts, as proceeding from the subject, or in accidents, as befalling the same. For these by repetition form properties ; as properties by accumulation form elements, and elements by combination form parts, of which every positive subject is compounded, save one, and that is not compounded, but self-existent, and consequently unalterable. " THE ANCIENT OF DAYS " (Dan. vii. 9), they call him. But his creation is a novelty, though they say, " as old as creation ; " being still a series of acts or accidents, as much as its original production, the great work of six days.

2. Relatively considered, the subject, as lately observed, is chief of three principal parts, which there are in every relation ; v. g., 1, subject ; 2, medium ; 3, object : its attributes being also denominated thereafter as follows, v. g.

if	{	of, or from through, or by on, or against	}	the subject	{	subjective ; mediate ; objective	}	whether	{	descending mutual ascending	}	superior. equal. inferior.

But of these attributes of the subject, and also of the relations of the kingdom, however derived, which are the same with its particulars relatively considered, it will be soon enough to speak particularly, as their turns successively arrive : it being desirable, to explain regularly in the course of the following discussion every thing technical or difficult, under the topic to which it relates.

3. As for the accidents of a subject, and particularly of the kingdom, which are the same also in another view or type, v. g., in occurrence; the definition of this particular will be given with the constitution of the same, if its exemplification be brought forward in other modes than the present.

A subject may also be considered as a matter of discussion, and in the same particulars as a matter of existence, or as an abstract subject in the way in which it has just been considered. And, to shew at once, the quality of import of the three parts, subject, relation, accident, above mentioned, and their relation to each other in discussion by a simile that is expressive enough in itself, though not so perfect in its associations—let the SUBJECT be regarded as a drama; ITS RELATIONS, as the actors; ITS ACCIDENTS as the matter enacted by them,—and such a comparison will reflect the notion required; the general effect of this view or glance at the abstract subject being to shew what it is made of, its simple principles or simple constituents, and that, nothing more solid than acts or accidents. Man in particular, being the principal subject on earth, is formed *by* the acts or operation of outward causes, and *of* his own suffering and performance, whether inward or outward, in thinking or in doing; and he will consist of such performance equally as of the material organs or members employed therein; as to a musical instrument its construction for sound is equally essential with the wood, strings, and other materials of which it is made. Thus a man will consist in some measure of every word that he utters, or is likely to utter, because his words are his own performance, as much as its sound when stricken is the performance of a musical instrument, and the melody of sound a performance of the musician, and his performance perhaps, the effect of another's superior skill and invention.

In one respect this may seem wonderful, v. g., that our words, and even our thoughts, which are such very sten-

der materials, should help to compose the most essential and enduring part of us. And in another respect the same may appear not only wonderful, but rather extravagant, when we go to construct most punctually, step by step as it were, first properties, then elements, then parts, &c., of THESE SLENDER MATERIALS. Such, however, is our mode of considering the subject of the kingdom of God in Christ: the subject as consisting of parts; and parts, of elements, and elements, of properties, and properties, of acts continued or repeated—the whole as its life, or all the constant part of it, however. For if we impute a man's sufferings as a part of his life, they are no part of it in fact, or not so much as they are of the lives of those from whom they proceed. THE SIMPLE CONSTITUENTS OF THE SUBJECT ARE ACTS PRODUCED BY ACCIDENTS, as the going of a watch is produced by hammering, filing and measuring, being also accidents to their object.

§ 1. Thus by *Accident* is meant the same with act accruing: and it may be either in liability, occurrence or perfection; what would be an act if it were not restrained or counteracted, as well as what is an act overcoming, or that has overcome its restraint. Therefore, while an act is only an accident broken loose, unrestrained, perfected, developed, manifested and declared, v. g., either inwardly or outwardly, in thinking, or in doing; an accident will be an act in any case or tense, as well as in any relation—in *præsenti*, or *de futuro*—an act, past, present, or to come—as well as to or from, or neither particularly; and yet nothing more than an act however conceived, at last. And if we would distinguish between accidental and proper, as said by logicians; or as it is said here, between incidental and constituent; so as to understand a subject fundamentally, or, as they say, from beginning to end, we should consider the same two ways distinctly; 1, in its beginnings or accidents; 2, in its workings or acts. He who made all things considers them all, no doubt, in this manner, or rather more fundamentally, even in their de-

sign; and men particularly, as David observes, "Thine eyes did see my substance yet being imperfect: and in thy book were all my members written which day by day were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them. How dear are thy counsels unto me, O God: O how great is the sum of them!" (Ps. cxxxix. 15, 16, 17).

To acts or operations might be added the Tendencies from which they proceed, and the Consequences they involve, as simple constituents; but both of these being in effect the same with acts, it does not seem worth while to make any distinction on their account. And even the distinction of Operations from acts is very inconsiderable, the difference between them consisting chiefly in a relation; one as transitive, the other intransitive: so that acts, if they could be applied to irrational and inanimate subjects, as acting is, would signify the same with operations; although in some cases we are forced to deviate still further, and substitute Effects for that expression. But however designated, the simple constituents of every subject, whether rational or irrational, animate or inanimate, and, it may be added, visible or invisible, will be operations or acts, as aforesaid; we will say, acts. When a stone falls, it is as much an act as breaking stones: and the only difference between the two accidents, appears in one being the act of a man, or united to that mode; the other the act of a stone. So the simple falling of a stone is mere acting, or an absolute act, and one of the intransitive sort, if we look no farther than the falling: its falling on the ground is acting upon; a relative act, an act of the transitive sort, and more like an operation. Thus minerals taken internally will also act upon the animal frame, and some most potently: fire, the same on minerals; light, on vegetables, &c.

Therefore as an accident is considered either alone, or in reference to some other subject, it will be either, 1, absolute; or 2, relative.

1. Absolutely considered, the accident does not admit

of a division, for want of a criterion to divide by ; but it may by accumulation form different states ; as present, future, and past ; also periods, epochs, ages and lives. For the life of any subject will only consist of unsorted accidents, or accidents in the order of occurrence ; as its present character, and perhaps future destination, will be determined by the proportions of the said accidents sorted or distributed under their several heads, when the subject comes to be examined, or, as it is said, to “ BE WEIGHED IN AN EVEN BALANCE ” (Job. xxxi. 6).

2. As long as any accidents may retain this neutral or absolute character, they will, if singly considered, be accidents still ; or, if doubly, periods, epochs, &c., as aforesaid. But on quitting its neutrality, the accident will become another thing, depending, like the verb by which it is represented, on its relation to the subject under consideration : and namely, as the accident is supposed to originate either within the said subject, or its circumstances, or without, and to tend or proceed accordingly, e. g.,

1, A relative accident coming *from* without and *towards* the subject, or its circumstances, will be *essentially* an incidental in relation to the subject ; and *characteristically*, a benefit or an injury, a blessing or a curse for the same, according to its nature, and the subject from which it is deduced, if the accident be single, or so considered ; but essentially, fortune, &c., or characteristically happiness, &c., if complex or compound.

2, A relative accident, originating *in* the subject or its circumstances, whether it be substantive, i. e. stationary and intransitive, or else transitive direct, i. e. proceeding from the subject named, or its circumstances, will be a constituent of either or both—simple, if singly considered ; complex, if double ; compound, if quadruple,—being thenceforward named accordingly, either a property, element or part, as it may be.

3, From this different relation of accidents, it so happens, that the acts of one subject will be accidents to

another at first; but may become acts by transfer. If e. g. a man should be rapt to the third heaven (Cor. II. xii. 2), which must needs be out of the body, as the kingdom of heaven is within,—this transition would be properly an act with the raptor, and an accident with the rapt at first; being made also in the same instant an act of the latter, v. g., a rapture; by repetition, exquisite delight, or the property of rapturous enjoyment.

It may be thought by some, that man, the principal subject of the kingdom incarnate is rather undervalued in having first himself identified with his own life, and next his life with its own accidents, and worst of all, some of these with the most enduring part of it, as aforesaid*; but there would be no difficulty in proving this immediately, if it were required; nor yet in proving too, that of what a man calls peculiarly his own life, a very considerable part, if not the whole, is only borrowed, while death comes to him by inheritance. The idea of such an order as life producing, and not consisting of acts or accidents, is a philosophical reverie, as much as, on the other hand, that of a principle consisting in its effects, or THE VITAL PRINCIPLE in that which it creates. And philosophers, if they had known or considered this simple fact, might have saved themselves the trouble of looking, as many have done, for a property that never had any earthly being, except in their imagination, which is earthly enough sometimes. Indeed, our lives severally considered, do not amount to any thing like what has now been conceded. It may be questioned, whether a single life be any thing more than one among others, and nothing alone: a concurrent relation of existence wrought into others, like a ring in a coat of mail, or like a circle encircling and intersecting others upon a common disk, which is the sum of life. It is a round or succession of accidents, by which their subjects are formed, and of which they consist in the manner before described: so

that its doing and suffering, or acting and being acted upon, will constitute one life among others; or a part of the common life that is formed or protracted by moral agents from beginning to end, in doing and suffering any how. And hence in the thing itself, i. e., in the substance of life, however it may be considered, we shall find no essential difference; whatever difference may be found in its characteristics, or in its results, or in its circumstances, being also the circumstances of its subjects. "For," says the philosophical as well as royal preacher, "that which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence over a beast. For all is vanity" (Eccl. iii. 19). AND SUCH IS THEIR COMMON EXISTENCE. But if the general state or relation of life be uniform in itself, it will exhibit different effects in different modes or combinations; as the same light exhibits different colours in different mediums. To exemplify this in one respect:—The same life which in water is mere fluidity, in earth is elective attraction; in stones and other minerals, assimilation by specific gravity; in vegetables, the same by mechanism; in brute beasts, the same by instinct; in rational creatures, the same by moral affinity; and that still differing with its directing force, and according to its different associations. And so this simple constituent assimilating, or being assimilated to evil by an evil affinity, is the death of sin; assimilated to good by a good, it is the life of righteousness, even life eternal.

In short, the simple constitution, or general state and relation of life, if it be always essentially the same, v. g. by accidents, &c. combined as aforesaid, will differ, however, specifically in different combinations, circles or modes of existence; and not more in different minerals and herbs, than in different animals that we know; as the wolf and the lamb, the kite and the dove, for example; and at different times in the same kind, and in the same creature; as we find by

experience. For doing differently, or as we say, different modes of doing, or only the same constituent modes with different circumstances or incidentals, will make different lives, or differences in the same; as life consists in living, and living in doing and suffering. But to proceed regularly with the form of life related in the kingdom of God as aforesaid:

§ 2. The second order of constituents in point of simplicity, and first in its degree of complexity, was said to be that of *Properties*, whether

incidental or constituent	}	consisting of	{	inverse direct	}	acts or accidents.
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Of which the first sort have been considered and shown, to be no part of the subject to which they belong; but the second to be its whole, comprehended under that degree of complexity: which, besides taking its proper turn, will also deserve a more detailed view than the higher degrees of elements, parts, &c., for several reasons, and especially as it combines the advantages of the several classes on either hand for discussion, being more sensible than accidents, and more tractable than elements, parts, or any other combination before mentioned. And first their own properties, the *properties of properties*, will deserve consideration, being such as these, namely, 1, their latency; 2, their circumscription; 3, perpetuity, e. g.,

In the *first* place, properties being composed of acts as aforesaid, we cannot imagine such a property as rest in any of them, however real in itself, without an essential contradiction: for that were both to be and not to be at once. But a reaction of the different properties in a subject might be supposed; and by that means, while properties of every sort were active in operation, they might still be neuter in effect; or they might still continue properties, notwithstanding their temporary, and oftentimes permanent latency.

This *Latency* of properties, through the effect of reaction

or counterposition, is a very remarkable property in them, and not more on other accounts than for its importance in reconciling the doctrine of the constitution of properties by acts, and of subjects by properties, to our experience. But, as the observation of the said latency and reaction is rather new, we must not expect to find a proper term for either in common use. Working, however, appears the most scriptural term for one of these, and Letting for the other: as e. g. where St. Paul speaks of the evil lurking in the moral world from the period of its introduction to this time, and its suppression or hindrance by a contrary principle; that, as "the old man" (Eph. iv. 22, &c.), "the man of sin," "shewing himself, that he is God" (Thess. II. ii. 4); this, as "the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness" (Eph. iv. 24). "And now ye know what withholdeth, (says he,) that he (v. g. the man of sin) might be revealed in his time: For the mystery of iniquity doth already work: only he who now letteth will let until he be taken out of the way," &c. (Thess. II. ii. 6, 7). Therefore, if any one would rather, he may understand working in this predicament, i. e. when let or repressed by something in the way, for latency, and such letting, for reaction. But,

Secondly, At the same time, that no rest nor intermission can be conceived in any property of a subject, as long as it exists or continues, a total cessation of the same, with all its kindred properties, its oppositions and connexions, may easily be conceived by the effect of the property's second named property of *Circumscription*. For the constituent acts of every subject, or the properties which they compose, will continue always, and active too, though it may be latent as aforesaid; but only efficient as long as their proper compliment, crisis and mode shall continue. Every constituent property is nicely poised, measured and arranged in its sphere or subject, and its acts or simple constituents are all exactly numbered, which is what makes their circumscription: and a consequence is, that

they may all, or any of them, end in this manner; failing naturally, exhausted by repetition, running as it were to the end of their allowance, and perhaps yielding to some rival or antagonist. Thus, gratification gone, loathing takes place: or the same may happen to desire, before gratification, as e.g. in the horrid case of hydrophobia, where a feverish thirst departing, yields to an agonizing dread of fluids.

One should almost think it might be enough to cure a drunkard, a glutton or any other sensualist of his heedless self-indulgence, or a pryer of his curiosity, or an idler of his idleness, if he was fully aware of this fact, a fact that seems to have become proverbial in the latter case*—as through such abuse not only the natural appetite, but the hearing or any other sense, and the judgment or any other faculty as well, may cease prematurely, or take their departure more leisurably, first, the other senses and faculties; as they are called, still continuing; then these, the breath perhaps continuing; or these perhaps after the breath: but in either case, the breath will cease at last, the material properties of the subject still continuing; until these likewise begin to take their leave of each other—and first the colour, then the figure will be detached from its subject and remaining associates: then another property, and another; as gravitation, elective or specific attraction, &c., till a perfect dissolution has overtaken them, and no two properties are left together of the whole body, mass, subject, or assemblage. Or the constituents may go more rapidly; and not merely by single properties, but by companies or squadrons, and be all obliged to seek for other quarters like an army disbanded, or dispersed. Elements and even parts may be served after this rate by their antagonists; as implied in that query of our Saviour to his disciples and the multitude, "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own

* e.g. "Idleness is not worth a pin, unless it be well followed," i.e. to satiety or exhaustion.

soul ?" (Mark viii. 36), meaning the best part of his constituents. What shall it profit a man to exchange his constituents, i. e., himself; and the best part of himself or his constituents, for mere incidental and external commodities ?

It would be no great advantage to one who undervalued the precious gift of reason or the equally precious gift of charity to have some trifling incidental given him in exchange for it, and such reason or charity removed from a station in which it wanted fit companions to another in which they abounded, according to another saying of our Saviour, "HE THAT HATH, TO HIM SHALL BE GIVEN; and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath" (Mark iv. 25). So the pound is taken from him who had only one, and given to him who had ten (Luke xix. 24).

Every individual life is a distinct process or one among others, and being finite must needs have an end too; or rather, being periodical, must needs have many ends answering to the several stages of existence above mentioned. And the more we dive into the subject, the more we shall find of such ends or interruptions in the same and its constituents proceeding from this finite property the circumscription of constituents, according to the verse of the Psalmist addressing their Ruler and Creator, "As soon as thou scatterest them, they are even as a sleep, and fade away suddenly like the grass" (Ps. xc. 5). By which may be understood his paralyzing or disabling of individual constituents by breaking their array, and so putting an end to that effectual co-operation, which gives life to each and is also their common life. And all this may happen or proceed, without any new fiat or decree, from their natural circumscription. Hence all your individual subjects or subordinate combinations of properties either, may be, and are, and will be, in this state at least, of no stay or continuance; as of the human subject, e. g., of which it has been well said, "HE COMETH UP, AND IS CUT DOWN

LIKE A FLOWER; HE FLEETH AS IT WERE A SHADOW, AND NEVER CONTINUETH IN ONE STAY."*

This natural circumscription therefore and a consequent instability is what forms in appearance, and is so considered under the name of Mortality, one of the greatest, because one of the most insurmountable evils of life; as its opposites, freedom and stability, may be thought to constitute its greatest good: that being generally dreaded; as these are generally desired accordingly. And though enough could be said to demonstrate the necessity, or even benefit of both; yet the effect of *circumscription* is hard to reconcile with the feelings of humanity: there is no arguing sometimes with "the terrors of death," when they press severely. For,

Thirdly, the *Perpetuity* or vivacity of his essential properties would be no more comfort to a man in the pangs of mortality than the toughness of his joints to a sufferer on the rack or between wild horses; when, if the wretch's nerves and ligaments were like iron, his sufferings might still be moderate compared with the "bitter pains of eternal death," which may be reserved for his persecutor, and protracted with as much ease by his Almighty Judge, as those of his hapless victim for a few wretched hours, by the persecutor.

From the same cause, their perpetuity, an host of essential properties is also liable to be reassembled from the state, whatever it may be, in which they expatiate, by the same breath that first drew them together, and restored to their principles like his disbanded army to an unfortunate general from their caves and glens. For it is certain, that there may be other departures besides the first, and as many exhibitions of death, as we shall find there are different editions of life, with as many different kinds and degrees of that as of this; whether general or partial, carnal or spiritual, first, second or third, temporal or eternal. And if either life, or kind, or degree of life,

* From our beautiful, and (in itself) unexceptionable Funeral Service.

should be dissolved entirely, or succeeded by its proper death, it is most probable, that such death could only be superseded entirely by a new creation: as, should any mortal life be reorganized, or any part of the same or of its constituents be reassembled with the old principle of mortality among them, the subject would still be dying, still mortal or dead; and that both generally and particularly—dead in the whole, dead in every part, in every element, property and act; a life of dead acts, or, as it may be said, a “body of death,” a collection of centrifugal ingredients like the place they tend to: hence the necessity of a new creation may be obvious: as it was said by Him that sat upon the throne, “Behold I make all things new” (Rev. xxi. 5).

The tendency of the remarks on several properties of essential properties which have now been proposed is, besides other purposes before signified, to reconcile some seeming exceptions to the forthcoming doctrine of the particular constitution of the subject or Kingdom: as it might otherwise be said, that, judging from experience and actual observation, all the subjects of the Kingdom have not individually the several kinds of properties hereafter ascribed to the general subject of the same. For when 1, the natural *latency* of properties, or of the acts composing them, is taken into consideration; it will appear, that many such might be present in an ordinary, or even in an eminent degree, where they are little suspected by other subjects, or most likely by the owner himself. Or if, 2, the natural *circumscription* of properties, which must be circumscribed of course in a finite and perishable subject, is considered; it will be easy, if not unavoidable, to conclude, that any single property, or even a whole kind of properties, may be either naturally or prematurely run out, or otherwise lost to their subject, as before observed; and that its disappearance in this way too will not prove any natural exception or peculiarity in the human race, to shew, as some would be glad to have it, that

one man is not naturally made of flesh and blood, as well as another, or of spirit and intellect either, with all their minute constituents. And 3, from the previous notice of the *perpetuity* of essential properties in themselves, though not in their subjects, several advantages will also accrue hereafter: but of these as well as of the preceding more needs not be said at present. There is but one further observation however on the said properties or constituents required before their specification; and that applies to them equally; v. g., that if the same properties or constituents are ascribed to the whole subject of the Kingdom, or to all its subjects generally, they still are not to be ascribed to all in the same proportion: for this would be contrary not only to experience and observation, but to certainty and demonstration. To say, that one subject does not abound chiefly in one of the properties, or of the kinds of properties now to be mentioned—and another, in another, would be a downright contradiction and very far from what is here meant to be asserted.

It is usual to distinguish three principal kinds of properties, material, spiritual, and intellectual, in the Kingdom, by means of very obvious differences and agreements; which kinds are currently talked of and classed likewise as it will soon appear. And thereupon as it happens with whole men so it happens generally with their constituents, that some turn more after the father, some after the mother; one property is more material, another more spiritual, another more intellectual; but sometimes a property will partake so equally of different kinds, that one shall hardly know which to assign it to, or how to assign it to one class more than another. To a certain extent, however, the three kinds, material, spiritual and intellectual, above mentioned, are distinct enough to be commonly acknowledged both in their sums and particulars, and often also distinctly named: there being at the same time likewise other distinctions, of which some may be useful enough on occasion, though too vague in general

for standing service. Such are, 1, one founded on the difference of sphere or origin supposed among such properties, some as being more particularly celestial; and therefore, allotted only to the enjoyment of a few privileged individuals, as ubiquity in one kind, miracles in another, prescience in another, and sanctity in all: while properties of meaner origin, though bordering on those, and of the very same kinds, are more widely diffused among the sons of men; being such as these, v. g. presence, power, intelligence; gifts appertaining likewise to many brute species, with many good social and private properties too; compounded of the same: 2, another of properties named from the manner of their introduction into this lower sphere; as natural and artificial, innate and acquired—the natural and innate having been also identified by proper names, as Gifts and Endowments; and the artificial and acquired likewise, as Accomplishments, Arts, Acquirements; and all together by the common name of Talents.

But these are all shades of difference, and not essential differences in the respects supposed: they are rather properties of its properties, than properties of the subject or kingdom: they may help to display its numerical strength, but add nothing to its real sufficiency, which is nothing like what it seems. Indeed a man who should bear the pains of considering how his most *essential*, as well as constituent properties are composed, might be surprised and confounded at the flimsiness of his own composition, and at the very few really differing ingredients that it contains. It may well be said, that “man is like a thing of nought” (Ps. cxliv. 4), considering what he is made of: and yet the subject is not little to know in each of the three divisions above mentioned. The most convenient order of pursuing this knowledge being, as already intimated, from incidentals to constituents; and among these, from the lowest upward, the first kind of these to be accordingly considered, will be the *materials* upon which the mind is directed, as appears in the

1, Among material properties, that of *Form, aspect or semblance* is the first that strikes us. And as a term for this constituent applying to the subject, Physiognomy might be preferred, were it not too peculiar for the general property in the first place, and in the next place one that applies rather to the science than to its subject. But for a science, physiognomy is not perhaps less important in itself than physiology, if it be not indeed more generally useful: it is likewise so widely connected with the particulars of the subject, that an occasional allusion to it can hardly be avoided. At the same time, it must be acknowledged, that the form, aspect, semblance or expression of the human person and countenance is not an easy subject to define, owing to its ample latitude and fertility. For every countenance, or every considerable countenance, however, in the world, will have a double expression; one obvious, superficial and uncertain; the other latent, deep, hard to be caught, but well worth considering; the former easily represented on canvas; the other not easily on canvas, nor yet in marble or brass without some reflection or affinity in the artist. For, "as in water face answereth to face, (says Solomon,) so the heart of man to man" (Prov. xxvii. 19). And it may also be said, that as one heart answers to other, so the eye of either as the seat of cordiality; which makes it in every case the surest criterion for judging not only of a man's temper and capacity, but also of his particular feeling at any time towards a present object, as fear or hatred, love or lust, admiration or hypocrisy. In a reverie, when no particular object is regarded, and of course the best opportunity is given for observation, a great and benevolent mind will be seen looking out fairly; a middling and more contracted, indifferently; the least and most contracted, not out, but in, or rather down, confusedly.

There are many subjects discussed daily perhaps of less importance than this material property of aspect or semblance. And perhaps it is rather detracting from the dig-

nity of the same, to place it at the bottom of the enumeration in which it stands; the same being in fact too high and too spiritual almost for a station any where among material properties, though it offers first, and especially just below

2, The property of *Size* or *Dimension*, which signifies nothing in a moral view, except as it makes a man look more like either a mouse or an elephant; but in a physical view, the comparative advantages of one stature for strength, of another for activity, and of a mean for both, are considerable, and would be worth mentioning as characteristics of an inferior rank.

3, For a man's worth is not to be estimated by size, nor yet by weight: though it is possible, that his *specific gravity*, like that of an orange, might indicate the subject's proportion of spirit, or more nearly, however, than his bulk, if the question should ever be thought worth an experiment. For gravity, or Gravitation, which is the same thing in progress, will be virtually motion, an high-born property, and as such, productive not only of other material, but also of higher than material properties, as may appear from a consideration of the first mentioned, in the following kind.

2. This kind will consist of such properties as are *more spiritual* than the fore-mentioned, and chiefly of four sorts, motive, sensitive, appetitive, and aversive; others being either evidently included in these, or borrowed or derived from them, or founded on, or compounded of them somehow or other. And as others rise out of these generic properties, so they likewise naturally grow as aforesaid out of the fore-mentioned, i. e. out of the material kind, and are an improvement thereon: the transition from one kind to another being so natural, as almost to elude observation, and the properties of either amounting in some cases to nearly the same effect. Yet considering the improvement made by such transition, as just remarked, it may be no more than the properties deserve, if they get a new name

to such their new dignity, as their owners do sometimes on the same occasion. And accordingly, to the properties that were of late only lines, colours, angles, inches and pounds, patrician names are now assigned, such as Powers, Qualities, Feelings, Appetites, Pleasures, Propensities, and the like ; the body itself being also newly named Spirit instead of Body : as St. Paul says, "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and AFTERWARD that which is spiritual" (Cor. I. xv. 44—46), shewing how one body or mode is ingrafted upon the other, or grows out of it.

Therefore it should be understood, and also carefully remembered, that however properties may be exalted or sublimed, in this, or in any other stage, mode, or appearance, their essential constitution will always remain the same ; the highest qualities, feelings, appetites, &c. consisting originally of distinct acts, whether apparent, perfect and efficient, or latent, striving and restrained, as much as any of the material properties aforesaid. So that upon the whole, ONE IS AT A LOSS TO FIND ANY REAL DISTINCTION IN THE WHOLE SPHERE OF A HUMAN EXISTENCE, FROM THE FOUNDATION TO THE SUMMIT, FROM BEGINNING TO END.

1, The first class of spiritual properties may be called *Motive*, as a class, or Motion as an element ; and the same as a property : which may be either foreign and incidental to the subject, as to a thing moved ; or inherent and constituent, as to a thing moving or that moves, being the object of our present attention.

—1, From what has just been observed, it will appear, that this property of inherent motion in animals, may first be distinguished into kinds progressively by its improvements, and named thereafter as primaries, secondaries, &c., each in its degree being again either absolute or relative, as it may happen to be considered ; and the primary first.

=1, *Absolutely* considered the first mentioned, primary

motion here also considered as spiritual, will be all one with the material property of gravitation before mentioned. *Gravitation* is motion absolute, primary, principal and unseen—attaching both severally to every other property, moral as well as material, of the subject in which it inheres and is a constituent, and collectively to the whole of which it is the basis, foundation or substance. So that every property and every particle, element or other combination formed of these properties, or any of them, is always gravitating severally and inversely towards its associates, in this manner, while the whole united are also gravitating collectively, 1, inversely also towards their common centre; 2, with that directly towards other centres, and so with these towards others again continually: whence proceed—

* 1 : 2, Two several species of motion (i. e. with relation to the subject), which are usually termed *Centripetal* and *Centrifugal*. And from this beginning of motions it might be possible to deduce perhaps every other sort, especially, in the first place, those which are considered as purely physical or mechanical.

* 3, It might be possible, e. g., to conceive how between the two tendencies, inverse and direct aforesaid, a compound motion may be generated, which they call *Vibration*. And this also may be either—1, universal; or 2, particular; in the latter of which we observe the principles of coherence or solidity, and solution or fluidity, with other and higher properties depending on these, whether more material, as visibility, palpability, &c., or more spiritual, as odour, vapour, sound, &c.: shewing as if an atomical and incessant motion pervaded the universe with its own private properties of persistence, propellence, repression, suppression; and how the maintenance of an equable life or state depends on the first, how a transformation or entire removal on the next of these, how a dissolution on the next, how annihilation or a total destruction on the next. Of so much consequence is one poor pro-

perty, as it would seem, beginning in the lowest department of the subject; or, as St. Paul would say, One poor member of the body—even of more consequence than many that depend on it, yet would seem greater. “Nay, much more (says he) those members of the body which seem to be more feeble are necessary” (Cor. I. xii. 22).

For it may be rationally observed, how the same primary motion, called Gravity or Gravitation, which begins in stocks and stones, is carried on through the higher departments of the kingdom by different names, and under different aspects; as degeneracy, depravity, dissipation, &c. It may also be observed how the moral and intellectual body both sinks and falls like the material towards a captivating centre; and that, not casually and occasionally, but naturally and habitually, though not by the weight of its lumpy associate, as vulgarly supposed. For if either species or body, v. g. the moral or the material, could precipitate the other to *Ades*, to the central fire, to the fire that will never be quenched, nor slacken till the last general conflagration, if it do then, it would be the moral and not the material. The particulars of that state which some call *Ades* or Hell have nothing to do with this fact, and whether the precipitant be this or that, the moral or the material, the spiritual or the natural body—is not of any final consequence: for let either of them rise or fall, and the other is sure to accompany it in this case as usual: we may be assured they will still go together at last, and not one half of the subject, or of its real constituents, one way, and the other half another.

=2, *Relatively* considered, or as between two different subjects, this primary motion will be the same with two other material properties as they are commonly regarded, v. g.

*1: 2, *Attraction and Repulsion*: to the former of which may also be ascribed the subordinate properties of assimilation and coherence, also of falling or resting, which is not very different from the fore-mentioned property of

gravitation, being, as one should say, the attraction of a lighter body exerted on a heavier, by means of which the mover is drawn towards his object, instead of drawing it, as a boat pulling by a rope is drawn towards the shore. So repulsion is allied in some respects to gravitation: or so it will appear however, when one considers the effect of gravitation completed by contact. For then the subjects which before were so anxious to meet, will be in the habit, if not in the effect, of repelling each other, and with a degree of violence always proportioned to that of their contact.

And do we not observe this effect too in the moral as well as in the material department? Do not base, wicked, and malignant spirits wish to repel each other as soon almost as they meet? It seems so indeed. The effect of their meeting is mutual disgust: and they cannot recede, it is against the laws of nature; but if either could drive its opponent out of the world, it would not be sorry, nor the world aught the worse.

*3: 4, On a similar principle such natural effects as *Magnetism* and *Electricity*, with every other kind of fermentation, might also be traced; in which is observed a mixture of some fluids and separation of others; one yielding to the general force of gravitation by its constituent globosity, the other resisting by its constituent crystallization, fighting with its sides and angles, as it were with sword and buckler, against the material union. The resolution of other natural phenomena might also be found on these principles, being all very important in themselves, as the great power of God; which we cannot help confessing in their extreme derivation, if we do not in their simplicity or beginning.

—2, Of inherent motions of the *secondary* sort, 1, some may be partial, whether inward or outward, called Action generally, and particularly by other names corresponding with the varieties of action; 2, some universal, of which the commonest is called Operation, and others also occur with their appropriate names.

6. = 1, *Action* is properly life, and where all is life, of course a very common property; being founded on the primary species of motion, as they are founded on the half material property of gravitation. Thus e. g., supposing generally two sorts of action as of accidents; one substantive or intrinsic, and the other transitive or direct—the first may be exemplified by the centripetal and centrifugal force (as it is called) of natural bodies above mentioned; the next by their attraction and repulsion, which are only centripetal and centrifugal action with an object. And thereupon it may be observed again, how these two species of action are found progressing continually from one sphere to another: as e. g., 1, the substantive or intrinsic first from the mineral department to the vegetable, thence to the animal, the moral, and the religious. So that what is centripetal and centrifugal action in a stone shall be contraction and expansion in the organs of a plant, systole and diastole in the heart of man, inhalation and exhalation in his lungs, love and hatred in his moral part, fidelity and apostasy in his religious. Similar to which are several analogies that may also be traced through the same departments for the two kinds of action in a transitive form above mentioned; as from the attraction of a loadstone to the grasp of avarice and the enticement of sinners, who “draw iniquity with cords of vanity, and sin as it were with a cart rope” (Isai. v. 18).

It may also be worth while to remark by the way how widely the action of any creature must differ from that of the Creator, not only in degree, force, or intensity, but also in its very matter or essence; as e. g., with regard to that particular species called Destruction. We know and too often feel unfortunately, that men have their share of this dreadful species confided to them: but what is it? Why to the extent of burning, slaying, and cutting to pieces, of drowning, desolating, overturning, &c., with such means as they possess. But what is their share, and what are their means to his? The Psalmist has an happy com-

parison of the two where he says, "Lord, what is man, that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man, that thou so regardest him? Man is like a thing of nought: his time passeth away like a shadow. BOW THY HEAVENS, O LORD, AND COME DOWN: TOUCH THE MOUNTAINS, AND THEY SHALL SMOKE. Cast forth thy lightning, and tear them: shoot out thine arrows and consume them" (Ps. cxliv. 6).

This may shew a wonderful difference in the degree or intensity of action: but another passage in Scripture also reminds us of a still more striking disparity even in the matter or essence of the property, between these two parties. For the most potent general that ever fought upon earth could only cut his adversary in pieces with the sword; but what does God to his? "Even as I have seen (says the Temanite) they that plough iniquity and sow wickedness, reap the same. BY THE BLAST OF GOD THEY PERISH, AND BY THE BREATH OF HIS NOSTRILS ARE THEY CONSUMED" (Job iv. 8, 9). "They are like the chaff which the wind scattereth away from the face of the earth" (Ps. i. 5). As a man would scatter chaff, or only dust, with his breath, the Almighty by means infinitely more sudden and direct is able to annihilate the wicked: or as a man might revive a drooping flame with his breath, so He with simpler means can kindle a sinner's whole existence into flames that never die nor droop. And hence that admirable precept of our Saviour to his disciples, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. x. 28).

Therefore, if we consider the varieties of action or partial motion occurring as before stated, we shall find them perhaps more particularly reducible to three sorts, mechanical, chemical, and metaphysical: the first dividing again into simple and reflected; the second consisting of parts that rank higher than any in the first on account

of their greater spirituality ; and the third, of such as are higher still through their affinity or resemblance to intellect. In the course of these three principal sorts of partial motion are performed, but how no one can say or conceive, all the various and intricate parts of mere animal life ; which may be enumerated and described in the order of their progress or complexity as follows, v. g.,

* 1. The simplest effect or process of which we have any sensible perception in this case is mentioned by the single name of *Breath*, though it properly implies two several parts ; 1, exhalation, which our body shares in common with others both animate and inanimate—the same being a common process or joint concern, and consequently A BOND OF UNION AMONG THE CONTENTS OF THE EARTH ; 2, inhalation, which has been considered the peculiar office of the lungs wherever they happen to exist. But whether such office be peculiar to that one organ, or a part of the general process of absorption going on every where may be a question. It seems to be no unusual thing for one member to run away with the credit of its comrades : and whether that be the case too or not at present, certainly this double or compound motion, inhalation and exhalation, considered altogether as respiration, and properly designated by the term breathing, or breath, in an animal machine, while in other machines or substances it would be steam and vapour, is the grand criterion of this present state ; and as such most aptly called life. For with this, life is present ; without it, past or to come. So in the first of Genesis we read of “the moving creature that hath life” (Gen. i. 20), and in the second, how “the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils THE BREATH OF LIFE ; and man became a living soul” (Ib. ii. 7). And “when thou takest away their breath, they die and are turned again to their dust” (Ps. civ. 29), says the Psalmist. An excellent apostle writing to the church also observes hereupon very

justly to them, "For what is your life? It is even a vapour that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away" (James iv. 14).

This process of breathing or property of breath is generally supposed to be carried on by spirit. But whether by a common spirit, or by a proper; by the spirit of an animal, or by the spirit of breath—we are not told: neither is it material, there being no necessity for either supposition according to the view that is here taken of the subject.

*2, Another partial secondary sort of motion not particularly complex, but more so than the preceding, occurs in the properties of *Growth* and *Repletion* erroneously supposed to be consequences or even properties of that property, rather than parts as they are of the same process or present state. For if the ordinary meaning of the first named expression applies only to the increase of material properties, or, speaking theologically, to the extension of the limits of the visible Kingdom, it may be recollected, having no doubt been observed by many, that human nature is subject not only to corporeal growth, decay, and renovation, but to intellectual likewise: which makes these properties to be partly intellectual as well as spiritual. And there can be no doubt either of the highest creatures even in that highest department being as liable to these accidents, or to the properties comprising them, as men: of which one proof may be taken from what St. Paul says of all coming "in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto A PERFECT MAN, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" (Eph. iv. 13), an highly intellectual growth. And if so much is not here said, we may infer from his superiority implied in other passages (Heb. i. 5, &c.), that not only men must grow intellectually to arrive at this standard; but angels too, who all grow no doubt towards perfection continually in their respective spheres, and still find room enough.

There are several shades and semblances of this property, for they can hardly be reckoned as distinct properties, which may be worth mentioning : such as repletion aforesaid ; which is not growth but a mean to it, and also to the maintenance of its acquisitions, and *Assimilation*, rather a mode than a part of this property ; a temporary growth of one subject by the conversion of another, and that more intimately than in the effect of repletion. But if in this process one subject grows to another, it is rather by giving than by receiving, by giving its likeness to the substance rather than by taking to itself the substance on which it is impressed. In short, the difference between the three last named properties, growth, repletion, and assimilation may be stated in respect hereof as thus, v. g., by growth a subject expands and its dimensions are multiplied, by repletion they are sustained and encouraged, by assimilation the subject rather imparts than receives, but still without any diminution of itself ; as a kingdom is not diminished, but rather increased by imparting its citizenship to new subjects.

As for the doctrine of principles, and of their development by growth, maintenance by repletion, and change by assimilation, which seems like being created again, it is passing all human observation. The principles of minute objects, as herbs and insects, would seem to remain suspended in their proper elements, whether of earth, air, or water ; which may be considered as their grave or intermediate position. But whether it be so with them, and whether these principles may be old or new ; principles that have gone the round of destruction, or * never yet been embodied, who can tell ? Or some of their subjects having all or nearly the same properties both material, spiritual, and intellectual with ourselves, who can tell, whether we may not have our germinating modes of principles likewise ; which, after having existed from the creation, or it may be long before ; first alone and then

* See note, p. 79.

embodied, going next their round of destruction, should latterly remain suspended somewhere like the principles aforesaid awaiting the period of their full appearance or advent? No one perhaps ever heard of such germinating principles in the human kind ever being brought to light by the spade. And the rule, "As I hear I judge" (John v. 30.), will apply in this case perhaps as well as in any. For no man can tell how these things may be: one might as well pretend to interpret a dream that one has never heard: "Let the king tell his servants the dream, and we will shew the interpretation of it" (Dan. ii. 7). Would the Author of human nature but deign to reveal his counsel or conception respecting this matter to one of us, such a one need not be afraid of divining its consequences; but, as it is, one might be allowed to understand by life the development or exercise of many essential properties, instead of the development of a single principle; ascribing with divine revelation every life and every part in life to the word or counsel of God (Deut. viii. 3), by which all are determined, and brought forward likewise in their determined periods from first to last (Pet. II. iii. 5, &c).

* 3, And if one should consider the progressive property of *Reproduction*, or increase, as a farther continuance of the same development, one should be near the truth perhaps as to the matter or effect, but as far from the cause as ever. Thus, in the vegetable kingdom, we see young plants spring up, grow to maturity, and continue in the same, as they are not all like ourselves. "For all flesh is as grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of grass, (so unlike his original!) The grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away: but THE WORD OF THE LORD EN-DURETH FOR EVER" (Pet. I. i. 24); and some plants of the ligneous sort will also endure for many of our generations. By the same process, seemingly, by which they grow and their blossoms expand with only one property superadded, they will likewise produce, it may be both seeds and effects to make fresh plants, and also reproduce by their means

from the effect of one act, creation kept up or continued. Farther than this, their author only knows, or can know perhaps the beginning of this increase; at all events, it is more than a man can modestly pretend to penetrate. And with regard to a notion that some have of the material form of every animal and every vegetable, individually, that ever has been, or shall be, having existed in the first of the kind; it is, what there seems no more reason for supposing, than for supposing a material First Cause, to give these material forms a suitable beginning; or for supposing any other medium besides the simple *fiat*, mode, or prescription of the Deity, beginning after the manner intimated in Genesis, and still continuing agreeably to the forecited text of St. Peter.

It would seem indeed, as if the fiat of reproduction and increase (Gen. i. 28), was subsequent to that of creation (Ib. 26), by its being directed to living creatures; but on the same ground a similar succession might as well be ascribed to the fiat of repletion, which were evidently superfluous. And the fairest construction upon the whole is, that of one eternal, ever-operating fiat; being, as they say, One word for all: no property, form, nor combination having essentially any other origin, at any distance of time or production; nor any thing appearing in the present state, "whereof it may be said, see this is new" (Eccl. i. 10). For "it hath been already of old time" in cause or necessity; and necessity itself even in moral action is older than the creation; being, in this respect at least, a latent property until it was excited by the abuse of freedom; as the thing that we are considering was also a latent property at first—the latent, spiritual motive, property of reproduction, being then combined with others and serving to their renewal on occasion, as any one property, whether physical or moral, might serve to the renewal of another. So breath assists repletion; repletion, growth, &c., in one department: and so in the other "tribulation worketh patience; and patience, experience; and experi-

ence, hope ; and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us" (Rom. v. 3, 4, 5).*

*4: 5, The last mentioned property, therefore, may deserve to rank high on account of its extensive influence. And low, as this partial motive sort of properties may seem to stand generally in the composition of the subject, it still is not destitute of some that seem highly refined, having even a shadow of intellect among them. Of this, Sleeping is an example, from its concomitant, though very unequal properties, Dreaming and Waking, which being so unequal, may be thought ill sorted in a joint consideration with that, but so they come to most men in effect, and so they have need to be mentioned.

Sleep has often been termed the image of death, and its consequent properties, dreaming and waking, may also be images for aught that is known, though not very precise, of similar properties consequent upon death. Perhaps, there may be in either case a wandering of the more active properties with a consequent latency of others, similar to the case of a chariot with the horses detached and run away from it. In a waking absence of mind too, we have the same simili-

* It may not here be amiss to anticipate a difficulty respecting principles *in transitu*, and their heterogeneous productions.

The notion of an incorporeal beginning for a corporeal nature or substance may seem a paradox to those whose second thoughts have not begun to prevail over the material preconceptions that we all naturally imbibe as soon as we begin to see and feel ; but a little farther reflexion may suffice to teach them, that a subject composed, like man, of both a corporeal and incorporeal nature or substance cannot require a material more than an immaterial beginning, since the accumulation and reproduction of flesh and blood by spirit or intellect would seem as natural as the accumulation and reproduction of views, passions and propensities by matter. And if we only once suppose such a beginning as the first named spiritual or intellectual, it will not be very hard to mount up therefrom, even by our unaided reason, not only to the idea of an endless production, by one word given as above stated, through congenial sensations and conceptions ; but occasionally also of an immediate production solely by the Divine Word, like those mentioned by St. John, "which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John i. 13).

tude of wandering: it is, indeed, like sleeping upright in the manner of a quadruped; but not so much like death as sleep—the whole mass or accumulation of properties being here prostrated as it were by a charm; the visible man, pinioned and fettered invisibly with shackles stronger than iron, and stretched forth like a senseless corpse to appearance; all outward motion, whether partial or universal, apparently suspended; all intercourse with the world and its affairs broken up; and all knowledge of the same, with every thought of it, except in short intervals of dreaming, which are more frantic than lucid, vanished, until the grand process of waking shall restore to us our locomotive properties, as well as our sensitive, the intellectual being, already up and abroad.

Dreaming is in substance half-waking, and our dreams are more or less lively, as we are more or less awake. It may, therefore, be hard to define the exact bounds between sleeping and waking. Consciousness appears to be somewhat of a criterion; but will not always answer, because we are often conscious, in a certain degree, of what passes both within us and without at times when we are the least likely to be awake. This may be mentioned as a remarkable exception, though too intellectual to be here insisted on. In other cases too, dreaming may be interesting, as connected with the physiology of the mind, though not in general as connected with future events. For it proves most clearly by its different shades a distinction of properties in the human intellect; some sleeping, while others are awake in both cases: while the awaking of all these properties in rapid succession from sleep, leaves no room to doubt a similar recovery, and that with improvement from death, out of any degree of madness or derangement, at the last general resurrection. The action or internal motion of the kingdom will then be unrestrained, and the prelude to as great a freedom of the external, being the second species which was to be considered under the head of Operation; and which many other interesting species of

action, or partial motive properties, as sound, gesticulation, &c., being left untouched, will now stand for consideration.

§ 2, The name of *Operation* is generally given to the second species of inherent motion before supposed; being ~~universal~~, or *of* and not so much *in* the subject, like emotion, commotion and other particular motions that have been mentioned. As for promotion; it is an incidental, and not belonging to the class, whatever may be said of rising this way. But the class or property itself, namely of universal inherent motion, or self-motion of the whole subject, might be made, if it never has been, the first criterion *in* the animal kingdom, to distinguish the superior classes which are naturally locomotive from the fixed, with a subdistinction of the first mentioned after their three principal spheres or regions of earth, air, and water, whether singly or in common. And to suit these distinctions, the class of spiritual motive properties now mentioned might also be divided into two species, locomotion and operation: since every operation is not necessarily locomotive, as may appear from the undermentioned examples, being but a few of what might be quoted in our species. For we are naturally moving subjects in the present state; and that on various accounts, as visiting, travelling, making war, and other matters; which being directed by invisible properties, or by the inner man, as we call this agency sometimes, are properly referred to him. For the outer man has no more to do with the ordering of such matters, than a chaise with that of travelling. The chaise is not the traveller, but the person within.

§ 1: 2, *Travelling* with its antithesis, *Retirement*, deserve to be mentioned in this view therefore; being not only spiritual as well as motive, but in a degree also intellectual, as the coming and going of intellectual spirits. Understanding, however, by the said expression of travelling, the subject of visiting in general, for whatever purpose, it may be worth while to consider shortly, what purposes it is adapted to, and whether such purposes may be best

answered by travelling or by retirement. With respect to which it is evident at first sight, that the selection and enjoyment of these two opposite universal motive properties or habits must depend with us, as in other cases, on the opportunities and convenience of the subject of such properties. One man is tied by circumstances to a settled residence, and could not travel if he would: another has every opportunity for travelling that could be desired; but finds it better for his affairs, to remain at home. And this same conditionality of the two properties respectively may sometimes attach to every object likewise for which men are accustomed either to travel or to stay at home; such as pleasure, profit, instruction, since it is possible to speed both ways towards either of these objects, e. g.

* * 1, *For pleasure* in travelling we may enjoy a continual variety of scenes and acquaintances; and great are the charms of novelty, as every one must have felt. While on the other hand, in our abiding place we enjoy the comforts of home, and of society endeared to us by habit. And can any public or foreign scenes compare with a man's own house and barton: where every creature, whether rational or irrational, looks up to him as its friend and patron, inspiring in return an interest that cannot be afforded to men of honest natures by any novel sight, that meets our eyes abroad.

There is a way indeed to combine the pleasure of both properties, v. g. of both travelling and home-keeping or retirement; which is by taking our friends along with us in our travels: and thus may be remedied in some measure one of the greatest objections to wandering. For whoever leaves his home and known friends to visit unknown places and persons must needs feel sometimes the pangs of separation. The company of our friends alone can always make travelling agreeable: and surrounded by them we may be comparatively happy and at home any where: especially if we happen to have a good inducement to travel likewise; whether it be for our own private advantage, or

to benefit others, or to fulfil a divine command; of which three the first appears the commonest, but the others, and the last especially, are most creditable. Indeed, cases of this kind are very rare: it very rarely happens for a man to be divinely called to leave his country and kindred like faithful Abraham: "Who (as the apostle well reminds us) staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God" (Rom. iv. 20). There was an example of happy travelling; first, as undertaken from a principle of faith, to fulfil a divine command, and next as having the agreeable accompaniments before mentioned. For when God had said unto Abraham, "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house unto a land that I will shew thee," (Gen. xii. 1), he did not depart alone; but "took with him Sarah his wife, and Lot his brother's son, and all their substance that they had gathered, and the souls that they had gotten in Haran" (Ib. 5.): so that his departure in effect was not more than half going from home. We have some broad examples of a similar practice in some of the patriarch's natural offspring; and they are well worth considering, both for the credit of the word of prophecy declared to this effect, (Ib. xvi. 12,) and also for the moral curiosity of such determined rovers as the wild Arabs, if not of some Tartar tribes likewise, founded thereon*. But what we are now properly to consider is the private advantage of travelling; and namely,

* * 2, *For profit or trade*: where some will thrive best in seeking new markets continually; others in cultivating one.

* A more interesting example of domestic travelling for ourselves, and what promises to be vastly more important to mankind generally than the wanderings of Tartars, Gipsies, and Arabs, occurs in the extensive system of emigration now going on; and for centuries past, between England and her colonies, through the spirit of the Gospel finding its way with the wanderers; as well as the spirit of civilization and general improvement. This is *something* towards the fulfilment of that glorious prediction for the kingdom, "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea" (Isa. xl. 5).

In general, however, the demand for travelling merchants is much less than for merchants minding their business at home: and while the former get most trouble and inconvenience, the latter get most of that for which both parties toil and traffic, *wealth*. It may also be observed, that greater security, without which profit is of little consequence, may generally be enjoyed at home. And this it is, no doubt, that makes things naturally wild to be sometimes so domestic, v. g. security against their foes. What is it, for instance, that makes cats domestic? Why, dogs. They dare not go from home for fear of being worried. So likewise,

* * 3, And most eminently, *for instruction*, both properties, v. g. both travelling and retirement, will appear to have their advantages, whether in giving or receiving this precious incidental;—as our heavenly Preceptor himself, e. g. received, no doubt, all the human instruction essential to his ministry, first through the property of retirement and the advantage of a settled residence, which he enjoyed with his parents, at once practising the part of a dutiful son (Luke ii. 51), and preparing himself for that of a spiritual Father to the human race; while the property of travelling, or a continued transition from one place to another, and from one audience to another, afterwards gave him opportunity for applying his acquired, as well as innate and divine abilities to good purpose, and for confirming such as required it by good practice.

But in giving instruction, the travelling system or property, appears to have been chiefly practised by this teacher from God. For we read of his going about “all the cities and villages teaching” (Matt. ix. 35); an office in which he was ordinarily accompanied by his disciples: but we do not read of his abiding with them long in one place (John iv. 40), or however, “not many days” (John ii. 12). Indeed, it is known, that after our Saviour left his Father’s house for the ministry, he never had a place that he could call his home, nor, indeed, so much as a lodging

where he could regularly lay his head (Matt. viii. 20); and, therefore, he must generally have taught in travelling before he died; as he did also between his death and ascension (Luke xxiv. 13, &c.); and still does, it is hoped, with many a teacher by the way, and by many a hunted curate. So, in common life, we find one preceptor more addicted to retirement, and regretting the time that he is taken from his study and quiet preception to accompany pupils abroad, while another shall find travelling as convenient for his own information as for that of his pupils, as convenient for receiving as for imparting instruction, a proof that either property, i. e. of travelling and retirement, has its advantages for this purpose; travelling, to supply the mind with continual food for meditation, enriching it with new objects, both great and small, continually, and assisting it continually with new patterns and models, for conceiving scenes past or out of observation; retirement, to afford leisure and opportunity for digesting our experience, which makes it as important after travelling as before; therefore, the smaller share of our time we can well devote to travelling, perhaps, the better for the general purpose of instruction.

Before a freer communication was opened between those who had, and those who desired the enjoyment of science by the multiplication of books, men were obliged to supply their deficiency, as well as they could, by travelling and personal intercourse; and to this necessary occupation the ancients owed both what information they possessed, in a great measure, and the want of leisure to imbibe a great deal more which the moderns enjoy. At the same time, good reading will require good reflection; and even our superior opportunities for laying in a store of knowledge, will make a larger portion of retirement necessary now than ever. And whether we travel or read, we shall do either to little purpose, or not to a very good one, if we do not take habitually more than the season of the night for retirement. Nature obliges us to lie by generally once in the

twenty-four hours; but reason and prudence would suggest, sometimes, the propriety also of an especial retreat; more particularly of a religious abstraction, the importance of which may not be felt sometimes by worldly men at last, as it is by those who have then the duty of waiting upon them.

Yet, while it may be inferred from the comparison now made, that in the present complicated state of society, more retirement than travelling and social intercourse is required to moral perfection; it must yet be owned, that self-seclusion and retirement of any kind are not at the same time unalloyed with danger; as scarcely any advantageous property or possession ever is. So, not to mention other dangers and inconveniences, it may be observed, that seclusion and retirement have too often a tendency to make men surly and morose, in the same way that dogs are said to acquire fierceness by being tied up and kept from their usual society.

* 3 : 4, There are other sorts of operation, or other universal motive properties that savour of the general character of locomotion, if not so decidedly as travelling and retirement, or going abroad and going home. Such are, e. g. the parts of *labouring* and *housekeeping*, which may be proposed as parallel to those in some measure; 1. as the whole subject is generally unsettled in either case; 2. as labouring is usually abroad like travelling, and housekeeping like retirement, within doors. If either of these were necessarily good, it would deserve to rank as an improvement on this class of properties: but such does not appear to be the case. For if, as the wise man says, "In all labour there is profit" (Prov. xiv. 23): and if his royal father tells the young housekeeper, "O well is thee, and happy shalt thou be!" (Ps. cxxviii. 2); the former is to be understood with a restricted meaning, as applied to our daily and regular avocations, by which we fulfil our several parts in society, and the latter to our domestic part, by which society is maintained. But we find also another sort of

labour, the very reverse of that by which society is benefited; the labour of those "who plough iniquity and sow wickedness" (Job iv. 8). And, to say nothing of ordinary faults in housekeeping, there is also a sort of it that can only answer the purpose of corruption, being directed more to that than either to hospitality or domestic comfort. On the other hand, good housekeeping is equivalent to good labour; or however, if to labour and to provide the necessaries of life be honourable for one sex, to lay them up and have them ready for use may be honourable for the other, and good housewifery as honourable as good husbandry. So thought Martha, perhaps, when she called upon Jesus to enforce this good part; and it is not necessary to suppose that he meant to discommend this in commending a better.

As the choice of labour therefore seems a matter of some consequence, a word or two may not here be unseasonable respecting its latitude and direction. In the first place, there can be no reason, why a man's necessary labour should not also constitute his favourite exercise and amusement, if it do not happen to be of an unhealthy description. And it must constitute a happy feature in any man's lot when the same part serves him at once for labour and recreation. But as the bare necessity of an useful part is revolting to many, the next best condition after that of making a necessary part pleasant, though some may think it better, will be the liberty to choose our employment, and either to labour or study as we will at any time, whether for profit or for amusement. Here is this, however, to be observed, that whether it be from choice or necessity that a man labours, he will find, that his turn for one is not much improved by the effect of the other: he will find, that while study enervates the body, and renders it unfit for labour, labour, on the other hand, i. e., actual labour, like a day's work for example, does not improve a man's inclination for study, and hence learn to excuse the indifference to mental pursuits, that is gene-

rally observed in the labouring class; if there have been instances as well in that, as in an higher class, of men endued with such extraordinary powers of body and mind as to be able to labour equally with both, and excel in both departments at once.

If one were asked, what sort of labour is most honourable? one should answer, The most necessary. So the Romans thought once, and shewed their wisdom in choosing for a dictator one who honoured the plough even more than the dictatorship. So thought another Cincinnatus perhaps, "as he was following the ewes great with young" (Ps. lxxviii. 72). And if the most useful employment was not the best, it exceeded the capacity of a Solomon to find any better for himself; which would surprise many. For a more eminent example of good fortune is hardly to be met than we find in his case. The station which he enjoyed was prepared for him, and he for his station by a remarkable providence: and his long reign would have been a continual feast of wisdom and power, of peace and respect; if he could have made this discovery, and if his life had not been troubled by an unworthy failing towards the conclusion. But admitting that even this single deduction had not taken place, and that Solomon's greatest felicity had continued without intermission as long as he lived, would he have gained any ground in all this time by his labour? Would he have placed his success on any sure footing? Would he have made any progress in establishing and perpetuating, not to say, increasing this good fortune for either himself or his successors? We know he would not: his successors in the kingdom were all of them to begin again where he began; but never one of them, to make so great an end. If they could only have begun where he left off, and continued the part that he had been at such pains in maturing, this might have afforded some consolation to the illustrious monarch on being obliged to resign it. But this, he knew, was not to be relied on: and it occurred to his penetrating mind as

more probable; that the beginning he had made in the sovereignty would be abandoned by the next taker, and all his work unravelled, as soon as his hand should be taken off, by hands that were only formed for undoing. "In all points as he came so shall he go: and what profit hath he that laboured for the wind?" (Eccles. v. 16). This cruel anticipation wrung his heart with anguish, and drew from him many a bitter reflection on the vanity and insufficiency of all human endeavours when it occurred to him, as he informs us in the review of his experiments, "to see what was that good for the sons of men, which they should do under the heaven all the days of their life. I made me great works; I builded me houses; I planted me vineyards; I made me gardens and orchards, and I planted trees in them of all kinds of fruits; I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees; I got me servants and maidens, and had servants born in my house; also I had great possessions of great and small cattle above all that were in Jerusalem before me; I gathered me also silver and gold, and the peculiar treasure of kings and of the provinces; I gat me men singers and women singers, and the delights of the sons of men, as musical instruments, and those of all sorts. So I was great, and increased more than all they that were before me in Jerusalem; also my wisdom remained with me. And whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them; I withheld not my heart from any joy; for my heart rejoiced in all my labour; AND THIS WAS MY PORTION OF ALL MY LABOUR. Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do: and behold all was vanity and vexation of spirit; and there was no profit under the sun. Therefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me: for all is vanity and vexation of spirit. Yea, I hated all my labour which I had taken under the sun; because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me. And who knoweth, whether he

shall be a wise man or a fool? Yet shall he have ~~ride~~ over all my labour wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have shewed myself wise under the sun. This is all vanityth (Ib. ii. 3, &c.; 18, &c.). It therefore remained for a greater than Solomon (Mat. xii. 42), to teach mankind the most needful and consequently most honourable part as aforesaid. "Martha, Martha, (said he,) thou art careful and troubled about many things: but one thing is needful; and Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her" (Luke x. 41, 42).

But any part that is not bad in itself must be better than idleness, as intimated in the forecited saying of Solomon, "This was my portion of all my labour." For continual experience has shewn, that labour is good in itself, and that an ingenuous nature will flourish in employment; but be enfeebled and dispirited by inactivity. Every one who has enjoyed it must be sensible of the benefit of a regular vocation. And it is obvious enough to be notorious, that labour and occupation are generally a greater source of enjoyment than their consequent gains, even when these are not inconsiderable.

Therefore we are apt to carry our care of ourselves or our faculties, as we call them, too far sometimes, when we talk of unbending them, or of assuaging their fatigue by idleness, and that before they have ever been strained or exercised perhaps. Indeed leisure and rest do not depend so much on exemption from employments and offices as on a facility in discharging them: and it is possible to conceive how by an improvement of our faculties in a future state we may be able to do more, infinitely more, than at present; and at the same time, experience in that state what we cannot in this, which is rest. "There remaineth therefore a rest to the people of God" (Heb. iv. 9).

It seems, too, as if we had something more than hypothesis in this case, we seem to have something like experience of the fact occasionally in our dreams; being thus engaged sometimes in the detail of various and lengthened

transactions; which would naturally have occupied the best part of a day perhaps, but shall pass off very well this way in the best part of an hour, and no hurrying. Add to which, the question is not here so much of enjoyment, or of fatigue or improvement, as of other constituents towards which we are gradually proceeding: the next sort to be mentioned being,

2, That of *sensitive* properties, chiefly known by the term sense or sensation; but comprehending rather more than is usually understood in that term through its intimate relation with each of the three principal kinds of properties, material, spiritual, and intellectual, above mentioned, e. g., 1, sense will have its foundation in the material kind, as being derived entirely from material objects through the several appropriate organs or mediums of the eye, the hand, the ear, the nose and the palate by the property of motion or commotion, i. e., vibration: 2, it will have its effect in the spiritual department by the properties of pleasure and pain: 3, it will terminate and find its consummation in the intellectual department through the several modes of perception; seeing, feeling, hearing, smelling and tasting, which are assigned by nature to the material organs or mediums aforesaid.

There may be also a kind of reflected sensation, when the object of feeling is identified with its subject and grows to consciousness: and the importance of such sensation appears in its being the very point at which the spiritual and intellectual boundaries meet. Wherefore the greater consciousness any creature shall enjoy of his own being, i. e., the more perfect and retrospective, the higher it will rank in the order of intellectuals, whether good or evil. And yet it were a wretched hap, to be so exalted only for a greater depth of woe; so as to be able to tell one's Maker, in the plaintive style of the Psalmist, "Thou hast taken me up, and cast me down" (Ps. cii. 10).

From the tenour of these observations it will be evident, that properties of the sensitive kind do not afford much

room for observation at present, however important they may prove to the doctrine of the kingdom in a more advanced and consequently more accomplished stage of their existence. A more relevant topic for immediate notice occurs in two other species of the same spiritual kind of properties, being appetitive and aversive, or in substance, appetite and aversion, and answering to the two species of motion, *to* and *from*, or centripetal and centrifugal in relation to the subject before mentioned.

3, The *appetitive* sort of spiritual properties, or the general property of appetite, even in its simplest form, is one degree raised above sense, though bearing, as just observed, a resemblance to properties one degree lower, i. e., in the material class which has been considered. And indeed, if we examine the groundwork of this property or sort, we shall be naturally led again to remark, how the same property may differ in different subjects or combinations, and in different relations, or in relation to different objects, continuing all the while perhaps essentially the same in itself. Any one may have observed the figurative manner of naming spiritual subjects from material on account of some analogy existing or supposed to exist between them; by means of which one property may be improperly deduced from another with which it has no natural connexion; and therefore it would be very unphilosophical, to take up with an association from sound, adopting words and phrases for facts and affinities. But making every allowance for a chance of that sort, we cannot help owning and admiring frequently, how properties between which one would hardly suspect an affinity, on being sifted and compared will appear the same; and in this case especially as well as in others above mentioned. Who, e. g., would suspect an affinity, not to say identity, between the appetite of animals and their gravitation or that of minerals? Yet such a gravitation is appetite, and in its kind equally primitive, universal, and indispensable with the material property. Nay, what is more striking, the said property of appetite is only a part in that univer-

sal dispensation known by the title of fate or necessity, by which the ruler of the universe always governs and has governed all things, without excepting the freest, from the point of creation, and even creation itself.

By fate the constituents or reiterated acts and efforts, the combined services, we may call them, of the earth, all generally tend or gravitate towards its centre, i. e. towards themselves and each other; as the earth, being but an atom in the creation, also gravitates with other planets towards the sun, and that with numberless atoms of equal bulk perhaps, towards a common centre ordained by the Creator. But with all this common gravitation of bodies and spirits, there will still be found a distinct preference in every kind, as its specific gravity, affinity, or appetite, which in the animal department is variously denominated according to its sphere and objects, e. g. First in the lower branch or division of the spiritual department, i. e. in the body, and towards such objects as are necessary to its repletion; this gravitation is appetite in its original sense, including two species, hunger and thirst. Also in the same department, but in a higher branch, as well as towards other objects and for other purposes, the same is called Love, but improperly so, when lust is implied, this being a distortion of the appetite, and not a necessary ingredient of love—any more than ravening is a necessary ingredient of hunger, or a sottish propensity of thirst. We shall find, as we proceed in a still higher branch of this same spiritual department, a different name and very different continually applied to the progeny of appetite; and the same again in other positions, the sort growing continually more positive and interesting, as it would be easy to prove, if it were desired; but here it seems desirable rather to notice only a few principal varieties of the property occurring at this point; such are, 1, 2, Hunger and Thirst; 3, Mood, Turn, Taste or Liking; 4, Following, Imitation, Assent, Compliance; 5, Curiosity; 6, Changeableness; 7, Promise; 8, Expectation; 9, Ardour, Zeal, Enthusiasm.

—1 : 2, The two lowest and most merely spiritual appetitive properties of *Hunger and Thirst* ; though two kindly ingredients as any in the composition of the kingdom, and what some of its subjects would be glad to purchase, if they knew how, will imply, notwithstanding, a troublesome and too frequently a painful sensation, making them almost unfavourably characteristic ; as do likewise others even of this appetitive class, to say nothing of the aversive, which is generally more unfavourable. One is puzzled indeed to assign an unquestionable position to every ingredient in so varied and equivocal a compound, greatly as such an assignment were to be wished : let us, however, keep to one line as distinctly as we can, proceeding from the lowest appetitive properties, hunger and thirst now mentioned, to the next above or beyond the same, v.g. to

—3, *Turn, taste or liking ; satisfaction, approbation, or preference* : which, though nearly as much intellectual as spiritual, are however not so intellectual as some of the undermentioned. For the whole of the sort, and taste i.e. what may be called elective taste, especially, whether good or bad, will be founded on judgment as its rule or definition, standing it in the same stead as the mathematics to music, astronomy, &c. And though there may be judgment without taste, there can be no taste properly so called without judgment ; nor good taste without good judgment either on the point to which it relates : as there may be a foundation without an edifice, but no edifice properly so called without a foundation. Taste is affection guided by judgment towards some good work, and following the varieties of the same : of course, therefore, taste itself must be sufficiently intellectual, if other properties of the same association are more so, and some of its correlatives much less ; somewhat, perhaps, like

—4, *Following : imitation, assenting, compliance*, which taken abstractedly are more passive properties, and often more brutish than intellectual.

—5, But such is not the case with *Curiosity* : which,

however, though more intellectual than imitation, &c., still cannot be regarded as characteristic either way, any more than imitation and others preceding it; because the rank of curiosity must depend a good deal on time, place, and circumstances, and more particularly on its selection of objects. There may be a doubt with some respecting the classification of this property; as e.g. whether it belong more to the spiritual, or to the intellectual class: because it looks one while more like an appetite of the heart, another while more like an appetite of the understanding. But that is a mistaken idea, founded on the old prejudice of spiritual and intellectual localities: as if the complexion of any one property was not liable to be changed by others with which it might be casually associated.

If, however, the importance of a property would determine it to the intellectual class, this certainly should go thither. For among so great a variety of agents as figure in the moral department, there is not a greater nor more universal than curiosity: witness hereto the temptation of Eve, and its fabulous version in the story of Pandora, by whose fatal curiosity all the evils in the world are said to have been brought into it; or witness more agreeably the enterprising curiosity of travellers, by means of which a beneficial intercourse has been established between the most distant parts of the earth, and a way opened likewise for the progress of salvation, to justify in time the royal Psalmist's prediction, "All the ends of the world shall remember themselves, and be turned unto the Lord: and all the kindred of the nations shall worship before him" (Ps. xxii. 27). Yet, it is not the importance of a property, but its natural affinity that must decide its station in the heavenly kingdom: and hence the present cannot be better allotted, perhaps, than to the position it now occupies.

—6, Allied to curiosity is another appetitive property which has not found a name yet, though one of the commonest and not least important members of the heavenly

corps ; but is generally designated as the love of novelty, fondness of change, &c. This is a property, that shews itself with the very beginning of its subject, and most likely will accompany him to the end, if his sense and apprehension should last so long. For these two things, novelty and change, depend entirely on the relations of experience ; which changing continually afford to every object and situation at first sight, and for a short time such attributes, being in truth mere accidents of the mind. We cannot call the appetite for such accidents Fickleness, because this property is not more appetitive than aversive : and Inconstancy is about the same. Moreover, *Changeableness* does not mean the appetite for change merely, but an inconstancy in purpose, and sentiment as well ; and yet it is the nearest term for this common appetitive property that now occurs ; which may account for its present adoption, if the term be not altogether as appropriate as one could wish.

—7, It appears then, that several of the properties above named are of a divided character : but the property now to be mentioned is so much so, that one hardly knows where to place, or how to name, or how to regard it. A name, however, the property must have ; and a name is accordingly here assigned it, being, it is true, only an old name with a new acceptation, to suit the nature of the subject, v. g., *Promise* : and what it stands for is an essential appetitive property nearly opposite to those between which it is placed, v. g. curiosity and expectation, as an object for both.

This essential property, whether virtual or effective, not being equally flagrant in every subject, may not have so obvious a part as some others : but this feature or circumstance is not peculiar to promise. There are few properties that do not blaze forth more or less in different subjects according to circumstances, and according to their proportion or share in the constitution. It cannot be doubted, that, with some men, promising is as common as

will of his Father the refusal of one son was discharged and void as if it had never been made, not having been accepted; while, by the same will and acceptance, the assent of the other was stamped with falsehood. And the example of the first "of them twain" will apply to every case of threatening, which is a sort of promise, to do something disagreeable to its object, as well as to every case of refusal, which is also a sort of promise not to do what its object requires. So likewise all promises made *expressly* before God, for all are *implicitly*, will be naturally voidable, when made against his will, or in favour of what he forbids.

But, even where a promise is better broken than kept, it will not be honoured in the breach: for a breach of promise can never be honourable under any circumstances; nor pardonable either until it has been duly repented. The maxim of the Preacher, "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin" (Eccl. v. 6), was intended chiefly for *religious vows*: but in their common affairs also people should mind how they promise; and not suffer this essential property, however forward it may be in them, to triumph over others of more consequence; as the characteristics, gravity, truth, honour, and sincerity.

—8, *Expectation, anxiety, suspense, &c.*, are also properly members of both the spiritual and intellectual association; being, however, strictly appetitive, and therefore, like the foregoing, rather more spiritual.

—9, There are still other properties of this class, and nearly allied to the last mentioned expectation; such as, *Ardour, zeal, enthusiasm*, and others very estimable on proper occasions, though it has been usual to apprehend one of them, enthusiasm, only in an unfavourable sense. But such properties do not any of them here seem to require a particular notice, as they only differ by a degree from others that have been noticed sufficiently. And the forenamed properties altogether are, perhaps, about the most remarkable of the essential appetitive sort: while

4, Others deserve also to be mentioned on account of their weight in the opposite scale of *Aversion*: such are, 1, Courage; 2, Anger; 3, Surprise; 4, Secrecy; 5, Avoiding, Resistance; 6, Doubt, Hesitation, &c.; 7, Diffidence, Distrust, Suspicion, &c.; to which the same general remark will apply as to the last mentioned opposite appetitive class, v. g. respecting the same property being attended with different names, notions and effects continually in different spheres and in different subjects or combinations, and in relation to different objects, though always itself essentially the same. Thus our disrelish of many material things, as of food, for example, is aversion: so is the grating of discordant sounds; so is the disagreement of other simple effects or feelings with their objects: and the dislike to certain actions and characters is no more; as the Psalmist's particular dislike, e. g. expressed in that apostrophe to the Supreme Being, "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee: and am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee?" (Ps. cxxxix. 21.) Neither was this holy feeling of the Psalmist and of many who have felt like he, any peculiar kind of aversion; though there seems a prodigious distance between the natural and spiritual casts of this property; as, e. g. between the loathing of unwholesome food, and a hellish abhorrence of all that is good or amiable in the several parts of thinking and doing.

It may not be a matter of great consequence, to ascertain the very exact position of every constituent in the spiritual body, association, or department—or not so much so, as it is considered in the departments or kingdoms of nature; if it were, one should be at a loss sometimes how to proceed. But still there are constant vestiges or criterions generally to be observed sufficient for the purpose; as e. g. with respect to

—1, That much talked of and often overrated property, animal *Courage*, which would deserve indeed to be set lower than the undermost of its class, if it were no more than what

the world generally takes it for, being on that construction not more a human property than a brutish, if it be so much. And what makes its classification doubtful is, that the property or principle of courage, however paradoxical it may appear, is (unlike fear) to seek what it avoids, as a worthy antagonist, or the hand of an assailant. But still we must be aware, that courage in any subject is not to be reputed invariably good for its object any more than fear, its antithesis; but often more formidable, which seems conclusive evidence, that neither of these properties can exist naturally without a very sensible tinge of aversion.

To judge from the derivation of the word, one would suppose, that courage was the most essential property of manhood; or rather, its very essence. Indeed, it is often called Heart and Spirit by the vulgar: as if a man's better, superior, or governing element consisted entirely in brute courage. Its degrees or simple modes (being an active property) are assurance or confidence, boldness, daring, defiance, &c.; its more complex modes, rashness, presumption, obstinacy, impudence—bearing of course the same relation to their antitheses, shyness or diffidence, weakness and timidity, desperation, cowardice, &c., as the general property of courage bears to that of fear, v. g. of seeking in some measure, as well as avoiding their respective objects. And if it were worth while to distinguish this general property of courage with fear, its forementioned antithesis still farther, the same might be done to a very great extent by means of various criterions; as of object, time, place, occasion, &c., producing a variety of sorts equally striking in themselves and incompatible with each other: as e. g. are produced by object, courage towards God or man, courage towards one sex or the other, and also towards equals or inferiors of either sex. It being generally found, that they who are bold towards God, can be timid enough towards their fellow-creatures; and also, that the most presuming coxcombs, in regard to women, are the greatest cowards in regard to men. So one man

has courage in speaking, another in doing ; one in the senate, another in the field ; according to the gift or ability that either may perceive or imagine in himself. But the same man is not the same always and every where in respect of these kinds of gifts and consequent courage, nor of any other kind indeed.

THE FEAR OF GOD IS THE TRUEST COURAGE, as it is said to be the truest wisdom : and the man who fears and obeys Him as he ought, has the most reason to be bold in other respects. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth : but the righteous are bold as a lion" (Prov. xxviii. 1). A righteous man will be as far as any from several sorts of courage above enumerated ; as from rashness in conduct and impudence in conversation, e. g. In the last mentioned part especially he will just have courage enough to disregard the frowns, the winks, the nods, the side looks, and the down looks, with many other weapons of the kind with which he is assailed by foolish emulators ; although, considering the invisible presence with which he is surrounded, he has seldom the courage to talk highly with any man in the presence of such superior witnesses. Therefore, upon the whole, it may be said of courage, and of personal qualities generally indeed, as it is of persons, that their quality is best known by their company : and as a man must be a fool to take up with every fool that he meets, so

Courage with { Levity
Intemperance } will be { Rashness.
Madness.

—2, The property of *Anger* discovers itself on the side of aversion, though often as it were by constraint and against the predilection of the subject, which is rather for collision. Its different shades and varieties, which are pretty numerous, may, like those of the last mentioned property, be generally reckoned among the little intellectual and nearly brutish constituents of the invisible kingdom ; though some of these shades are too closely allied with a vicious intellect to appear in this stage of the property ; and of the particulars that might be severally mentioned

here it is not worth while to make a distinction, since all are fundamentally the same. But if these shades and varieties of anger generally seem to rest on a brutish foundation, some of them will not however be brutish, as 1, when they are not suffered to continue too long; and 2, when we can so manage as to do nothing under their influence, but what we may approve thereafter, when such influence shall be past. For this were agreeable to Christian precepts, and Christian precepts do not make brutes; as that, "Be ye angry, and sin not" (Eph. iv. 26), e.g. But unrestrained passions, which is a giving of place to the devil (Ib. 27.) will make brutes, or something worse; when all in a house seems clamour and discord—the man wreaking his anger on the partner of his bosom; she hers on their common offspring; the father also on the children; they again on the servants; and these just as freely on the poor cattle: making altogether a very hell upon earth through this house full of demons, the accursed spawn of pride and cowardice; which dare to trample on the weak, but will vanish at the sight of a superior.

Thus anger cannot long preserve its neutrality; but must needs degenerate into an evil characteristic, if persevered in, degrading its subject, if an intellectual, at the same time to the condition of a brute or a fiend. Beware, therefore, O intellectual, of whatever degree thou art! "Leave off from wrath, and let go displeasure: fret not thyself, else shalt thou be moved to do evil" (Ps. xxxvii. 8).

—3, *Surprise, wonder, and astonishment* are more of this aversive than of the opposite or appetitive class, though the aversion they denote is not so sensible or striking as its outward expression. For if the feeling of surprise, &c., do not clearly indicate aversion, the natural action consequent thereon, as starting, recoiling, &c., will be expressive enough; unless it should happen to be studiously restrained by the property next mentioned, being

—4, *Secrecy or concealment*, the aversive character of which is every way more decided. For secrecy will con-

sist in the withholding of information, whether the object to which it relates be general or particular, constant or occasional, and the subject matter of greater or less importance. Indeed some persons have that admirable share of secrecy belonging to them, that they can display it upon any objects, and with matter or information of any importance, or of none, if necessary, as it most frequently happens.

There are three essential kinds of secrecy besides some more characteristic ; the essential, of which we are thinking, as follows, v. g. the first consisting in manner and disposition, which is reserve ; the second, in word or conversation, which is silence or taciturnity ; the third in action or deed, which is concealment, or secrecy properly so called. But of the first mentioned, Reserve, it may be questioned almost, whether it do not speak sometimes, and lie too, as before signified, by affecting to conceal what it does not know, "hiding counsel without knowledge" (Job. xlii. 8.) as it is said. And in the next place, if a man knows any thing, he had better, in general, shew his taciturnity by selection than by self restraint: he should not force himself to say little, but rather be careful what he says; first, that he may not abuse the opportunity afforded him of speaking a word in season—"and a word in due season; O, how good is it!" (Prov. xv. 23.); 2, that he may not feel the inconvenience of a word spoken out of season; which is better prevented by caution than remedied by any means. But the times may be so unfortunate, perchance, that a man shall hardly know how to prevent mistakes, or how to say any thing, or whom to confide in: when, as the prophet says, "there is none upright among men . . . the best of them is a brier; the most upright is sharper than a thorn hedge . . . Trust ye not in a friend, put ye not confidence in a guide, keep the doors of thy mouth from her that lieth in thy bosom. For the son dishonoureth the father, the daughter riseth up against her mother, the daughter-in-law against the mother-in-law; a man's enemies are the men of his own house" (Mic. vii. 2, &c.).

In such a state of society, and generally indeed, if a man should have the grace to mean good and the happiness to do it, he had best take care, how he mention the same, or suffer it to be known; as our Saviour advises with respect to one sort of beneficence. "When thou doest alms (says he) let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth" (Mat. vi. 3). It may be said with a little circumlocution, Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth, for fear it should pick thy pocket: for there are always those about you who will be glad to take advantage of your ostentatious charity, whether by imposture, stealth, or taxation. This may be one argument for secrecy in doing good, and a very prudent one sometimes, no doubt; but the nobler and most proper for a Christian at all times appears in the reason which our Saviour annexes to his forementioned advice, "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth, that thine alms may be in secret: and THY FATHER WHICH SEETH IN SECRET HIMSELF SHALL REWARD THEE OPENLY" (Ib. 4). He will reward thee with the true riches, the heavenly treasure which none but himself can bestow; with the riches of his grace and approbation, and the consequent increase of thy own moral and intellectual worth, which is worth more to thee than any thing.

Indeed, it is very evident, how the habit of doing good in secret improves a man's moral character; particularly when done as our Saviour requires, in respect to "Him which seeth in secret". As much worth almost is lost by seeking the praise of men for beneficence, as for fasting, or chivalry, or any other ridiculous exhibition of one's self, or even by a hardened indifference to what others seek, without looking to any farther consequence. But from the time that men begin to consider that secret and inevitable witness, to seek His approbation especially, to make Him the prime or only object of their ambition to please; from that time they begin to acquire a degree of positive worth, and to cover themselves with no ideal glory. And we can be secret enough in the evil that we do, or in that which

the world condemns ; why not, therefore, likewise in the good which our conscience approves ? Secrecy in doing good is as necessary as secrecy in doing evil, and the occasion much more becoming. Indeed, when either is done the less we say of it generally the better : but THERE SECRECY AND LIBERALITY, HERE CONFESSION AND ATONEMENT WILL BE THE BEST ACCOMPANIMENT.

Thus too, it appears again, how indifferent properties may be made either good or evil by a choice of objects ; as a good secrecy, e. g. with doing good sincerely, for its object ; and an evil secrecy with doing evil, for its object ; though boasting with evil is worse at last than secrecy.

If there had been a name for that excellent property of doing good in secret, or of secrecy in doing good, it could not have been mentioned here : but through the absence of a name merely the same is kept at home ; and, like many an useful plant perhaps, but little cultivated for want of being more considered. Absolutely regarded, however, there will be nothing more characteristic in secrecy than in

—5, The properties of *Avoiding resistance* and others of their kind ; which denote merely the withdrawing of one's self from any object, or a forcing it off, which amounts to the same point, with more or less violence, whereby the several degrees of such avoidance are marked ; as 1, Flying or simply avoiding ; 2, Repulse, defence, offence, &c. And by the rule just mentioned, according to what the object avoided is, the subject or avoidance will be : wherefore, the distinction may here be omitted, if only to preserve the indifference, or, as it may be said, the essentiality of the subject. And also with regard to the next shade or degree of the general property of aversion, or next property of the aversive class ;

—6, *Doubt, hesitation*, with other essential, and consequently neutral properties of the kind, it is necessary to observe some bounds, in order to avoid that which would make either of them an evil characteristic, being its vice or excess ; which must needs be a vice. For were we to doubt

or hesitate on every subject and on every occasion until we had duly considered the grounds and propriety of the case, little good would be done, and often that little too late: the life of man being too short for this very deliberate proceeding. The best rule, therefore, to govern our conduct by, when no fixed principles occur, is found in our own chastened inclination, which may be readier than reason, coupled with the most approved practice of mankind; without sticking too long, or too much doubting of consequences. For, without tempting Providence, something may always be expected too from that quarter.

—7, Therefore, it is in the next degree, v. g. of *Diffidence, distrust, &c.*, that the aversive principle begins to shew itself, or to appear as well as to exist: though even here it appears rather faintly. Indeed, there is one sort of diffidence, and that the most commonly understood by this expression, in which there seems but little room for aversion; i. e. a diffidence of ourselves, a distrust of our own virtue or abilities. Yet, regarding this as one step towards self-dissatisfaction, disgust and abhorrence, it may still pass for an aversive property. And a very useful property also it is, though diffidence may not look so well to some minds as the opposite extreme. However, it will be a fortunate case for any beginner in the voyage of life, if he should retain his native diffidence long enough to allow time for the accumulation of genuine worth: then let the young man's diffidence subside, if it will, into a *modest assurance*. A diffidence of this sort, or so circumstanced, ought not to be ranked among evil properties, nor hardly among indifferent, it being decidedly good: while on the other hand there is a diffidence as decidedly evil, v. g. unauthorized jealousy, uncharitable suspicion, censure ill deserved, and the like. These are evil characteristics certainly; as much as fond confidence, and ill deserved admiration. And if men are not accountable to men for such evil thoughts "before they are expressed in word or in deed", because they must then be secret, as occurring only in the heart,

a sphere to which man's observation and empire do not extend; they will have to account for them, no doubt, to One who reigns there universally, and knows all the secrets of the heart even better than the heart itself. So, on the other hand, if men will be so fond, as to confide in men of no worth, and to doat on men of whom they know no good, they may thank themselves for the consequences of their miscalculation. We ought neither to trust nor distrust any one without sufficient reason, or reason equal to the occasion and degree of either sentiment.

But this is only a place to speak of the essential property, and not of evil diffidence, nor of evil jealousy, nor of evil suspicion: for there may be an evil sort of each, as well as a good; and that is why the property ranks among essential, and consequently neutral constituents, rather than among characteristic. Which being observed, it may now be time to have done with the consideration of both appetitive and aversive properties not naturally characteristic; as it is hard to find neutrals in such a scene of corruption as the world presents, and another step perhaps would conduct us to properties that are commonly evil; before which we find the whole order of intellectual essential to be yet considered.

3. For still ascending by degrees through the ranks of essential properties in the heavenly kingdom, we are at length arrived at the greatest exaltation of which we, or they (being the same) can have any conception in the region of *Intellect*; being now got among such entities, products or concretes, as Talents, Faculties, Gifts, Abilities; and among such general properties as Apprehension, Memory, Judgment, Will, Imagination, and risen to such an element as the Mind, Understanding, or Intellect. All which may be considered, like other classes of constituents, either essentially or characteristically: the essential view of the subject being more metaphysical; the characteristic more moral; and the first mentioned, that with which we are now engaged. Agreeably whereto, it may be first ob-

served, that intellectual properties, or the element of intellect which they compose, is the sum of intelligence and the description of reality; signifying the same with mind and with understanding, and answering to genius nearer than spirit does, though spirit and genius are often used interchangeably in their concretes, as we say *Genii or Spirits*. And so we may say indifferently, that such a man is one of an elegant mind, genius, understanding or intellect; referring to the sum of that exalted class of essential properties which is now under consideration, v. g. to intellect, as his distinguishing part and uppermost constituency.

Intellect is the sum or product of the acts, instances or particulars, of every kind of thinking, afforded by three combinations successively; 1, of the said accidents into numerous properties; 2, of these properties into several classes, sorts or distinctions; 3, of the said classes into the said element of intellect. But there have been three different opinions among philosophers respecting the life or operation of this element: one ascribing it to spirit alone; another on the contrary to matter alone; and another, to spirit by the instrumentality of matter. These are the different opinions of philosophers respecting the operation of intellect: while divines have still another opinion, ascribing to intellect its own operation; though they admit at the same time a reciprocity, a co-operation, and even an unity between the three elements or classes here mentioned in connexion. Perhaps they have all some reason for their hypothesis: so that intellect, or its constituents, being originally self-motioned and all-sufficient, is still liable to be actuated and influenced by its associates, whether the same as those above-mentioned, or any others. v. g. Intellect in combination with matter and spirit may be exalted by this and depressed by that; or it may, as formerly observed, be depressed and degraded in particular cases by the spirit to which it is allied, even more than by the supposed weight of matter, or by any other burden,

defect or inconvenience, whether real or supposed, that has ever been attributed to it.

If the spirit, or any spiritual constituent is liable to suffer from its association with the material, there appears no reason why the intellectual should not suffer in a double proportion from its connexion with two inferiors. And to remedy this inconvenience, there is little hope according to some fatalists, maintaining that both spirit and intellect are tied, as well as matter, to a certain course, by the immutable law of nature. For they perceive or imagine, that in themselves each of these constituents is bound by laws of the strictest necessity, as well as the vegetative process in trees, shrubs, and other productions of the botanical department on every side: so that every impulse to which the mind and soul are subject, shall have a necessary effect answerable to itself, ordained and decreed from the beginning to attend it. They observe, that the mind as well as the body has its aptitudes, tastes and propensities; the soul, its passions and appetites,—its likings and aversions; the former preferring one kind of knowledge to another; the latter, one kind of practice. And hence, judging of universals by particulars, these advocates for *statu quo* conclude the same of spirit and intellect in the abstract, as they experience in a particular concrete. But they might as well employ themselves some other way, as in concluding at all, where their data are so very insignificant. All that we know, or can know, respecting the elements of which we are compounded, is proportioned to the share that we possess them in, and adapted to the circumstances in which we possess them: this share and these circumstances therefore should be the boundary of our conclusions on the subject; within which it is possible to conclude a few particulars, but not too certainly.

Thus we observe the universality* and integrity of both these elements, spirit and intellect, in their respective

* Meaning Commonness or General Diffusion.

spheres. We observe first an universality and integrity to prevail in intellect through the mental intercourse subsisting between men of all ages and nations, by means of tradition as well as conversation, and by numberless phenomena of art, as well as of nature, exciting similar ideas between millions of intellects which never had the smallest knowledge of the bodies belonging thereto. And secondly, we observe an universality and integrity of spirit in the same passions and appetites extending and descending without let or intermission, through all times and all places, so that it might be most pertinently queried of these, as well as of some other subjects, "Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new?" (Eccles. i. 10.) To such an universality and integrity of constitution both in spirit and intellect may therefore be imputed a general affinity of moral, which is the same as of spiritual and intellectual, constituents: by means whereof all disprejudiced thinkers of the same principles and capacity will be apt to think nearly alike; entertaining nearly the same views, and drawing nearly the same conclusions therefrom: which will be a means of their finally aiming at nearly the same ends in morality, however they may vary in taste and disposition respecting things indifferent to this subject. For men who are united in spirit may be divided on many points; such as dress, amusements, habitation, &c., which they cannot so well be on points of morality fairly proposed. Moreover, as we observe in human nature the universality and integrity of these two elements, spirit and intellect respectively, so likewise in the whole sphere of this existence, as far as it is subject to our observation, collectively. And where spirit was originally united with intellect, it will be united still; where it was originally severed, it will be severed still.

And still it does not follow, from these observations, that all intellect must be like human intellect, or all spirit like human spirit; but, while from the moral and intellectual improvement occasionally perceived in some portions of

humanity, we are apt to conclude, that there is no natural impediment to the same success for others, no debasing cause or principle, which might not be surmounted by God's help, no necessary continuance for any part of mankind in the wretched degradation from which some have happily escaped—we can in like manner conceive the possible existence of such degrees or altitudes, both of spirit and intellect in other states or spheres, as man will never be able to attain by any means short of a change such as would take him out of his present body or constitution.

The class, element, or, as before named, region of intellect, may be divided into five other properties or portions, making, as it were, so many districts in this empyreal region, the highest region of the Kingdom of God in Christ: which five properties, divisions or districts will be differently named, according to different considerations; as for example, if considered in the light

1, Of Divisions or Districts; 2, Of Properties.

- 1, The Acquisitive Apprehension.
- 2, — Retentive Memory.
- 3, — Comparative Judgment.
- 4, — Decretive Will.
- 5, — Creative Imagination.

Which districts or sorts of properties are liable to be divided again into sections, or more particular properties, as may appear from their separate consideration; and

1, With respect to the property of *Apprehension*, which, if considered in a more personal light, instead of looking like a portion or district, would seem more like a whole kingdom or state, and nearly engross all the other parts which have been assigned as its correlatives; seeing the memory is nothing in fact but a protracted,—nor the judgment, but a comparative,—nor the will, but a decretive,—nor the imagination, but a creative apprehension: all these therefore might well be included under that one head, if required. And in that case too, a greater latitude

would not be assumed for apprehension, than has been commonly assumed for the same property long ago, under another name, being that of Understanding. Or, it seems hard, however, to distinguish between these two notions, apprehension and understanding, in either state, i. e. in either the present or perfect, of which they are both susceptible, so as to determine what understanding may be, if not apprehending, or what the understanding, if not the apprehension. And if by understanding, may be signified the memory, judgment, &c., as well as simple apprehension, why may not apprehension likewise signify the same? Understanding, Intelligence, Perception, Conception, and the like, are but so many synonymous terms for simple apprehension: no more is Attainment in a spiritual sense; Comprehension is rather different, meaning to embrace as well as to attain or lay hold of, and being a sort of intermediate step between apprehension and memory.

But if the forenamed casts or portions of intellect are all liable to be engrossed by one denomination, we should here endeavour, notwithstanding, to keep them all distinct, considering each of the five, above mentioned, as a property of itself: of the first of which one distinction may be worth insisting on, v. g. into two sections, being those of external and internal apprehension.

Of these two sorts, the first mentioned external is implied in the action of the senses, and therefore called Sensation; the latter independent of such action in a great degree, and therefore peculiarly styled Apprehension, except by those who would rather call it Perception. The same two properties or sorts are also known abroad by other names besides external and internal; as by those of corporeal and mental sight, for example, which have been even acknowledged in Scripture, and especially, in the following passages, in each of which their distinction and contrast is very perceptible, v. g., 1, the saying of Jesus, "This is the will of Him that sent me, that every one

which (1) seeth the Son, and (2) believeth on Him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (John vi. 40); 2, another, "Jesus saith unto him, Thomas; because thou (1) hast seen me, thou (2) hast believed: blessed are they that have not (1) seen, and yet have (2) believed" (Ib. xx. 29); as faithful Abraham, for example, of whom he tells the unbelieving Jews, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to (2) see my day: and he (2) saw it, and was glad" (Ib. viii. 56). Also (as a third example) the prophet cries out on the Jews, "O foolish people and without understanding; which (1) have eyes, and (2) see not; which (1) have ears, and (2) hear not!" (Jer. v. 21).

For what is said of apprehension by seeing may be said likewise of the same by hearing: where we find the two modes or spheres very distinct, and often separate, that is, external hearing without internal, and internal hearing without external; as in dreams and visions. But, what may seem still more remarkable, as before observed*, instances will sometimes occur of the union of these two kinds, v. g. of external and internal apprehension in dreaming or visions as clearly as in waking and common conception, or even more so; as e. g., when persons have either waked justly (if it may be so said) in sleeping, or enjoyed two waking scenes at once. Of the first mentioned condition, we have a remarkable instance in the case of St. Peter, when he was liberated by an angel in his sleep, and conscious to every part of the transaction, but unconscious to himself, and "wist not that it was true, that was done by the angel, but thought he saw a vision" (Acts xii. 9), and another, in the case of St. John being in the Spirit, as he says, on the Lord's day (Rev. i. 10). And of the second condition, or as it may be said, of two waking scenes at once, St. Paul affords a remarkable instance like-

(1) Sight corporeal—Apprehension external.

(2) Sight mental—Apprehension internal.

* Page 79.

wise, when he was enraptured certainly; but whether "in the body or out of the body," he could not say, so equal was his consciousness of both states, combining, most likely, at the time a view of the Highest Presence, with a feeling of his own petty existence. Similar to this, was also another instance, of "Balaam the son of Beor," the man who "saw the vision of the Almighty; falling into a trance, but having his eyes open" (Num. xxiv. 16). So likewise with those who were called Prophets or Seers generally, there must have been the same sort of divided consciousness, or distinction of the mental sight; theirs being, as it were in two worlds, the near and the remote, or the present and the future at once. For of the possibility of such a divided consciousness or apprehension, there can be no doubt; neither of its going forth beyond the limits of vision to real objects, and to objects in embryo without calculation, solely in the way of intuition; nor yet of its going backward likewise, and pervading the past as well as the future, like Moses in his retrospect of the creation, and St. John in that of salvation. But such instances being miraculous, will of course be rare. Indeed sight, or perception, in the last mentioned cases must be the part of a higher property than what we call apprehension: of which property it will be more pertinent to speak hereafter. Add to which, the most ordinary, as well as natural instances of this division or abstraction, as it is properly called, of the apprehension, are to be found in the first mentioned case or condition, v. g. of external without internal apprehension among persons seemingly awake. And this unfortunately is but too often the fate even of God's Word, whether heard in public, or studied in private. It must be owned, indeed, that all that passes for this word does not require the deepest apprehension of which we are capable; there are in it some things to be heard, some read, some marked, some learned, some to be inwardly digested. At the same time, equally true it is, that of what deserves to be carefully learned and deeply

digested, many excellent morsels often pass, like dishes at a great banquet, untasted and unregarded. But let us now consider these two properties, or two kinds of one,—the external and internal apprehension, briefly apart.

—1, The property of *external* apprehension, which is here mentioned as an intellectual constituent, resembles that of sensation before noticed, in the spiritual class, and agrees with the same likewise so far, that it may be necessary to point out their distinction, which seems to consist chiefly in this, v. g. that mere sensation does not imply any necessary connexion of itself with intellect; neither does it require altogether the modifying organs by which our external apprehension is varied, but may belong to plants as well as animals, since those have the sensation of light, heat, savour, and odour too perhaps; as well as these, if they have not the appropriate organs. Consequently that may be separated from sensation, which is the very essence of external apprehension, v. g. a notion, image, or specific impression. For example, the eye may feel, and that most painfully, the sensation of light, without any particular object or image being apprehended; the ear may be stunned by an overpowering noise, without apprehending any definite sound; the palate may be satiated, even to loathing, without the apprehension or perception of any particular flavour, whatever may be the real object or cause of such sensations. As an example of these phenomena, may be cited, the case of a man sleeping in a thunder storm, who both sees, smells, tastes, hears and feels, when the objects of these sensations are presented to him, feeling their presence, but not perceiving the objects: the glare of the lightning distresses his sight; the sulphurous vapour his olfactory nerves; the subtle acid disgusts his palate; the roar of the thunder awakes him, and his whole body thrills with the shock, if it be not paralysed. Thus the man will see, smell, taste, hear, feel,—and that most intensely; but what? Why nothing: no object perceptible to his apprehension; and it may be

his fate, never to know what it is, that has so terribly overpowered his senses. But should the man be allowed to survive, and happen to wake up in the midst of the din, it may be said of him, that he has felt sleeping what he now apprehends waking.

And if people are not prepared for the doctrine of a man's feeling in his sleep, what would they think of his feeling when dead? For such may be the case too, and will most assuredly, at that awful crisis, when the pealing of the last trump shall be felt one moment, and apprehended the next; but in a storm of which none that was ever felt or seen upon earth can afford the most distant conception.

External apprehension is a process between sensation and conception, or between the access of ideas and their final apprehension: it is the end of sensation, and the beginning of perception; being virtually, but not substantially distinguished from either. For these three, being so many distinct parts, are yet all employed on one object or material notwithstanding; as in the animal economy sanguification succeeds digestion, and is itself succeeded by a still more elaborate preparation; the end, as well as the beginning of the process, being altogether three parts with only one material.

—2, Therefore, when the object or material has thus been grappled with, and laid hold of, literally apprehended and taken into custody as it were, the final or *internal* apprehension views it in confinement, it is under the eye of internal apprehension, and subject likewise to every other intellectual property or process; the memory, judgment, will, imagination, and others, if there be others, with the faculties, arts, methods and inventions founded thereon respectively, as learning and teaching, hearing and speaking, &c. The image of an outward object is now assimilated as closely as it can be to the inner man; as closely as a man's diet, or any part of it, can be assimilated by the outer; and helps to swell the bulk of that, as diet

to swell the bulk of this. Food in the belly, or in any other position, is not, nor ever can be, an ingredient of the human shell, or of the outer man; no more can sensible objects or images be lasting ingredients of the heart or kernel, as we consider it; because these both consist of properties to which the others only serve as matter or fuel: but as near as any one subject can be to identification with another, so near to the body is food thoroughly assimilated, so near are objects internally apprehended to the soul or intellectual spirit.

And here a question might be raised, that were very trying for any theorist, and more especially for one who has ventured to assert a general hypothesis on the subject to which it relates, because such a one has not merely to answer in that case, but to answer on his own principles. The question then is, How or by what means are objects internally apprehended? what is it within us that apprehends them? and where are they when apprehended? Because it has been asserted, that the soul is an assemblage of properties as well as the body, the apprehension being one. But where is the apprehender or subject of apprehension; who or what is he, and how does he perform his part? To this question the answer may be twofold, one general, and the other particular. 1, For a *general* answer, enough has been said already. It is the apprehension that apprehends, and is also formed by apprehending; as it is the light that shines, and is formed by shining; or as it is life that lives, and is formed by living. If this answer prove not satisfactory, it will be hard to come nearer to a general conclusion that may be so. And the second sort of answer, though more *particular*, is not different in principle from this. For if it should be asked, What is it that apprehends this or that sort of object particularly? it may be answered, a corresponding apprehension: and no other answer can or will be thought of. e. g. Some objects are more spiritual or heavenly, as they say; some, more natural or earthly.—How, or by what

means are these different sorts of objects apprehended respectively, who, or what is it that apprehends them, and what is to become of these particular apprehensions?

St. Paul may inform us on these intricate points, although he was not a professed metaphysician: he will tell us, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things; yet he himself is judged of no man. For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ" (Cor. I. ii. 14, &c.). So then the Spirit of God will apprehend the Spirit of God; and the mind of Christ will apprehend the mind of Christ. The Highest Intellectual Spirit alone can apprehend the Highest Spirit or Intellect, and others by Him: as a man in one STATE cannot see what passes in another, any more than a man in one place. For there is an affinity, a sort of elective attraction in spiritual and intellectual as well as in natural and earthly ingredients, by means of which like tends to like continually. And thereto our Saviour's doctrine also agrees where he says, "Whosoever hath to him shall be given" (Mat. xiii. 12). Or if a man would have something more intrinsic in us, something like a substratum to apprehend or receive the treasures of science, and nothing but a substratum will satisfy him; let him tell us, what is the substratum to receive more ordinary treasures sometimes, as a drop of water for example—what may be the substratum when one drop takes another? for it were as easy to tell, what may be the substratum, when too ideas meet. It is hard to trace the progress of sense even to the first degree of intellect: therefore the hope of tracing it farther may seem almost ridiculous.

These two sorts of apprehension, v. g., external and internal, with the modes above mentioned, are the most memorable of all that can be considered essential; the rest of that class, of which there are several, being rather charac-

teristic. And the radical property of apprehension having thus been noticed, from which those of memory, judgment, will, imagination, take their rise, and many other branches of intellect through them, it will not be requisite to dwell particularly, or at much length, on these in an occasional sketch like the present; which is subservient to other purposes than those of metaphysical science: yet it may be useful to observe them a little, and somewhat of them in common.

It has been already observed how these properties, v. g., of memory, judgment, will, imagination differ, as well as how they agree in proceeding alike from simple apprehension; when the difference between it and them was shewn to be less on comparison than may be generally conceived: and the more we compare their subjects the less this difference will appear.

2, The second named property of *Memory*, will be an example to this effect: for as the apprehension or holding is but the first sight of an object continued, so memory is nothing more than a continued, and as it were closer, apprehension. It is a sort of annexation to the intellectual principality or district, but without any distinct form or process, of what is acquired for it by simple apprehension with the help of other correlatives, particularly of the imagination. So that it may be as hard to draw the line between memory and apprehension as between the property and accidents of either. And therefore it is a false conclusion respecting the memory or continued apprehension, to look on this likewise as a substratum, or as a corner of the general substratum which people imagine in the mind. Yet such a conclusion is soon set up: and then they talk of the memory being richly stored with knowledge, facts or ideas; as if the memory was one thing, and its acts or simple constituents another, the same as a store-room would be one thing, and its stores another; or a magazine one thing, and its merchandize another: whereas the intellectual store and store-room are all one; and the intel-

lectual merchandize will keep itself without a magazine. But all this mistaking proceeds from the same gross conception, which requires a foundation, floor, or substratum for every spiritual and intellectual property to rest on, as well as for the material; materializing immaterial things, to suit a material apprehension. For material things must needs adhere to material; as spiritual to spiritual, and intellectual to intellectual; their natural affinity requires, and they cannot exist without it: but the subjunction of material things to intellectual can be no more necessary, than of intellectual to material; and it were as reasonable to suppose that no material body could exist without a mind, as that no mind could exist without a material body.

The memory is liable to be connected with other properties of its own heavenly nature; and then may be regarded as a basis itself to certain secondary properties, such as conscience, e. g., with its varieties and dependents likewise; and to faculties, as that of recollection, and others equally dependent again on this, either useful and pleasant, or useless and terrible Gift—as it may happen to be employed. The memory itself is now mentioned only as an essential constituent of the heavenly kingdom: but if its characteristic quality was to be indicated, it could not be better accomplished any how than by an exposition of its importance to the next mentioned intellectual property or class, being,

3, The comparative class of intellectual properties usually called *Judgment*; by which is not to be understood at present a particular act only, but its repetition or habit; as by apprehension in the forecited use of the word was understood, not any particular apprehension, but the property or habit of apprehending. The foundation of judgment is memory, as aforesaid: but it will also have at the same time other foundations or principles equally indispensable; as attention, deliberation, comparison, decision; which are all likewise variable by various criterions. Indeed the composition of this, as of other proper-

ties, is in all points precisely the same with that of every individual act or accident of which it is composed.

Of the parts or kinds of judgment the most remarkable are those formed by two distinct objects, v.g., ourselves and others; by which our judgment is distinguished into two sorts, foreign and domestic—that regarding other men and theirs; this ourselves and ours. For however unbecoming such a distinction may seem in theory, in practice it is real enough, and no distinction more common. And farther than this we shall hardly find among the different kinds of judgment, though sufficiently numerous, a distinction that is not more characteristic than several kinds of its correlatives that might be mentioned. Therefore, as the characteristic class of constituents is reserved for future consideration, it does not seem necessary to insist any more here on the essential property of judgment.

4, The *Will* is another intellectual property, and a correlative of the last mentioned: but its being also most important in the characteristic type makes it subject to the last observation; and the most that needs to be said of it now, is a word in apology for the station it here occupies among intellectual constituents; as the property may appear at first sight more spiritual, and more allied to appetite. But a little consideration will shew, that the property of willing is not placed by this arrangement at all above its rank in the heavenly corps, and that it is most nearly allied to the two between which a station has been assigned it, namely to judgment on the one hand and to imagination on the other. It would be beside the purpose to enter here into a formal demonstration of this fact; and only a little reflection may also make it apparent to every one how the judgment, the will and the imaginations of the heart are nearly identified as one in most of us; especially when the characteristic types of the will, as good-will, free-will, &c., are compared with the essential. For of these, that is of essential types, there are also instances though rare; as, 1, a divided will, which we call Hesitation; 2, a decided

will, which we call Resolution ; and, 3, one still more decided perhaps, which we call Determination, with perhaps some others, which it does not seem necessary to look after, as these may serve for a sample. No more does it seem necessary to look after many particulars of the forthcoming and only remaining essential property of the intellectual kind to be now considered : which is,

5, The property of *Imagination* : the same being indeed a theme at once so slender and so slippery that one should hardly know how to take hold, or how to say much of it, if one was so disposed : and the spiritual historian might be glad, that he is not obliged to dwell on such airy portraiture in the way of his undertaking ; the most that can be expected on this behalf, consisting in the enumeration of a few principal features in the proper objects of his attention, and the main of which it will be soon enough to produce at the same time with their objects.

Therefore, although the imagination rank as high as the top of the very topmost class of essential properties, being that by which a human intellect communicates immediately with the divine, the known with the unknown, the intrinsic with the extrinsic, the spotted and mixed with the immaculate and unalloyed—as appears in its characteristic type ; yet it will not be proper to insist now even on this last property any farther than just to indicate an essential distinction of the same. This distinction will comprehend two principal differences or conditions of the imagination, which we find between sleeping and waking ; and which simply considered have neither of them any moral character or perfection, as in simply being awake there is neither good nor evil, nor yet in being asleep. And, yet considered in another view, from these two principal varieties of the highest intellectual constituent may be deduced some very decided characteristics ; as sweet sleep on this, vigilance, alertness, &c., on that : although with regard to these varieties, and also with regard to other properties similarly founded on the imagination, as discovery and invention, skill and ingenuity, and faculties likewise of the

same foundation, as lying, fiction, &c., with one exception there is nothing to be said.

The instance excepted is that of the two first mentioned properties, discovery and invention ; which differ from each other by a single shade only ; one being more spiritual, as it implies outward motion ; the other more intellectual, as it implies only the motion of the mind : while either of them shall be equally considered, as a faculty built on the imagination. And it may be useful to notice this particular, if only for the sake of shewing by an example how faculties are constructed : which is, by adding the property of volition to another property, as in this case to the imagination. For we may understand two sorts of imagination, voluntary and involuntary in this respect ; the first mentioned sort being what is commonly understood as the faculty of imagination or invention. A very uncertain faculty however, if it be one, at the best ! We find performance indeed quite another thing in every pure operation of the understanding from what it is in any in which the members of the body or its organs either are engaged : but most particularly in the invention of subjects that have no ostensible train or climax by which they may be apprehended, any more than the wind, which a man might as soon gather in his fists (Prov. xxx. 4). And the most a man can do towards such an apprehension is, simply, to bend his sails, and put the helm of his understanding on the course he means to steer when the breeze or tide of inspiration shall serve. A man cannot do better in that case than as the Psalmist advises, “ stand in awe, and sin not : commune with your own heart, and in your chamber, and be still ” (Ps. iv. 4). For the exercise of the mind alone may be sufficient in a trying case, without any sort of bodily motion, to say nothing of fatigue ; and of what use is it ? Much time may be spent in looking for the wind, much weariness felt in waiting, much trouble in keeping a man’s versatile imagination to the point ; but without feeling the wind, which he cannot

without laying himself out for it, and patiently waiting for and ardently expecting it, he can never advance towards his object. Therefore, "Though it tarry, wait for it" (Hab. ii. 3), may be a good rule on this head; and the Psalmist's a good example; as he says, "I waited patiently for the Lord: and he inclined to me, and heard my calling" (Ps. xl. 1). But such a dependence as this, however agreeable it may be, will abate very much of the consequence of our faculties; and may make them appear to be less substantial in their existence, perhaps, than the world generally supposes*.

* To remove any objection which may arise on the view that is here taken of the subject of FACULTIES, a farther definition of the same may be convenient: and especially, to distinguish these from constituent properties, whether essential or characteristic. For which purpose it should be observed, 1, that faculties are understood, in relation to the human species at least, as plain acquirements; which shews, that they cannot be *essential*: 2, that as the good or evil of faculties must depend on their application, they cannot be *characteristic* either: and 3, that however intimately faculties may be received and assimilated, there can be no more reason for regarding them as *constituents*, than for so regarding that which is received outwardly. For being taken into, or endowed upon the imagination or any other central property cannot make a foreign matter to become a part or constituent of the subject, any more than its being taken into his body or circumference; an error in the judgment any more than a thorn in the flesh, it is to be hoped. The constituents of human intellect are a part of its creation, the faculties depending thereon a part of its education: the difference of the two articles seems obvious enough. Yet it may not be amiss to illustrate the same by an example.

And as these two particulars, *v. g. properties* and *faculties*, seem to refer to a double creation, the said example would not be unaptly taken from the operation of the divine Word, which is a prime agent in both, and the miracles of our Lord Christ, which were generally performed on constituents, rarely, if ever on faculties. This may be thought some evidence of the reality and supremacy of those miracles: and at any rate is a circumstance that may enable us with due attention to discriminate between these nearly related subjects. Thus, in operating on the deaf and dumb person, as we read, it does not appear that our Lord did either restore or communicate the faculty of speech, but the property of sound or utterance, which is an essential constituent of every created being, though not *voluntary and spontaneous* as in man, and in most other animals. For it is evident from the two different accounts of the affliction thus removed, one ascribing it to an evil possession (Mat. ix. 32—Luke xi. 14), and another to some unfor-

It is not here meant to be asserted, that the five radical or essential properties above mentioned are all the essential sorts of an intellectual cast or quality : for there may be others of which we have no conception ; and we know there are other faculties which have not been mentioned, because, however important they may be in themselves, they are not so in reference to the objects of this discussion ; as the properties of learning and experience, and also the remarkable faculty of ABSTRACTION or CONDENSATION, being one by which many apprehensions, recollections, conclusions, determinations, imaginations are blended and form one image ; making, as it may be said,

tunate impediment (Mark vii. 32.), that such affliction was not natural, but adventitious, and subsequent to the knowledge and enjoyment of speech.

The part required, therefore, was more than to have such knowledge communicated, it was to have a constituent restored, or the use of a constituent restored, which had been bound for some time by Satan, according to the more spiritual account, or obstructed by some defect of the organs, according to the more material : and this part the divine Operator performed solely by the Word, his Principle ; the person so healed, owing to man secondarily as its medium the blessed faculty of speech, to God immediately, the creation and restoration of the power or essential property.

So in the gift of healing others, which our Saviour imparted to his first apostles (Mat. x. 8 &c.), there was no art, or skilful process like that which we justly esteem in physicians included, but a spiritual property—opposite in its character, but in other respects similar to that by which hereditary and infectious diseases are communicated. So, likewise, in the gift of eloquence, which is an improvement on the faculty of speech, as great almost as that faculty on the natural constituent of spontaneous sound or utterance, no act nor even cogitation was included, whenever the Saviour bestowed it on his apostles and faithful professors after he left them corporeally ; as he often did according to his promise. “ And when they bring you into the synagogues, and unto magistrates and powers, (said he,) take ye no thought how, or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say. For the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say” (Luke xii. 11, 12). To have given the art either of healing, or of eloquence would have been as easy for the divine Bestower as to give the property or performance : which appears from the gift of languages or tongues to his disciples by the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost : but what he gave being freest from suspicion was most convincing, and therefore best suited to the purpose for which it was given.

of many one, and one that might still be adapted to use by repeated abstractions.

§ 3. If any thing can shew the poverty and contraction of the human intellect, compared with others that may be conceived, it must be the necessity of the last mentioned property (or faculty rather) of abstraction, which is the root of more complex constituents. And a necessity it is too that increases with the course and progress of complexity: so that a double share of abstraction will be required continually for the production of every class of constituents, as it succeeds another in that course and progress; and if the whole detail of reiterated acts, by which a property is composed, must be abstracted, to make room for that being the lowest or least complex constituent, another abstraction will be necessary upon that for the production of *Elements*; which are next in point of complexity, being formed as aforesaid by the union of properties; also, for another and another again in the more and more complex degrees that follow. With all this poverty of intellect, therefore, it may be thought much, for a man to be able to acquire by reflexion an idea of his own constituency, so as to feel how fearfully and wonderfully he is made. This may seem much indeed, being much more than any other earthly creature can be supposed to feel: yet by dint of his natural superiority, and its use in reflexion, man is enabled not only to feel the inward effects, but also to comprehend the outward process of his own making, to a certain extent; the beginning, or first act being a secret of his Author's; which no man, nor any other intellectual, it may be presumed, can ever penetrate, though he can hardly help owning it. And then, if a man can only conceive the possibility of a first act, or a First Cause, he may both deduce therefrom all the consequences that we behold in creation, and also learn to distinguish these consequences, both from their First Cause and from his FIAT, as clearly as the sound of an in-

strument is distinguished from the hand that formed it, and the stroke by which such sound is excited or produced. This seems an agreeable encouragement for any one to proceed in tracing the subject or constitution of the kingdom; as the end of such an undertaking may be also consequently expected in something more than empty sound, or unavailing information. Considering, therefore, this combination, called elements, first in the abstract, or any subject, we may specify these two, namely, 1 Matter, 2 Mode, as examples of the same.

1. The *Matter* of a subject is that *of* which it consists, and differently named, according to the light in which it may be considered; as e. g.

if	{	absolute	{	Essence,
				Existence.
	{	relative	{	internal { Constitution,
				Substance,
			{	external { Property,
				Work, Performance, &c.

The variety of matter is endless; as may be gathered only from its specification in the three several kinds of properties, material, spiritual, and intellectual before mentioned. For if the first of these have engrossed the family-name, as being (perhaps) the elder of the three upon earth, as well as the most conspicuous branch of the three, there are, nevertheless, these same three sorts of matter, namely, 1, Matter properly so called, 2, Spirit, 3, Intellect: and after their exhibition in the class and degree of properties given above, there will be no great difficulty, perhaps, in

1, apprehending such an element as matter by abstracting or mentally condensing the class of material properties above described, so as to form one general (however abstract and confused) notion of that lowest element of the kingdom, v. g. *Matter*, and its several particulars. With the same faculty any one may be capable 2, of drawing the spiritual class of properties to a focus in the point or element of *Spirit*; also, 3, of condensing the intellectual rays or

properties before mentioned in the point or element of *Intellect*. The notion of these three several elements of the kingdom, v.g. 1, matter, 2, spirit, 3, intellect, being therefore once conceived by abstracting or condensing their particulars as aforesaid, they are afterwards easily resolved and currently mentioned as matters of course; and more confidently too, if not more consciously, than their primitive constituents. For, however it may seem, their difference—or the difference that obtains between the three forementioned elements, matter, spirit, intellect—is not such as that of three distinct things, and yet sufficiently decided to yield three very evident notions in one subject; whether the same be considered as elements, or as kinds of properties: shewing that the material element is not the spiritual, nor the spiritual element the intellectual, nor consequently the intellectual either of those; but that they are all in themselves equally substance of the kingdom, or the subject under consideration; all equally essence in respect of their necessity; all equally presence in respect of their perceptivity; and in respect of each other, all at the same time precisely indiscriminable. They are all felt spiritually and conceived intellectually; their mode, design, or character—and their virtue, spirit, or effect—and their being, life, or essence are all one, in fact, however distinguishable to a certain degree in our apprehension. Men's notions of these three elements or kinds may be innumerable, but the same three will still be only one subject or thing; their description may also be one thing, and their perception another: but all will not serve to make two things of them, leaving three out of the question. Notwithstanding so strict an unity, however, it is usual to consider these elements as fountains; and properties as streams detached, rather than as streams springing out of them.—And a man would not be well understood who should describe classes of properties as elements with their relations and accidents simply as they are.

2. Of the second abstract element, or element of the

abstract subject, *Mode*, above named, a few particulars may also be observed. But if one should go to define the expression, as usual, in the first place, it would be found absolutely too simple for a definition: it is only in relation to the subject from which, and the object to which it proceeds, that a mode is definable; being a design or conception in relation to that, a boundary or description in relation to this; or generally that in which, as the other element, matter, was said to be that of which, our object, or ANY subject, consists.

As for its distinction, or the kinds of modes; they are properly two, Persons, and Things: Places are also named sometimes, as an intermediate species; whence three sorts of modes; Persons, Places, and Things, have been conceived: but Place cannot well be considered in so distinct a light; the same being, in strictness, a property of things, and answerable to Habitation with persons, rather than a correlative or parallel subject. The use of this deduction is, to prepare for a better acquaintance with the first named sort of mode particularly, and not forgetting the last; the first named sort being Persons, and its subject Personality, a subject that is found to have a more than metaphysical importance in Christian Modes of Thinking and Doing; entering, therefore, on the particulars of the subject accordingly,

1, A *Person* will appear to have two meanings, 1, perfect and conclusive; 2, partial and inclusive as aforesaid: by a perfect person or presence being meant, a presenting of the subject, either actually as he, or symbolically as some other subject exists in every and to every sense or respect, of which either the subject or object or both are susceptible; by a partial person or presence being meant, a presenting of the subject in some, or by, or to some respect or respects of the subject, or object, or both. For in every case the person or subject and the object or percipient must be more or less alike for the purpose of perception: spirit, e. g., is not presented to matter, nor matter

to spirit, nor either to intellect, without a sprinkling of itself in the object. A person may not only be presented, but also enthroned, and reign universally in either the spiritual or the intellectual department, without being there materially, which, as before signified, is impossible for an immaterial subject. But, such a subject will have the advantage of being presented more intimately, and also of ruling and directing in either, or in all three of the forementioned departments, by his own special presence.

—1, In its *perfect* and conclusive meaning, Person, will signify a description, presence, or representation of an intellectual subject, in opposition to the other sort of mode, denoting a presence without intellect: and it may be either absolute as the subject in itself; like Man, Angel, Spirit, for example; or relative, as the subject in its presence, like Opponent, Partner, Antagonist, &c., being rendered with this view in the original of the New Testament, by Παρουσία and Πρόσωπον, that is in English, Presence, generally speaking. And upon this relative view of the mode, namely, as consisting in presence, we may, by help of the relations aforesaid, literally understand so many different sorts of person; specifying the same, likewise, thereafter, and in the order of their complexity, as follows: namely, 1, universal; 2, general; 3, special; 4, proper, or particular. Considering the different sorts of persons here mentioned distinctly,

=1, The first mentioned *universal* person, or presence, will be an abstract of the whole undivided presence of any intellectual nature or being; as 1, God; 2, Man; v. g. God always, as well as when He was only one person, v. g. to Himself; and man once, being then by possibility all men in one, and all taking their mode from one. For upon this point also we may distinguish two sorts of persons and things; some existing by possibility, implication, necessity; and others in effect—or more shortly, some being future, and some present. So Adam was once by necessity or implication, millions of millions of men

born, tempted, falling, dying; to wit, by necessity or implication. Such is the most complex; or, as aforesaid, universal person, differing from Nature, or Being only by the relation of presence; as was also before observed. Any one may conceive the difference between a subject in possibility and in existence, or even in a train for existence; as the first will not only include the second, but all that may be added to it; and hence proceeds among such subjects as we are considering,

=2, A *general* sort of person, comprising all that either are, or have been, but not, that may or will be; as the person of angels, or, "the heavenly host" (Luke ii. 13), implying the general order or host, as it is called, of angels in being; or, "the person of men" (Mat. xxii. 16), implying the common run of mankind, not in nature, or possibility, however, but in fact and existence. Of this general, as well as of the preceding universal sort of person, we have an example in that apostrophe of the Psalmist to his Maker, "What is man that thou art mindful of him: and the son of man, that thou visitest him? Thou madest him lower than the angels, to crown him with glory and worship" (Ps. viii. 4, 5). In an inferior degree of complexity to this is

=3, The *special* person; which implies a class of beings, somewhat more particular than the preceding; as the holy angels, angels of light, angels of God, or the Lord, the angel of the Lord, the children of God, of the Lord, or of light; and the evil angels, angels of darkness, the devil and his angels, the wicked one, the children of the wicked, or of the wicked one, the children of the devil. And for special persons of the human being we have examples answering to either of the above mentioned, and derived from its root; as the good and the wicked, the just and the unjust, and men of every quality and condition, as well as in every relation of which they are susceptible; particularly the rich and the poor, two persons that are often contrasted, as in that beautiful clause of the Levitical law, "Thou shalt not respect the

person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty ; (to which another person is also added) but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour" (Lev. xix. 15). The persons of the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, are also objects of that admirable code (Deut. xxiv. 19, &c.).

Sometimes the sum or whole of a common person, like one of the forementioned, is referred to an individual in place of a kind; as Israel the people to Israel the patriarch; and his family and followers also to the same by himself before they were a people, as when he "said to Simeon and Levi, Ye have troubled me, to make me stink among the inhabitants of the land, among the Canaanites and the Perizzites: and I being few in number, they shall gather themselves against me" &c. (Gen. xxxiv. 30). As we also read, on the contrary, of an unclean spirit in the Gospel, which was called Legion, because he was many in one (Luke viii. 30); and if not actually, at least by implication; as Pride, e. g. may be called a Demon of demons, or a hundred tempting in one; and making, so far, but one person, one special, consistent, and very indiscriminable person.

=4, The fourth and last sort of person to be mentioned in the kingdom for such objects as will appear hereafter, is the proper or *particular*, i. e. the private mode of the subject or person; being presented in particular instances, as in Peter, and James, and John, in each of whom, all and every portion of the human being existed alike, and gave a very fair sample of the kind, or rather of what it was capable of; while, in common samples, perhaps, we shall have so many pounds of gravity, so many feet of extension, some few grains of good sense, and not enough of any other good principle to be very flattering to humanity. For every individual man is a combination of modes and materials taken out of the heap, and adjusted in a certain proportion, or within a general mode; being distinct enough here, but more so hereafter.

Yet, allowing for the difference to which subjects are liable in this respect, one man may serve, therefore, as a sample of the race; and so may one of another order of intellectual spirits, as of angels good and bad.

—2, It should be observed, that the foregoing are all instances of perfect persons, i. e. of whole or conclusive modes of this sort; but there are likewise instances of *partial* or *inclusive*; and that, as in others, so especially in the proper or particular sort now last mentioned: it being very common to intend only the corporeal presence of an individual when his person is proposed, a third part only for the whole. And hence, as we have Πρόσωπον in Greek, to signify presence generally, so Πρόσωπον τοῦ σώματος in the New Testament, to denote the corporeal person, or presence in particular; being so used by St. Paul in a chapter that is replete with such distinctions (Cor. II. x.). But if the whole person may be presented by a part, one should think the spirit a worthier medium than the body; and to have a person, as it were, before our eyes in spirit, seems also by much the more satisfactory sight, as we may then conceive better both what he is, and what he is capable of. Though it must be owned that a man's spiritual presence is more likely to elude observation than his corporeal; as it happened by the spirit of Elisha, or his "heart" as it is said; when it went with Gehazi after Naaman, and he little suspected what a witness he had of his knavery (Kings II. v. 26), or as it happens by a Higher Presence that knaves think little, and honest men can never think enough of.

A man's memory, that he leaves behind him, on removing either to a distant part of the world, or clean out of it, is also a partial sort of person or presence, and may be called intellectual; or intellectual and spiritual, a more finished presence, when such memory is followed, or as we may say clothed, with affection. And as both in this and the former example, it appears that a person may be either a partial representation, or but partially represented; so, on the other hand, may it likewise present, not two in-

tellectual beings certainly, but two kinds of intellectual being, or two degrees of the same at once; as the human and angelic, or even the human and divine. Indeed, it is as easy to conceive, how all these three natures may be presented in one individual, as how any two, or only one; also, how the same person may be at once a **SAMPLE** (if so familiar an expression is here allowable) not only of human and angelic being, but also of the divine; and consequently, present the same to each other simultaneously; v. g. men and angels to God, and God to angels and men—an object of love to all, and to the last mentioned natures, an object also of dependence, hope, and adoration.

But our earthly intercourse with corporeal beings is so clear and constant, and at the same time our observation of the incorporeal, so faint and rare, that we have hardly any conception of the personality, or particular presence of the latter. It would even look like a solecism to talk of an angel or spirit in this way. As if, e. g. speaking of angels, indefinitely, one should say, Raphael, or any other person; as we might say, Thomas, or any other person, in speaking of men: but we must say Raphael, or any other angel; unless we would rather go farther about, and say Raphael, or any other individual of the angelic host or kind. Thus, it would seem, as if men were the only persons to themselves; no persons of angels, nor spirits; no angel, no spirit, nor even the Deity himself could be a person, or individually presented. But a little consideration might be likely to teach us, that if intellectuals of a foreign race and constitution be no persons to us, they may be some to each other; also, how either of the forementioned natures, being equally spiritual, though not of equal degree, is tacitly regarded as a general person, or one of either, as a particular person immediately on being so presented, by the change of the pronoun from the material to the personal type in such languages as consult the meaning of nouns more than some in their etymology. For any sort of intellectual spirit, which takes the neuter pronoun in a

substantive state, will take the masculine in a transitive; and now it is personified, now it is an active being, now no longer It, but He. It comes partly of our using an ellipsis continually without heeding it, that human individuals are regarded as the only persons in the world: being every thing to themselves, and thinking little of any other intellectual class, it does not occur to them, to say, Thomas, or any other human person; but simply, Thomas, or any other person, as if there were not persons of any other class or kind.

And what are those precious samples of humanity, that they should be considered, or consider themselves, however, as persons especially? Why, a person of this frail kind is like a bottle of air, a fugitive nature, secluded within limits that are impervious while they last, but easily broken. The bottle gives their *mode*: and as the column of air contained in a phial is to that without, so is the matter, spirit, and intellect of every such being to the sum of these elements, restrained and cut off from its sources at present, but ready to escape and reunite therewith on the first convenient occasion. The whole human race, therefore, individually taken, may be likened to an heap of bottles; the great mass broken and forgotten; each dead one being "like a broken vessel" (Ps. xxxi. 14), some comparatively sound, but none sealed, none lasting, none that will hold always. They are like the fumes evaporating from an empty vessel, till "the pitcher be broken at the fountain, or the wheel broken at the cistern. Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God, who gave it" (Eccles. xii. 6, 7). But who can tell how his own merely, much less all the bottles of the Lord are filled? We read of phials and vessels of wrath (Rom. ix. 22. Rev. xv. 7, &c.); we have also felt the breaking of some of these phials in a most convulsive era; we daily meet with phials of malice and ignorance, by chance also with some of wisdom and benevolence. However it may be, they are all inflated by

the same breath, even by the Spirit of Omnipotence. No other phial can be of so much consequence to a man as his own; and however it may be coloured by climes or circumstances, this every man ought to mind first. For it is not the quality or colouring of the vessel that signifies, but of its contents. St. Paul was proud to possess the treasure of Christ in an earthen vessel (Cor. II. iv. 7). So may any other man: if he has nothing else to be proud of, he may be proud of this; and full of his treasure he will think, if he do not say it, MY MIND IS MY FORTUNE; my present resource against want and obscurity, my future dependence for honour and felicity: it is a blessing with which Heaven has liberally visited me, and supplied the deficiency of every other advantage; an ample estate, in the improvement of which is my interest, my study, and delight. "The Lord himself is the portion of mine inheritance, and of my cup: Thou shalt maintain my lot. The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground: yea, I have a goodly heritage" (Ps. xvi. 6, 7).

There are also other significations applied to Person, besides those which have just been enumerated; as, particularly, the grammatical of persons in a sentence corresponding with the real: But this and the like are not worth insisting on, that they should detain us from matters more relevant.

2, *Things*, the other principal sort of modes above named will include, in a general way, every sort of subject without intellect; i. e., without the sublime faculty of speech, or some higher mode of communication; also, loosely speaking, with these advantages. And things, too, properly understood, like persons, are classible in so many ways by different criterions, that it would be endless and unavailing to attempt their enumeration. But a few abstract properties of things may be worth mentioning for a sample; as novelty, rarity, and antiquity; strangeness, probability, possibility, &c.; with their sub-modes and derivatives; prodigy, miracle, &c.; because they too are class-

ible as well as the terms before cited ; making novelties, rarities, antiquities, probabilities, prodigies, miracles, &c.

Besides this simple view of the subject of modes, making only two sorts, which are Persons and Things, above mentioned, they are also liable to be reviewed, and apparently multiplied by the several combinations that were mentioned with them, making collective and complex modes of either sort ; as of Persons, besides those before enumerated, corporations, communities, &c. ; of Things, systems, collections, heaps, &c. ; and of both, kingdoms, classes, orders, and the like. So that only from the example here given, it may appear, how the elements of the kingdom are all one with its properties so combined. While in another degree of complexity we may also perceive, how the last mentioned element, Mode, applies to other divisions of matter, as well as to the intellectual, which consists in thinking and doing, and the mixed, which consists in three sorts of properties, the material, spiritual, and intellectual above described.

§ 4. For there are several methods by which the properties, or elements of the kingdom may be gathered, abstracted, or condensed again into *Parts* ; but the chief and most natural are only two : and even these will not be without their difficulties in a subject at once so universal as well as simple and continuous, as the Kingdom of God in Christ. The first method is that of the subject's formation, proceeding gradually from the simplest constituents as above described ; the second, that of life or existence, proceeding likewise from the same simple constituents, but in the way of succession instead of formation, in the order of time, instead of selection and constitution. Considering them both distinctly ; but one here, and another hereafter :

The first mentioned method having its rise in the simplest constituents of the subject, which are accidents, as aforesaid, will furnish several distinctions, of which,

1. The *first* depends immediately on the union or con-

traction of the three elements just mentioned in two ways both tending to the same effect ; as follows, v. g.,

I.		II.	
ELEMENTS.	PARTS.	ELEMENTS.	PARTS.
1. Matter,	} make 3 {	1. Matter,	} active, doings, contemplative, thinking, {
2. Spirit,		2. Spirit,	
3. Intellect,		3. Intellect,	
			{ Body: Soul :

the manner of which deserves to be explained ; as it may in two parts, shewing, 1, how the subject or kingdom is divided into Thinking and Doing, or, Theory and Practice ; next into their equivalents, the Soul and Body.

First, for example ; if the subject of the Kingdom were divided or distinguished into the two constituent parts of *Thinking* and *Doing*, or Theory and Practice, it would amount to the same effect as what follows. Theory is intellect, and its fruit to the mind what the fruits of nature are to the body, its means of development, its food and support : practice is spirit, and to the inner man what the taste and digestion are to the outer, formation and enjoyment, or corruption and suffering, as it may happen. There is nothing in nature, or above, or beside, that ever was thought on, nor any thing that was ever deduced therefrom by art, but what belongs to the first, and may be a subject of the second. Even practice itself belongs to theory, and theory may be a subject of practice, as likewise practice itself ; since it is the part of practice either to describe, try, consider, and believe, or confute the one ; or to alter, improve, and encourage, or discourage the other. So things which are not within the controul of any artist, besides the tendency of his performance ; as the immutable order of nature, for example, are still subjects for practice in some shape or other : if we cannot change their nature, we may their destination ; or if we cannot change their destination, we may apply its discovery to some useful part.

Applying these observations to thinking and doing, the two principal parts, as they may be called, of the Kingdom of God in Christ, we shall perceive where they belong to theory, and in what respects they are rather objects of

practice. Thinking is theory : it is the part of the internal sphere, and the immediate cause of doing : it is the LIFE OF THE SPIRITUAL BODY ; which a man passes in himself remote from observation, secretly and securely with respect to other men, but openly and accountably with respect to God, who is as much within a man's thoughts as they are within the man. Doing is practice, the part of the external sphere, and an effect of thinking : it is the LIFE OF THE NATURAL BODY ; which is protracted in the world, as the other is out of it ; and of course not always so secretly, nor independently, but that the world may observe and animadvert upon the same, though it take its rise from within ; or, as our Lord expresses it, " out of the abundance of the heart " (Mat. xii. 34). For out of the heart (says he) " proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies " (Ib. xv. 19) ; which are proper objects for human animadversion. And in fact doing, whether good or evil in a moral acceptation, must be regarded as the consummation of thinking ; thinking, as inward doing, so close is their affinity. Yet thinking and doing will not be the same part ; as appears from this, v. g., that there may be thinking without doing, and doing also without thinking, taking both in a literal sense : though too frequently, even in the most thoughtless actions, as we kindly call them, in adulteries, fornications, and the like, there is the process of thinking going before doing, however vicious or absurd such thinking may be found.

Besides these two sorts of materials, v. g., thinking and doing—that the interior, and this the exterior of the Kingdom ; that the soul, and this the body ; that the internal, and this the external life—we find likewise a third sort not so decided, being of an intermediate nature ; more inward than doing, more outward than thinking, and generally a way or medium from one to the other ; which is *saying*. The same distinction of the Kingdom or its like, v. g., into thinking, saying, and doing, seems also not uncommon : but from the aforesaid participation of this middle sort in the other two, it is often found inconve-

nient to distinguish it as a constituent, and far preferable in a general way, to acknowledge only two sorts of materials in the Kingdom, or two parts of life in this respect, being the first and last mentioned, Thinking and Doing.

It should here also be farther observed, though rather in advance, compared with what follows ; that, as there is generally no doing without thinking—or if otherwise indeed, there can be no thinking either without some tinge or character, which the heart derives from principle and imparts to practice, or else to inaction whether right or wrong. So that a man's actions will generally bespeak not only his inward sentiments, but also the extrinsic principle from which they proceed, as well as the heart or government in which they are digested and matured. And in this manner "every tree is known by his own fruit" (Luke vi. 44) : as the divine Teacher infers, and as we also shall have further occasion to observe.

Thinking, which cannot in any sense be deemed a moderate part, will appear less so than usual in that which it is here, and perhaps not unreasonably assumed to be. For usually *thinking* will imply only one half of the spiritual or inward life ; the other, which is the more ostensible, consisting in volition, &c. ; whereas, according to the sense that is here preferred, thinking will also imply volition with every other property or particular, however situated or combined ; being the office of both mind and soul, or of the assemblage of constituents called the inner man. By which extension of its meaning, if the term is rendered more complex, the subject in return will be rendered more intelligible, and its discussion more exact. While, on the other hand, *doing*, which is the part of the external sphere, or of the visible and executive department of the human republic, or Kingdom incarnate ; the life of the natural body and the proper effect of thinking, figures with equal importance in the definition that has been given ; according to which it will consist of as many parts as there are in the power that directs it. The doing of the hand, of the eye, the feet, &c., are all parts

of the general performance which constitutes the life of the natural body; and have all their several denominations and peculiar descriptions of properties; as the performance of the hand in giving and receiving, e. g. with the properties of bounty, liberality, munificence—the performance of the eye in seeing, descrying, surveying, with the properties of sharpness, clearness, comprehension; of the feet in walking or going, with the properties of sureness, swiftness, &c.; of the whole body, in habitation or being, with many properties incidental to either, of which some have been mentioned. And as the life, or performance of every member has its peculiar denomination when complete, so has that of the whole united, according to its effect or product; which, if material, will be a *work*, and give to doing the denomination of working, or making; if immaterial, will be an action, deed, effect, operation, performance; and give to doing, besides its proper denomination, that of acting, effecting, operating, executing, performing. Which several modes of doing will all be preceded, and generally followed by the other part of thinking, as their principle; giving and taking, as it appears a character accordingly. For there is an undeviating reciprocity between practice and principles; so that good or evil, at either end, will unavoidably produce the same, or confirm it in the other. As a good principle is conducive to good works, so are good works to a good principle: and as an evil principle is conducive to evil works, so are evil works to an evil principle; as in its place will be more fully shewn.

In the next place, as there are two sorts of action and life described by the criterion or circumstance of connexion, one desultory and quotidian, the other progressive and variously combined according to circumstances, so are there likewise two parts or portions in a life of either sort, which are Thinking and Doing, distinguished by their respective spheres, as we conceive them: and these spheres

are internal and external with respect to the owner or occupier, visible and invisible with respect to other men; being denominated in proper terms, The *Body* and *Soul*; by an elegant periphrasis, The Natural and Spiritual Body (Cor. I. xv. 44): which is also the most satisfactory and intelligible form that has been adopted hitherto for expressing this subtle distinction. For a Body may signify a combination, either of parts or individuals: which shall all have something distinct, both in their subject and relations, and yet be so connected with each other at the same time, as to form an harmonious whole in some particular respect, like the body politic, for example, before alluded to. So the sea is a body of waters, and the land a body of earth, &c.; so one learned compilation is a body of laws, and another of divinity; and so in the author of either compilation, both being artificial productions, in man likewise, we find these two several bodies, v. g. the natural and spiritual, or material and immaterial; appearing very distinct in their numbers or detail, yet so related in the gross by sympathy and co-operation, by reciprocal influence and intersubordination, as to make a decided whole, or one connected being: which, from its beautiful order and prodigious variety, has been styled, The Microcosm, or Little World; and literally distinguished, into its celestial and terrestrial parts, like the great world in which it is included, a province being also assigned to either part corresponding with the sphere, whether higher or lower, to which it is related.

Sometimes this admirable union has been considered as a federal republic, and its principal sections as the two main branches of the human constitution. Which allusion is equally correct with the other, or perhaps more natural and significant, if it be not so sublime: the internal sphere representing the legislative, and the external the executive body; this composed of eyes, hands, and feet, tongue, and other material organs; that, of conscience,

thought, volition, and other similar gifts or faculties; the organs in one sphere performing what the faculties shall determine in the other, except, first in a case which is not uncommon, of murmuring and rebellion; next in another, which they cannot avoid, of natural incapacity, or gradual decline, and final dissolution.

The distinction of parts in any subject will be more easy and decided than that of elements, inasmuch as the distinction of elements being made first, is one step towards that; and also, as every new obstruction, in contracting the view of a subject, increases its certainty by suiting the contraction of intellect, as before observed. And what makes the distinction difficult is nothing natural, so much as the improvements that have been unnaturally made, or intended to be made upon it: of which one is, to consider the material or inferior part of the subject as mortal by nature, and mere earth in composition; also vicious in the extreme, and not only vicious, but seductive and degrading; while the superior and invisible part, which is the proper seat of vice as well as of virtue, shall (with the usual good fortune of superiors) be extolled to the skies, as heavenly, immortal and immutable; the only part that has itself the chance of surviving to a future state in the same form which it now exhibits, and of exalting the other part to such a state likewise through its felicitous union. This seems to be setting up an invidious distinction between the two parts; to be carrying the distinction between the two parts farther than is meet, farther than is creditable for both, and consistent with their happy connection; whereby two parts, the body and soul, which God hath joined together, vain man would put asunder. They who have made up their minds to such an hypothesis must be blind to all the natural reciprocities between these two parts: and how one is always either better or worse for the other, like man and wife, or like the different members of our visible body, as observed by St. Paul (Cor. I. xii. 12). They must be ignorant, for example, how on

the one hand study, grief, and every other affection of the mind, if violent and long continued, will affect the body in the same manner as a strain or overtaxing of some of its own constituents; and how, on the other hand, a violent and long continued exertion of the bodily members or constituents will depress and weaken, if not completely destroy, or incapacitate at least many of the higher and more exquisite order of intellectual constituents, with which they are associated.

For so strict a reciprocity cannot be the condition of two distinct things. Of distinct things brought together, one may exist without the other, as well as with it; but such cannot be the case with parts, and especially with two like the body and soul, which have so many spiritual properties in common to unite the extreme elements of matter and intellect. The form indeed of either may be defaced, and even cancelled, as it were, from the draft of creation, while that of the other shall remain; but the materials of neither can be separated entirely from the other, seeing there are so many of which they partake alike. "And though after my SKIN (or present exterior) worms destroy this body; yet in my FLESH (or substance, with a more glorious form) shall I see God" (Job xix. 26). says Job. Among all the changes in life, from infancy to puberty, manhood, age and death, there is still an identical existence protracted: and it is still to be hoped, and indeed hardly to be doubted, that death is a grand restorative for human nature, and will replace every constituent, both of body and soul in its primitive position, where both may then come off well together, "as being heirs together of the grace of life" (Pet. I. iii. 7).

To so easy a distinction as this, no one can object, if it be only considered as arbitrary, and not real, as a distinction of man's making, and not of his Maker's. For had the Author of human nature made two things of the body and soul, or of the mind and the spirit, their opposition would have been still greater perhaps than we unfortunately

find it. But distinctions in nature are not so common as we make them: and what one of her chief secretaries* says repeatedly†, of classing their sums or integrals, may be said likewise of classing constituents in reference to this point, namely, "NATURA NON FACIT SALTUS." If therefore we distinguish the parts or constituents of the kingdom into some that are more material, some that are more spiritual, and some that are more intellectual, according to the usual method, it must be with an understanding, that such method is not observed from any belief in the trinity, nor duality either of the human subject, but for the convenience of a natural, well known, and consequently *useful* distinction.

2. Subject to the same reserve, another distinction of *Heaven* and *Hell* may also be seen in the two characteristic hemispheres of good and evil, which are soon to be exhibited in their principles, as the two essential hemispheres have now nearly been. For it may be said, in one word, that the two chief ESSENTIAL parts of the kingdom are soul and body; heaven and hell the two chief CHARACTERISTIC. But the division that would identify characteristic parts with essential, making the immaterial heaven, and the material hell, though abetted by many, and particularly of the ancient heathen philosophers, is a whimsical notion taken up at a venture, not warranted by Scripture, and not worth refuting. For if it be said in Scripture, "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other" (Gal. v. 17), we need not understand by such expressions, that the human flesh and spirit, or the more material and more intellectual constituents of the subject, though poised against each other, are characteristically distinct, any more than they may be essentially, or that one is uniformly good, and the other, as uniformly evil: for by the Spirit may be, and most likely is, here intended an higher spirit than belongs to this composition.

* Linnæus.

† In *Philosophiâ Botanica*.

There are several, and some much fairer divisions of the subject, besides this and the preceding, that might be mentioned; as e. g.

3. One, by selecting and combining from among the materials above enumerated, to form subdivisions or departments; as 1, the earthly—*visible*; 2, earthly—*invisible*.

4. Another by the criterion of accidents, and particularly of the divine operation and agency manifested in different channels, as we understand it; whence may be derived three several departments, by the names of *Nature*, *Grace*, and *Providence*. To this it may be added,

5. That in every subject there is something particularly essential and indispensable, which constitutes its identity, and cannot be separated from the same without its destruction, though, what that something may be, is not yet agreed. And so it seems with respect to the subject of the everlasting kingdom of God, which is over all from the beginning and for ever. Yet a good part of this kingdom cannot be everlasting, we know; and of the heavens too, as well as the earth, of which it is said, "They shall perish, but thou (their Maker) shalt endure: they all shall wax old, as doth a garment; and as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed" (Ps. cii. 26, 27). Upon which the kingdom may be divided into parts, *proper*, lasting, essential, &c., and parts *common*, perishing, incidental: one, in which there is no confusion of the passions, nor any other sort of unrighteousness; "and there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie" (Rev. xxi. 27); but all is order, peace and regularity:—another, full of envying and strife, where "there is confusion and every evil work" (Jam. iii. 16), and all is lying, abomination and unrighteousness; clamour, rage and uproar, the very throne of anarchy, and dominion of discord. For the Kingdom of God in Christ divides, like his general kingdom, into two parts, that

may seem rather paradoxical, being that which is his, and that which is not, upon every imaginable characteristic. Hence

6. The medium and mode of subjection in the kingdom differing, afford three other plain criterions, each distinguishing the same into two parts; v. g. as the said subjection is either—1, covenanted or uncovenanted; 2, perfect or imperfect; 3, mediate or immediate. For

1, As this subjection is either *covenanted* or *uncovenanted*, being the same as knowing or blind, two parts will be formed thereon, and may be similarly named; the first including those who come under the yoke of Jesus Christ willingly by invitation and agreement; the second including those who are compelled to come, and come without knowing it, from “the highways and hedges” (Luke xiv. 23), being “other sheep” (John x. 16), as our Saviour calls them.

2, As the subjection to the covenant is more or less entire in any respect, the two subordinate parts of *perfect* and *imperfect* may also be distinguished, or of that which is Christian wholly and solely; and that which is either partly heathen, like the Mahometan population, or but half Christian, like the Jewish, in which Christ is acknowledged, but not Jesus.

3, And still two other parts may be formed or conceived by means of this subjection, though these are not coexistent in effect, being *mediate* and *immediate* or present and future. For at present the Kingdom is governed in a great measure by means and ministries; but we look forward to an epoch after time, when even the highest ministry, that of the Son himself, shall cease, “that God may be all in all” (Cor. I. xv. 28).

For if St. Peter would seem to have confounded the distinction of covenanted and uncovenanted altogether, when he said, “Of a truth I perceive, that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth Him, and worketh righteousness is accepted of him” (Acts

x. 34, 35), it should be observed, that this was spoken, not of the work, but of the evidence it afforded, as much as to say, It may appear who is accepted of God in every nation by the work of God which is wrought by them through faith in Christ; as he told his disciples, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent" (John vi. 29). Else it might be asked, "What advantage then hath the Jew?" (Rom. iii. 1) if men might be as likely to enter the kingdom without any reference to the covenant. But the Jew would have an advantage "every way" as St. Paul continues, if he had but the grace to avail himself of it; and "chiefly because that unto them were committed the oracles of God" (Ib. 2.). The Jewish church, being a shadow or nucleus of the Christian, is not subject therefore blindly, if it be blindly alienated; but freely and knowingly, however imperfectly, by deed and covenant fairly proposed.

4, And even among "the other sheep" a subordinate distinction may be made on the same criterion, with the addition of blood or descent; v. g. between the seed of Jacob and the seed of the stranger: the former having also become "other sheep" frequently, by forsaking the covenant of their God for Baal-peor, and other gods of the nations round about, long before the grand apostacy; in which, as St. Peter told them to their face, "Ye denied the Holy One and the Just, and desired a murderer to be granted unto you, and killed the Prince of Life" (Acts iii. 14, 15). These, therefore, at such times, were also "other sheep", as much as the unbelieving stranger: but, as formerly by other means, so latterly by the preaching of St. Peter and others, a remnant has been reclaimed continually, and brought back into the fold of the church: "For ye were (said he to some of them) as sheep going astray; but are now returned unto the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls" (Pet. I. ii. 25.) And more of these "other sheep", it is hoped, will still return; notwithstanding that blindness, in part, is happened to Israel, until "the

fulness of the gentiles be come in" (Rom. xi. 25). "Also, the sons of the stranger, that join themselves to the Lord, to serve Him, and to love the name of the Lord, to be his servants; every one that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it, and taketh hold of my covenant; even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer (saith the Lord): their burnt offerings, and their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar: for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people" (Isai. lvi. 6, 7).

Now "the house of prayer for all people" is not to be seen any longer at Jerusalem, any more than it is on MOUNT GERIZIM; nor could be either if the temple should be restored immediately, except as a nominal, partial, or periodical place of worship; as it used to be according to the Psalmist. "For thither the tribes go up (says he) even the tribes of the Lord; to testify unto Israel, to give thanks unto the name of the Lord. For there is the seat of judgment, even the seat of the house of David" (Ps. cxxii. 4, 5). But the proper seat of judgment is conscience: the constant, real, and universal house of prayer, being also that which Jesus predicted to the woman of Samaria. "Woman (said he) believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem worship the Father. Ye worship ye know not what: we know what we worship; for salvation is of the Jews. But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship Him in spirit and in truth" (John iv. 21, &c.). This being, as one might say, his HOLY INVISIBLE CHURCH. Add to which, St. Paul likewise reminds the Corinthians of another place, but not very distinct from the forementioned: "What (says he), know ye not, that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God; and ye are not your own? For ye are

bought with a price: therefore, glorify God in your body, and in your spirit which are God's" (Cor. I. vi. 19, 20).

So the whole subject of the kingdom of God in Christ is properly an house of prayer in two sections or spheres; the material and immaterial, the outside and in, the body and soul above described in their essential properties, resembling together the temple and sanctuary at Jerusalem, and being an excellent substitute indeed for the same. Whereupon, advancing another step, and adopting another very common conceit, we may fill this "house of prayer" at once with an ample congregation by the name of *Contents* or *Individuals*; being the fourth degree of complexity in which the constituents of the kingdom are liable to be considered.

§ 5.—To understand the difference between *Contents* or *Individuals*, and the forementioned constituent, parts, it should be observed, that there are in general two sorts of division, v. g. constituent and integral, applying to every complex subject; which will yield two corresponding results or products, called *Parts* and *Contents*. Every complex subject, and every subject that has any thing in common with others may be so divided: and hence comes the last mentioned sort particularly. For the mind having a power to distinguish more and more precisely between constituents by means of the faculty of abstraction, &c., with an abundance of criterions, as aforesaid, is got at last so far in this way, as to be able to make constituents that meet in the same subject, and even in the same composition, numerically distinct, and as it were perfectly independent; not only of each other, but also of the subject in which they meet. Thus the contents of a book shall be one thing, the book itself another; and thus the very stones too accumulated in any country or part, shall come to be regarded no longer as parts, either of the country in which they lie, or of the rock in which they originated; but *absolutely* as individual stones, and *relatively* as contents of the field: and thus, likewise, men come to be con-

sidered no longer as parcels of the earth, of the same lump in which they originated, and to which they return, like triturated granite to granite again ; but as inhabitants of the earth ; as its several and independent contents, like stones in a scrip ; or like travellers at an inn, who are also like rolling stones—making so many individuals of them. But the truth is, (let the mind conceive as it may,) that the relations here mentioned as Contents and Individuals will still be as much portions of the earth as any, and not independent subjects.

The individual contents of the kingdom, however, being thus formed or conceived, will admit of a twofold classification, i. e. general and particular. The *particular* classification of individuals in, or composing the kingdom, must be sought in the particulars of the subject, the *general* being that now considered ; and according to such classification the individuals of the kingdom will first be divided into two species, Persons and Things ; being the two principal modes of existence before* mentioned in this light. And as for the general distinction of individual or integral parts, called Contents, or Individuals, into such modes ; it seems, not only just and clear, but as popular as any distinction in common use ; it is what there is hardly any one but seems to understand, and is in the habit of applying : so that one has every inducement to avail one's self of the same without the trouble or necessity of staying to define it, after a sufficient exposition of its principal particular. But with respect to the manner in which persons and things are usually mentioned ; it may be necessary to observe, that speaking of either of them in a loose way, we generally express the matter, and mean its mode, or image. But if we would speak more precisely, we have terms for every purpose to help ourselves with ; as, e. g.

1, When we would particularly denote the substance of a subject or a subject's self, we may use either of these expressions, or another equivalent thereto : and

* P. 129.

2. If we would rather denote some particular type of the subject, we may also choose an expression accordingly, having sufficient latitude for the same; as 1, for the ordinary type of a person; Likeness, Image, &c. being more objective; and Character being more subjective: 2, for the type of a thing; View, Notion, Idea, &c. more objective; and Figure, Form, Manner, Mode, &c. more subjective, according to an enumeration before given.

Perhaps, if we were to scrutinize the bulk of moral subjects, or of subjects applying to the moral man, we should find, that the greater part relate, not to man himself, but to the type or abstract that he has formed of himself. So that, whether we consider the subject of man, or of his relations or accidents, we shall not be considering the substance so much as its shadow: and whether we discourse of the subject, or of his relations or accidents, we shall not be discoursing of the substance so much as its shadow; but generally mean the shadow, while we name the substance. In the same manner we shall find too by this examination, that while there seems to be nothing more in a man's thoughts than himself and his own concerns, it is not really these that a man regards in that LAND OF SHADOWS so much as his own image, and the concerns of his image. These he regards with a truly idolatrous reverence: these are every thing to him, however unjustly; i. e. unjustly towards himself, the image of God, which ought to be better known. "Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you" (Acts xvii. 28). For it is desirable that men should see the emptiness of their supposed substance, as well as the solidity of that which is real—of their real substance and essential, primitive self, "the inner man" (Eph. iii. 16), as St. Paul expresses it, or "the hidden man of the heart" (Pet. I. iii. 4), as it is similarly styled by St. Peter; that invisible witness judging all things, yet judged of no man, (Cor. I. ii. 15) as before* observed. For this is every thing to God: Who lives in us; and we in Him: Who is as

as within the man of the heart, as that is within the man of the flesh, or man's own image. And, as it was shewn in a former chapter, that incidentals are not constituents; so it may be presumed to appear by this time, that they are not intitled to the same deference with these, however fashionable it may be to equalize, or even to prefer them thereto.

It has been shewn, how the kingdom, being chiefly spiritual and intellectual, the chief subject or matter of the same, that which enters into or composes it, only can be such; i. e. spiritual and intellectual, though its object may be also spiritual and material, or purely material sometimes. The kingdom of heaven is the kingdom within, and from within: therefore, not only spiritual and intellectual subjects, as propensities and opinions, e. g. which are within, but actions coming from within, and productions likewise, as words, writings, and other symbols; buildings, plantations, and other works, as to their design and conception will compose a portion of the heavenly kingdom, though not as to their matter or substance, and may be ascribed to the same, as original constituents. Indeed, some subjects of this sort, v. g. actions, &c. coming from within, are most properly parts of the incarnate kingdom; being the same gone through and perfect.

The actions and works that he puts forth are to a subject of the kingdom like its verdure to the earth: which, although it seem a mere covering, is still as much a constituent as its deepest minerals, sending its roots downward into the solid parts, and its breath upward into the fluid elements, even into the ambient air which is above the earth and in the earth, being, therefore, also equally constituent with its verdure, and with "all flesh wherein is the breath of life."

To know, therefore, where any properties or elements, as grace and moisture, for example, are naturally constituent, we must consult their derivation, looking towards

the subjects from which they naturally proceed; as grace from Heaven, and moisture from the earth. The property of those evil devices too that may proceed from a man's heart cannot be imputed any where more accurately and correctly than to the part from which they proceed. And accordingly our Saviour determines, that such productions must denote the quality of the man better than any contents that merely pass through him. "Do not ye yet understand (said he to his disciples) that whatsoever entereth in at the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught?*" But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man" (Matt. xv. 17, 18). What enters in at the mouth may come from an ox, a sheep, or a calf; but what proceeds out of the mouth will come from the heart, which is the man himself, or his most essential part: this is constituent; that, incidental in the order of nature and providence; though it rests with the Director of both to make, if He please, of any incidental a constituent; and of any constituent, an incidental. So we may well say with David, "Blessed is he, whose unrighteousness is forgiven, and whose sin is covered: blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth no sin" (Ps. xxxii. 1, 2); "all my fresh springs shall be in thee". (Ib. lxxxvii. 7).

Well then may it be asked on the one hand, "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" (Rom. viii. 35) by those who have put on Christ, and are assimilated to God by his means; as on the other, Who shall separate us from the devil and his murderous hate? by those who are bound to him thereby, "vessels of wrath fitted to destruction". For as the greater in every association is held to take the less, the annexation here will be of the

* This may be, and is most likely, in the main, a physical fact. For, however the receipts of the mouth may be thrown off again, not an atom of the whole, but will be so, most likely, by the subject, or receiver. They may answer the temporary purpose of excitement to blow out, or develope his inferior modes, but will not make even the shadow of a particle of him in reality.

recipient to the Giver by his gift, rather than of the Giver to the recipient by the same ; v. g. of man to God by the gift of his Holy Spirit, and not of God to man, or contrariwise by its receipt. We meet indeed with expressions in scripture sometimes that would seem to denote the natural constituency of incidentals in their object; as e. g. "Our soul is filled with the scornful reproof of the wealthy and with the despitefulness of the proud" (Ps. cxxiii. 4). But this means no more than the belly being filled with unwholesome and indigestible food. And whereas, on the other hand, constituents are there mentioned sometimes as being incidental only to their subjects; this is to be understood metaphorically; as where it is said of the ungodly, "He clothed himself with cursing like as with a raiment" (Ib. cix. 17): the same, where St. Peter exhorts his followers of both sexes and of all ages and conditions to be "clothed with humility" (Pet. I. v. 5), as a part of their heavenly uniform: the same also where our Lord says of himself, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me" (John iv. 34). For every one must know, as St. Paul says, "that the kingdom of God is not meat and drink (or any other incidental) but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17). Neither can there be any more question, that humility is a constituent of its happy subject; nor that cursing is equally constituent of the wretch who addicts himself to the same: "And it shall come into his bowels like water, and like oil into his bones" (Ps. cix. 17).

There never was signified, nor ever could be in a single sentence a juster notion of human constituency than one that we have from St. John, "He that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as He is righteous: he that committeth sin is of the devil; for the devil sinneth from the beginning" (John I. iii. 7, 8). And what makes the condition of "the dead which die in the Lord" so blessed is, the constituency of their past lives, "from henceforth. Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their

labours, and their works do follow them" (Rev. xiv. 13). Their works do follow them like the track of light that follows the sun, and is a part of his essence. "And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars, for ever and ever" (Dan. xii. 3). A life of beneficence is the truest evidence of immortality in the liver, one excellent characteristic of another: as St. John also intimates in several of his sayings, especially in this, "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren" (John I. iii. 14): as on the contrary, "he that loveth not his brother abideth in death" (Ib.).

But when God himself is represented by the prophet, as clothing himself with created properties, the expression may be understood more literally; as e. g. "He put on righteousness as a breastplate, and an helmet of salvation upon his head; and he put on the garment of vengeance for clothing, and was clad with zeal as a cloke" (Isai. lix. 17). And only upon this one article of salvation may be exemplified the manner in which acts, or the properties, &c. composed of them, will belong to their subject, and effects to their object. For regarding salvation as an incidental in this case, the property will be *chiefly* his from whom, and secondarily theirs to whom this blessing proceeds; in the same manner as harmony is first the property of the musician, and next of those who hear it. So the Psalmist avers, "Salvation belongeth unto the Lord; and thy blessing is upon thy people" (Ps. iii. 8). And so the gift of song is thine, O heavenly bard; while the blessing, or effect, is theirs who have the gift to feel its music and eloquence.

§ 6. If under the preceding heads the constituents of the kingdom may seem to have been wound up to the highest degree of complexity, from their simplest appearance, in the acts or accidents of which they are composed, their survey will not, however, yet seem complete without an allusion to their chronological as well as physical order

in respect of the observer, after the second of the two forementioned methods of dividing the subject*. And this will bring to mind three states or periods, the past, present, and future: of which any one may have as good a general apprehension as of east and west, with the space between, in respect of locality. But as east and west may seem rather mysterious distinctions on a particular consideration, so will two of these states, the past and future, at least; and their observation also, of some consequence to the knowledge of the present. Standing, therefore, in the midst between that which is past and that which is to come, as it were between east and west, and considering the whole life to be, as it has just been described; not a particular property of the kingdom, but the same in substance formed, by successive combinations, of its own specific tendencies, acts, and consequences; we may therefore suppose, first the three several states, parts, or positions aforesaid; and then, placing the present, or middlemost as a centre, we may suppose next, three several stages, or periods either way; namely, first on either side one, that may be called *continuous*, there being no particular breach or interruption between its two parts, one way to the birth, the other way to the death of the subject, as youth and age for example; and next to these, two stages either way; that may be called *intromitted*—the first of the two one way being antenatal, or prior to the birth of the subject; the second supramundane, or prior to the creation of the world—the first of the two, the other way, being posthumous, or after death, (a temporary indulgence to many) the second ultramundane, or after the world, a state of eternal bliss, or torment—all together as follows, v. g.

Life

<i>past</i>	<i>present</i>	<i>future</i>
1. Supramundane.		1. Age
2. Antenatal.	0. Present	2. Posthumous.
3. Youth.		3. Ultramundane.

* P. 137.

But in considering these several states, it will be necessary to proceed from a beginning instead of the centre, if we can find a beginning for the past any more than we can for the east.

1. First, therefore, consulting our experience with regard to the past in order to make out something of a *Pre-existence*, and finding that nothing happens ever without a cause, nor yet without ways and means, we may thence infer and clearly perceive two subjects of such a state, namely, 1 the cause, and 2 the means; as the subjects of such pre-existence; whereby the question is narrowed so as to turn wholly on a third object, namely, the effect, or product. And what we shall now have to consider is, whether any of the effects or productions that we now perceive in existence may have existed before, and in what manner. The flower that now glows, for example, in perfect bloom was three days since an opening bud; three weeks before, it was neither bud nor flower, but still to be what it is: what then could it be when it was not; or where could its present being and appearance, or essence and presence, have begun? The present being of the flower, say a rose, has two beginnings, one in the purpose of the Creator, and one in his creation: but its present appearance; what beginning had that? It may be said, The same: the present, whether in being or appearance, in essence or in presence, being but a part of the whole, only one scene in the beautiful exhibition of a rose. So we may presume the Kingdom of God in all its glory to have been at first both generally and particularly as it is now and to be in virtue and liability; the same also in progress or continuity, the mode or first purpose naturally growing to its proper effect, if nothing hinders; like "every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew" (Gen. ii. 5); as the same lay SLUMBERING IN ITS MODE, waiting a joyful resurrection.

This we may presume, although presumption on such points be not so smooth as some may imagine: and more we may inquire too concerning the *past*; though

we know that it is more Christian-like, or more the Christian mode, to inquire prospectively than retrospectively, in this case; considering the end of our existence, to which we may and must concur in some sort, rather than the beginning or early part of it which we cannot influence now, if we ever could. Yet such an inquiry will not appear to be without its consequence, nor the present occasion unfavourable to a short review of the arguments on either side, especially as far as the inquiry may happen to turn on a PERSONAL PRE-EXISTENCE, the mode of which has been already defined in the abstract. Understanding therefore the reality of an abstract pre-existence, or a pre-existing course and outline of persons now in existence; we may advance a step, but inquiring now, instead of understanding, as to the FULL AND ACTUAL pre-existence of a person or tenant of the present state in some other or others, somewhat as follows.

Being here such as I am, and different perhaps in some respects from what I have been within my own remembrance; admitting also the common ingredients of which I am compounded, or some of them, to have had a being before I was born, or it may be any one else, or, if required, that they even existed before the first man was created in the same mode or general medium by which my dear self is described, and in virtue likewise together with such mode or medium from eternity—though the precise mode of such an eternal existence is too subtle a point, and too speculative to demand my attention this moment; for many reasons I could wish to know and understand, and need not be afraid of attaining at least to some general conclusion on the subject, whether the same portion of intellect by which this question is now agitated has ever existed before? Have my soul or my body, or both, or any less complex constituent or constituents of my self, either jointly or severally existed before their appearance in my present state?

There has been a belief, and a wide belief certainly of

both these conditions; that is of both a partial and an entire, or a spiritual and a personal pre-existence, in the human kind at least, and that founded in religion: some holding the doctrine of a metempsychosis, or a pre-existence of the soul only; others, that of a continual renovation, or something like a personal pre-existence by joints or successions in a sort of concatenated being; and others may think, that if neither a whole person, nor any considerable part of him, if neither soul nor body, yet some act or experience at least, if not some property, or perhaps one element that he deploys in life, might have pre-existed for him as a sort of nucleus, or else as a part of what he was. But supposing first, our acts to be our own, it will be hard to conceive how they could be so much beforehand with us; one should think there must needs be a general beginning somewhere, or none. Or, supposing secondly, our properties to be made of our acts, as aforesaid, they could not begin severally either. And thirdly, these being the sum and foundation of elements, the pre-existence of elements too will not seem more plausible than that either of the forementioned less complex constituents. While, fourthly, with respect to the pre-existence of either part: as of the soul or *immaterial* for example, though one should rather expect the *material* to be the elder, if any odds, on account of its comparative simplicity—in either case the hypothesis would seem about as consistent, as that of the pre-existence of one integral part only: and to understand the soul existing before the body, or the body before the soul, would, considering the general and indispensable union as well as distinction between all our essential constituents before remarked, not be more rational, than to understand a man's body coming into the world a century or two before his head, or the head a century or two before his body. And as for the doctrine of a continual renovation, though it implies no absurdity, with those who believe in one renovation by the resurrection of the dead, and may even be

received for fact by some who are disposed to think with the royal preacher, "Is there anything whereof it may be said, See, this is new! it hath been already of old time, which was before us" (Eccl. i. 10). Yet will there be still no warrant nor necessity for such an inference. The existence of good principles before now, and their transmission from one age to others, is very credible: and Christian modes may be satisfied with this principle for all that relates either to pre-existence or futurity. But still this is not to satisfy the plain question of a personal and perfect pre-existence generally: which, though a question of minor importance compared with that of a spiritual regeneration in life, and eventually of a corporeal likewise in us consequent upon that, may, however, be worth considering for reasons that will appear hereafter.

Understanding therefore by PERSONAL PRE-EXISTENCE a pre-existence of the same person considered in existence, it may be proper to determine, in the first place, what it is that constitutes a personal identity, or in what that sameness of person may be held to consist. The great historian of the Kingdom derives its general identity, from its general beginning; and if there be any other identity for any part than what occurs in its particular beginning, the same is beyond conception. Therefore, whether similar or different, whether one thing or another, in the beginning of every thing, and in that alone, can we perceive its identity. If a man in the beginning should be next a tree, and then a bird, and then an elephant or any thing else, (though it is most probable that a person could not come of a thing, as every thing comes of kind,) in every change he would be the same person, the same forming altogether the mode of his existence and pre-existence. It may seem a long while to account for, may that of the two former periods, namely, first, the antenatal, and next the supramundane before mentioned: so that, supposing a man to have existed before his last essential birth, it will be of no use to consult a register for his identity; he may be the son of

Ephraim, who was the son of Joseph, who was the son of Jacob; but was he Ephraim, and Joseph, and Jacob, or was he either of them, as well as the son of Ephraim?

But without reverting particularly either to a former period, to a period before principles or beginnings, a period of darkness and chaos, at least to our perception; or to the antenatal and comparatively modern state, ere the relation of parentage began upon earth with multiplied sorrow for one party, an increasing responsibility for the other, and disappointment enough for both—without insisting on the perfections of a primitive state including the same excellent properties, or species of acts, pure and perfect, which are now so alloyed in our race, and it may be, more excellent that are lost; or inquiring, as to what might have become of such properties on their separation at the fall, and by what means they may be restored to the body: as where went righteousness, for example, when it left the earth; with holy joy, and peace, and purest love? Where went all “the fruits of the Spirit” (Gal. v. 22) in short? Went they partly into the pages of history or rather into those of fiction? or most likely, into the land of oblivion? If not; in what exalted region, in what blessed repository, or rather, in what perfect model, were they located and laid up; to be reissued at the appointed time, and handed down again traditionally from generation to generation among the sons of men, like their vital acts, or such simple constituents as in their several species naturally descend from father to son? Whether then were they all disbanded and dispersed like withered blossoms on that occasion, or like those same vital species in the case of persons dying without issue?

Not to insist on these or any the like particulars, we may be allowed to admire the traces of superhuman ability as well, which are extant in the wonderful invention of language, and its perfection in the impenetrable recesses of antiquity, with the superiority of the earliest compositions, in literature especially, to any more recent specimens,

corresponding with the primitive perfection of language, and being such as to authorize almost an imputation of the form as well as matter of the said compositions to a superhuman operation, like the book of Job, for example, which has never been paralleled by a work of the kind—also of the useful arts, or those which minister to the support and comfort of this present life—but above all those gifts, as they are rather called, by which our future state is improved as well, gifts even higher than that of language; a sense of decency, honour, and propriety in our moral conduct, a peculiar cast of beauty and elegance in the highest order of performance; and chiefly, among other uncommon powers and perceptions, a glimmering of divine light, an imperfect sense of religion, with the power to walk thereby superadded. And while we wonder at these phenomena, it may sometimes be thought whether they do not afford a plain evidence of nobler generations than the world has been able to boast, at any period within the knowledge or conception of the present; earthly angels, who did not fall with the rest, nor yet were either forwarded or restored to an higher state untainted with corruption; but sent onward, or rather downward, after that catastrophe to act their parts over and over in the changing scenes of life, with multiplied disadvantages continually.

Certainly, the development in this life of higher constituents than common, like those above mentioned, must look in general more like a resuscitation than either a natural or a new birth; although the same constituents may still go on improving sometimes or in some subjects, not only through this life, but also through every future stage of their existence. And although likewise the generality of mankind have so few first-rate constituents, that to account for *them*, we need not suppose any other opportunity than what this life affords; yet it must be owned, that there are, in the course of ages, to be seen some who display a degree of excellence that cannot be

ascribed to such opportunity, nor accounted for on any common principles. It would seem as if some subjects or combinations had been previously formed in some more perfect state, to break out with such uncommon lustre in this. If all we hear of them be true, such samples of genius and virtue as we hear of must have gone through fire and water, to arrive at such perfection; must have been trained by other spirits of various qualities, have passed through different natures, and collected something superior from each, to appear with so much advantage in their present state.

Or it may be thought, whether a divine breed has not really been amalgamated with the human, as seemingly asserted in sacred history, and more directly in heathen mythology.

Or the *original* perfection of a man's nature might make him *naturally* all that we can imagine of general worth in a creature: while the proportion of hereditary advantages varying in most cases, it would not be wonderful, if a larger share of one sort should fall to one man, and of another sort to another, occasioning a diversity, perhaps without a disparity, in this respect. So had he, on the contrary, an opposite origin, there would be as full a meed of imperfection for the man, and as ugly a difference as possible between him and others, without any chance of amelioration. And certain it is, that as much may be said on this hand in favour of a wretched, as we have just observed in favour of a fortunate pre-existence; v. g., that such villainous dispositions as men appear sometimes to be born with could never have come into the world originally with their ancestors, but must have been cast in hell sometime before, and imported into human nature somehow or other from that wretched state, or else contracted here by some infernal mixture answering to the heavenly above mentioned. Without the help of divine Revelation it were as hard to account for the discordant feelings with which the human heart is too often distracted, as for the

supernatural melody which it occasionally pours forth in loud, impassioned strains by day, or warbling inwardly enjoys, as it is said, by "songs in the night" (Job xxxv. 10).

But by the help of Revelation, as aforesaid, we are able to account for these evil phenomena likewise, and to trace them from a second beginning even more decidedly than from a first. We know how men are exercised at present: the cares of the world are a great trial for them; its blandishments, a greater: but the divine seed being infused into their existence at any period will overcome all; and not only all the world, but the devil himself must likewise succumb to this gratuitous acquisition of a candidate for eternity. "We know, that whosoever is born of God sinneth not; but he that is begotten of God keepeth himself, and that wicked one toucheth him not" (John I. v. 18).

As men are always prone to flattery, they will be more likely to assume an heavenly pre-existence for themselves than an infernal, or both: but admitting either or both in substance will not be an admission of the fact in dispute; which is not a pre-existing substance, nor a pre-existing mode either, but a pre-existing substance within a certain mode, which is a pre-existing person. And either way there will be nothing to hinder the hypothesis, for it cannot be more, of our continual preparation for a better state or a worse than we occupy at present, and perhaps oftener for a worse than for a better. We know that great purposes are long maturing, great operations are long in combining; the one has many changes to undergo before it can be wrought into an utensil, and so may an human existence before it can become a person to use it. We may go back with such an existence to the very beginning of mankind; and, without affecting the subject's identity, deduce from that point all his constituents agreeable to his first beginning; or which should not rather be traced to the second era before mentioned and the general source of corruption. And then all our best properties, our every

solid advantage and enjoyment, will seem to be derived or continued down together in the way of descent before mentioned, from a former paradisiacal state of existence. These are the better part of our present life; which it is our wisdom to cultivate by all means. Then comes a middle state, coming in with evil angels by the will of God; as it is written, "He sent evil angels among them" (Ps. lxxviii. 50); the old serpent, for one; when our modes became infected before they were applied to essentials; and men were evil before they were born, being shapen in wickedness and conceived in sin (Ib. li. 5), by evil modes spread all over the earth, to be subsequently embodied in evil men; both of which, v.g., evil modes and evil men, it is still our wisdom as well as duty to avoid.

For it is as possible for human as it is for vegetable productions to be infected in their principles: or disadvantages of station, local disadvantages, may hinder the development of a man's highest properties in life; as the spicy myrtles, the citrons, and the roses may be hindered in maturing their fine aroma and exhaling delicious perfumes by an unfavourable climate; or as the sacred breath by which man was originally ushered into life might pass over him again without producing any more response than a sandy desert will yield to the sweet-hunting zephyr: and other causes might still be suggested to account for the great disparity that certainly seems to exist among men in the present state, without recurring to a particular, perfect, distinct, or what for that class of beings would be called a *personal* pre-existence.

If, moreover, a personal pre-existence, as well as a pre-existence of principles must be supposed; why not a pre-existence of things too, which are of natural production and of principles equally pre-existent; such as our rocks and fishes, trees, shrubs, and birds—why should not they also have a material pre-existence? As far as we can trace the pre-existence of those, it is, on the hypothesis

just advanced, through successive modes admirably developed by the special powers or spirits assigned them in creation for that purpose; the same modes and spirits being strictly allied through all nature in different degrees, and originally produced by one mode and one spirit. And what should hinder us from including man, also a natural production, in the germinating chaos and general order of progressive increase? Why should man, of all creatures, be thought so very precocious as to exist in maturity for ages before he is born, or even become an embryo? It seems very unphilosophical, does the doctrine of such a perfect pre-existence; and certainly none can be more unscriptural: it does not accord with the first of Genesis and of St. John, to mention no farther authorities.

Knowing so little as we do of possibilities, it would not become us to deny the possibility of any thing; and particularly of the same personal modes which were assembled in chaos and developed in Paradise, having been identically developed before now with all their Paradisiacal and subsequent circumstances; ores for implements, and birds for food, and trees for shade: but this certainly cannot be esteemed so probable as, that after they shall have been disembodied, they may be reorganized with all their old essentials, and likewise with all or most of their present incidentals in a future state. For, as the power or spirit by which we live and consist is known to continue after dissolution, so may the word or mode originally appointed to it also be presumed to continue. But a posthumous existence and continual reappearance is a very different case from an eternal beginning; except by the One Word and Spirit, the beginning of which cannot be conceived: when, there being only one, of course the others could not be.

For even after a man has been born, and lived out his time in the world, and been "gathered to his fathers," he is not a person. If there be any intermediate state, like

Elysium or Tartarus, as poets feign, for the deceased, we should not call them *Persons* in such a state, but manes or remains, and ghosts or shades. It is only in a future state, when the dead shall rise again, "every man in his own order," that we can again call them *Persons*. And "Christ, the First fruits," if he had not risen in person, that is corporeally and entirely, would have been no more a person in his future than in his pre-existing state.

We should also be governed by what we read as well as by what may be reasoned or inferred, on this head. What is clearly revealed to us we may confidently believe; what, ambiguously, we may think of accordingly. The eternity of one Word and of one Spirit in unity, is clearly revealed, therefore we may confidently believe it: the *several* pre-existence of other modes and spirits, such as are combined somehow in the present state, is also revealed, but ambiguously; ambiguously therefore, let us also receive it. But if there must needs be such a state as that of a full and perfect personal pre-existence, and nothing less will go down, judging from the analogy of faith, it would be much more reasonable to suppose likewise some constant recollection than a total or temporary oblivion of the same. Indeed it would be contrary even to nature, contrary to our experience of the present, as well as contrary to what we believe of the future, to think otherwise. For a future state will place the present in exactly the same position as that has placed the past in: what is present to the past will be past to the future when it shall be present; and if, as the apostle says, "when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away" (Cor. I. xiii. 10), if we shall then have a full and distinct recollection of the present that now is, some partial recollection suited to its general incompetency at least might be expected in the present of a former state, supposing such a state to have been. On the other hand, assuming such a personal pre-existence to be for the main a needless and unwarrantable hypothesis, and even a *several* pre-existence of either element, that is, of

either matter or mode, soul or body, to be at least ambiguous; a pretended consciousness of either cannot certainly be entitled for the main to any higher credence; but must be reputed also ambiguous at least. The authority of revelation in not warranting either foundation forbids the superstructure of consciousness thereon. And as for the pretensions of some both to a personal pre-existence and a perfect consciousness of the same, and Who they were, and what befel them in that state; we must receive these as we should other unusual pretensions, with a mingled regard to the strangeness of the fact and of the evidence adduced in its support. The consciousness of such a state being certainly as unprecedented as the most unnatural occurrence that can be imagined, however it may happen by the state itself, would require the same quantum or proportion of evidence in order to belief. We ought not to believe such a pretension from any one who was not entitled to implicit credence for any assertion. At least it does not appear how a pre-existing person, whether of the natal, antenatal, or supramundane period or sphere, can be acknowledged on any other ground than that of implicit belief. For if he should tell us of events within the compass of human experience or invention, his consciousness of the same need not be supposed; and what more could he tell us, but "unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter" (Cor. II. xii. 4), as being contrary to the order of nature? The pretensions of a wandering Jew would be as credible in this instance as the pretensions of the patriarch Zerib, or those of such a philosopher as Pythagoras.

2. Considering in a general way the relations of the *present* state, and understanding by life itself something more than a latent principle; v. g. the whole matter and mode or description of the subject whether latent or apparent, together with its affections and accidents; it may be observed, that different persons have had very different ideas of this combination as it appears at present, or of its present state or appearance; some accounting it a state of en-

joyment; some a state of probation; some more rationally, a state of preparation; but others more truly and infallibly, following the light of Scripture, and looking also at the primitive order of life, a state of degradation and reparation—a state below that which was, and to be higher than that which is. To unassisted reason a state of preparation seems more probable than a state of reparation: and some may also think to deduce the same from Scripture; as particularly from that where St. Paul says, “Howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, &c.” (Cor. I. xv. 46). But the apostle evidently means, first in this life, and not in the whole being of the subject—in its combination and development, not in its principles or elements. For supposing the natural or material first in creation, neither St. Paul nor any one else could ever mean to deny that which is spiritual to have been in fact long before; considering what the divine nature is from which all things proceed. But whether we understand a state of preparation or of reparation in the present, it ought in either case to be a state of improvement.

When the repairing of a subject or a state of reparation for the same is mentioned, it must needs be with reference to a more perfect state existing at some particular period; as here, e. g. the period proceeding from creation, the first from its combined or corporeal existence, and generally designated as the state of Paradise. And if one should go to draw a general comparison between the present life and that, such comparison must necessarily fail for want of data. The panegyrists of the present order of things do not detract, by their eulogiums on this, from the beauty of the original order, which is past, but rather exalt the same. For if so much beauty and decorum be still discernible in the world, both natural and moral, notwithstanding its complete overthrow and consequent decline, what must the same have been before in its perfection. If the stones and disorderly rubbish of this sublime structure be worth regarding,

what must the structure itself have been when in thorough repair? Or say rather, if that original order was but the commencement or foundation of a state that we have yet in view, what must that state exhibit in perfection? Why, if a man could only be growing towards the perfection of the beginning, it would be much for him; how much more, to be growing beyond it by a superior accession of light in the same magnificent design! He might then be truly "going on unto perfection" (Heb. vi. 1), as the apostle writes. "And he shall be like a tree planted by the water-side that will bring forth his fruit in due season" (Ps. i. 3). To such a one the intervening state between an earthly and an heavenly paradise will appear, to be sure, like a great gulf, or a very considerable breach, however, but not impassable. And so this period may be generally regarded by the children of the resurrection, with reference to the past and the to come; while with others, on the contrary, the present life shall be every thing.

Indeed, no one scarcely can be aware of his own blind partiality to himself in this transitory scene, and in how many ways it is shewn; so that not only in matter of fact, but also in reading and information, every trifle concerning the present will have an unaccountable charm, and command an interest that the gravest concern of the past can not, nor of the future either, unfortunately. For a preference of that which is passing in our day before that which is gone by may be naturally attributed to self-love, but it must be owned an odd sort of self-love that can make a man love his little finger beyond his whole body, or dictate a preference of the concerns of this short period to those of the eternity by which it is succeeded. One thing may be said for it, that while eternity looks blank like a smooth ocean through its simple continuity, time is magnified by distinction: and thus, to say nothing of its continual division and subdivision into years, months, days, hours, and minuter intervals, (which seems, however, but a poor argument to ac-

count for so great and ghastly an effect,) from the same general criterion of occurrence before mentioned, or the natural order in which subjects are deduced from their beginning to the maturity assigned them, and to the warning which thence succeeds, making the present state almost a nullity, we derive a very clear distinction of the same, and one that has also been pretty generally adopted, namely, into two principal parts, portions or periods, called *Youth* and *Age*, or Growing and Declining. As for the staid state of manhood, it can hardly be ascribed to a creature that "fleeth as it were a shadow, and never continueth in one stay." But those two are worth remembering, as more sensible periods of the present life; also as including both the internal and external relations of the same, and bearing a similar relation to each other with that of life and death. For it is not unusual to consider life as a journey, "The journey of life." In Scripture it is called "walking," with various qualifications, as "walking in uprightness," "in the fear of the Lord," &c., on one hand; or "walking in darkness," "in deceit," &c., on the other. So death is considered as the end of our journey; and youth and age, the periods in question, as its two principal stages or portions,—that, over a smiling country with a very sanguine or very thoughtless population; this, over one altogether as barren, and made more wretched by the sufferings, disappointments and endless complaints of travellers slowly wending their way towards "the valley of the shadow of death"; our ears greeted as we descend continually with the lamentations of our coteremporaries, sounds which in our younger days we were hardly aware of.

And if this language should be thought romantic, it may be thought still more so, to talk of an *intermediate state*, of a state between the present and future, or of any beginning of a future state, other than such as is well understood by the *state*, and more properly expressed by the *shadow*, of death. But such a state is however talked of

by many; and that in two ways, 1, as the state of the subject *intire*; 2, as the state of the subject in *parts*. To speak of these two in succession;

1. If there be for the *intire subject* any sort of intermediate state other than what is simply meant by death, or its shadow, whatever the same may be like when complete, the entrance to it is known by experience to be a state of insensibility, "from whose bourne" many a traveller has returned certainly, whether he had to re-pass the Stygian flood for that purpose, or was not got beyond it. But there is no room for concluding from their report the presence of any other distinction in that incipient state, "where the prisoners rest together" (Job iii. 18), than is commonly observed in our prisons, between "the weary and the wicked" before trial: neither does it appear consistent; as, to suppose a distinct existence for these two parties, like Purgatory and Paradise, e. g. in death, were in effect to suppose a prejudication, or rather no death. So it is rather, to suppose even a sort of neutral state for some of the departed, while others should be writhing in purgatory; as this distinction also implies a judgment for both parties, with a life worse than a temporary death for one; also a violent interfering with the course of nature, which, if one may be allowed, one should rather suppose, would be suffered to run on her course quietly to the Great day.

Therefore, as we generally believe in the future destruction, if not in the remodelling of the present order of things, which even now is ripening to that end, it would be more consistent, though it may not be always so profitable in certain respects, to talk of a mundane and ultra-mundane fatuity in relation to its subjects, than of Lethes and Purgatories, and temporary or short-lived Paradiases.

2. But the question is not so properly of a whole intermediate state, as of half, i. e., of a *separate state* of existence; a state in which one set of constituents shall keep together, and be all on the alert, while another is dissolving or qui-

escent. And who can tell us more of this than we know, little as it is? If the eye sees nothing less than itself, and every man is a stranger now to his own face, one might be excused for some ignorance of one's self, or of what one is to be in such a state, if *state* it might be called, as passes between one life and another. For one hardly knows how to call that a *state*, in which there is so much unmaking, and which is so full of dissolution.

In Scripture we never read of any rest but one, which is the final condition of the just: much less do we read of a rest for one part of him before another, as for the body before the soul, e. g. That text of Ecclesiastes which mentions one sort of spirit going upward, and another downward (Eccl. iii. 21), is authority only for a dissolution of the subject, and not of a separate state of existence: no more is that of the dust returning to the earth, and the spirit to God who gave it (Ib. xii. 7) by the same: no more is that striking verse of the Psalmist, "When the breath of man goeth forth, he shall turn again to his earth: and *then* all his thoughts perish" (Ps. cxlvi. 3): with much more that might be adduced to the same effect, as well from the Psalms as from other parts of the Old Testament. And in the New Testament, that very text which has been thought most conclusive for both, namely, for both an intermediate and separate state of existence, is as far as any from authorizing a belief of either, being our Saviour's reply to the thief on the cross, "To day shalt thou be with me in Paradise" (Luke xxiii. 43). For his words were not, "To day shall thy soul," a part of him; but "Thou," that is, the whole man, both body and soul; as it happened no doubt either in necessity, or else by "a new thing," like the Saviour's own resurrection, with the sinner's belief. For in any other way than this even Jesus himself could not have been in paradise that day, nor yet the next.

Comparing the notion of such a separate state of existence occurring between the present and the future, by such

means and criterions as the Almighty has kindly afforded us of judging between things that differ, and approving the more excellent (Phil. i. 10); we shall find it, 1, very unphilosophical, if that can be of any consequence with those who maintain it; as implying either a partial interruption of the steady process going on between creation and futurity, or else a partial dissolution of a subject that exists by the concurrence of its principles, or ingredients, and these hardly to be distinguished in effect, as before observed*. And, 2, whether this be of any consequence too or not, even people's own experience might teach them what to think of this matter: so that seeing as the breath of man goeth forth, first his thoughts perish with his senses, if not before; then there goes the colour, and then the substance turns again to earth, they might easily conclude for themselves that so perfect a dissolution as that above signified is now really taking place. Or, 3, if they pay no more deference to the testimony of their own eyes than to the deductions of reason, it is hoped, they will hearken to the Word of God, as soon at least as to the inventions of superstition and priestcraft; as they may find in that sacred repository authorities enough to prove a perfect dissolution by death, if those above cited should be deemed insufficient.

The soul, or inward life, as far as it had been developed or proceeded, would be as though it were not, or at least like its own latent properties, those which still remained to be developed, in this state of suspension or insensibility. And as for the outward life or body, any one who has ever looked into the common prison or receptacle of "the weary" and "the wicked" may guess what is going on there. In the general dissolution or expansion of principles by death, it is not necessary to suppose, that any train of thought, or any single perception either should be lost with our breath, any more than the air that we breathe, or any evil act any more than a good. Perhaps some man

would be happy to think he might be rid, if it were but of a single compunction, in this way : but what should hinder it from recurring after death as well as after sleep ; and after a thousand years as well as after one, to resume its place in the ranks of its kindred constituents, as between love and jealousy perhaps, or between friendship and avarice ? There is but one impediment that can be thought of.

If the subject of an intermediate state was not so controverted and improbable as it is, there would still be the same objection to its distinct acknowledgment here, as to acknowledging the period of manhood with the present state, v. g. that it is not actually distinct from the periods or states on either hand ; and therefore upon all accounts enough may now have been said on that head.

3. But whatever may be thought or supposed of an intermediate state, to a man of reflection, a principle cause of doubt and discomfort in the present will accrue from his uncertainty respecting the *future* : for, perceiving an immense disparity between these two states, he thinks, if he could only know what were good for the future, he might know what is best for the present, and shape his course accordingly,—adapting the smaller interest to the greater at all events, if (which cannot often occur) they should seem to disagree at any time, and if he could but be also satisfied as to 1, the reality of a future state ; 2, his proper interest in that state.

1, And certainly it seems but reasonable to inquire into the evidences of its *Reality*, before we proceed to speculate, or to raise any expectations on a state, which many appear to doubt, while others advocate it, and some even of these do not much honour, however they may profess to believe it. For most of them are only reasoners at the best : and the evidence of reason will be found very chimerical and insufficient in this case. Divine justice would seem to be one of reason's best arguments for a future state ; but that is too loose in its application, since

the same principle would equally authorize the future state and endless bliss of brutes with that of our honoured species. Divine bounty is another good argument, but less plausible: we have found so much of this attribute in our present life, that we think, it can never fail our wishes, and therefore that another and an happier life must be reserved for us because we wish it; but let us think too of divine bounty abused, and we shall not be apt to reckon so fondly on such evidence thereafter. Then the intellectual advocate steps forward again in aid of our wishes, which are the only advocate with some, and reminds us of our instinctive reliance on futurity, shewn in a natural concern for posthumous reputation, for offspring, and for other incidentals: but this too proves no more than any other prepossession; and prepossession alone is not evidence. The truth is, then, that the evidence of a future state, as just observed, is not to be gathered from reason, but will be more a matter of revelation and record. And such evidence as this, it may be presumed, we also have; the fact being clearly revealed in the Old Testament, and recorded in the New. And if one did not believe this, one might save one's self the trouble of thinking or speculating on the subject. For, as St. Paul well observes, "if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain" (Cor. I. xv. 14). And vain, we may also add, must have been the faith of all Christendom for so many ages in relation to a future state. But "blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; which according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead" (Pet. I. i. 3), and so placed the fact upon record.

Taking then the belief of a future state primarily from revelation and record, Reason may now step in, (for now is her time,) and testify with the Word of God concerning our proper interest in that state, and our fittest preparation for the same. "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good" (Mic. vi. 8). And a man may also conclude for

himself, that to retain and accumulate in a future state the most important article that he can enjoy in the present, would be the best for that state, and consequently, its improvement, the best for this. If he derives any happy principle, like justice, mercy, or humility, from a former state, or from the beginning of the present, or from any subsequent period, the same will constitute no doubt his greatest present wealth, the most important of his present possessions, the worthiest of a future state, the most to be minded in this. For he who has the means, and knows how to be happy here, is the likeliest man for happiness hereafter. He is wise enough to adapt his pleasures to the state to which he aspires, thinking the longest lived of the company here the most likely to be eternized hereafter; and wonders, how any one who has made his present existence a burden to himself by his follies, and shortened it by profusion, can expect any chance of succeeding to an happier state in reversion; as the squandering of one good patrimony is no just ground for expecting another.

For allowing, that some of our most valuable properties are derived from a former state, as before asserted or supposed, it will not be much, to suppose likewise, that the same may be transmitted again together, or as it were in a body to some future state. We cannot help wishing, that our information on this important subject was equal to the interest which it naturally excites, and that we were not left to guess so much more than we are told concerning it. A man must be very careless and incurious not to think occasionally of the past and future, as well as of the present; at the same time, that it might be said of a forward inquirer concerning those two mysterious states, as it is of the covetous in other respects, "What profit hath he that hath laboured for the wind?" (Eccl. v. 16): for the goodness of God will be the only confidence of the wisest at last, with respect to either the future or the present. But, without quitting that confidence, or presuming too

far either, one might still have one's hypothesis on the subject of futurity.

Judging by the account of man's expulsion from paradise, it would seem as if those select properties were then all suppressed or left behind together, whereupon it is reasonable to infer, that they would so continue in their latency or separation from the body or swinish multitude of constituents: and also upon its restoration be so resumed, i. e. altogether,—or if not altogether, yet in very near succession; as the properties of purity and peace and love, and others, both known, and it may be, unknown. And then, according to other passages of Scripture corresponding with the forecited, the last great change, whenever it arrives, will only confirm this second creation, as it will the suppression or dissolution that has not been reversed. So the precursor of our Lord is reported to have said of him, that he would baptize “with the Holy Ghost and with fire” (Mat. iii. 11); would revolutionize the world with the same powers which gave it a beginning: “Whose fan is in his hand (said the prophet): and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire” (Ib. 12). The good plants are to be transplanted to their permanent stations; the bad, to be not only eradicated, but totally decomposed, as chaff is consumed in the flame.

Perhaps this analogy may be continued a little farther; and there may be room to hope, that the vital constituents escaping from these ill-fated plants may be assimilated again by others, if not by their own posterity. It would be some consolation to know, that we can only be damned organically, and not essentially: for any being is better than no being; any sort of life, than endless dying,—if it be but the life of a beast,—that we lose our mode only (this is spoken very hypothetically), and not our existence; may only be lost to ourselves, and not to the universe. It might even, in so bad a case, be some consolation only to

know, that our earthly or excrementitious life was hidden somewhere, as our heavenly or enduring life is hid with Christ (Col. iii. 3): "in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Ib. ii. 3). And yet it is a horrible thought after all, to think of perishing like stubble which the greedy flame devours, or to have the properties that we glory in all dispersed, as the Psalmist expresses it, like "the chaff which the wind scattereth away from the face of the earth" (Ps. i. 5): more especially as we have no assurance either, of any thing like a neutral state after this; but all the authority of Christian Revelation, and even of heathen tradition, as well as the plain dictates of reason, preclude the supposition of such a state, and there is nothing in favour of the same, but the grovelling views and fatal illusions of those who are base and foolish enough to entertain it. Smoke will be smoke, however dispersed; and if the ungodly be dispersed in like manner, such dispersion, we may be assured, will not contribute either to their comfort or to their impunity. An immortality of this kind therefore would not be a desirable endowment for the subject, if it was not so deplorable as what might still be imagined, and; it may be, as much worse that might not.

Immortality, properly speaking, is only an indefinite, as Eternity is an endless, futurity; it will be either a *deathful* or a deathless existence in some shape or other after the present; an incalculable series of accidents not necessarily good or evil, but dependent on circumstances: which being unfavourable at present, it may be wished to come in, as indeed it will, with a change. Originally any change in the constitution of the kingdom, or any diminution of its constituents—one word different, or one word less, must have been for the worse; when every word was good: so that all the evil in the world was naturally privative, as when dying was the only evil of life, and the only evil threatened. But since the introduction of sin, or the character of evil, life itself is become a burden to many. What makes life a blessing in itself is, when it so

happens, the goodness of its constituents : it is this goodness that constitutes the natural integrity of the kingdom, which therefore could not originally be partitioned, nor spoiled of a single constituent without damage or even destruction to the whole. And if life itself be naturally good, a point that seems to have been settled by instinct, or universal consent, immortality must naturally be better ; but if at present certain conditions are necessary, to make even life tolerable, how much more for the weight of eternity !

Immortality, therefore, though naturally essential, may be conditionally characteristic, i. e., a good characteristic with a good subject, and a good immortality with immortal goodness. Or if the character of a subject could be changed from evil to good, immortality might become, by means of such change, a good, a blessed, characteristic in many a subject to whom it had otherwise proved a very abyss of woe. But can a subject be changed and continue the same ? If it can, there may be found in immortality what there cannot simply in life, and we may hail it as a good characteristic. There is then no doubt, that the character of any subject may be changed, its essence continuing ; or as one should say, without any impeachment of essentials,—and the character of every minute ingredient, i. e. of every simple constituent, separately too, as well as the character of the whole subject together, by the operation of a foreign principle. Such is the blessed efficacy of that one principle : whereby one might safely propose “ to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality—eternal life ” (Rom. ii. 7), and life worth their having too, a decidedly good characteristic ; being “ dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord ” (Rom. vi. 11).

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER III.

GOOD SUBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

1, Of Incidentals.—2, Of Constituents.

“ The tree of the knowledge of good and evil.”—GEN. ii. 9.

HAVING considered the essentials, whether incidental or constituent, of the Kingdom of God incarnate, by the table presented to us in our own constitution and circumstances, we are now to consider likewise, in the second place, its colouring and characteristics. Which *Characteristics*, although they would seem to bear the same relation to the essential subject, as a shadow to its substance, are not mere shadows however, but matters of as high concern as the subjects themselves to which they relate ; those which meet in any subject forming together, or in the aggregate, its whole character, and being as necessary a part of the same as its essential constituents, with the advantage also of being more intelligible. For the real essence of *every* subject is, like its origin, unknown in some measure, not being fully developed by its consequences ; but of One, and He the Author of all more especially. UNKNOWN (according to the heathen mythology, NIGHT ; and according to the Christian, DARKNESS) is the source of all things. And all things must

have a character, even where there is no notion of the same; as with respect to things that were never seen nor heard of.

If we were to consider notions as shadows, and characteristics as substances in relation to them, we should be nearer the truth, than by considering characteristics only as the shadows of substances; the shadow of any thing being a mere accident, the characteristic as indispensable as its outside, and its outside as substantial as the inside. We should be very attentive to the distinguishing between notion and character; because the former is apt to vary with views and circumstances; but the latter only with facts and realities, and not according to any one's thinking, nor saying either. Good, e. g. will be good, and evil will be evil, notwithstanding the perverseness of those "who call evil good, and good evil" (Isai. v. 20). The notion is a midway signal between character and description: it belongs by right both to that *of* which, and to that *by* which it is conceived; to the object of conception as well as to the subject or concipient, though its native place is with the latter. And considering the weakness and fallibility of human conceptions, it may be said of subjects generally, if not universally, that our notion is one thing, their character another. Thus, to deduce an example from the highest point, the highest subject that can be quoted, from the Author both of the character and essence of every subject as aforesaid; we know that "the Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works" (Ps. cxlv. 17), though some have very unrighteous and very unhallowed notions both of Him and his ways and works. Which seems natural enough however: because our notions are constituent parts of our own intellect, and must therefore agree with its other constituents; while the characteristics of the Godhead belong only to God, being his own notion of himself. The former are human; the latter, divine; and no two subjects can be more dissimilar than the Divine Being, and the notion which many men have,

nor more unequal than his own notion, and that which any man can have, in this life at least, of that Glorious Object.

If it seemed worth while therefore, a plain distinction might be founded on this principle, of incidental and constituent characteristics answering to incidental and constituent essentials; our notion of a subject being considered as an incidental characteristic; its genuine character, (God's notion of the same) as constituent. But the genuine character of a subject being inaccessible to every understanding besides that by which it was formed, and men being consequently obliged to substitute notions for characters, the observance of such a distinction would be both difficult and superfluous, at the same time that the notion or foresaid substitute may answer every purpose: for, as every subject has its character, so every KNOWN subject must have one notion appertaining to it at least, if that should be the greatest secret upon earth.

Indeed every subject, while it can have but one character, is susceptible of two notions relating thereto; both of which may be proved correct on different criterions, as we find by considering them in their principles: yet these two notions form only one together; which is the notion of the subject relating to either criterion: e. g., The principles of every characteristic constituent are two, v. g. good and evil, having different relations, as the same subject may be either good in itself and bad in other respects, or bad in itself and good in other respects: and the general notion of every thing will be also thus compounded; as we find to be the case with regard to the Best and worst of beings. For first, God in himself is all goodness; but they who do what they can to make him their enemy will not find Him good; and next, while the devil, on the contrary, is all wickedness in himself; still, as the work of God, he will be good for some purposes notwithstanding, like God's other works. And the same comparison may be extended to all the adherents of the wicked spirit, to

the whole mass of the wicked. For however loathsome and abominable they may be in themselves, they must still be good for something, or they would not be here: just as a dunghill must be good for something, or it would not be tolerated in the vicinity of our darling habitations.

And so it is presumable, that the distinction may now be sufficiently indicated between, not only the notion and character of a subject, but also between its essential and characteristic constituents, however inseparable these may be in their own nature or natural position. And inseparable indeed they also are generally, though not specifically; every essential constituent of the Kingdom having its characteristics always, if not always the same. For characteristics being acquirable, of course cannot be invariable like essentials, which are not acquirable; as brilliance, e.g., among material properties, which may be acquired by the essential properties of gold, and quickness by those of the apprehension; while the essential properties of gold and apprehension are themselves perfectly unacquirable, and cannot be ever transfused or transmuted into any subject in which they do not naturally exist. So evil was acquired once in the moral department especially, and good may be acquired by the mediation of Christ; but not the essential properties, whether spiritual or intellectual, that are susceptible of this characteristic, without a miracle.

But there seem to be two opposite notions among the teachers and preachers of the doctrine of the Kingdom respecting the balance of its constituent characteristics: some maintaining, that in all its subject or composition there is not a good one; others, on the contrary, that there are more good than bad. In the meantime, among the first mentioned class some will even go so far as to propose themselves for examples on their own doctrine; as St. Paul for one, where he tells the Philippians, as he had also told the Corinthians before (Cor. I. iv. 16), "Brethren,

be followers together of me, and mark them which walk so as ye have us for an ensample" (Phil. iii. 17): and as the pious Psalmist, when once he felt the power of grace in tribulation, crying to his heavenly Guardian "Preserve thou my soul: for I am holy" (Ps. lxxxvi. 2). Whereas the same Psalmist also exclaims on another occasion, "There is none that doeth good, no not one," &c. (Ib. xiv. 3): and St. Paul not only quotes this saying of the Psalmist, to shew generally, that there are no examples like that which he proposed, "As it is written, There is none righteous," &c. (Rom. iii. 10), but also applies this very case expressly to himself, concluding, "O wretched man, that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Ib. vii. 24), which seems to imply a great contradiction, and yet is easily reconciled by its context in the last cited authority, "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man" (Ib. 22). As much as to say, my primitive constitution, my essential constituents are good; and so far might St. Paul stand for an ensample, if we had no other; "but I see another law in my members (an acquired character) warring against the law of my mind," &c. (Ib. 23). Who could ever be an example for others, or even a comfort to himself under such circumstances? "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Ib. 25). "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ" (Cor. I. xi. 1): "and the life that I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God" (Gal. ii. 20).

Thus the materials of the Kingdom are naturally good, and so is their original combination: but both are the worse for use, as elsewhere observed, and as the royal preacher also intimates in one saying, especially, "Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions" (Eccles. vii. 29). There may be some difference between a good instrument cracked and one that has never been good: or so Scripture seems to consider the case; still admitting,

that lost goodness can be good for nothing until it be restored to its old essential confederates. No new essential has occurred in the incarnate Kingdom, that we know of, since its creation: the properties that have occurred since are all in their nature fleeting and contingent; they are modes, consequences, characteristics—such things as used to be called Accidents. But all constituents are composed of accidents; and consequently the merest modes in this present state may become essential in another, with another Fiat of the Creator, if not by virtue of the first. For his work is still going on: and his creatures are all going towards their respective destinies; towards good or evil, heaven or hell. “When thou lettest thy breath go forth, they shall be made” (Ps. civ. 30).

With regard to the varieties of characteristics; they may be found by any criterion, and enough of them too for any scientific purpose; as by tests in chemistry to distinguish the different characters in that department; by evidence in law, to ascertain right and equity; by reason and argument in philosophy, to demonstrate what is truth; by judgment and experience in the conduct of life to discover what is prudent; by effect and allotment, to find what is common, as sense; and uncommon, as genius. But what we want to find, ascertain and demonstrate is, the two opposite characters of good and evil, by which the Kingdom of God is distinguished into its two principal spheres or portions of heavenly or heaven, and hellish or hell. Such are the two great divisions of characteristics, which we are now to consider as far as we can, generally in the first place; and afterwards more particularly, with their fruits or consequences. We cannot in the moral department, any more than in the natural, trace every production through every stage from the beginning: we cannot refer every transaction in society to the actual springs or passions by which it is specially combined and produced, as the epic poets of antiquity and some poetical historians of later times have affected to do; but we can

discern in these transactions certain general characters, by which (as in the natural department) we may know sufficiently what class to refer them to, with proper caution. For that we must apply, and some ingenuity likewise, to avoid mistakes in the confines of good and evil; the same being very narrow and as it were, intermingled, however distant their extremes, so that mistakes are easily made in this quarter; and "woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil!" (Isai. v. 20.) We may infer this from some of the undermentioned properties of good and evil; which are worth considering, such as 1, their reciprocity or convertibility, 2, their reality, 3, utility, 4, necessity, 5, merit and guilt. For,

First, Considering the *Reciprocity* or *Convertibility* of good and evil—so that by the ordering of Providence nuisances often become benefits; and on the contrary, benefits, nuisances through the mismanagement of those who do not deserve them—may be enough to occasion the misnaming which the prophet denounces as so serious with some who are apt to consider; but that is not the greater part by any means of those who confound the distinction of good and evil; the majority of confounders in any respect being such as are not apt to consider. On farther consideration the former sort may be satisfied with calling evil good, or good evil, when it is made so by conversion; as we call flint, glass, and water, ice, when they are converted into these substances, but in the mean time they had best call them as they are; i. e. evil, Evil; and good, Good: which is too much to expect from the other sort, or from the sceptical tribe either, which denies the second named property of those just alluded to, v. g. the reality of good and evil.

2dly, With those who are not particularly wild, either in their conduct or their opinions, there can be little doubt of the *Reality* of good, though there may be much of its universality. For if good be universal, people will not always know where to find it: but "there be many that

do say, who will shew us any good?" (Ps. iv. 6.) This property, therefore, generally imputed to good even by those who are yet far to seek for it, in that they never despair of finding the good for which they are yet to seek, needs not to be proved.

One should rather prove, if one might be allowed, to an headstrong votary perchance, that the particular good which he imagines for himself has no foundation either in nature or in equity. For such a conviction might save the man some trouble, and litigation; if it led to no higher consequences: but it might be a means of preserving his good humour, and counteracting a very common revolution to which such votaries are liable; when from a fixed persuasion of the reality of good, they come to be more persuaded of the reality of evil.

And even this is a fact too, that many have denied; but at the same time, no one ever seems to have doubted when fairly put to the test. For what do men fear, but what they take to be evil? and where is there a sceptic by profession, who would not be afraid, and fly like his master, Pyrrho, to the nearest tree, if he should happen to meet in a narrow lane, a dog as mad as himself? Never a one of them indeed. Which shews, by the way, what liars these sceptics are: for they will deny any thing as it may suit; and to deny the existence of evil is easy enough in theory, but will they deny it in practice? To do this, the sceptic must make it appear, that "though he walk through the valley of the shadow of death, yet he will fear no evil" (Ps. xxiii. 4). The humble Christian is more likely, perhaps, to exhibit an evidence of this sort, when he comes to be tried. At the same time; as the sceptic may allege, that his weakness or instinct, or whatever he may be pleased to call it, is no sufficient proof of the reality of evil, and this reality is what many would be glad to disprove, if they knew how, the same may deserve some farther consideration, when opportunity offers.

3dly, The *Utility* of good appears to be more generally admitted than the reality of evil; and a character that no

one can deny to good who believes its existence; since the very idea of good will imply utility, unless it be good for nothing—that is, neither for the present nor yet for the future: which is no sort of good; and consequently, of no use. But real good will be useful, or good in more ways than one: it will be good for enjoyment, and good (or rather better) for an assurance of the divine favour, when such good comes unalloyed with evil; as temporal prosperity, for example, unalloyed with plunder and self-reproach. For “better is a little with righteousness than great revenues without right” (Prov. xvi. 8), or, than “riches kept for the owners thereof to their hurt” (Eccles. v. 18). And according to this rule it is, that we find every sort of temporal prosperity considered in Scripture, and in the Old Testament especially (where the greatest stress is laid on it) v. g. as good, when unalloyed with any particular indeliberate, to make its goodness questionable. Thus, when victory, conquest and other advantages in war are there referred to, it is not merely for their intrinsic value or importance; but in consideration of the divine favour to which these victories are ascribed. “For they got not the land in possession through their own sword, neither was it their own arm that helped them; but Thy right hand, and Thine arm, and the light of Thy countenance; because Thou hadst a favour unto them” (Ps. xlv. 3). In these and in other respects even temporal prosperity may be useful: so that the general utility of good can hardly be questioned; if that of more serious good may be frustrated by indeliberate, and the greatest good be made only good for evil, as when the grace of God is received in vain.

But the utility of evil, not being so apparent, may require an example or two by way of illustration: and it is useful indeed many ways by different forms and directions. Evil then is useful in the form of justice and mercy; as a punishment for the wicked, and a correction for the just. It is useful for grace and humility; to put a distinction between the just and the wicked; giving the

former something to look down upon, and the latter, a badge that they will not be so proud of as they are of some things. The best men too want humbling occasionally: and even moral evil may be useful in such cases to others of that class, as it was once to St. Peter, making him weep bitterly. Evil may be useful, therefore, if it be only to shew us, that we are not good. It is also useful for charity; to soften our hearts, to make us kind and gentle in our disposition towards others, and indulgent to their faults from a sense of our own demerit. It is useful for edification: the best men want to be thwarted sometimes as well as humbled; they must be crossed and opposed sometimes, even in good wishes and works, for the trial and exercise of their virtue, their patience, perseverance, fortitude, faith; to such, therefore, evil in this form is good and wholesome. Even in the form of sorrow, which is its extreme, or consummation, evil may be good by being useful many ways. Solomon pronounces this form of evil generally conducive to our spiritual improvement, observing that "sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better" (Eccl. vii. 3): and in a natural relation, there can be no doubt of such an effect. Thus, the father's sorrowful travail in this fallen state is conducive to his own physical health and strength, as well as to the support of his family; and the mother's is conducive to the remembrance and consequent care of her offspring; being for a boon both to her and it, to one as the foundation of maternal fondness and delight, to the other as that of early protection and nutriment. For the same bountiful Creator is Author alike both of good and evil for one end, which is invariably good; as pious Job would intimate in that saying, "What, shall we receive good at the hand of the Lord, and shall we not receive evil?" (Job ii. 10). As much as to say, How is it possible? For these two properties being so closely interwoven as they are in human affairs, it is not easy to conceive how one can be had always without the other.

So the curse of Adam is followed by an immediate foretaste of blessing; and the multiplied sorrow of Eve, is to her a present fountain of delight, and a prospect of unspeakable honour in her future seed. And these are but a few instances of the utility of evil, or of many cases which are so considered. It gives a demand for hope; a zest to comfort, and an edge to all our faculties, making us quite other beings for any work to what we should be without it: insomuch, that one would almost think sometimes whether evil might not have been *originally* as well as *consecutively* ordained for good; which would clearly be making God its author. But of this enough for the present; and enough also of the utility of good and evil.

In the fourth place, it were hard to draw a line between the utility of any thing and its *Necessity*; as they are only shades of difference, but this property also may be generally averred, both of good and evil, as well as that. And if good be necessary, as every one seems to think, both to the prosperity and very existence of order in the creation, we need not scruple to admit, that evil may be necessary alike in every respect; whether physical, metaphysical, moral, social, or religious. Thus, in a physical respect, the evil of a less disease may be necessary either as a preventive or a remedy for a greater; in a metaphysical, the evil of forgetfulness is always necessary in a certain degree to the faculty of abstraction, which is one of the most important, and in fact most characteristic of the human understanding. In a moral respect too, the same evil of forgetfulness is necessary to assuage the pangs of grief, and quell the force of resentment. In a social respect evil may be necessary to enjoyment several ways, though in general nothing can be more destructive of social happiness. For first, how can there be joy in the presence of friends without grief at their departure? Or, what is more; how can the greatest, best, blesseddest, and most desirable happiness of meeting again occur

without the pangs of separation? So if pain be an evil, evil is necessary to every good purpose for the future, and to every improvement of the past. Without a painful impression we could not bear in mind what we mean to do well; nor what we have done ill either, so much as we ought. Without a liability to pain, we should not be capable even of self-preservation; but be burning and wounding our own bodies continually, and breaking our own limbs worse than children. Therefore, if pain and painful impressions are evil, evil must be more than useful: it is necessary, absolutely necessary, in these respects.

Evil in short appears, and is to our conception, necessary both for the production of a free and happy, i. e., a moral agent, which may be thought its prime object, and also to counteract in some cases the effect of such a production on the agent himself as well as on his dependents: more especially is it necessary to satisfy him of the reality of a future state; and to teach him how to enjoy, as well as to wean him from the enjoyments of the present. One should not presume to say, that evil was necessary to Omnipotence in any of the forementioned respects; nor, that the Almighty Creator could not have formed that happy creature, a truly moral and religious creature without such an incumbrance, because no man nor angel either can understand the resources of Omnipotence. "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible" (Mat. xix. 26). We can, therefore, only say, that we do not comprehend the possibility of such a formation under existing circumstances. In these circumstances most of the evil, whether physical, metaphysical, moral, social, or religious that we know of, may be considered as a sort of back game that is played by divine Providence, and rather as a supplement, than as an opposition to good. And so it may be said, that man is formed for happiness; and nothing but sin can prevent it: but by sinning he goes counter to nature, defeats his own happiness, and is

miserable: yet by a due sense of his own misery he is brought again into the way of happiness, and of happiness, of an higher cast than he had ever known without it. Thus the misery of man, a superlative evil, is the basis of a second and better creation; and through the fall of some others are exalted, as St. Paul observes of the Jews and Gentiles (Rom. xi, 11), through the merciful ordering of divine Providence. Man is here in a state of purgation and preparation, for which every sort of evil seems necessary; and the existence or duration of such evil being bounded by this necessity, it may well be asked, Where is the evil? For if evil be necessary in such a state, there must be evil for the necessity; or else what is necessary must be wanting, which itself were an evil.

But still, is not evil, evil? Is not a violent, painful, and ignominious death an evil? for example. If it be no evil to the judge who inflicts, it must be some to the wretch who suffers it; or if it be not evil to the prisoner, it must be evil to the judge, or to some other party. There must be evil in this case somewhere. For judges are fallible, and in general have also a delegated power only; it may therefore happen, that in the case of an unjust execution, the same shall be evil, neither to the prisoner, nor yet to his judge entirely, but also to false witnesses perhaps, or perhaps to a false government. Somewhere or other however the evil must alight, and ultimately fix upon the guilty head: since evil is evil to him undoubtedly who does or chooses it, and to no other in the end. "There is nothing unclean of itself" (Rom. xiv, 14).

Thus then evil is evil as well as good; and that evil is both useful and necessary at present we must also allow. But it may be allowed too, at the same time, that the necessity of evil is no proof of its eternity: and its being necessary in this mixed mortal state may be thought a valid argument for two immortal and opposite states hereafter; one in which evil shall be no longer necessary, and one in which it shall be more necessary as well as more intense

than ever. But this is another consideration, and belongs to another head, v. g.

5thly, The Merit and Guilt of characteristics : and however one of these properties may deserve by and by a several and repeated consideration, on account of its particular relations, as well as its particular importance in the kingdom, they are now unitedly, and in the first instance ascribed to the spirits or characteristics to which they belong, rather than to the subjects or bearers of these characteristics, as attaching more immediately to them. In every reward, it is the action that we consider more than the agent ; and in every chastisement our object is not so much the person as the offence ; it is the chastisement of the offence, not the chastisement of the person properly speaking. A man's spirit or spiritual constituents, are his ministry in a manner, — the ministry by which he governs and is supported : and being himself irresponsible, if he governs amiss, it is they must bear the blame ; albeit, he will not find himself undamaged in the disgrace of his constituents, if they should draw it upon themselves by their ill advice.

Both merit and guilt therefore are properties, of good and evil, as these are of actions and the subjects they constitute, and may be removed with the good and evil, or without them either, at the pleasure of One who has the command of both, as there may be occasion to observe, which shews their nearer proximity to those properties, than to their subjects.

But since both good and evil happen of necessity, and in the moral department, as well as in those of Nature and Providence, with other circumstances also, as well as necessity, which prove them both to be good in their way, there may be, and have been, doubts respecting the merit of the one, and demerit or guilt of the other : which doubts have no sanction either in revelation or experience. For judging by these authorities, there can be no doubt of both good and evil generally receiving as good as they

bring, according to the divine expostulation with Cain, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? And if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door" (Gen. iv. 7). And though the good or evil done shall generally be partial, as in the instance of what is called some particular merit or failing, yet there can be little doubt either of general good or evil being its consequence, or that the whole subject must generally abide the consequences of what is "done in the body" of every description; as a whole family is liable to be affected by the good or evil performance of a single member: "and whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it" (Cor. I. xii. 26).

Then such being the natural train of cause and effect, one should think there could be no difficulty in apprehending the reality not only of merit and guilt, but also of their reward and punishment all in the same train; as it is only to substitute Merit or Guilt for the Cause; and for the Effect, Reward or Punishment, as either may happen to be due; and, the terms interchanged being perfectly synonymous in this case, the doctrine is proved at once,—proved only by a translation of terms. For to every separate act that may be performed in the kingdom, there is attached a certain reward or penalty, and that greater or less by necessary consequence, in the way of cause and effect, according to the degree of good or evil appearing in the said act or performance.

That there are degrees in both, v. g. in both good and evil, and especially in the moral department, of which we are chiefly to consider, there can be no question; and it would not be an impracticable task perhaps, if it has never yet been satisfactorily performed, to ascertain these degrees; neither would such a discovery be without its use in determining the quantum of merit or guilt attending any performance, with a view to retribution. Only we should observe, that as there are two sorts of doing, inward and outward before

mentioned, and two corresponding sorts of responsibility, one to God, the other to man ; so there are two several scales or modes of computing merit and guilt adapted thereto, one human, extending outwardly ; the other, divine, extending inwardly. In cases of guilt, at least, or of the evil actions to which they relate, it is in the manner here called human, that men are wont to estimate ; actions of a good quality being rather left to the animadversion and recompense of Him from whom they proceed. And according to their estimate, any offence against a man's principles, or as we say, against the inner man, shall be light compared with one against the outer man, that is to say, against a man's person, and lighter still than one against his property or circumstances ; you may debauch his principles, or spit in his face, but you must not touch his pocket.

Thus the world has reversed the true scale of injury and guilt, which rises in a quite contrary direction to the above mentioned, and is here asserted as the proper line of excess. For the proper centre or essence of every object who may have been injured, is the proper object of offence, consisting, as we have seen, in the inner man ; the outward person comes next, the property next : therefore, to touch a man's person, the crime must run beyond the man's estate ; and to touch his principles, beyond the man's person ; and on account of such excess, offences against a man's person should be esteemed more serious than offences against his property ; and those against his principles, more serious than either, as being the last or farthest injury that he can possibly receive, even beyond the loss of life, if an injury should extend so far. It was thus that some superior lawgivers, as Moses and Solon, for example, estimated ; but the scale of another Greek, who lived and legislated in a period of antiquity, between the times of Moses and Solon, was, to visit an offence in its extreme effect, and the detection rather than the offence ; a plan now pretty generally followed in jurisdiction by

nations that were then barbarian : and we must not expect any better course from human justice, but may be glad sometimes, to get even that. With respect likewise to offences that are nearer to the perpetrator than any that he can commit against others, even those against his own soul and body and fortune ; with respect to these, men cannot judge or legislate much ; they must be left likewise to One who omits nothing, who animadverts on every point in every case without a possibility of mistaking, who will “ judge not according to appearance, but judge righteous judgment ” (John vii. 24) ; punishing heavily many faults which human authorities censure lightly, and some which they approve. “ For that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God ” (Luke xvi. 15).

To sum up this argument, we shall find, that as there are two sorts of action, inward and outward, and two characteristics of each, good and evil, and two judges of good and evil, God and man, and two sorts of consequences, reward and punishment,—so there are two sorts of merit and guilt answering to their judges or objects, besides the degrees before mentioned. And so distinct are these two sorts, that what may be merit or a favourable claim towards man, shall be guilt, and perhaps an heavy debt towards God. An example to this effect is often seen in some nefarious victory, where the best fall foremost, and the victor is crowned

by { men—outwardly with laurels upon earth.
 { God—inwardly with scorpions in an hell of the
 victor's own making.

And all this notwithstanding that God himself, as LORD OF HOSTS, has had the greatest share in the victory.

Here then lies the difficulty of guilt in this case, that while the evil is inflicted chiefly by the Lord of Hosts, his general shall bear the guilt and chastisement. We do not find much difficulty respecting either guilt or merit towards men ; but it is in our account with God that the

difficulty lies. It may seem strange, that being impelled to evil by so strong a necessity, we should yet be accountable for the same, as if it were entirely our act from beginning to end; particularly considering that our good, if we do any, should be placed at the same time to the account of another. But this is very naturally explained in an article of the church*, implying, that as we go wrong naturally, but not innocently, evil is our natural desert: and as we go right by means of another, while the benefit of the act is ours, the merit will be only his: the necessity of the evil with all its guilt is entailed upon us; the benefit of the good we enjoy by favour, and for the sake of another.

But of native merit, and of the means of grace whereby that which is naturally given to one may become the portion of many, with other topics relating to this matter, it will be more seasonable and convenient to speak hereafter: and at present another distinction or two may be well bestowed on the original properties or characteristics over and above what has been yet signified; and namely, as both good and evil may be either

First, *positive*, that is real and unquestionable; as the latter for instance; which whoever does or suffers, either does or suffers evil certainly and indisputably in the case assigned; or

2d, *comparative*: depending on various circumstances in relation either to the subject or object of evil or both. In which case a man may either do or suffer either good or evil comparatively or conditionally, and neither do nor suffer either in effect: or,

3d, in the same case a man may either do or suffer positive good or evil in doing or suffering the opposite to either comparatively: because, as it has just been observed, necessary evil is good in respect of the necessity, though evil in itself; and on the other hand good as well as evil must be evil however good in itself when it hap-

* The Tenth.

pens to be, as it may, either useless, or unnecessary, or even injurious.

By such distinctions as these we avoid the necessity and incongruity of supposing a third kind of principal characteristic, namely, the indifferent; that which is indifferent having no character of course, and consequently belonging to the class of essentials as before explained. And when we consider, that every essential, however gross or however minute, whether incidental or constituent, and of the former sort whether personal or real, of the latter sort whether material, spiritual or intellectual, will be furnished with its proper apparatus of characteristics as aforesaid, we cannot think the whole inconsiderable; or if we should, there are degrees not only of evil as before specified, but also of good; and sufficiently numerous, if not so well understood as the degrees of physical properties. Happy were it for us, if we could always ascertain the degrees of good and evil as promptly and decidedly as those of long and short, or wet and dry, or heavy and light! But there seems to be a great deal of intricacy in this matter; or a great difference of opinion however respecting it.

In distinguishing between the subjects of these two principal characteristics, people generally consider two opposite spheres, heaven and hell, assigning one of these as a subject to each respectively; v. g., heaven as its subject to good, and hell to evil. But the circumstance of either sphere being denoted by characteristic constituents will not preclude from such sphere the essentials to which these characteristics relate, as before observed. And as much having now also been generally observed as seemed needful respecting the two said principal characteristics; good and evil, it may be time to consider the same more particularly in succession; and the good first, as that which was first in existence, consequently ever was and ever will be first in importance: considering the same, first, broadly and simply as it exists in every sphere;

without any nice discrimination of its several degrees or of those of its enjoyment which seem rather vague. For the *summum bonum* or best for any creature is not the best for the best, but the best that such creature is capable of, whether it be much or little.

God being infinite, good must be infinite likewise, as his proper characteristic : and God being also the ONLY infinite, must be the only subject of good without limitation, since the limitation of good is the commencement of evil. Whereupon our Saviour observes, "There is none good but One, that is, God" (Mat. xix. 17). And yet we talk not only of good, as if it had bounds, but also of that Infinite Being, who is all goodness, as if He was contained within them. We do this as often as we talk of God in heaven ; if we talk thus without considering the latter expression as synonymous with goodness, and goodness as infinite. For it is evident enough, how the natural and immediate sphere of every characteristic of a person, whether it be good or evil, must be the person in whom it appears ; and it may also be evident how the sphere of the person, whether he be good or evil, will be the good or evil in which he exists : that is, the characteristic in the person, and the person in the characteristic ; as St. John, speaking of two other cognate spheres in one, similarly observes, v. g., "He that keepeth his commandments abideth in him ; and he, in him" (John I. iii. 24) : and as our Saviour intimates in his petition to the Father for his church or selection, "That they all may be one : as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee ; that they also may be one in us . . . that they may be one, even as we are one : I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one" (John xvii. 21, 22, 23).

So far forward as this indeed, it seems to be agreed, v. g., that at present the same general sphere contains both sorts of characteristics, that is, both good and evil, with the subjects of both, or the whole Kingdom of God incarnate ; which has the earth for its present habitation, and

all the habitations upon earth. It is also understood and taken for granted by some, that hereafter the two opposite characters, or kinds of characteristics, good and evil, will be severally assigned to two immense localities or spheres, which will be very distinct, by the names of Heaven and Hell. But admitting the existence of two such opposite spheres, there may be, if there is not, a difference of opinion respecting their locality. It may be thought for example, by some, that the distinction of the great gulf fixed between them (Luke xvi. 26) does not consist in a material barrier so much as in a spiritual and intellectual; that Heaven especially is not, as some have thought it, a place among the stars; but the presence of their Author, which was before the stars or any creature existed, and uniform then as that presence, though subsequently, or upon creation, divided into two inseparable provinces :

subjective	}	or	{	happiness and
objective	}		{	righteousness :

which are placed in this order, namely, the subjective province or happiness first, as being most suitable for discussion; and not as according to their natural order of succession, which seems to be the reverse, and is so mentioned by the Psalmist in this passage, "As for me (1) I will behold thy presence in righteousness: and when I awake up after thy likeness, (2) I shall be satisfied with it" (Ps. xvii. 16).

Some may have considered, that the divine presence is not restricted to any sphere; as the Psalmist also intimates where he says, "Whither shall I go then from thy spirit; or whither shall I go then from thy presence? If I climb up into heaven, thou art there: if I go down to hell, thou art there also. If I take the wings of the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me" (Ps. cxxxix. 6, &c.). And considering heaven to be constituted at the same time by that presence as aforesaid

in the same manner that a palace may be constituted by the presence of royalty, the reasoners on this side will infer, that if heaven can be in hell by the divine presence, it may be any where ; and regard a future locality as improbable, particularly for such beings as angels and spirits, which are supposed to be not only immaterial, but also of an indefinite form and unlimited motion. They will think farther with respect to themselves, that if an inferior subject like man can find an heaven in his own breast or spirit, how much more in the principal, in the bosom of the father ; as David, speaking in the person of the son, proposes to him ; when, after naming the position of the wicked as a contrast or foundation for one, v. g., "Thou shalt not leave my soul in hell" (for it may be one sort of heaven to escape from such company) he adds thereupon, "Thou shalt shew me the path of life: in thy presence is the fulness of joy, at thy right hand there is pleasure for evermore" (Ps. xvi. 11, 12).

It may be conjectured ; indeed, there is room for more than conjecture, it may be proved that the immaterial part of which we consist, will have its affinity and juxtaposition as well as the material ; and if a material appointment be required for this, an immaterial will be required for that. A common character will also be as good a bond or cement for spiritual things as any adhesive principle in nature for material, and if these must have an earthly place or station, that must have an heavenly communion, as intimated by the Preacher on the event of their dissolution. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was ; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it" (Eccl. xii. 7). The proof of these assertions is found in the observation, that no essential property of ours can be without its character of good or evil : which character, applying at the same time to other subjects will be as close a principle of union between them in that respect as any the most indissoluble subject or essence can possess in itself. And the aforesaid common character, being applied as aforesaid,

may constitute for its owner that blessed footing which is expressed by "Heavenly places in Christ" (Eph. i. 3); or more generally, by Being in Christ, (Ib. 10, &c.), or in the Holy Spirit (Gal. v. 25). And, however named, the heavenly communion or divine Presence is one and the principal Heaven, no doubt; as formerly intimated: which, whether there be another heaven or not, will deserve beyond all the good that man can enjoy either subjectively or objectively, as his happiness or his righteousness, to be the object of his constant, highest, and most earnest ambition. For the subject being united in itself likewise as well as in Christ, one affianced property of affection or sentiment will draw on others to the uniting of the whole, as St. Paul writes, "till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" (Eph. iv. 13).

On the other hand it may also be argued, that if the heaven now described, whether we call it second or third, be the highest to us, or the exquisite heaven of our souls, there can be no incongruity in understanding also an inferior heaven, a *terrestrial* paradise at the same time for the reception and accommodation of our bodies, as at present only more perfect, innocent, and agreeable. There are, it is to be hoped, those who even now enjoy with their earthly existence the heavenly communion alluded to; living, as it were, in two spheres, the spiritual and the material, at once, which is an heaven upon earth for them: and why should they not live again in the same manner, enjoying the same more perfectly hereafter? For being united in themselves by a community of essentials, originating in their habitual acts as aforesaid, while they are also united to God in Christ by the community of one class, and to the earth on which they tread by the community of another, there can be no reason, why in going to heaven hereafter they should not return to the planet they now occupy (the same having been purified again

with fire during their dissolution, as it had often been purified, no doubt, before their last existence) and there enjoy themselves with him who purchased this happy privilege for them in person, according to the view held out to us in the Apocalypse (Rev. xxi).

The notion of a heaven over head and an hell under our feet may appear to some as visionary as the ancient doctrine of the stars, when the sun rose on one hand and sat on the other, now that the motions of the heavenly bodies are better understood by mechanics than they were in those days by philosophers; and some may also account that divines should be responsible for the errors of philosophy, and suffer accordingly. Nevertheless, as an enlightened and inquisitive age is generally the least dogmatical, thought should still be free; and particularly to conjecture, if any one likes, whether, in a future state a man's local condition might not correspond with his spiritual, whatever that may be. If one thinks, as before stated, another may think otherwise for him, or with him as far as he goes, and afterwards otherwise; both being right as far as they agree: and there are many good believers who differ thus, as in respect of the millennium for example, without any dangerous consequence. It will be no crime nor absurdity therefore, whatever may be its probability, to suppose that our heaven or sphere of happiness may be in a new or purified earth; which, if no larger than the present, might still be large enough to contain all the moral produce of the old worth keeping from the creation or last renovation to a period still as distant. And there would also be a nice correspondence between such an arrangement, and the past fortune of the kingdom: for as our lasting misery began with the corruption of the earth, so may our everlasting happiness with its purifying or renovation. And why should not a local union or relation be assigned to the happy hereafter, as well as a personal object of obedience, enjoyment and adoration? There is no contradiction in expecting both; and we cannot liter-

ally understand some passages of Scripture either without such expectation.

Therefore, let thought be free among us in detail, as long as we can agree on the sum of the question, v. g. respecting the agreement of subjective and objective characteristics; or of good to good, and evil to evil. "Let us, as many as be perfect, be thus minded: and if in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you. Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing" (Phil. iii. 15, 16). In attending to the sphere or locality of happiness and of its forerunner, righteousness, which is only a relation, we should not forget the subject; neither should we suffer ourselves to be led much beyond the test of experience in speculating on a subject that is future to all men living as yet, consequently unknown to all: and very properly. For when a master has any design to promote by the help or instrumentality of servants, he generally keeps the main of it to himself, and only signifies to them the means and manner by which it is to be effected with sufficient motives for acting thereon. Just so does Providence by us in relation to the grand design which occupies the period of our earthly existence. Believing the general end of such existence to include the happiness of the subject, we are still as ignorant as the creatures that we employ below us of its specific purposes, being sufficiently informed at the same time of the means necessary thereto, and stimulated by sufficient motives; the means being our *righteousness*, and the motives our *wisdom*.

Indeed, it does not appear as if the general subject of happiness had ever been reduced even to the certainty of which it is capable, though there is no other matter in which men are so deeply interested. It is, unquestionably every man's first and highest concern; but few will stay to comprehend it; they are so eager in the pursuit that they cannot stay to consider their object. And it is

not always that its votaries have any particular object either to consider in their habitual pursuit of happiness: there are numbers—we may say, a majority, of mankind, who never pursue any thing beyond the medium of that which they account happiness: retracting their gratification continually from one stage back to another, as first from the highest to an inferior object, and next from this inferior object to the means of attaining it; as for example, from the first necessary, life itself, to a fleeting portion of life; from that portion to a few fleeting incidentals belonging to the same, and from these incidentals to the means of procuring them. But if we will rejoice in the medium of happiness, we should rejoice, too, in that which is its highest object at the same time, and which we may always enjoy under all circumstances, setting our affections on things above, not on things on the earth (Col. iii. 2); even if the earth, or a good number of its restless inhabitants, and still more the spirits by which they are troubled, should be subject to us; as our Saviour once told some of his apostles, when they seemed to pride themselves on a triumph of this sort, “Notwithstanding, in this rejoice not, (said he,) that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice because your names are written in Heaven” (Luke x. 20).

Still, however, as earthly happiness seems worth considering, and its general subject does not seem to require any farther observations, let us now proceed to dissect the same, and review its several kinds, or things so reported, in succession: which will lead us in the first place to consider a species of good characteristics, that may almost be called indifferent; being the least good in themselves, also outermost in relation to the subject, and therefore, according to our method, fittest to begin with; namely, the good characteristics of incidentals; or, simply speaking, good incidentals; or, speaking more properly, incidentals so reported.

§ 1. For these good incidentals, or externals, as they

are oftener called, have for one general characteristic a degree of indifference, however inconsistent it may appear with their character for goodness. Which characteristic, though few men will care to admit, having resolutely made up their minds to a contrary opinion, it would not be difficult to prove by a deduction of consequences originating in experience ; but a shorter way will be, to suppose a case on two opposite endowments, one in incidentals or externals, the other in worth or constituents. Suppose then, for example, first a man noble and rich in himself, but poor in externals, and also doomed to spend his days in a solitary exile ; and suppose another poor in himself, but noble and rich in the other respect, and also surrounded with a choice of congenial acquaintance ; and then, applying on either part the test of real enjoyment, you will find, that one man can be happier without such externals than another with them : which proves their natural indifference. We will not say that such an one must be happier without these characteristics : for that would be asserting their opposition to good, and making them worse than they are, which does not seem necessary ; but there would be no incongruity in saying, that he may be happier without advantages of this class. And of such a liability we shall find farther evidence as we proceed in considering these good incidentals more particularly, and somewhat after the order that has been led by their corresponding essentials. Accordingly,

1. The first good incidental to be here noticed, as it also still appears to be regarded foremost in its class by some old fashioned people, is one founded on nearly the first named among the same class of essentials, to wit, birth and station : which by a very trifling change of expression is for want of another word here, designated as *Ancestry* or *Gentility*. And certainly no one can condemn a proper esteem for this circumstance. Such esteem is like a part of the fifth commandment ; which requires the honouring of father and mother, a duty that has no bounds

in respect of object through all the ages that are past, though there may be distinctions in it arising from different peculiarities. Among these a personal acquaintance may be named for one: as they who have the advantage of remembering their father and mother, may honour their memory more distinctly than they who have not such advantage; and they who can also remember some good qualities in the same, or only a freedom from evil, will have the additional advantage of reverencing as well as honouring their memory. Some may have the somewhat singular advantage of remembering their whole parentage for the past and one preceding generation, including two worthy grandfathers, with a father and mother, who were no disparagement to either. Such may truly be called **MEN OF GOOD FAMILY**; at the same time that such advantage is nothing for them to be proud of, as their ancestry, however good or enviable, can do no credit to their choice.

The want of the advantage in some of a personal acquaintance with their forefathers, which others enjoy as aforesaid may be compensated to them, partly by the effect of tradition, whether oral or written. And sometimes a few words in print, perhaps some lying or very partial record, shall be more esteemed, than the memory of a thousand obligations which might have been retained: but that is not honouring father and mother so much as the world; it is mere vanity and family pride, a failing which ought to be exposed in its place, that the honouring of our parents and theirs may be enlightened by a proper consideration of family dignity, or the dignity of this relation, and guarded at the same time from that very unworthy extreme.

2. Equal to the noblest birth and station in honour and enjoyment is the good characteristic, *Liberty*: which consists in the entire use of such means and abilities as have been either granted to us by Nature and Providence, or acquired by art, subject only to the law of God and to

such authorities as may be agreeable to the same. It may seem inconsistent to regard two properties so opposite in appearance as freedom and subjection in the light of help-mates: but this is not the only instance of two subjects supporting each other by counter-position; and here they are really the making of each other, v. g. freedom of subjection, and subjection of freedom: the same being part of a reciprocity that begins with the meanest of his creatures, and ends only with Him "whose service is perfect freedom." "And I will walk at liberty; (says the Psalmist) for I seek thy commandments" (Ps. cxix. 45). And so these two properties, freedom and subjection, may be said to walk in unity, or in mutual subservience to each other through the whole kingdom of God properly so called. For these properties of every sort are free, being subject only to those on which they ought to depend; as the incidental sort, on earthly government; and the constituent, on heavenly; the lower sort among constituents being also subject in some degree to the higher; as the material to the spiritual, by which they are kept and replenished; and the spiritual again to the intellectual, by which they are, or ought to be directed under the Supreme Intelligence. The several properties of the kingdom being subject in this manner with only such a reciprocity as cannot be avoided in combinations may then, and only then, be considered free. And wherever a chasm in the course of dependence, or any disorder, or derangement occurs, there will be mere slavery, or subjection without freedom in that respect; though in other respects the subject may be free. For example, a man may be free in his incidentals (fortune or circumstances), and captive in his constituents (substance or self); or vice versâ, free in these, and captive in those: or he may be free in one incidental or constituent, and not in another; or in more than one of either sort, and not in one of the other. He may be free, for example, in his place and habitation, but not in his

estate: he may be free in his material properties (body or person), and not in his spiritual (spirit or disposition); free in his spiritual, and not in his intellectual (mind or understanding); or vice versâ he may be free in this or that class of properties, and not in the preceding from the last mentioned to the first.

Also by the object towards which a man is either captive or free a lively distinction may be made; as we find it in different passages of Scripture: having there first an example of bodily captivity given by our Saviour, where he talks of "a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years" (Luke xiii. 16), and of bodily freedom examples enough, besides that of Samson in his prosperity (Judges xiv. &c.): also an example of spiritual captivity and freedom likewise intimated by St. Paul where he mentions some whom he had the happiness to reclaim, "being made *free* from sin, and become *the servants* of righteousness" (Rom. vi. 18). All which, being considered, may furnish some idea of the variety contained in this one article of freedom.

But these distinctions are not half: for the same property is also liable to be varied by other circumstances; as by department for one; into civil and political, temporal and spiritual, &c. It will be variety enough, however, for the present purpose, if we distinguish the subject of freedom, in the same manner as we distinguish its subject, the kingdom: and then the result will be as follows, v. g.

FREEDOM.

<i>Class.</i>	<i>Denomination.</i>
1—of Incidentals	Liberty; whether political, civil, or domestic.
2—of Constituents	Freedom.
—1—material	Ease and Grace.
—2—spiritual	Freedom and Energy.
—3—intellectual	Free Will—Freethinking, &c.

Which several kinds of liberty or freedom will all deserve

to be separately considered with the other good characteristics of different classes whereto they severally belong. It might be desirable to see the whole of so interesting a subject at once: but as this would be too independent a task, and yet all the premises deserve consideration, it will be a convenient medium to notice here one sort of freedom, which is that relating to incidentals, and hereafter the others which relate to constituents in their several classes or spheres.

The first mentioned sort of freedom then, which for want of a more specific appellation we will call Liberty, though it relates properly to incidentals, as proceeding from without, and being external in fact, i. e. not a constituent of the subject, has yet from the reciprocity of species above mentioned a paramount influence sometimes over the nearest constituents, whether material or spiritual. It is by the help of this blessing, that we continue to move and breathe upon the face of the earth, and enjoy its productions securely: no wonder, therefore, that so great an account should generally be made of the same by its inhabitants, and that not only rational, but irrational creatures, or all that happen to have the common appetite of self-preservation, will fly for it to the ends of the earth, or fight for it to the last extremity, choosing rather to return their spirit unbroken to God who gave it, than to own a *slavish* dependence on their equals. For a due subjection of each to other is not only tolerable, but really good for all, and even essential to an higher sort of freedom, as before observed; but slavery is such a beginning of evils, as no man would submit to who had not made up his mind to the worst. So that a man, if he have only the excellent characteristic of a free spirit, will sooner yield his life than his liberty to a sturdy ruffian, though he would surrender without hesitation to a very child at the sight of a warrant backed by lawful authority.

But the notion of liberty will, like most other notions, differ widely in persons of different characters. Some of the

weaker sort of persons, e. g. will think it liberty, to be allowed to call their souls their own, while others cannot think it any thing, unless they may be allowed not only to do what they will themselves, but also to dictate to others, to whom, *to be free*, they should rather be subject, as wives to their husbands, children to their parents, servants to their masters, and subjects to their prince. It is very seldom that we find any in either class who have a just sense of freedom; not too retiring on the one hand, nor too presuming on the other. Indeed our flocks and herds appear to understand the routine of freedom and subjection, and to appreciate their equal importance better than ourselves, with regard to individuals: and with regard to parts and properties, it cannot be said that mankind are very consistent in this respect. For while the importance of one species of freedom or subjection to another seems to be acknowledged by temporal governments, in their denying to idiots, or those who are bound in intellect, the common share of incidental freedom with regard to the disposal of property, they make no account of irregularities and captivity in the spiritual department, by any restriction or privation whatever. A man who is deranged in mind or understanding, must forfeit, according to law, the government of his own property and person; but a man of the most depraved disposition, or ever so badly bound in spirit to Satan, which influences the government of property no less than idiotism, is at perfect liberty to dispose of his property as he will. He may give away every thing at his death from those whom he is bound to maintain while he lives by the law of the land, as well as by nature and common sense! This is an anomaly in civil jurisprudence that deserves to be corrected, and most likely will be too some time or other, as the practice is not confirmed by instinct. The practice of alienation ought to be prohibited *perhaps* like that of intermarriage within certain degrees, or only allowed in such degrees with proper restrictions. It ought to be said "perhaps," as the question is rather out of our line.

3. And so it seems rather, likewise, to question much about a kindred incidental, *Ease* and *Comfort* in one respect, for all its modest appearance. The comfort of constituents, whether in body, which is a part of health; or in spirit, which is a part of virtue; or in mind, which is a part of wisdom,—may deserve a share of our attention, as much of it indeed as can be afforded in justice to higher objects: but comfort in incidentals, pecuniary, external comfort, or comfortable circumstances, are only to be regarded in an inferior a much lower degree, and as subordinate to the first mentioned comfort of constituents, which is also subordinate to greater good for the subject.

4. But if so modest an incidental good as comfort can deserve only a moderate share of the true Christian's attention, still less will be deserved by the more glaring, and at the same time, more precarious advantage of *Wealth*. Few good incidentals will stand wholly acquitted of the charge of precariousness, and almost indifference; but few, if any, are so liable to that charge as the incidental now mentioned. Indeed, the sort of wealth here alluded to, and which the world generally considers as the only sort of wealth, is not such as would be called the wealth of the kingdom in a Christian sense, although it be the true incidental characteristic. For true Christian wealth is constituent, being the same which our Saviour recommends to his followers, in that memorable precept, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth; where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven; where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal" (Mat. vi. 19, 20): which may be rendered thus, Lay not up for yourselves the poor and precarious enjoyment of worldly wealth; but lay up for yourselves the enjoyment of heavenly peace, or the treasure of a good conscience. As may appear from the reflexion with which our Saviour accompanies this recommendation, "For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Ibid. 21).

The dearest possession in the world to any one who has the happiness to have it *genuine* will be the treasure of a GOOD CONSCIENCE which is only to be had in Christ. But of this sort of treasure or wealth it would be unseasonable to speak at present: we are now considering the good characteristic answering to the above named essential incidental, money, stock, &c., i. e., Goods and Property, as these things are commonly called, or more commonly called than proved. And even with respect to the simple acceptance of this characteristic; we observe, that it depends entirely on comparison; what is but a bare competency, or even mediocrity, or less than that—poverty and want, with one man being riches, wealth, and affluence with another; so that these properties are necessarily undefined, and so must remain. Notwithstanding which, it may be worth while to consider now the said properties according to our vague ideas on account of their moral and spiritual influence. For,

1, In a *moral* view our responsibility must be regulated in some measure even by our foreign means: in respect of which, as well as of nearer and more considerable, it may be said, "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more" (Luke xii. 48). Which saying from the highest possible authority, if it were rightly considered, might be enough to cool many a man's ardour in pursuit of what would be wealth in his possession, and reconcile him to the condition of mediocrity, or even to a somewhat less. And in approaching such an object, before we rushed upon it with open arms like worldlings and unbelievers; we, Christians, not regarding the world as our oracle, should be apt to pause at the prospect of wealth, and look it in the face, to see how far we may venture to lay hold of it: or if wealth should happen to drop upon us in a manner almost unheeded, its charms at least might still remain so for us; as the Psalmist advises, "O trust not in wrong and robbery; give not yourselves unto vanity; if RICHES INCREASE, SET NOT YOUR

HEARTS UPON THEM" (Ps. lxxi. 10). We should observe how ruinous a thing it is to reckon upon our riches only in an economical, which is the lowest part of a moral view. For we think so much of them, and rely so much on their all sufficiency for accomplishing a variety of objects, that we are apt to exhaust them before we are aware of it, and find in the end, that "riches certainly make themselves wings" (Prov. xxiii. 5), if they do not fly towards heaven. So that, as the wise man again observes, "There is that withholdeth more than is meet; but it tendeth to poverty" (Prov. xi. 24), and we may often see men ruined by the effect of their own ill gotten wealth.

2. But it is in a *spiritual* view, that the baneful influence of riches or wealth is most to be dreaded. St. Paul writing to Timothy, one of his chief converts, and also one of the earliest bishops of the Christian church, his "dearly beloved son" (Tim. ii. 1, 2), as he calls him, meaning in principles and sentiments, cautions him against this dangerous temptation by a fact that he or any one may have observed, "They that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition." For the love of money (i.e., much of it, *wealth*) is the root of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows (like those alluded to in Isaiah, v. g.; Is. lvi. 13). "But thou O man of God, flee these things, and follow after righteousness" (Tim. I. vi. 9, &c.). The master himself also exhorts his disciples to the same effect with this eminent apostle in the passage respecting thieves, &c. (Mat. vi. 19, 20), lately cited: telling them likewise in another passage of his discourse or conversation with them, that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God" (Ib. xix. 24). And the grounds of this difficulty are very obvious, v. g., that the rich man, esteeming others as he esteems himself more for their wealth than for their wisdom, is out of the reach of instruction. Our

Saviour must often have experienced this delusion in the course of his teaching: and his ministers must often find thus much likewise—for he tells us, “The servant is not greater than his Lord. If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you; if they have kept my saying, they will keep yours also” (John xv. 20): thus much therefore his ministers may find, that there are many in the world who regard neither them nor their doctrine at present; because they are poor by honesty; but would regard them as oracles, if they were unprincipled and ignorant enough to avail themselves of the opportunities they have to be rich.

Riches indeed would seem to afford a facility for instruction; and this is also one of the best uses to which they can be applied: but if the two conditions of poverty and affluence were to be heard together, the pretensions of the former to wisdom and learning would soonest be allowed. For if affluence claims a Job, a David, a Solomon, a Daniel and others; poverty can shew not only some of these in their wisest years, but a Saviour and his apostles with a majority of their most consistent followers. And any candid teacher will own, for he cannot but have proved it, that with equal gifts and opportunities the poorer scholar is the likelier to excel.

To preserve therefore the advantage which this incidental may afford in any respect, as well as to honour and deserve it, we should forget that we are rich, till reminded that we have something to spare, either by our own actual occasions, or by some charitable demand of others on the store confided to our management. This is knowing how to abound, a harder part than knowing “how to suffer need” (Phil. iv. 12); and amounts to nearly the same with the Psalmist’s exhortation, “If riches increase, set not your heart upon them” (Ps. lxii. 10), lately cited. Especially when a fortune has been amassed, we will say, not by “wrong and robbery,” perhaps, but by prudence and industry, ought the advanced to beware of giving himself

unto vanity, thinking, and looking too perhaps like the king of Assyria: "For he saith, by the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom" (Isai. x. 13). For, as leaving a house open by night is offering a temptation for thieves to enter and ransack the same, so a human breast exposed or unguarded by conscious power and affluence offers a temptation for every evil spirit to enter and ransack its apartments, stripping the same of all their agreeable furniture or useful properties. Indeed affluence itself will often take away industry, dismissing at the same time every thing like exertion and ingenuity; will send humility, moderation, and content to other quarters; stifle the calls of nature and the voice of conscience: and make a man any thing in short but what one should like to see him, and what he would like to see himself while he retained a morsel of discernment. But more frequently a wealthy fool does not perceive, neither can it be expected that he should, how contemptible a figure he makes in the eyes of others, while he prides himself on his superfluous wealth.

If a man would both look well and be well as long as he lives, he ought to think of some better dependence than that worldly minion: which better dependence is the treasure of righteousness that our Saviour and his apostles teach us to lay up in heaven. For "he that trusteth in his riches shall fall: but the righteous shall flourish as a branch" (Prov. xi. 28). "Riches profit not in the day of wrath; but righteousness delivereth from death" (Ib. iv. 4). Therefore, "a small thing that the righteous hath is better than great riches of the ungodly" (Ps. xxxvii. 16). It is said, that a man cannot carry his riches with him when he dies (Job i. 21; Ps. xlix. 17): being properly meant of such worldly riches: for to be sure he cannot carry a part of this world into the next. But heavenly riches; faith, love, honour, and sincerity, will accompany a man both here and for ever with all the good actions and works they include—A GOODLY EQUIPAGE!

5. If there be any thing positive in temporal wealth, or any outward condition definable as wealth, it is that in which the owner finds a *Competency*. A competency is the means of gratifying, not our necessary demands; for God only knows what they may be, but those which we reasonably esteem to be such. If a man should happen to have more than can reasonably be thought necessary for one in his condition whatever it may be, all the excess is to be considered as wealth: and hence it appears, that there can be no wealth nor even competency without content; because content is the foundation of both, being what the apostle would have other ministers to be with him, "as poor, yet making many rich" (Cor. II. vi. 10). Not, as it seems to be generally understood, that having as much as we know how to use is competency, and more, wealth. For a man's wealth is not to be computed by what he has, nor by what he wastes; but by what he enjoys: and his poverty is not to be computed by what he has not; but by what he wants or wishes to have. Therefore the poorest man is comparatively rich; as enjoying all that he has—while another shall enjoy but half, or less. And by the same token likewise the richest man is not he who has most, but he who wants least. Which will make our competency to be a more creditable as well as more agreeable condition than wealth; since, understanding by the latter more than we well know what to do with, as the world understands it, will imply both a grievous burden and also a great want either of goodness or judgment.

In so necessitous a world as this generally is, and where there will always be so much room for improvement, wealth has not need to stand still long for want of either ends or objects: for goodness and judgment would soon reduce it to a bare competency, if it were seemingly inexhaustible and perpetually increasing. And as for competency being more agreeable than wealth: if light spirits may be more agreeable than indigestion; if a well-poised habit, more agreeable than plethora in the body;

or an exact occupation, than excessive care for the mind; or just affections, than ungovernable passions of any sort for the spirit: if, in short, moderation can be more agreeable generally than excess in other more intimate respects; it may by the same token, be more agreeable likewise in all the foreign property of the Kingdom, whether it be real or personal; whether consisting in houses and lands, or in money, cattle, jewels and the like. And all things considered; who would not be of the same mind with Agur the son of Jakeh, as well in regard to wealth and competency, as in regard to other objects of Agur's petition "to Him who is a shield to them that put their trust in Him"?

"Two things have I required of thee: deny me them not before I die. Remove far from me vanity and lies; give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full and deny Thee, and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor and steal, and take the name of my God in vain" (Prov. xxx. 7, 8, 9).

If the name of *Mediocrity* had not been previously mentioned, it might here have been added to the list of good incidentals; although the term is susceptible of a wider meaning than that of inferiority in this respect only, and may be as well used to designate a middling degree or attainment only in any other respect, in respect of mental treasure, or bodily advantages, as well as in this of pecuniary resources. For admitting the general signification to be such as aforesaid, there could be no impropriety in here considering the term to stand particularly for a middling endowment in the respect last mentioned; and at the same time, as a degree below competency in the estimation of the world, or a degree above according to the estimation of those who do not profess to follow that of the world. A man who could think more independently than usual might conceive, that any degree of a property so foreign to his person as worldly riches could not be of that all-sufficient importance as the world will.

have it to be. And there are other sorts of property more foreign still than that; but whether more important or not, must depend on occasions and circumstances: There are two more especially; which the owner may enjoy, but cannot command on account of their situation, whether in the voice and outward action of others; or in their inward feelings and sentiments.

6. The first of these will consist in such incidentals as *Fame*, *Honour*, and *Distinction*: respecting which it has been differently argued, whether the same be worth regarding or not, whether all or either of them be worth its usual purchase. And the question seems to be rather a difficult one, or at least liable to a distinction: as these foreign commodities, v. g., honour, fame, &c., may be worth the purchase sometimes, and sometimes not; according to the region in which they are situated, like the property of lands and tenements. Situated with men better than ordinary, and with One better than men, such property is indeed desirable, but not with others; which makes a distinction of the same unavoidable. Considering then the reality or foundation of honour (for its reality and foundation are one) we may observe two kinds of the property differing widely from each other like their respective sources; from which they may be called divine and human: one *real*, proceeding from God only; who presides at the fountain of honour, and can turn its ennobling stream whithersoever he will, to honour them that honour him (Sam. I. ii. 30): as it is written, "Such honour have all his saints" (Ps. cxlix. 9); the other *unreal* proceeding from men; who also pretend to bestow the real sort, as they pretend to other divine offices; but cannot bestow that, any more than they can bestow thunder, or the command of the clouds; having none to bestow.

As the first or real honour which God bestows is a constituent characteristic amounting to grandeur or nobility of disposition, it does not of course belong to our present argument, like the unreal sort, and also the only to be ex-

pected from man, or likewise to be mentioned at present. This sort is purely incidental to its object or receiver, and evinces merely the good opinion that others may have, or profess to have of him; this is what it is for a man to be "had in honour in which he cannot abide" (Ps. xlix. 12): this is honour according to the notion of many; but a notion that is not a whit the more substantial in itself for the consent of its many assertors. And if we examine fairly, we shall find the whole substance of honour such as the world will have it, being, to be sure, SUCH ONLY AS THE WORLD CAN BESTOW, by no means so solid a thing as one would expect from the account that is made of it; that such honour may be something in a relative way, but absolutely nothing. And that many have felt after bestowing great pains, and incurring a chance of greater for it; as Alexander of Macedon, falsely surnamed the Great for one, who after all his great exploits, and with all his guilty renown, finding no better foundation to rest on, must needs claim kindred with the gods of the time in order to establish his patent of celebrity.

But still, fame, honour, and distinction only in a human degree, may seem to deserve a proportional regard, being the same as Solomon intimates where he says, "*A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and loving favour rather than silver and gold*" (Prov. xxii. 1). A good name or reputation, and outward favour, flattery or worship are certainly to be chosen rather than riches, as far as either may be worth choosing, seeing the end is generally to be chosen rather than the means. For the end of great riches is to procure reputation and favour for one thing: that is one principal end for which men generally desire them, and consequently the more to be desired. But notwithstanding the general opinion of their importance, it may be allowable to appreciate in a few words these much esteemed articles of foreign property; and particularly that of fame or reputation. For if fame or reputation was the way to happiness and immortality, and

every one who happened to get a great name could know how to keep it, the same would be most desirable for the sake of the farther end to which it conduced. But we have good authority for believing that human reputation, so far from being the way to happiness, is rather the way to woe: e. g. "Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you" (Luke vi. 26).—And if a man should have the good fortune, as it is generally considered, to immortalize his name, he would not be aught the nearer to immortalizing himself. But if you get a name, others must keep it for you: and they will not always be able to do that, if they should be willing; but every day some great name (for it is but an every day thing at last) will descend through bad keeping into the gulph of oblivion, and sometimes a whole calendar of them shall go at once perhaps by some untoward revolution.

Therefore, what is reputation? Reputation is called a bubble as well as human honour in general: but with more propriety, honour being more like froth which is full of bubbles, and this only one among others. There are men in the world who value their name and the notion or opinion that is entertained of them beyond all the comforts and necessities of life, if not beyond even life itself. This is certainly preferring the shadow to the substance: as a man's name and notion are only at the best, as it were, his ambassadors and representatives, and therefore deserve not to supersede himself however accurately they may describe him. But so far from such correctness, there is hardly a name worth having, or which a man would be pleased to bear, that he has any right to. Holiness and Reverence, Love, Virtue, Patience, Honour, Grace, and other esteemed properties not excepting CHARITY, are as far from belonging to the men or women surnamed by them as are the gifts of the apostles from being the property of all who bear their names; consequently the names of those properties cannot be property of theirs.

Christian modes forbid the use of odious as well as of flat-

tering epithets ; of Raca, e. g. as well as of Rabbi ; or if men were to be christened with names answering to their latent characters, as names are said to be the signs of ideas, we should meet with such occasionally as it would be painful to utter : and sometimes a man could not even retain his specific name in that case, degraded as it has been since its first imposition, without arrogance, Man being by many shades too good a name for some men. But considering the name of properties, as arbitrary signs of stations and offices : as these are sometimes of families, they may clearly be used without any disparagement to them. Thus, e. g. let Holiness signify merely a pope, and Reverence, a priest ; Grace, a duke ; and Honour, a justice of the peace ; in the same manner, as Pope may denote one family ; and Priest, another ; and Duke, another—or as John, one individual ; and Cæsar, another ; and there will be no flattery nor misnaming, whether the pope, priest, &c., be holy, reverend, &c., or the reverse. Then Holiness will not stand like the sign over an empty shop ; nor Grace, like an old memorandum ; nor properties naturally foreign be made more so by a misapplication.

If nominal property, such as honourable or opprobrious names, titles, degrees, and epithets be however the possession of any party, it must be, not of those who receive, but of those who apply them, and especially, to distinguish one man from another ; because it is they who have the benefit and enjoyment of them in this respect. Or let the giver and receiver divide the property between them, if they will ; for it does not matter much, who owns a property of this sort. Neither, besides the deductions already mentioned, can it be any great commendation of this article, or of honour and distinction altogether, that their bulk is generally more considered than their cost and quality : that a huge reputation is thought more of than a good reputation ; and extensive honour, applause, and distinction, however they may be expressed, are thought more of than the more merited and judicious. Neither is it

very creditable to public opinion, to judge of honour, as it were by the lump in this way; the quality of which must depend, as before observed, principally on its source, next on its medium, and last of all on that bulk or quantity which the world prefers. It may be saying enough for a worldly judgment, to say, that it does not regard the Highest Giver, nor the noblest medium of honour more than the lowest of both, if it do so much: but the honour that a silly audience shall bestow on a more silly performance at the theatre, shall be more accounted than that which God himself bestows by his Holy Spirit on a faithful performance in the house of God. For the theatre has most hands, and bestows the loudest, consequently to the world most evident, applause.

7. The property which one man seems to have in another's voice and sentiments will certainly be some of the most portable as long as he shall be able to keep it. Yet the most portable property is not always the lightest or least important: for what may be carried on the tongue is of more weight and consequence sometimes, than any burden for the back. A name has great force sometimes, and will give a preponderant impetus to great undertakings: but then it must be through the medium of that other incidental, which is indeed the soul of a great name—of a property as easily diffused and as lasting in its effect or duration. The notion and influence of a person will often operate equally with his power and presence; or even more effectually, as appears by the examples of potentates secluding themselves from the profane gaze of their subjects systematically in some states, that they may be thought the more of, and also by the example of many who are no potentates (and a pity they ever should be!) who make themselves scarce in the private walks of life, or if not themselves yet their sayings; that either by absence in one case, or by silence in the other, they may win that distinction in society which they never could by their speech or presence.

This good incidental usually known by the name of
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Authority being further removed from its object's superintendence than the last mentioned, may be considered as still more foreign property; that being only felt or conceived in this case which in that was published and expressed. And herein also a distinction may be made answering to the two spirits, soft and asperate, used in pronunciation; as first, authority, favour, credit, influence, 2, authority, power, dominion: the spirit of the first named in either association being denoted by its associates, whether mild and permissive, or harsh and compulsive; that the authority of the father or sage, and this of the civil government; both emanating from one source; and the property of both either too good to be in other men's keeping, or of too serious an import to be at their disposal, though its object or owner may not know well how to help it.

1, Considering first the first of these two sorts of authority, or that of a soft spirit, as it seems; *persuasive* authority, the authority of *Favour, Credit, and Influence*, it will appear that as this authority tends not only to assist our operations, but also to enhance their effect when complete, it may be desirable sometimes, so far as these consequences may be desirable; and so far only. For sometimes our operations were better let alone perhaps; and their success, as well as the authority by which it was furthered, so far to be deprecated: since many a man has helped himself into mischief and disgrace by virtue of his own authority, and through the great credit and influence that he happened to have with some who were proud to assist him. For nothing disarms the judgment more than authority; but it saves a world of pains to the indolent; and thus many lose THE BENEFIT OF CONTRADICTION who stand greatly in need of it; being blind leaders of the blind. "And if the blind lead the blind (says our Saviour) both shall fall into the ditch" (Mat. xv. 14). Which shews, that undue authority is more to be dreaded than desired on either side.

Authority is a very becoming weapon for the wiser and more enterprising members of society : only let them take care how they use it. Authority is also a dangerous weapon for any but the wisest to use : let us also take care therefore how we concede it too far in any shape. For if it be true, that trusting in some cases is both useful and necessary ; it is equally true, that the more enterprising are not always the wiser men, nor the most trusted the most deserving of trust : but frequently men of very plain intellects will venture to usurp an authority and influence that nature never designed for them ; and sometimes very unfeeling and otherwise contemptible upstarts will be allowed to domineer too, only through their wickedness and insolence by foolish persons not having the fear of God, nor a due regard for their own preservation and dignity. We should neither trust nor distrust without good reason ; but keep a judgment evenly suspended, until we know well where to bestow, or where to reserve, our authority and confidence.

For there are several casts of this mild species of authority, besides favour, credit, consideration and influence above mentioned, but all partaking more or less of one feature, a willingness in the subject to concede them ; though the authority that some men appear to exercise over the minds of others, may look almost like fascination or witchcraft ; as they appear to rule without power, and to persuade without argument, no one knows how ; while the effect is still visible, especially in public meetings, and popular commotions. But it ought not to require any effort of witchcraft, nor any great sacrifice of property either, to gain that sort of mild dominion over others called Favour, and sometimes *Esteem*, when rather intellectual : since a man by shewing clearly the effect of this principle on himself might do enough, one should think, to win over other subjects to the same, v. g., by shewing favour to himself, which does not put him out of his way. “ For while he lived (says the Psalmist, speaking

of some great favourite, but not with him,)—while he lived, he counted himself an happy man : and so LONG AS THOU DOEST WELL UNTO THYSELF MEN WILL SPEAK GOOD OF THEE! (Ps. xlix. 18), that is in their way, and so will the Highest Authority when thou doest well unto thyself in his.

Else, it should also be remembered, the same danger and woe which often attend universal applause, may also attend this silent property of favour, and in a greater degree. For the danger of human applause is, that of withdrawing our regard from the notice and approbation of that Highest Authority : and whenever this happens, it will be clearly the beginning of woe. If moreover so empty a present as fair words can entice us from our duty and interest, the more sensible demonstrations of favour, credit, consideration, influence and other species of mild authority must have a more sensible effect in that, as in any other way. Would to God, that they who are studious of favour, credit, and the like, could pursue such things in a quarter where the acquisition is greater, and the danger less ! that they would study to approve themselves always to Him who is always near them, and therefore most able to do justice to their deserts ! Indeed, without such a witness, a man of more than common worth could never reap his due share of credit. For such worth surpasses the conception of the multitude, in the first place ; and, in the next place, if every one could be a judge of worth like that man's when known, they could not have the means of knowing it, without following him through all his private walks, and observing all his actions, the most private, as well as the most conspicuous. And, at the same time, it may be said of the favour or credit which has been described in comparison with that which is now commended, as our Saviour said of fear (Luke xii. 4), and his apostles, Peter and John, of obedience,—Which is best worth minding ? I wonder which is to be minded most,—the favour of the whole world, or the favour of Him who made it !

Pursuing our comparison, there are also other rates of human favour only, besides the forementioned; for instance: First, the favour of the righteous will have one rate, and that of the wicked another: that, to be valued in a degree next to the favour of the Most High, to which indeed it is also allied; this to be valued in as low a degree as possible, or rather, to be suspected and feared, without any regard to the quality of the subject: and next; the favour of many at once is more useful, more honourable, and less irksome than the favour of a few, or perhaps of only one, except the One aforesaid, and consequently rate higher. Give us therefore the favour of the people, and the blessings of the poor, before the favour of the great; and the favour of our sincere friends, before that of princes: and still the favour of that One, before all. For people need not at last be very solicitous about any sort of human favour; since comparing these two points together, v. g. the importance of such acquisitions as favour, and the rest above mentioned, with the expence of maintaining, and the uncertainty of retaining them, we shall not find the same intrinsically deserving of all that solicitude with which they are wont to be regarded, and those enormous sacrifices with which they are so often conciliated.

It is only for their relative or occasional importance that these good incidentals, as we must consider them, or any of the kind can be desirable. Honour and distinction, credit and authority, reputation, fame, &c.; favour, homage, and every thing of the sort, is what no man should desire from men, except for the honour of God, and for the good of his fellow servants, as well as for his own. To desire these incidentals, without such ulterior objects, were not only foolish and absurd, but treasonable and impious, considering whom they properly belong to.

2. The other description of authority, which is coercive in its effect, in its manner more harsh than that just described, and in its enunciation more aspirate, being the authority of *Power, Jurisdiction* and *Dominion*, armed with

terrors, and secured by enactments, which make the same to be Power in fact, and its object a Prince; as we say a prince is one in authority, may therefore be considered as power. But by Power, we are here to understand, not an ingredient of the owner or object, but his image or apprehension impressed on the subjects of such power, or those who yield it, and with whom it is situated; as a man's corn and hay are yielded to him by the land in which they grow. It is moral rather than physical power that makes coercive authority. For what they call physical power, being only single-handed, is nothing except in romance, until it derives an accession of weight from the sword, the poniard, the gibbet, and other foreign sources, to make it terribly moral, and give it the effect of this unpleasant authority. Yet this, as well as the persuasive sort, and every other kind of moral influence must centre at last in the imagination of their subjects, which is also the immediate seat of the divine authority: and where the imagination will not yield to one in authority, he can have no power, or none however of a moral kind over its owner or subject, but what is very imperfect.

In the moral and most material respect therefore, Jesus was clearly superior to Pilate, while he was subject in a physical for the salvation of mankind; as he told him, "Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above" (John xix. 11). Which was as much as to say, Directly, Pilate, thou hast no power against me, for my spirit is superior to thy influence; but indirectly thou hast a power that seems unfavourable to me, inasmuch as others are sufficiently thy slaves to take away my life, for fear of thee: so "the fear of thee hath undone me" (Ps. lxxxviii. 16). That the tyrant had no perfect or direct authority over his innocent victim, was clearly proved by his "enduring the cross, and despising the shame" (Heb. xii. 2), as numbers of his early followers did, and continued to do, till at length the cross began to triumph; suffering to triumph against violence! And

thus it was decidedly established, that Christian fortitude is superior to the brute force of any power upon earth.

Indeed so much had been often proved before by inferior spirits to that which Jesus displayed in his own character, and transmitted to his disciples: of which, among others, we have one remarkable and well known example in the behaviour of a practical philosopher, who had the courage to tell his tormentor, while having him bruised to death in a mortar, as they say, "Pound the shell of Anaxarchus; himself thou canst not hurt." And even this remarkable instance of a sovereign spirit has been often equalled, no doubt, and often is perhaps, by warriors in the new world, whom we call savages; but not for this trait of conquering their captors by patience, it is presumed.

8. *Merit* and *Importance* are often attached to power and dominion, though their proper place, or where they should rather attach, is with good works; but not necessarily with these either, notwithstanding it may so happen from the affinity of good works with merit and importance, that the two latter shall be regarded sometimes as constituents of a fallen creature, rather than as incidentals; which is more than can be properly said of either, that is, of either works or merit. One should be glad if it were otherwise, and if men were made up of merit particularly, instead of being as they are merely, and that not invariably, enriched with its presence: also, if merit was oftener attended with due importance, and had not the mortification of seeing importance so much oftener attached to the cause of insignificance. For in reason and equity merit should always go before importance, as a debt before payment; that being in reality what this merely may be, a creditable demand on its subject, or the party from which it proceeds, and to which it relates.

But according to the light in which it is here considered, merit will have two principal subjects: one inverse or putative, being the party to which it is lent or imputed,

and more like its object; the other direct, or productive, being the party to bear or produce the same, which is the real subject, though the said merit may also be incidental to him in some respects, as before signified. For endeavour without success takes no reward with men; which makes its merit with such subjects often incidental, and precarious. But with God, merit will never be incidental, any more than constituent, but an arbitrary allowance: so that all merit will be properly his in every case, and towards him likewise by the same allowance.

To make a further estimate of this incidental, or, rather of its imputation, the particulars having been already considered*; merit and importance towards men are to be estimated by several circumstances, and particularly by their extent, or the extent of their object and application, whether it be only to a single family, to a whole state, or to society at large, and by the importance of the respect in which they may happen; as some occasions of merit and importance are more important in themselves than others, in a human relation: but seeing that no man can benefit his Maker, all the advantage resulting from any work or performance having Him for its object, must depend on his spontaneous allowance and consequent imputation or note. Thus we say, "that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness" (Rom. iv. 9), which means imputed to him for merit; as the same was made merit also by imputation. But any human service will be meritorious towards its object, whether he impute it to the performer, or, as we say, give him credit for it, or not. This distinction seems to be clear enough however, and is of consequence, as it extends to futurity, where the Highest must be considered not only as the ultimate, but as the only real Rewarder; men having only this life to pay their debts in, or their credit either.

Thus the question of future merit, or merit towards futurity, is nearly the same with that of merit towards

God: and as all our merit towards God will depend on his allowance, so all knowledge of the same must remain with Him until it be fully and finally declared; when the same will probably be found very different from common conception. "For the Lord seeth not as man seeth" (Sam. I. xvi. 7): and so we often find even at present by the disgrace of worldly minions, which shews the vanity of what we call intrinsic worth. It is not intrinsic worth that makes the difference originally, even between man and brute, much less between man and man; but the Will or Word of God in making intrinsic worth to all who have any cast of worth, by qualifying and allowing them to become instruments of his gracious purposes to others. For as the mode of our being is determined by, and indeed, a part of the Word of God, in the sphere of nature, so is that of our living by the same Word in his good Providence; and as it did not rest with ourselves to be born men, so neither does it to be good for any thing now that we are born. We own, indeed, that to be good for much is the way to be great, being the instruments of great good; also that goodness is a great happiness; and that to be good, in short, is to be happy and great: but what certain way is there, or has there ever been discovered, to goodness? Not education or instruction; not example, persuasion or coercion—the way to goodness and consequent happiness proceeds only from one point, God the Fountain of Perfection, and lies straight forward between two dispensations, hedges as it were, his grace and kind providence—that inwardly this outwardly operating in behalf of the favoured object: so that our heavenly Father may be taxed by Satan continually, with a partial interference in the trial of every virtuous, and consequently happy man, as in that of constant Job, "Hast thou not made an hedge about him, and about his house, and about all that he hath?" (Job i. 10.)

So, God loved (that is, was favourable to) Abraham for example, hence his faith; and Abraham believed, hence

his reward. Upon which sort of dispensation the Psalmist avers, "And that Thou Lord art merciful: for Thou rewardest every man according to his work" (Ps. lxi. 12), or service: and it must needs be accounted both merciful and liberal, to reward his creatures for the works that he enables them to do, or rather does by them. Indeed the notion of any other claim on the divine Rewarder, or of a capability to do and deserve well inherent in man, is contrary to reason and common sense, as well as to divine revelation. The Word of God informs us, that he has not conceded this inherent capability to any man: "I will not reprove thee because of thy sacrifices, or of thy burnt-offerings, because they were not alway before me (says he). I will take no bullock out of thine house, nor he-goat out of thy folds. For all the beasts of the forest are mine, and so are the cattle upon a thousand hills" (Ps. l. 8, 9, 10): and reason also teaches us, that it would be both impolitic and derogatory for any superior to put his servants and creatures in a way either to lay him under an obligation, or to do without him. But if we should say with St. Paul, that "godliness (or serving God especially) is great gain" (Tim. I. vi. 6) for ourselves, instead of merit towards God, we should be correct, because his service bears its own reward. He is never a moment in debt to any man, but makes them debtors to Himself by all the good they do. Among the sons of men, there is not a more degrading relation or predicament than debt; and we should be very cautious of regarding our Maker in this predicament, notwithstanding his gracious promises and the merciful allowance for his servants to draw upon Him in the manner aforesaid.

Where then was the beginning of Abraham's merit if not in that allowance? and for what did God ever give him the title of Friend, &c., if not for what He had given him before? All our merit towards God is derived from his bounty, in first giving us the means, and then paying us for what He gives. It is really as if a man should give

one a garden first, and then buy one's fruit at a good price. We dare not therefore arrogate to ourselves any merit either for well-doing or well-suffering in this state, or to found any expectation thereon with regard to the future, not only for the above mentioned, but for two other special reasons ; 1, that our manner in doing and suffering is generally defective, and more suited to apology than to reward ; 2, because the goodness of our doing and suffering, if any, is generally repaid here, as before observed, by the present gratification of some pleasurable feeling, whether of good or evil ; of piety and benevolence, or of vanity and selfishness.

It were easy to enumerate other incidentals still of this sort, or other distinctions of this ; and if the distinctions of this sort of incidentals are numerous on other accounts, others may still be derived from their payment or application, v. g. from the payment or application of such incidentals as fame, honour and distinction, authority, favour, credit, power and dominion, with all the merit and importance attending, or supposed to attend them. For if yielded to force these good incidentals will become force and compulsion ; if to inderset, flattery, meanness, sycophantism ; if to some objects rather than to others of equal desert, partiality. And owing to its foreign scite and consequent remoteness from observation, this kind of property is also very liable to be miscalculated, as well as mispaid ; being overrated at one time, and underrated at another, both in the mild or persuasive and in the aspirate or coercive department. Even the proper objects of credit, authority, and the power of opinion, cannot always reckon on good payment from more than One in the world ; and He does not belong to it: the Principal, First Author, Subject and Subjective of merit, who pays and deserves for all, yet is more robbed than all, by the ungrateful objects of his bounty.

No wonder then if the said objects should be very poor stewards, and very capricious dispensers of these inci-

dentals, in relation to each other. That they should bestow their sort of honour, and often their authority and dominion, as some do their alms, on strangers whom they know nothing about, withholding it at the same time from a neighbour of whom they know nothing amiss; which is a great deal to know for a neighbour. Our Saviour himself, the chief minister of merit, has noted this curious management of the property, observing, that "a prophet hath no honour in his own country." (John iv. 44). So that where a man should seem most likely to be known, there he will be in general the least likely to be esteemed, unless he have the address to make himself a greater stranger at home than his superiority makes him, like Pythagoras and others. People ought not however to think lightly of an eminent individual, merely because he has had the misfortune to be born and brought up among them: for by the same token, a man should be accounted no better than his father's sheep. It is also remarkable, that notwithstanding this propensity of his kindred and acquaintance to undervalue such an individual while he is alive and at home, these too will do him justice, and more than justice perhaps, when he shall have departed either for another country, or for another world. And how they come to do it is, by separating themselves from us in one instance, and uniting with us in the other. For though we be many in our own house, town, or country, out of them we shall yet be one. And the same principle of self-love which operates thus in one sphere will operate the same in all; even so far sometimes as to reconcile two of a trade in their external relations.

§ 2. We feel the elevation of properties from incidentals to *Constituents* in the kingdom more sensibly, on considering their characteristic, than on considering their essential type, as that strikes us immediately, but this only on comparison. Yet we must not expect all men to be of one mind in this respect either: for many will prefer, as before observed, some of the good incidentals just mentioned

to any good of constituents in either department; i.e. either in the material, spiritual or intellectual. If it be, however, because they do not find constituents so tractable as incidentals, that the latter are preferred, those constituents will not be altogether so ungrateful as they may imagine in some cases.

If any class of constituents might be naturally incapable of a good return, one should expect to find it in the *materials*; and as our Saviour asks, "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?" (Matt. vi. 27) so one would think it might be asked with equal propriety, Who by taking thought can add so much as one good characteristic to his person? 1. Who, for example, can really add to his own personal *Beauty* by any attention that he may possibly bestow on it? Perhaps, on considering, we should find, that a man has more influence over this characteristic than over the characteristics of stature and of height particularly. Indirectly, it is true a man, that is the thinking man, may influence or govern his exterior, which is the material man in both respects; v. g. in respect both of beauty and stature, by prudence and discretion, in supplying it with necessities and regulating the use of them. But when we talk of beauty, we do not merely mean a smooth skin and comely features; but a certain outward expression, indicative of something particularly estimable and pleasant within. Therefore, supposing that indication to be regulated by that something within; attention to this something may serve somewhat to the improvement of that indication. "Wisdom makes a man's face to shine" (Eccl. viii. 1), and to shine very differently from the common gloss of health, which is produced by good cheer on a subject that has not been over-fed. By prudence, with the blessing from above, may be had "wine that maketh glad the heart of man; and oil to make him of a cheerful countenance" (Ps. civ. 15) and by wisdom and divine grace, a man shall have the air of honesty; whereby not only his face is made to

shine or look beautiful, but "the boldness of his face shall be changed" (Eccl. viii. 1): which would be a great improvement for some who are bold on other accounts.

Wisdom or righteousness is the foundation of grace and beauty in every production, whether of nature or art; but in an intelligent creature, both the foundation and superstructure: and the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is the foundation of righteousness to every intelligent creature, as the righteousness of that creature is of all the grace in him. Or it may be said, that grace is the foundation of grace; or grace within, of the grace without; and by one "of whose fulness have all we received, and grace for grace" (John i. 16): as it is written, "Out of Sion hath God appeared in perfect beauty" (Ps. l. 1); and as it was said once by an eminent ecclesiastic* of our countrymen before they had the polish of perfect freedom, "They would not be Angles (or English) but angels, if they were Christians."

As far, therefore, as beauty admits of demonstration, the beauty of righteousness may be demonstrated: and if there was not something particularly attractive in its appearance, the property would not be so amiable as it is, even in the eyes of unprincipled seducers, with the devil at their head; who will be at double costs and pains to entrap a righteous man, to what they would bestow for an epicene or half strain. And, what is more creditable to the exterior of righteousness; the righteous themselves are in love with it, as well as with its substance or effects: there is in its whole exterior an idea of loveliness that one knows not how to describe, nor yet to conceive either, without a pattern. Christian poets have dwelt on the beauty of our first parents: and with reason; for if only the fragments of righteousness, as we have them sometimes, are beautiful, how much more must the image have been so before it was broken in Paradise! The ancient heathens had likewise some of them, a very strong idea of

* Gregory the Great.

abstract beauty, or of the beauty of properties ; like justice, temperance, fortitude, and other particulars, as well as of the general property or element of righteousness, which some of them worshipped under the name of virtue ; but they had no idea of the same beauty restored, concentered and visibly expressed in form and feature. Their conception of personal beauty was not so high as it is generally supposed, being either purely material ; or if moral, only of an inferior description. Their persons were all statues, or little more: of featured intellect, or intellectual features, they had hardly any conception ; of the BEAUTY OF HOLINESS, none. So that to them, and even now to the children of this world, who are all heathens in fact, the beauty of Christian perfection exhibited in " a man of sorrows " would seem preposterous.

2, If, however, this be desirable, v. g. that a man should carry a good countenance among his fellow mortals upon earth for the short time that he has to be with them, how much more is such a countenance to be desired for futurity ? Who would not like to shine among the heavenly host for ever ? And if such a *Transformation* be desirable, the way to it is plain ; being, in short, that to which St. Paul exhorts the brethren at Rome. " I beseech you, therefore, brethren, (says he) by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God " (Rom. xii. 1).

2. But if in this offering the subject be material, the action will belong, as usual, to another class of constituents, being objectively related to that of which we are now to consider the good subjective characteristics. For we are now to consider the good subjective characteristics of the *spiritual* class dividing again into four others ; the motive, the sensitive, the appetitive, and the aversive, answerable to their essential bases, as before explained, and exhibiting various good properties, or properties so accounted in each division.

1, Of these may be mentioned, first in the *motive* class,
 — 1 : 2, Such properties as *Strength* and *Agility*: which are both from God, as much as many superior endowments; but, like these, capable of great improvement by art and exercise. Therefore, it will be as much the duty of a Christian to guard and improve those two advantages of strength and agility, as it is to employ them for his own good, and for the good of the community according to the will of the All-bountiful Donor.

If one might venture to draw a comparison between these two good characteristics, the advantage or preference would generally be given, perhaps, to strength for performance. But in cases of dangerous opposition, or persecution, the agility of a Christian will serve him better than his strength; as flight with him is more becoming than fight, if he may be free to choose. For it is our divine Master's rule and commandment, founded in excellent policy, the diffusion of life and immortality by the gospel, that when persecuted in one city, we should flee into another (Mat. x. 23). Therefore, as Christians are bound generally to consult their safety by flight, when free from particular engagements to the contrary; and running is then even more creditable for them than standing the brunt, it seems an important article of education for Christians to learn running betimes; and not only running, but such honest evasion too as it may become them to employ sometimes rather than to withstand, or endeavour to withstand, an overwhelming tide of persecution. Among personal endowments for a Christian, swiftness for flight may be as important, however, at least, as strength for resistance; both being, as before observed, equally and originally the gift of God his Creator and Redeemer. So are

— 3 : 4, *Vivacity*, *Fertility*, and every other species of health, with length of days, their usual accompaniment; it is all "an heritage and gift that cometh of the Lord"

(Ps. cxxvii. 4): concerning which, the ministers and stewards of the mystery of the kingdom must not be expected to discourse like physicians, any more than in speaking of their essential bases.

→ 5 : 6, Or admitting the existence of such a class as spiritual physicians, their proper or professional object will be immortality and eternity, rather than *Health* and *Longevity*. At least, it seems more their business, to shew what may be real health, or the health of the soul, and to point out its habitation, v. g. in the persons of the righteous, than to dwell on the physical ingredients which are required to make up that transient insubstantial kind here spoken of. For health with its shades, and disease its antithesis, may indeed be ascribed to the soul as well as to the body, and deemed a good moral, or objective, as well as a good subjective characteristic of the kingdom or subject; as in that affectionate salutation of St. John to his friend Gaius, "Beloved, I wish above all things, that thou mayest prosper and be in health; even as thy soul prospereth". (John, Ep. iii. 2).

But the health here understood, is particularly meant of the body, so far as the bodily health can be separated from the spiritual and intellectual: and it would seem from the forecited wish of St. John, as if such a separate health could really exist; indeed we often find, that it does. For though death with all its preparatory train of diseases came into the world by sin originally, and all our bodily sufferings may be ascribed to that single source, yet our emancipation from the stains and dominion of sin being begun in a state of mortality, it may and does happen, that the soul's health is often improving as that of the body declines: and, it may be, not only the rather, but also in a more rapid proportion.

It is also often supposed by elderly people (from their experience of others it may be presumed) that longevity is rather an indication of perverseness, and a short life of grace in the subject; because they seem to observe, that

persons of a meek and amiable disposition are seldom either so long or so violently exposed to the trials of life as those of a more rugged temper ; who, according to a vulgar but not insignificant phrase, have more of the evil principle in them. Therefore, they say sometimes of a comparatively innocent young person, He is too good to live ; thinking, perhaps, from the usual cooperation which they imagine between Nature and Providence, that such amiable young persons being naturally more forward in the way to happiness than some older, may require a shorter preparation for it, and therefore be sooner removed to it. And if the Christian doctrine on this head do not allow in fact any such notion as that of one man being naturally endowed with more grace than another, whatever may be his share in life ; it allows a preponderance of one quality over another in any personal combination, or less of any and every quality in one person than in another ; as in some flowers there may be less colour than in others. Therefore, while all persons will have their proportion of innate evil, and evil enough no doubt to spoil their goodness, as any flower may have enough of blue, red, or yellow to prevent it from being white—yet the circumstance of there being less evil in some (children of slender stamina perhaps) than in others will have somewhat of the same effect in appearance, as if the subjects were born with less life and more grace. Hence a life naturally short is not always a proof of innate goodness, any more than one shortened by accident, or by course of justice, is always a proof of unusual depravity ; whatever elderly people may think of the cooperation of Nature and Providence in that respect.

Compared with our essential health and ultimate good, it may be questioned, whether that good characteristic of the material class, that sunshine of the body so generally prized, be always a peculiarly good property ; the rainy days being good for something as well as the bright, or sickness as well as health. At the same time health most

frequently is a personal advantage, therefore ought to be so reputed ; and they who really “hope you are well”, or wish you good health sincerely, may be thought to have some regard for your welfare. Yet it seems extraordinary, considering how much our welfare includes, and how many different advantages we need and are capable of, that our friends should attach all their concern, and direct all their inquiries to this kind of welfare only, as if there was no other ; or, that their inquiries and concern should ever be so construed. For if the common salutation between friends expresses something more than a regard for each other’s health, as it certainly might, nothing more appears to be generally understood between them ; and not always so much, either.

“How fare ye?” “How do ye?” might certainly be applied to faring and doing in more respects than one : in respect of our foreign as well as of our domestic properties ; in respect of the weal of our habitation, credit, fame, &c., which is our foreign health ; as well as of the health of our body, its members and organs, which is our domestic weal. And it is here suggested as a matter for improvement, whether the salutation between friends might not be turned to some better account than that of bringing up a subject in the first instance that either is not noticed, or noticed to no purpose. The inquiry should *imply* by right (for it could not do more) every property and every defect within the reach of human counsel and assistance ; and would not be unseasonable, if it stirred up also on either side a momentary recollection of passing circumstances that were not exactly of a nature to be communicated. If, however, we must confine our inquiries on saluting to a single object, others might be found, one should think, as interesting as bodily health. Some may think the object of peace as interesting : and these would be apt to ask their friends, as Joseph asked his brethren in Egypt, and people do still in that quarter, it appears, “of their peace” (Gen. xliii. 27).

Knowing the untoward humours of his brethren, Joseph's allusion was most likely to their outward peace, and especially towards each other: but there can be no reason, why the ancient mode of salutation, "Is it peace?" (Kings II. ix. 18): or "Peace be with you" (Pet. I. v. 14), might not also have some allusion to that internal quiet which, if well founded, is better than any outward peace or health, or other good subjective, and is also very likely to be attended with these inferior blessings wherever it may happen to abide; as the Psalmist observed, "The voice of joy and health is in the dwellings of the righteous" (Ps. cxviii. 15).

2, But joy, with its kindred properties, mirth, good humour, cheerfulness, and the like, belong rather to the second or *sensitive* division of the spiritual class of good subjective characteristics. And hence it may be seen how in our idea of this same sensitive division of spiritual constituents something more is implied than mere sensibility; sensibility denoting only a superior *quantum* of sensation, and not a superior quality of the same. Yet as any share of sensation is an advantage in the subject to which it has been assigned, an extraordinary quantum, or what we call Sensibility, must be an extraordinary advantage of course; and in whatever animal this advantage appears, it may be regarded as one indication of a superior nature, or of the presence of other excellent properties. For this of sensibility or rare sensation is certainly to be accounted as one such property, although it be the foundation of our most exquisite sufferings, as well as our sweetest enjoyments; exemplifying an awful species of power in our Almighty Judge, which, as it may be pushed to any extent either way by Omnipotence, and our demerits point to the suffering side, we may tremble at, if ever we reflect like men in their senses. It would be a source of the highest gratification to some malignant spirits, little considering what themselves are liable to, if they also in like manner could whet the feelings they design to wound. But for our comfort, the

Merciful Creator chooses to retain this awful privilege in his own possession ; and “ doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men, to crush under his feet all the prisoners of the earth ” (Lam. iii. 33, 34). He does not give sensibility, to promote suffering, but to avert it, and promote enjoyment in every quarter in which the same may abound.

For sensibility is not of one kind only, but of several : and the very different notions attached to this particular characteristic may shew the difficulty of classing characteristics generally, according to their natural affinities ; as the same single good characteristic will make three in this case, and three that are also referable to as many distinct bases or essentials occurring in their several classes or divisions of constituents above specified ; as 1, sense in the spiritual-sensitive ; 2, sympathy in the spiritual-appetitive ; 3, apprehension or perception, in the pure intellectual. So that the said characteristic might have been applied to either class or division of essentials before mentioned, though the first is preferred as the simplest and most obvious, and the good sensitive characteristic or pleasant sensibility, consisting in the habitual sensation of what is called Pleasure or Enjoyment, is but a shade or degree of that now mentioned.

Pleasure, properly so called, is a rarified species of sense, and the fair offspring of appetite, or aversion by success, varying not only with the association in which it originates, as aforesaid, but also, we may presume, with the subject in which it is associated or felt, and producing different symptoms, as it accrues either from sensible or intellectual objects. Pleasure coming from either of these quarters, from one as well as the other, will still be pleasure in either case, and may be equally sweet and innocent. But there is a striking difference in form or symptom between the gentle thrill that a congenial figure inspires, and the rapturous enjoyment that is gathered from a congenial sentiment, or between the pleasure of the heart and brain ; as wide a difference as there is between the

opposite classes of spiritual and intellectual essentials on which they are founded. Even homogeneous pleasures, as the corporeal, e. g. may be more exquisite in one subject than in another, being polished by higher endowments: which proves A CONNEXION BETWEEN PLEASURE AND MORALITY THAT IS NOT ALWAYS SUSPECTED.

Indeed it is of more consequence to distinguish morally than metaphysically, in this case, and to find which are the pleasures to be most desired, than where they are felt or where they originate. It may be enough to have, as is generally had, a superficial idea of the difference between spiritual and corporeal pleasures and pains, or any other subject of both kinds, v. g. spiritual and corporeal. For then it may be further understood, how there are also two ways of enjoying life, corporeal and spiritual, and two ways, it may also be added, of resigning the same. They who understand the first mentioned corporeal enjoyment only may be loath to depart this transitory life when summoned, because they leave their all, little as it is, behind them; but they who understand the spiritual likewise may be glad to depart, because they do not leave their happiness, but greatly augment it, great as it is, by passing on to a more spiritual condition. And thus it may also be seen which is the truest pleasure, and the pleasure for choice, the spiritual or the corporeal, v. g. by endurance. For the latter is proverbially short and uncertain, even in this uncertain state; while in the next, they say, there is no room for it: but spiritual pleasure, or pleasure *intellectually* spiritual, is sterling everywhere; and the pleasure of a truly intellectual spirit always will be; the same being true happiness, and in effect the same as our Saviour describes it,—that on eating thereof we shall not hunger again, as we do, and that almost immediately, after partaking of false or inferior pleasures. “I am the bread of life (said he). He that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst” (John vi. 35).

The choice or appetite must needs be directed to one of

these two sorts of pleasure, the spiritual and corporeal, since we cannot choose both any more than we can serve the masters of both, being God *supremely* for both, and for one more immediately Mammon. The matter is therefore, where will we have our pleasure or treasure,—above or below?—with God or with Mammon? Christian modes encourage us to have our treasure in heaven; i. e. in spiritual rather than in corporeal enjoyments. “Set your affections on things above (says a teacher of these modes) not on things on the earth” (Col. iii. 2). “For (as the Master himself observes) where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.” Therefore it may be one good rule in making this choice, to take him sincerely for our Master, and God in him, looking for pleasure only in the discharge of our duty, as there is no substantial pleasure out of it. And a good line of duty may be taken from a combination of these two grand requisites, pleasure and profit, because where there is no profit there can be no lasting pleasure. “The unfruitful works of darkness” (Eph. v. 11) may please for a season with men of corrupt imaginations; but should they be afterwards questioned, “What fruit had ye then in those things whereof ye are now ashamed?” (Rom. vi. 21) they might own, truly, no fruit, consequently no lasting pleasure; but shame for our present recompence, and it may be something worse for us in reversion. “For (adds the apostle) the end of those things is death” (Ibid.).

Our greatest pleasure, therefore, should always be the greatest good. But a man of the earth, i. e. a voluptuary, does not think much of any good, but the gratifying and preparing gratifications for his inferior appetites. He makes the pleasure his primary object, and not the good which his bountiful Creator has annexed for its encouragement; nor Him either, as he might, without any real diminution of his corporeal enjoyment. For the Creator has made a duty of every pleasure honestly enjoyed: though he does not intend, that we should make idols of

our pleasures, being "lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God" (Tim. II. iii. 4); to serve them instead of Him. This He could never intend; but "in the day that God created man (Gen. v. 1), male and female created he them." "God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. And God said, Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of the earth, and every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat" (Ib. i. 28, 29).

This may be regarded as a divine license for every honest and fruitful enjoyment, both at bed and at board: being likewise only one among many instances in which the Creator appears affectionately solicitous (if it may be so said) for the lowest as well as for the highest enjoyments of his creatures. At the same time, however, he requires such enjoyments to be taken with faith (Heb. xi. 6) and moderation by those which have a sense of duty, as its proper consequence; and then they may enjoy them as its reward. But to be doating and dreaming on such enjoyments beforehand, or to desire the same immoderately, would be the way to debase in time our appetitive constituents, and likely to disqualify us for higher enjoyments accruing by right, i. e. by God's allowance, to those who look higher, as they ought.

Before we proceed to the particulars of pleasure, or of the sensitive division, of good spiritual subjective characteristics, it may finally be observed how the Christian modes, concerning these particulars, apply chiefly to persons of a middle age, or to those who do not seem to be going from them immediately, according to the course of nature; but who would do well nevertheless to follow the heathen precept of considering pleasures as on their departure, and to reckon on them accordingly; also, as delivered to every man by tale, and manage them with

suitable frugality. While to those from whom pleasure is departed, a retirement from its neighbourhood may be recommended with the example of a loyal veteran in king David's days, and one who had been instrumental to his preservation when he fled before Absalom. "And the king said unto Barzillai, Come thou over with me, and I will feed thee with me in Jerusalem. And Barzillai said unto the king, How long have I to live, that I should go up with the king unto Jerusalem? I am this day fourscore years old: and can I discern between good and evil? Can thy servant taste what I eat or what I drink? Can I hear any more the voice of singing men and singing women? Wherefore then should thy servant be yet a burden unto my lord, the king? Thy servant will go a little way over Jordan with the king: and why should the king recompense it with such a reward? Let thy servant, I pray thee, turn back again that I may die in mine own city, and be buried by the grave of my father, and of my mother" (Sam. II. xix. 33, &c.) For admitting a man's glass to have run nearly to the extent of this worthy veteran's, the remainder would afford, one should think, but a small space for pleasure.

The different sorts or varieties of the moral property now defined may be numerous, or more numerous however than interesting, some of them being very low; as jesting, frolic, fun, &c.: but all that are worth enumerating may be distinguished under two heads by the criterion of endurance before mentioned; being 1, the transient; 2, permanent species of pleasant or good subjective spiritual sensitive characteristics: the first containing such sorts or varieties as joy, mirth, gladness, delight, enjoyment, ecstasy: the second, such as good humour, gaiety, cheerfulness, tranquillity, peace, happiness, properly so called, and bliss; the said sorts or varieties being, however, scarcely distinguishable in many instances. For though they may be formally distinguished by the different modes of indication or expression of which the general property is susceptible pro tempore, in the voice, the countenance, the action,

and gesticulation; yet such distinction would be always more formal than real, more subtle than significant; and in fact as incomprehensible almost as it is uncertain. The only considerable distinction, and much to be relied on is, the specific distinction perhaps above given: and even that must depend on circumstances or contingents more than on facts or essentials; the first mentioned species being only a casual display or manifestation of the second; as individually, joy for example, of good humour; and mirth of cheerfulness, &c. In other words; it may be said, that joy, mirth, &c., are good humour, cheerfulness, &c., unrestrained by their antagonist properties, moroseness, care, &c., and too often preponderating also against discretion. For the certain though latent effort of permanent properties will break out and appear in the transient of one element as well as of another and also of their approximating degrees, whether the same be more spiritual or intellectual.

—1, Therefore, *Joy, Mirth, Gladness, Delight, Enjoyment, Ecstasy*, and all of that kind are to be regarded as the breaking out or manifestation (sometimes disorderly enough) of the varieties next to be mentioned: and so, consisting in this accident or occurrence merely, they may also be regarded as more incidental than these.

—2, But the latent properties of *Good Humour, Gaiety, Cheerfulness, Tranquillity, Peace, Happiness*, properly so called, and *Bliss* are decided constituents, not depending on the chance of manifestation; but the same, whether manifested or not: some of them being also ascribable to higher subjects than human; as we talk of the happiness of the Deity, the bliss of angels. And if others of the sort, as good humour, cheerfulness, and the like are not ascribed to angels, they would be no disgrace to them. For habitual good humour and a cheerful disposition is a constant eulogy on the Creator and his works; as their opposite is a constant reproach; not to the Creator however, but to its subject or owner, the event in either case answering to the quality of the same. Thus while the cheerful man

consoles himself on the exit of summer with the prospect of a future spring, the discontented changes summer into winter by hard anticipation. Cheerfulness may therefore be regarded as one note of a good subject in the heavenly kingdom of God, as it generally seems in his earthly kingdoms. No human policy indeed can always ensure this happy note among subjects; but as far as the same may predominate, it will generally bespeak a good local government. What then should we think of the gaiety, peace and enjoyment naturally diffused through the animal creation; insomuch that there is not, as far as we know, one creature (sinners and their adviser excepted) but seems to have its proper fund of delight? To see the general ebullition of spirits, even under favourable circumstances, what should we think? And what should we think, to see it under the most unfavourable? as e. g. to see the humour of a Lapland gamme or encampment—to see the endless dance too on equatorial sands not prompted by art and emulation, but prompted and sustained by real good humour among the children of nature? It is chiefly in a rural life that downright good humour prevails: for there the very beasts of the field are seen dancing as it were for very joy of heart, and that sometimes in such circumstances as would rather seem to indicate a degree of tribulation.

Is not this some evidence of a wise and gracious government in the world? Let theologians of the material school insist on perfection in the material department, and propose it as an evidence, which it certainly is, of divine goodness reigning there: but spiritual observers can find a more striking evidence of the wisdom and goodness of that government in the provision it has made for the spiritual enjoyment of the creature; and refer to the abovementioned **FUND OF DELIGHT** as one particular of the same, being still inconsiderable, perhaps, compared with what may be further seen or suspected; inconsiderable too, when compared with our conception of happiness properly so called.

For the general property of happiness is very comprehensive, as we have observed ; applying to the perfection of incidentals as well as to that of constituents, and being itself also more like an incidental, founded on good hap, as we call it. But happiness properly so called is the highest or most intellectual cast of the property under consideration as well as the most stable or permanent.

Happiness is pleasure permanent ; or rather, the substance of that property of which pleasure is a shadow or resemblance. For pleasure does not imply perpetuity, but a thing of comparative duration ; and there is no permanent pleasure even for this life only ; whereas happiness is an immortal property, not depending on circumstances, but existing independently, it may be, in the most wretched, though then clouded and imperceptible. Its seat is in the members of the soul, as that of pleasure, or the ordinary characteristic, is more diffused among the members of the body. It may not consist in a particular property, whether incidental or constituent ; but in a state or mood, in which the troublesome properties of both body and soul are counterbalanced and kept under by the more agreeable. Or it may consist in one particular property, a sweetener to the rest ; being a medium of enjoyment, as the property of grace is a medium of holiness, between the Creator and his creatures. It is not so material for us to know how such a thing as happiness may be or consist, as it is to know, that whether in word or operation, God is its author ; that we may understand the derivation rather than the composition of so great a blessing, and how to pursue, and where to apply for it.

This property, therefore, (considering happiness as a property) will appear to us quite another thing than what is meant by *Cheerfulness* : and also for the following reason besides what has been already mentioned ; namely, that we regard this cheerfulness with good humour, and every other property of the sort, as temporal and fugitive : and though they do not vanish instantaneously, like mirth

and other properties of the first mentioned sort, each of which is a mere flash of pleasure, they still continue only as tapers: they have no root, no foundation in immortality, like the good objectives. Therefore, the said properties are but half good, not naturally and necessarily like these; and if they do seem so nearly related to them, as a shadow to its model or substance, we should still make a distinction between them so far as to put the last named class of good objectives by themselves: and there now remains only one branch more of the good subjective sort, which is the intellectual, for consideration, before that highest class may be also considered.

3. By good subjective *intellectual* characteristics we do not understand the same, embodied with their respective objects; as ideas, phantoms, visions, conceits, recollections, devices, inventions and the like; which according to the vulgar notion of store-rooms constructed in this department, would furnish a rare assortment of ready-made articles for them: but the goodness or good side of their characteristics, and especially in relation to the owner or subject; which, however abstracted to our consideration, will make them as positive constituents in themselves as any of the essential class. They do not seem to have found any general name so express as the objective characteristics of this class have found: but *Talents* might serve; though these good intellectual subjectives seem to be oftener acknowledged by the name of their corresponding essential, Sense. And in this double naming there may also be found a convenience, as making, apparently, a distinction of the class into rare and common; the first, genius or talent; the second, common sense—as it is vulgarly expressed; or Light, as the foremost distinction is named in Scripture, when the two happen to be there mentioned in opposition to each other; as e. g. where our Saviour says, “The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light” (Luke xvi. 8): i. e. they have more common sense, if they have not so much light or intelli-

gence. These two sorts of good intellectual subjectives, common and uncommon, or sense and talent, or worldly wisdom and heavenly light, may possibly subsist together in one character or person, as there is no natural impediment to such an union : and such an union is also much to be desired, but hardly to be expected, or at least in the measure that our Saviour recommends to his disciples in their earthly relations. " Behold, I send you forth (says he) as sheep in the midst of wolves : be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves " (Mat. x. 16).

Subject to this primary division of good subjective intellectual characteristics into common and uncommon, or worldly and heavenly, another may be had for the association, and taken from the essential species on which the said characteristics are severally founded ; making five classes of the same, or one for either species of the essential constituents.

1, For the good subjectives of the first species, which is apprehension, wanting intellectual terms, we are obliged to borrow sometimes any that we can assimilate from the material department ; as solidity and extent, bluntness and acuteness with others most opposite to the nature of intellect. But this will not always be the case : seeing other properties of the apprehension have a more congenial supply of expressions in the other department, as justice, elevation, quickness, life, and others of the sort ; together with some of a more peculiar cast ; as shrewdness, penetration, discernment : by all which properties so many different characters or qualities of apprehension ; as lofty and mean, swift and slow, &c., may be conceived. Also various modes or degrees too may be conceived by other criterions ; as by the grasp, or firmness of apprehension, certainty, faith, conjecture, opinion, knowledge, science, &c. ; by the process ; 1, learning, reading, information, erudition ; 2, experience, observation, consideration. Which kinds, modes and degrees are all important characteristics in practice, though with regard to the subject of our pre-

sent discussion it does not seem worth while to insist on them: any more than it does to insist on the kinds, &c. of good characteristics of the second department of intellect.

2, For there are also different characteristic sorts of memory acknowledged by public opinion, as capacious and shallow, retentive and treacherous, vast and contracted, besides the two general distinctions of good and bad, which are most to our purpose. According to public opinion, indeed, a good or bad memory will signify no more than a retentive or treacherous, or either of the other forenamed distinctions; but this opinion cannot be so just as one should expect from the public; because a good or bad memory, if it signified no more than retentive, &c., or the reverse, would signify nothing. Memory itself, meaning the same withholding or retention of intellectual subjects, or the same withholding and retention in an intellectual sense, as before observed. It may not be so common, but it would be a juster opinion of memories, not to consider the most particular or retentive memory always the best, as if retention alone were needful to constitute a good memory; but that which is productive of most pleasure: and the pleasure attending it, as one indispensable qualification for a good memory. FOR FEW MEN WOULD ACCOUNT THAT A GOOD MEMORY PERHAPS, THAT SHOULD BE A PERPETUAL PLAGUE TO ITS OWNER.

What may be considered a good memory, therefore, is one that should be at once both retentive and pleasant; convenient for use, edifying in practice, and peaceful in reflection. We should not call a memory good, that was stored with vanity, whether learned or unlearned, nor one stored with wicked arts or information; but one in which the best ideas should always lie uppermost. No more should we call a memory good, however retentive, or much of a memory it might be, that reflected its owner's folly to no purpose; but one that should either correct errors and suggest room for improvement, or preserve for its owner a

source of agreeable recollections, in which wholesome labour might appear combined with harmless enjoyment, and such as God approves. Then might one look back on the past with complacency ; and reflect on its direction with gratitude, declaring with the Psalmist, "The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground : yea, I have a goodly heritage" (Ps. xvi. 7) ; though one should be no better than a ploughman, or a shepherd.

And this may indicate a propriety in distinguishing memories still farther into two sorts, for the convenience of characterizing them both subjectively and objectively ; which is into natural and moral ; the first relating merely to the property, the second to consequences founded thereon, such as those above mentioned, and others of the kind : which being more moral or objective are not to be mentioned at present. For we are now to consider the characteristics of a serviceable memory distinct from the moral. And so distinguishing them again, we may observe of natural memories or mere retentions, that these, like other natural things, being greatly subject to the influence of art, will admit of as many varieties as there are varieties of arts, employments and concerns in life, for each of which there may be such a characteristic as a particularly good memory ; and the instances of these which occur sometimes, are extremely curious. Also in point of strength or retention, there may be room for improvement, as memories are found to differ greatly in this respect, and one memory to be often more of a memory than others. As apprehension is the basis of memory, it will generally be found perhaps, that the soundest memory accompanies the clearest apprehension : and if so, the same means and assistance may serve for one as for the other ; v. g. observation, precision, habit, and most especially interest ; properties that are highly conducive, if not indispensable to success or good characteristics, also in other departments, as for example in

3, That of judgment : of which the two principal sub-

jective characteristic kinds are founded on the distinction of subject or judge, whether it be God or man, and may be termed accordingly divine and human, or effective and constructive, which will amount to the same; the divine judgment, or principle of judging being effective, while the human is only constructive. For God judging any thing to be or not to be, will thereby make it immediately either to be or not to be, precisely as he judges; but man cannot make any action or thing to be either better or worse by his judgment, let him put what construction he will on it; the impotency of human judgment being as general (Thank God!) as its fallibility, according to the Protestant faith, is universal. Hence the only good, or, as generally said, *sound* judgment will be that which proceeds from, or is founded on the will of God.

4, And it is the same with respect to the good of the fourth intellectual department, v. g. of the will. For if we talk of good will—and good will there may be no doubt, without this reference, it must be only as a relative and rather objective property, as of a will that is good for some party or purpose, but not therefore necessarily good in itself,—if there can be any fault in partiality. Whereas, the will that is founded on, or conformed to, the will of God, will be, not relatively, but absolutely good, as God is good.

5, As the property of imagination is the highest step in the climax of intellect, of all its properties the most active and aspiring, the medium of inspiration, the sense of prophecy, the connecting link between a human and any superior intelligence,—its good subjective characteristics will rank proportionably high, being designated therefore by such lofty names, as illumination, splendour, brilliancy, and others taken from the sovereign element of light, which itself also is frequently referred to this highest species of intellect; as when we talk of the light of the imagination, &c.

It is not here meant to be asserted, that every kind of the

imagination is good or every degree great: nor can it be dissembled, that there are evil casts of this property likewise, as we may find, on considering the sinister side of the subject; neither is such a degree as a *grovelling* imagination a thing unheard of on that side. But, not to separate the kinds founded on one criterion, although some of them should happen to be bad or indifferent, if others be good; there are three several kinds of imagination adapted to the single criterion of affinity, or of the element to which they may be supposed to be each respectively the most akin. For the imagination, like the apprehension, and every other property of the intellectual combination, though more intellectual upon the whole than of any other class or complexion, will vary its affinities nevertheless, being more related to matter in most men, than either to spirit or intellect; and in some again more to spirit, in others more to its own class, i. e. to intellect. And hence these three several kinds of imagination may be conceived; 1, carnal; 2, spiritual; 3, intellectual; the operation and effects of which are very distinct, so distinct indeed, that one of these kinds will appear to have no eyes for the objects, no wings for the pursuits, no admiration for the depositaries of the other. Thus a carnal imagination has no eyes for any but carnal objects, "having eyes full of adultery" (Pet. II. ii. 14), and closed, as our Saviour intimates, to the pure mystery of the kingdom (Mat. xiii. 11). "But blessed are your eyes: for they see" (Ib. 16), says he to his enlightened disciples, "Children of light," as they are elsewhere called: whose regenerated spirits seem to prefer their native element, and love to wander from the body, whether in rambling through the fields of science here below, or dwelling aloft in heavenly contemplation. It is every man as he prefers, or according to his natural, if not according to his new, affinity: and farther than that, no reason can be assigned for the difference we observe among men, both in the measure and application,

not only of this, but of every other property or endowment.

* And now, deferring the farther consideration of this subject to the opportunity which a consideration of good *objective* characteristics on the same basis will afford, let us straightway proceed to this class in which it occurs though late, bringing up the rear of the same, as it may be said : the class itself being of all that are here named most responsible, and consequently most interesting.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER IV.

GOOD OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 1.

MORAL—ON INCIDENTALS.

1, Honour and Honesty.—2, Bounty, Hospitality, &c.—3, Content and Moderation. — 4, Frugality and Economy.—5, Neatness, &c.—6, Prudence, &c.

“ This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord : and their righteousness is of me, saith the Lord.”—ISAIAH. liv. 17.

THE good and evil following or resulting from spiritual and intellectual acts, consequently from the more complex constituents that are formed of such acts, and ultimately from the subjects that are thus combined, will be named *objective*, generally from their direction, as before explained* ; and otherwise also, particularly after the particular objects of such direction, whether they be incidental or constituent. But every objective characteristic, though named from its particular object, or sort of objects, will belong essentially to the subject or bearer ; comprising, first the more complex, and therein also the simple constituent to which such characteristic attaches or belongs, and from which it follows or results to the object as aforesaid and before signified.

* Page 51.

The good objective characteristics then being thus compounded are generally known by the common name of Righteousness; and the evil, by its antithesis or Unrighteousness, with several synonymes or corresponding terms for each, which may thus be stated in the order of proximity to their root, v. g.

OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.	OF UNRIGHTEOUSNESS.
1. Right.	Wrong.
2. Uprightness or Rectitude.	Obliquity, Frowardness, Perverseness.
3. Perfection, Soundness, Integrity.	Imperfection, Unsoundness, Corruption.
4. Goodness, Innocence.	Wickedness, Guilt, Depravity.

Righteousness*, according to the ancient orthography, means right wisenesse; and to be righteous, means to be rightly wise; not being over righteous, nor over wise (Eccl. vii. 16), neither under, nor yet beside. And by this rule the property of wisdom would be more essential than characteristic, signifying only practical knowledge, which may be very wrong by chance in the moral, as we often find it in other departments. But in the moral department especially, we often find men, who, according to the prophet's observation, "are wise to do evil, but to do good they have no knowledge" (Jer. iv. 22). Therefore wisdom originally would require some qualification, like the characteristic epithet Right, to make it that excellent thing which it is allowed to be; just as its correspondent Sense is beholden to another epithet for making it that Good-sense, which any one may be proud of, if he may be proud of any thing.

Besides the terms above mentioned, Duty is also fre-

* One of our old countrymen, speaking of manslaughter, in an excellent discourse on Divine Morality, says thus:—"Manslaughter in dede is in foure maneres. That on is by lawe, right as a justice dampneth him that is culpable to the deth: but let the justice beware, that he do it rightfully, and that he do it not for delit to spill blood, but for keeping of rightwisenesse."

quently used as an equivalent for righteousness: and equivalent indeed it may be, but with two distinctions; 1, that duty is righteousness in embryo, the form of righteousness chiefly; righteousness due, but not done: and duties, or kinds of duty, are righteousnesses, or kinds of righteousness, or righteous acts, due, but not done; and which *ought* to be done, if they are not: righteousnesses in thought and description, but not in word and deed; their intellectual type; their form or notion in short, and not their substance or being; 2, that duty may stand as a metonymical expression for righteousness, in the same manner that toll, tribute, &c. stand sometimes for the money they are discharged with. Righteousness is a duty, impost or tribute which the Lord of heaven and earth has laid upon his subjects in either sphere; first as a return for his bounty and protection; next as a means for communicating the same to them, his subjects. For, as tribute enables earthly sovereigns to maintain the states confided to them in peace and prosperity, so the tribute of righteousness is returned upon the heads of the payers, whether sovereign or subject, in many blessings both spiritual and temporal, by their heavenly King. "ALL THINGS WORK TOGETHER FOR GOOD TO THEM THAT LOVE GOD" (Rom. viii. 28).

Thus being viewed in different lights, the same subject may be differently apprehended and named. But no difference of apprehending and naming can ever make two things of righteousness: for righteousness can be but one under all circumstances, as its Author is One. Righteousness is the will of God: and one God can have but one will. Therefore, to ascertain, what is righteousness, or in what it consists, or what may be the right going of that wonderful machine, the moral man, i. e. the mass of our spiritual and intellectual constituents, whether considered as properties, or more precisely as acts or accidents composing the same, one should do as one would to ascertain what was right going in any other machine; as in a watch for example; or perhaps in some newly invented,

and still more elaborate piece of mechanism. If we wished to know whether its motions were all true, and all its curious offices duly performed, who should tell us? whom should we go to for information, but the artist who made it, and to him? His must certainly be allowed to be the highest and best authority, as he should know best his own purpose in such production; and although the servants or apprentices may be able to satisfy us in ordinary cases, yet in cases of greater doubt and importance, we must recur to the master himself, and by his authority be determined. Even so should we recur to the authority of God, to learn what is righteousness: for "it is He that hath made us; and not we, ourselves" (Ps. c. 2), nor any other person or being. Man did not make us, angels did not make us: to neither men nor angels therefore can we look, to tell us what is right in our sphere, but to God alone who made us, and (as all one with Him) to the Branch of David, whose name is "The Lord our Righteousness" (Jer. xxiii. 6), as being an example of the same, or indeed its Very Presence. When parties are at issue on any point especially, whether it be a matter of property or opinion, and the prepossession on either hand is such, that neither party will yield, it would seem, that the only way to end all disputes, is by arbitration: and here a difference on the most interesting point than can be suggested having thus found its Arbiter, we have only now to wait on his sentence, and learn from Him *what is righteousness*.

A voice has been heard from Heaven: it was only one sentence; but the most memorable that ever came to mankind, even from above: more memorable than the whole law that came to Israel by Moses from Mount Sinai; more memorable even than that which prescribed their duty to mankind in Paradise. For it was not a pattern of words merely, that this sentence conveyed, but a pattern of life, "a new and living way" (Heb. x. 20), as St. Paul entitles it, indicated by "the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and lighting upon him: and a voice from Heaven,

saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (Mat. iii. 16, 17).

Whatever pleases God in any subject must be right; whatever pleases Him in any intellectual must be righteousness: any intellectual that pleases Him entirely must be all righteousness: now the Son pleases Him entirely; and Jesus Christ is declared in this memorable sentence, to be the beloved Son in whom he is well, i. e. entirely pleased. Therefore, to mention no other reason, the Son must be all righteousness in himself first; and, from the communion, freer than air, of those properties which constitute an intellectual spirit, righteousness in him must be righteousness in every intellectual, by the same spirit. Jesus Christ is righteousness to every created intellect, and to us, "the LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS." He is our righteousness, and there is none other: all that is Christ or of Christ in us is righteousness, and no more: all the righteousness in us is Christ, or, as we should say, of Christ—"BONE OF HIS BONES, AND FLESH OF HIS FLESH."

God once embodied in the properties of a man both incidental and constituent; now glorified in these and disencumbered of those, as men shall be; yet still both now and for ever identified with human properties, whether spiritual, or intellectual, or both undistinguished; "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to day, and for ever" (Heb. xiii. 8)—is in every thought and deed the Lord our Righteousness: and in no thought nor deed have we any righteousness but him or his. His word or rule, his power or spirit, his life, example or practice, both inward and outward—are righteousness for every intelligent creature, and for man in particular. "For (as St. Paul justly and eloquently observes) none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord: whether we live therefore or die, we are the Lord's" (Rom. xiv. 7, 8). With this principle of righteousness we shall please God in the well beloved Son, and fulfil the

glorious destiny of high born creatures; without such principle, we shall miss our birth, and do neither: with this unerring Guide we shall go as true as time here; and long hereafter, when time shall be no more.

This is what we find to be the sum of our righteousness, namely CHRIST: other righteousness than this, have we none. By God's grace, and the discipline of his good providence, harrowing and exercising our froward hearts in many ways, some foreign properties may be wormed into them; as St. Paul and St. James have observed, "And not only so (says the former) but we glory in tribulations also: knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience, experience; and experience, hope: and hope maketh not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us" (Rom. v. 3, 4, 5). And when we have suffered so much for these properties, patience, experience, hope, and above all—the love of God, they may indeed be called ours, by the same title that the painful offspring of a woman may be called hers, after suffering what she has suffered for it: but, as there will always be a distinction between her and it, so likewise, between us and our righteousness: we may call it ours; and ours it will be in effect, but not independently, nor alone. And hereupon, considering their righteousness in this view, i. e. as befalling rather than proceeding from them originally, the sorts of persons who are generally called "just" and "holy" in the world, would be more properly called "justified" and "sanctified," as they are in Scripture sometimes, and all, as it is said, "in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God" (Cor. I. vi. 11). So Isaiah in his song of Judah, "Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us: for THOU ALSO HAST WROUGHT ALL OUR WORKS IN US" (Isai. xxvi. 12). If therefore the righteousness of Christ be shed upon us, we shall be righteous in this way, that is incidentally; as we are made guiltless by his precious atonement; and that, whether we work or

not ; as they who are endowed with worldly riches will be rich incidentally, whether they work or not. Nevertheless, as these can carry none of their incidental riches with them into another world, so neither can those who do not work, their incidental righteousness, nor any thing but their constituent acts. While of others, who make the righteousness of Christ their own, by working the works of God, or believing on him whom He hath sent (John vi. 29), we may say, with the voice from Heaven, "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord . . . that they may rest from their labours ; and their works do follow them" (Rev. xiv. 13). "And that thou, Lord, art merciful : for Thou rewardest every man according to his work" (Ps. lxii. 12). The principle alone from which this character is derived, will make us righteous whether we work or not ; but with such a principle we cannot help working, if only life and opportunity be given us. Thus the green fruit of righteousness is ours as well as the ripe : and on the other hand, that which is borne in us by a Christian spirit, will be as much the righteousness of Christ, as that which he bears without us : and again, the imputation of one is as necessary, to make it ours, or assign its benefit to us, as the imputation of the other.

Imputed righteousness is something like what we mean by "taking the will for the deed" in an intended kindness from one man to another ; only with greater force as applying to the goodness of God : who takes not only the will for the deed, but the principle itself for the will which would thereby be determined to good works, if opportunity should permit : that principle being Christ ; on whose account only all is accepted from first to last, and whether in will or deed. "There is, therefore, now no condemnation (says the apostle) to them which are in Christ Jesus ; who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit . . . And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin ; but the spirit is life because of righteousness" (Rom. viii. 1, 10).

But we cannot give a clearer illustration of this subject of imputed righteousness than is afforded to us in the eminent example of Abraham: who was justified (as St. James observes) by works in offering his son Isaac upon the altar; though he did not consummate his offering in deed, but only in will, which was taken for the deed. And by this means (as St. James continues) the scripture was fulfilled which saith, "Abraham believed God; and it was imputed unto him for righteousness: and he was called the friend of God" (Jam. ii. 23). And if Abraham had not had time to will such an offering after its injunction, or had not so much as had it enjoined him, he would still have enjoyed the benefit of that original offering in Christ of which Abraham's was but a shadow, decreed long before Abraham was (John viii. 58), even from the beginning—"of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. xiii. 8). "And (subsequently) being found in fashion as a man; he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. ii. 8). For this offering of Christ would be as much Abraham's as his own offering of Isaac; since they both proceeded from the same principle of which he had the happiness to partake. And so Abraham's intention was fulfilled, though differently from what he intended or ever could intend: Christ was his lamb, and the cross his altar; but the piety of Abraham which would not suffer even the presence of servile witnesses at his intended sacrifice (Gen. xxii. 5) would have been shocked, to see his real atonement offered like a malefactor between two thieves, and in a more thievish presence!

And, to apply this example; the offering of Christ is as imputable to others as to Abraham, if they can sacrifice their own inclinations to the will of God, as Abraham did. For Christ his principle is equally a principle of obedience to all who serve God, and make his will the measure of their own; and when he says, "I seek not mine own will,

but the will of the Father which hath sent me" (John v. 30), he speaks in every Christian as he did in Abraham; his obedience is equally imputable to them and so is theirs to him. But our righteousness is nothing, and worse than nothing; it is really sin, if we do it as of ourselves, or of our own will, and not of the will of God. This is a perfection of righteousness for which we are indebted to the Christian dispensation. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!" (Rom. xi. 33.) In his kingdom the greatness of the effect produced by any instrument is not so much to be considered as knowledge and consent, making what we regard as a sense of duty. Great effects may be wrought by means of irrational, mute, or even inanimate and very transient subjects, greater perchance than are often produced by the instrumentality of human beings under his direction who "maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flaming fire" (Ps. civ. 4); "Fire and hail, snow and vapours, wind and storm fulfilling his word" (Ib. cxlviii. 8)—agents like these under his direction will be too hard sometimes for human intellect: but neither such things, nor any personal instruments either, without excepting the cleverest politician that ever pacified or embroiled a state, will rank so high in the universal kingdom as a poor faithful servant who knows his Master's will, and humbly endeavours as far as he can to fulfil it; who does what he can expressly and intentionally for the good of the service as his lord, or hers, if a woman, shall direct—like the poor widow with her two mites for example (Mark xii. 42). By intentionally shaping our actions to the designs of Providence and concurring in the prosecution of these designs, we become rather more than its instruments; we are more like ministers, friends and allies; and acquire a dignity that is not natural to us, being covered with the shadow of the divine Majesty. But further than that, or

the good they do the doer by the credit of his good intentions, our best performances may be, and generally are, very unimportant.

It is a very high and enviable privilege, if rightly understood, to be allowed to cooperate *directly* in the gracious designs of Providence: for indirectly all things are made to serve them, as formerly remarked. And all who wear the livery of righteousness, being holy as He is holy (Pet. I. i. 16), be they high or low, will bid fair to enjoy this privilege. In other respects the beasts of the field, impelled by instinct, fulfil their respective obligations as well as we, and often better: but it may be presumed, they want the motive that sanctions and enhances our efforts; they want that luminous principle, that enlightened obedience: which is imputed to the followers of Christ. This is the real righteousness, the living righteousness, the righteousness of faith; and all other is but dead works. For the meaning of dead works is not confined to mere ceremonial observances or positive institutions like some of Mosaic origin; but will include every moral action likewise among Christians that is not virtually performed in obedience to the will of God revealed by Jesus Christ. "For whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 23). "Surely then, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength. Even to him shall men come; and all that are incensed against him shall be ashamed. In the Lord shall all the seed of Israel be justified, and shall glory" (Isai. xlv. 24, 25). "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch; and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS" (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6). "No weapon that is formed against thee shall prosper; and every tongue that shall rise against thee in judgment thou shalt condemn. This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord; and their righteousness is of me saith the Lord."

(Isai. liv. 17). And if its present definition has run into other topics of the kingdom, and especially into some of a very high import, the same could not well be avoided. Let us now proceed from the general subject of righteousness or from the general collection of good objective characteristics towards its different sorts of particulars: the order in which these particulars should be enumerated being marked for us by the order of objects in nature; as for example: 1. God, its Author; 2. Man, its principal constituent, with whatever it may be necessary and possible to observe of either: the good objective characteristics which relate to the former as their object being all comprehended under the term Religion; or more properly, Godliness; and those relating to the latter under that of Virtue, or more properly of Morality; while a third more general expression is found to comprehend them both, being that of Righteousness just defined.

It is like enumerating the heads of a prolific family, when we come to reckon up all the heads of righteousness. And what a family it is for quality as well as multitude! It is like the seed of "Abraham, as the stars of the heaven and as the sand that is upon the sea-shore" (Gen. xxii. 17) in this respect; while it also rivals the stars in glory. Therefore, to trace however succinctly this fair collection of characteristics will not be an easy task, although our route is indicated by the course of the subject, still ascending, as hitherto, from lower to higher, from outer to inner, from the circumference of the kingdom to its centre. And so postponing the first mentioned class of objective characteristics relating to God, which is called Godliness, for the present, we begin with the class relating to man, which is called Morality as aforesaid, and among all its contents with those founded on incidentals; such as 1; honour and honesty in acquiring and keeping; with 2, bounty, hospitality, &c. in communicating; 3, content and moderation in retaining; 4, frugality and economy in enjoying; and 5, neatness, &c. in adorning with a portion of the same. Considering these in succession.

§ 1. *Honesty* is inverse or impropriative justice. It may seem like innovating to place the characteristic in this light; as it is usual to consider only two sorts of the property, understood as distributive and retributive: but that is certainly a part of it, as much as these. It is like the first mentioned, distributive, sort reflected. Honesty is spontaneous equity, is justice without a judge, justice at large, justice self-directed and unattended; and justice that is gain too without corruption—as a principle; though its sacrifices are often expensive. For in the moral republic every sacrifice to justice or honesty is made up by a tax on skill and industry, to be returned in better feeling; whereby the riches of the moral republic are continually increased. Thus, for example, justice and industry in their proper latitude may tend to enrich the republic with charity; because assistance is a due in many cases, though its payment be unconstrained as a part of charity; and for this payment must honest industry be taxed according to the Christian modes of thinking and doing as particularly expressed in that rule of the apostle, “Let him that stole steal no more: but rather let him labour, WORKING WITH HIS HANDS THE THING WHICH IS GOOD, THAT HE MAY HAVE TO GIVE TO HIM THAT NEEDETH” (Eph. iv. 28).

This is honour as well as honesty; understanding by Honour the constituent, and not the incidental property. This is honesty heightened by sentiment, being generally a matter of habit: and a very different commodity it is from what the world calls Honour. For that random casuist will call it honour to fulfil your engagements, be they never so dishonourable, somehow or other. Hence it would seem, as if there was a measure of justice to be observed in iniquity. And in this measure, if any one should think it worth considering, he may apprehend some curious particulars: such as requiring the unjust to be just towards the unjust only; which is what they call Honour among thieves—paying those who ought to be hanged with them—robbers, assassins, and others as well as thieves,

in good coin and full weight with what they plunder from honest men ; whereas the honestest thing they could ever do would be to rob each other. That is one curious canon of worldly honour : and another may be recognized, proceeding on a different principle but still very ingenious ; that of not paying any acknowledgment to your worthless accomplices for their assistance, you being so much better than they—but to bestow their guilty meed on some more proper objects ; “ the poor, and the maimed, and the halt, and the blind ”. Or else you and the rest may bestow your joint property in building and endowing churches, hospitals, schools, almshouses, or (except restoring it to those whom you have plundered) in any other laudable undertaking : which, by the way, can never thrive with such help, because the evil example given beforehand is more than enough to counteract all the good proposed or intended. “ A small thing that the righteous hath is better than great riches of the ungodly ” (Ps. xxxvii. 16), says the Psalmist. And accordingly we find the constituent, honour and honesty, generally enhancing the value of incidental property, in the same manner that our noblest constituents have been enhanced by the presence of divinity. The worth of such constituents is proverbially acknowledged, and even attested by those who want, as well as by those who enjoy them in the choice of their connexions, servants and friends. For if alliances, places, and friendships are to be desired, that property which leads to them must be desirable of course for their sake, if on no other account. But these are very inconsiderable items in the account of honour and honesty with their kindred casts of righteousness ; such as incorruption, or practical purity, with truth and sincerity. For properties like these will not only recommend us to men like ourselves, but to God the Giver of all : they are not only qualifications for trust and confidence in the society of our equals, but for our reception, as it seems, into the glorious presence of God. “ Lord, (says the Psalmist) who shall dwell in thy taber-

nacle; or who shall rest upon thy holy hill? Even he that leadeth an uncorrupt life, and doeth the thing which is right, and speaketh the truth from his heart." (Ps. xv. 1, 2).

Justice and equity, honour and honesty, incorruption or practical purity, truth and sincerity and the like are the uniform of that heavenly service which constitutes the peculiar kingdom of God in Christ: "and there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie" (Rev. xxi. 27). This perfection of honour and honesty is a striking feature of God's peculiar kingdom. It has been found by experience, and even regretted by the parties themselves before now, that persons at the helm in earthly governments are liable to more chances of pollution than persons in a lower sphere; insomuch, that any but the very best natures may happen to degenerate in the element of politics. And supposing such regrets to proceed occasionally from the ingenuous feeling peculiar to great minds, more than from the strict reason of the case; it still will seem probable, that in the main they have but too much foundation. For let a man occupy what sphere he will in any kingdom upon earth, he shall find things enough that defile, and can hardly be avoided: which causes an infinite disparity between such kingdoms and the kingdom of God in Christ. Indeed, so far is any danger of corruption or defilement from being here apprehended through promotion, that the higher any being rises in this kingdom, the more secure he may be considered, if in so safe a sphere there can be degrees of security. It cost a great deal to purify this kingdom: and it is not to be supposed, that after all the cost any thing should be admitted into the kingdom again, that might carry a defilement along with it, to defeat the immortal purpose of "our Saviour, Jesus Christ; who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works" (Tit. ii. 13, 14). Every dirty

action or thing, therefore, must remain for ever near the element from which it takes its denomination; the earth, or dirt; there can be no room for it in the Kingdom of Heaven and of God.

So our Saviour, commenting on his own parable of the unjust Steward, plainly intimates to his disciples, that they must forfeit their allotment in that blessed state, if they do not act honestly in the present, and fairly dispense to each other his due share of incidentals, without appropriating or reserving for their own use more of the same than justly belongs to them. "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much: (says he) and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much. If, therefore, ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon who will commit to your trust THE TRUE RICHES? and if ye have not been faithful in that which is another man's, who shall give you that which is your own?" (Luke xvi. 10, 11, 12). Which deserves to be well considered by those who oscillate (as many do) between piety and avarice; fondly thinking to reconcile God and Mammon, because it suits their grovelling inclination.

§ 2. But if men cannot be meet to partake of higher riches without honour and honesty in giving and appropriating the inferior, it is because such higher riches cannot stand without these conditions. In particular there can be no *Bounty* without honesty: as without this the case were partiality, or something worse, and not bounty: it is wronging one man to oblige another; and has at least as much hatred as kindness in it, which is not the character of bounty. Or if a man's table be garnished with plunder, his *Hospitality* will not deserve that name; though he should keep open house to all comers from year's end to year's end: but the curse is clearly fallen upon him of the wicked set which the Psalmist had in view, when he exclaimed, "Let their table be made a snare to take themselves withal: and let the things which should have been for their wealth be unto them an occasion of falling" (Ps. lxi.

23). And there can be no doubt, that many have plunged themselves deep in iniquity partly for the purpose of shewing a specious hospitality: defrauding their creditors and robbing others for the sake of a table which they think is to do them credit; but which in the end will redound to their lasting disgrace. *Almsgiving*, another species of bounty, is also liable to the same remark; so that men shall often get but little good by their bounty or goodness (which is also little enough) in either of these respects. For they say, there are two sorts of goodness in respect of the performer: one that is good for himself, and another that is not. Its original author will never suffer good to fail: there must be good for some one ever; and if the immediate performer himself will not be the better for it, who but himself will he then have to blame?

It may be worth any one's while to remark, how different persons, and some in very unequal spheres, perform their part for the general good under divine Providence, and get nothing by it, but a few temporary accommodations in life; working like horses, and to as little future purpose, only for want of something which they have not, to make their good perfect. We ought, therefore, to consider here, 1, the proper scope and definition of bounty, hospitality, and general beneficence; 2, how many consentient properties are required to make up any one particular kind of it; be the same hospitality, or almsgiving, or giving and lending, or briefly, doing good in any way whatever; with 3, the consequences or collateral inducements to this practice.

1. The *proper scope* and definition of bounty or beneficence is contained in our Saviour's golden rule, of doing as we would be done unto, and proved by the remark with which it was accompanied; when having said, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them"; he adds as a reason, "For this is the law and the prophets" (Matt. vii. 12), meaning the whole scope of beneficence. So that more needs not be said on this head.

2. The *consentient properties* required to bounty, hospitality, almsgiving, and every other sort of beneficence are—

1, A *proper feeling and consideration* towards its ultimate as well as towards its immediate objects, namely : a degree of *faith* and *love* with *heartfelt gratitude*, as well for his other blessings as for those by which he has enabled us to make, or endeavour at, a return of the same in blessings on our fellow creatures. And indeed it is such a part, is this, as one who pretends to love God can hardly know how to get out of, if he be base enough to desire it ; considering first, how our Universal Benefactor has identified himself with the very objects of our duty and attention, with those very objects whom he enables us to relieve—the hungry, the thirsty, the stranger, the naked, the sick, the prisoner ; and next, how he means to present himself again hereafter in the person of the Son glorified, as both party and Judge, rewarding or condemning as every one has deserved of him in the parties aforesaid, “when the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him” (Matt. xxv. 31). For Christ sympathising and suffering with the afflicted as he does, and as it was foretold of him (Isai. lxiii. 9), we can neither benefit nor incommode them, without pleasing or displeasing him : and therefore in all such transactions he is the object to be especially regarded by us ; as in all his transactions with mankind the Father was his. “My meat and drink (he would say) is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish his work” (John iv. 34), i. e. to prosecute his benevolent designs. So at last “he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross” (Phil. ii. 8). And “it is a faithful saying : for if we be dead with him, we shall also live with him : if we suffer, we shall also reign with him” (Tim. II. ii. 11, 12).

2, Therefore, our love and gratitude towards the Giver of goodness and of all that is good, must be accompanied

in this case with *a sense of duty*; or the living principle of obedience being the root of all righteousness, as afore-said. "Blessed is that servant whom his Lord, when he cometh shall find so doing (says our Saviour). Of a truth, I say unto you that he will make him ruler over all that he hath" (Luke xii. 43, 44). And again, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant; thou hast been faithful over a few things; I will make thee ruler over many things: enter thou into the joy of thy Lord" (Matt. xxv. 21).

There may be a chance for the poor servant or ruler over few things beyond that of the rich devotee or ruler over many things: and that, not only for the reason assigned by our Saviour in the parable here alluded to, v. g. of a servant's reaping before God according to his zeal, rather than his ability; but because it is likely that a servant will also reap in this case according to another consentient with the same aspect, being

3, His *humility*. When we go up to the treasury of divine Providence with our hundreds and thousands, we imagine that we do great matters; and Heaven allows us to encourage ourselves with this innocent deception; while it knows, that we are not the enlightened instruments that we take ourselves to be, nor our services of the great importance that we imagine. But the poor payer is wise enough to know this: he does not esteem his contribution any object in itself: like the poor widow with her two mites, he has given his all, and DOES NOT OVERPAY HIMSELF BY A FOND RECKONING.

4, In reference more especially to other men, a prime consentient or qualification for beneficence appears in *charity*, or a kind intention towards any one who may happen to become its object. From different expressions in Scripture, and especially from some of St. Paul's in that eloquent eulogium on charity (Cor. I. xiii.), it would seem as if beneficence had no merit without this addition; consequently was indifferent in itself, and consequently characteristic. But we are talking now of relative, not of

absolute goodness : and in that respect beneficence must necessarily be good for its object under all circumstances : though to its subject only if he be good, that is, benevolent.

For every action will have two parts in relation to its subject, as above stated ; one intrinsic, which consists in its beginning, motive, notion, or image ; the other extrinsic, consisting in its end, effect, matter, or substance ; one thinking, the other doing in short. And though either part may be good alone, unless they are both good together, the whole cannot be perfect and available in both relations ; v. g. in relation both to subject and object ; and particularly to the former, as it should be. It is not as wanting our assistance, that God Almighty requires us to cooperate with him in affording advice to the simple, comfort to the afflicted, relief to the indigent, or any other kind office ; but to give us an opportunity of serving ourselves by them, in exercising and improving that paramount principle in an earthly relation, called Charity : therefore, should this principle be wanting in any good work, however serviceable it may be to others, we shall not serve ourselves by it, as we ought and might.

5, While the heart accompanies the hand, the head too (as it is considered) must not be wanting. It is the business of the head to see to the measures of the heart for fear of overweening. And without the concurrence of these two members, or as it would here be said more consistently, of these two sets of properties ; the more spiritual and the more intellectual also in other respects, beneficence will not deserve the name of bounty or charity. One might as well call it Charity, to scatter money in the streets, to be taken up, one neither knows nor cares by whom ; as to bestow it on individuals without any *prudence* or *circumspection*.

6, Some *discrimination* and *distinction* will likewise be required for the proportions of our beneficence : and, though we are certainly bound to do good to all by our

Saviour's example and institution, we are not bound to do it to all in the same measure and proportion, if there be any meaning in Gospel regulations ; as e. g. in that of St. Paul, " as we have opportunity let us do good unto all men, and especially unto them who are of the household of faith " (Gal. vi. 10). Without overlooking or neglecting any whom we can possibly serve, we should generally give a preference in our favours as far as our means and information will enable us, to believers and doers of the truth, and that in proportion to their attested belief, before those who are mere professors, and perhaps not so much. Which we should do ; not because the faithful deserve more than others : for they have received infinitely more already in faith and righteousness, but because our means are limited, and we cannot do as much good as we would to all.

7, Another very important article, though it be rather a consequence than a consentient of beneficence, is *secrecy* : which our Saviour, who always taught his followers to do the best things with the best grace, strictly enjoins, and particularly in that rule on almsgiving, " When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth " (Matt. vi. 3). He will not have his followers be like the hypocrites who sound their own trumpet (Ib. 1, 2) to gain the applause of the multitude. Neither is that so certain a reward for prodigality, since the multitude, however prone to admiration will not be weak enough to admire long any profusion without the accompaniments before mentioned, particularly a kind disposition : as if they had determined to make the prodigal experience what St. Paul says, " Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor—and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing " (Cor. I. xiii. 3). But when good is done secretly and without ostentation, the benefit as well as beauty of this consentient, may be felt in many temporal respects ; as for one, that of not drawing people from their work, by teaching them to look up to you ; also as the avoiding of envy sometimes ; sometimes of robbery ; sometimes of

calumny, or at least of unpleasant imputations ; with others already mentioned. But the greatest of all the benefits attending secrecy in beneficence is one of a spiritual nature, and the same which our Saviour suggests as its reason, that of an open reward for secret services—"That thine alms may be in secret (says he) and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly" (Matt. vi. 4). The third mentioned consentient, humility, may also be assisting in this case, and help to ensure the consequence or condition of secrecy ; and if we do not think too much of the little good that we do, we shall not be so apt to publish as to improve on it.

It is not necessary to seek any farther examples of these consentient properties attending on beneficence, in order to shew the improbability of finding it any where in perfection. Indeed, considering how many points must concur to make beneficence perfect, it may well be questioned, if such an accomplishment has ever been found in any subject that was merely human. And we may be still farther satisfied only by this sample, that there is no extravagance, nor mistake in asserting THE IMPERFECTION OF ALL OUR RIGHTEOUSNESSES ; and that more especially when we recollect, that to make beneficence complete the means of gratifying should be our own as well as the thought and application. For what great things were it, to give out of another man's purse ? But not only are not the thought and application ours, but neither in strictness have we any thing of our own to give ; as David confesses in that beautiful thanksgiving to God for himself and people, "Thine, O Lord, is the greatness and the power, and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty : for all that is in the heaven, and in the earth is thine : thine is the kingdom O Lord, and thou art exalted as Head above all. Both riches and honour come of thee, and thou reignest over all ; and in thine hand is power and might ; and in thine hand it is to make great, and to give strength unto all. Now, therefore, our God, we thank thee, and praise thy

glorious name. But who am I, and what is my people that we should be able to offer so willingly after this sort? FOR ALL THINGS COME OF THEE, AND OF THINE OWN HAVE WE GIVEN THEE" (Chron. I. xxix. 11, &c.).

It seems, therefore, that our bounty at the best, must be very dependent, as God gives the means of our giving; and sometimes, perchance, a man shall also apply God's bounty so injudiciously, if not unjustly, as to resemble a young magnifico; who shews an ostentatious bounty at his father's expense, and perhaps OF HIS LITTLE BROTHERS AT HOME. All this may seem a considerable deduction from the merit of our beneficence, but still the grace is worth cultivating, and especially with the conditions before mentioned, if it be only in consideration of

3. Some collateral advantages which may be added to those already enumerated; as

1, That obliging ourselves to do to others as we would have them to do to us, which has been proposed as the sum of beneficence, may have the good effect of *teaching us to moderate our expectations towards them*. This is one positive advantage of the characteristic: so is

2, All that *delightful feeling*, which the practice of beneficence, the pleasantest practice or profession in the world, reflects on its subject or performer: and some of its negative advantages are also not inconsiderable; as

3, That by some sacrifice of our incidental property to the wants of others *a worse application of the same is often prevented*, such as pampering and bedizening our own persons, to make them loathsome and ridiculous; or, which is much the same, pampering and bedizening those who belong to us. As it often happens for a man who is moderate himself both in dress and diet, to suffer his wife perhaps to carry the portion of many a widow and fatherless child on her back, or to indulge his sons in riotous living at the expense of the fatherless and the widow. For all these things the unjust steward will have to account, together perhaps, with the objects of his mis-

placed generosity: so will he perhaps, for many other faults, which a sacrifice to charity might have prevented, BY DISQUALIFYING HIM FOR SUCH IDLE OR VICIOUS EXPENSES.

4, And certainly none of these fore-mentioned advantages, whether positive or negative, of beneficence, can be considered light, though generally outdone by *the consolation which our dying moments are likely to derive* from a life of good works: when a dutiful and benevolent mind, without reckoning on the merit of such performances, or of any other cause, but the atonement of a blessed Redeemer, may still be pleased at reflecting on the kind offices that have been rendered by one poor creature to others in worse circumstances, and enjoy the pleasure of doing good over again, when the season for doing is passed.

§ 3. If there could be any excuse for covetousness, it might be the last mentioned good objective characteristic on incidentals, namely beneficence: but they who know what covetousness is, will not be very sanguine in their expectations of beneficence from that quarter; and perhaps they may not have the same idea, as some others, of the omnipotence of wealth. Perhaps they will think, that *Contentment* is more nearly related to beneficence, than any thirst of aggrandizement; that they who require least for themselves will generally have most to spare for others, independent of circumstances. And if content do not imply generosity, it will imply at least so much as this: Here are, it may be, so many pounds that I have; I care not how much more I might have if I would: which seems a good opening at least for generosity. To some, content may look therefore like apathy, accounting that it does not imply any appetite: but that is a palpable mistake, for it certainly does, though without expectation or dependence. Content is an appetite with fruition, like a dinner of herbs with a seasoning of love (Prov. xv. 17). It clings to its present circumstances, whatever they may be, and delights in its station. It does not wish to be

either richer or greater than it is : but still, what it is, it likes to be ; SEEKING WHAT IT HAS, without acquiring, or caring to acquire any thing further : while another righteous property, and the next of kin to content, is supposed to have acquired something, and positively to have likewise the power of acquiring more, though it can rest with a subdued appetite (no easy part) in the midst of acquisition.

Such is the noble part of *Moderation* ; a part that seems more difficult altogether than that of content, because content has no antagonists to struggle with, apparently : but moderation has, and sometimes very powerful, not only in the sanguine temperament it supposes, but also in the habit of acquiring ; an habit as hard to be subdued almost as any that is against us. Therefore moderation may be thought more admirable even than contentment, in making or selecting such a fortune for itself as content inherits from the cradle.

Content is common sense ; and if the poor man be wise, far from envying his superiors in fortune or incidentals, he will rather pity them ; and instead of seeking to undermine, will rather wish to keep them above himself : in troublesome times particularly, he will desire this, as he would like to wear his hat in a rainy day. By the poor man, is generally understood one in narrow circumstances : but more properly speaking, he is the poor man who either covets something, or has nothing to spare. But that man is rich who has any thing unappropriated, be it time, or wealth, or information, or any other valued incidental. So that a day labourer, who has not a foot of land, nor a guinea, when he is out of work, and has a portion of his time unappropriated, is so far rich. But a person cannot be justly reproached with this quality, who devotes all his time, wealth and information, be they never so great, to the service of others, any more than the steward can be reproached with being a lord, only because he holds a lordly revenue in his hands, and applies it ac-

cording to his lord's behest. A man's private wealth must depend entirely on his disposition: "Godliness is great riches, if a man be content with that he hath: for we brought nothing into the world, neither may we carry any thing out" (Tim. I. vi. 7).

§ 4. The convenient share of incidentals prescribed by moderation, and accepted by content, must not be surrendered to waste and neglect: but there shall be other good objectives found, to regulate their application and secure their efficiency, such are the virtues of *Frugality* and *Economy*, differing outwardly from the two last mentioned also, in two respects; 1, as they seem rather more domestic, presenting in themselves the part of a good housekeeper, whose proper duty consists in such parts; 2, as they are exercised on their own exclusively, while the others are also occasionally exercised at other men's tables.

And likewise between frugality and economy there seems an internal distinction worth understanding; v. g. as the object of economy is rather more local than that of frugality, whether its scite be the house and homestead, the barton, the garden, or the fields: so economy may be called, a local frugality. A man may be frugal without keeping house, and no matter where: he may be frugal in camp, or frugal at an inn, but can only be economical at home. And hence persons of one description are cut off from the enjoyment of this property, with its natural concomitant, abundance: that is to say, the absentees or runagates, who wandering every way from their respective abodes, will sometimes meet elsewhere,—not however to improve each other, but to drag on an useless existence in common. How often do we find these runagates permitted to continue in scarceness! (Ps. lxxviii. 6.) WANDERING LIKE THE RAVENS FOR LACK OF MEAT (Job. xxxviii. 41) AT LAST; BUT ORIGINALLY, WITHOUT ANY OBJECT.

§ 5. When matters are come to this pass, it will be almost too late to recommend a virtue by which frugality

and economy in and about the house should always be attended,—and that is *Neatness* of the person. It will be too late to recommend this when a man is returned from his extravagant rambles ragged and penniless: but while the means exist, a degree of neatness in the person or habit, may be worth cultivating. And therefore our Saviour, while he particularly taught men to look most to the things that are most intimate and unseen, has also delivered to us a precept on this characteristic of externals, as beautifully expressed as its meaning is high and accurate; not condemning the study of dress, nor of neatness altogether, but the fault of foppery, or an overprizing of articles so foreign to the kingdom or subject. “Why take ye thought of raiment? (said he to the multitude). Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they toil not, neither do they spin: and yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these” (Mat. vi. 28, 29).

Now the lily of the field, where it grows spontaneously, may be regarded as an emblem of neatness: and therefore our Saviour, who was not ashamed of a sense for the beauties of nature, may be thought to inculcate neatness, when he reminds us of its modest emblem. The divine law of love, keeping still before the human law of expedience, requires here, as in most other cases, a greater degree of perfection. For WHEREAS HUMAN LAWS REQUIRE CONCERNING DRESS ONLY WHAT MAY NOT OFFEND; AS AN INDECENT EXPOSURE OF THE PERSON, FOR EXAMPLE—THE DIVINE LAW AFORESAID WILL REQUIRE WHAT MAY ALSO PLEASE, at least to an elegant taste in this respect; as it aims to make its subjects amiable in all respects. A cynical slovenliness is as strange and unbecoming in the exterior of a Christian as the fantastical full dress of a fop or a footman.

And as the Christian precept concerning dress is an improvement in artificial legislation, so is it likewise on the more ancient law of nature, which does not suggest

neatness, if since its disgrace it suggests a covering for the person, and is not deficient either in a sense of modesty applied to other articles beside that of dress. In respect of this, neatness and modesty may be considered almost as parts of frugality and economy by precluding extravagance on account of this necessary incidental, and preventing waste. Neatness in dress is as distinct from extravagance, as frugality is from avarice; and modesty in the same respect as distinct from mummery, as chastity is from prudery: and it happens not unfrequently that one is a true indication of the other; v. g. neatness with its companion, of industry, temperance, chastity and other characteristics like these higher than itself, because more essential; while opposite characters in dress indicate others that are worse than themselves, and for the same reason.

§ 6. But even in relation to incidentals there still appears one good objective characteristic to be mentioned, and the last that will require it, of such transcendent worth, that it would seem almost like one of another class; and must be owned, a very proper stepping stone, or passing note, as it were, between the present and that which follows. This last characteristic on incidentals, is *Prudence* or *Discretion*, which excels not only on account of its superior comprehension in respect of the forementioned; but also on account of its nearer relation to intellect.

1. For if, in the first place, prudence and discretion seem to relate chiefly to the management of incidentals, there are some of that ambiguous nature, as to make it doubtful almost, which element they should be referred to, the incidental or the constituent; and this doubt respecting them will attach of course to the characteristics also by which they are distinguished. The Psalmist has furnished us with the example of such an incidental, in his beautiful similitude of a good man. "A good man is merciful and lendeth: and will *guide his words* with discretion" (Ps. cxii. 5). Words in conception, words unuttered, or, as it may be said, *originally*, are decided con-

stituents : and happy would it be for the subject sometimes, if they could so remain,—locked up, as it were in the asylum of the imagination ! Happy were it for the parties concerned, if these volatile constituents were never suffered to go abroad without such a guide as discretion ! For immediately on their release from confinement words will change species ; being then any body's property who can snatch them, however undeserving, and no longer constituents, or a part of the subject from which they issued, but incidental every where ; and, it may be, to the subject himself, being retained among his greatest plagues, if he should deserve them, as it is written, " Great plagues remain for the ungodly : but whoso putteth his trust in the Lord, mercy embraceth him on every side " (Ps. xxxii. 11).

2. With respect to the superiority of prudence and discretion, on account of their relation to intellect beyond most, if not all, of the fore-mentioned good objectives, so much might be observed, as would make the understanding appear almost to be its object, when the same could no longer be the good objective characteristics which they are on incidentals, but of the highest constituent. Indeed the high quality of these characteristics is such as to occasion a doubt, whether they should not be referred to the intellectual class, as improvements on judgment ; or at least be enumerated in the spiritual objective class next ensuing. But such doubts are not of much consequence, as they indicate that the situation assigned them must be very near, if not precisely, where it ought to be in the heavenly kingdom.

There are besides discretion several *minor characteristics* allied to prudence, which it may suffice barely to enumerate ; as e. g. in the lowest degree of thinking and doing, where the object is only graces and accomplishments, or personal treasure, as it may be called—*skill* and *address* ; also *propriety*, which is like the first mentioned prudence, in a slight degree ; and *precision*, which is a little further off, but still of kind to truth.

• Truth indeed is a general feature in characteristics of every degree, among all their shades of difference and resemblance in respect of each other, only varying after the department in which it is exhibited. Thus prudence is truth in relation to incidentals generally, whether they be liberty, wealth, honour, reputation, or others; discretion the same thing in relation to the same sort of objects, but of a somewhat more passive and retired complexion. Skill is truth in operation; address, more in manner; propriety, truth in small matters, but not a small matter itself; no more is precision. Consequently the attainment of any of these important characteristics, let us call them Graces, Accomplishments, or what we will, must not be expected a very easy matter, but one of considerable difficulty, and singularly good fortune. There is neither of these good characteristics, that can be deemed common; neither of them, but is a nice point to ensure, and easier to be overdone or let alone. Truth is a very fine point in the heavenly kingdom, and cannot easily be hit or apprehended.

CHRISTIAN MÔDES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER IV.

GOOD *OBJECTIVE* CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 2.

MORAL—ON CONSTITUENTS.

1, Material.—2, Spiritual.—3, Intellectual.

“ Lord ; who shall dwell in thy tabernacle ; or who shall rest upon thy holy hill ? ”—Ps. xv. 1.

THE righteousness of incidentals, or righteousness founded thereon, respecting them as its object or basis, is highly to be prized, as all must own who know its worth by experience ; but a higher species, as resting on a higher foundation, and consequently an harder to be attained, is *the righteousness of constituents*, or moral characteristics in relation to them, righteousness in relation to the properties of which its subjects are composed, and not merely in relation to those of which their owners have only the enjoyment, care and direction, like incidentals, just considered. And even among these highest characteristics, there will also be found a gradation ascending in the same order as before intimated, with regard to essentials, v. g. according to the proximity or admixture of intellect.

§ 1. But if a man cannot, by taking thought, add so
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much as one cubit to his stature (Mat. vi. 27), he will not find in his lowest order of constituents, the *material*, by which it is included, many practical objects for the foundation of moral characteristics. Some such characteristics it however has, of which may here be mentioned one or two proceeding, not from stature indeed, but from the equally low essential of aspect or countenance; as placidity, gravity, manliness, dignity, plainness and sincerity, meaning only in expression. But generally the expression or character of the countenance, which is called Physiognomy, by a metonymy for the notion or doctrine, appears to consist in other men's fancies, more than in any real property of the person to whom it is applied: it is chiefly their production, and therefore, what they will have to account for. So that frequently, when a man is said to have an hanging look, the more hanging cause, if any, shall be in those who look so unfavourably upon him. But when a look is either concealed, or put on intentionally, the effect will properly belong to the one who is both subject or maker, and exhibitor, the inner and the outer man.

1. There are two degrees of this property, called Simulation and Dissimulation, respecting which, as there is hardly any part more practised and studied in society, a hint by the way may not be amiss. We see almost every one moulding his countenance out of doors after some east or other; and it should be our endeavour always to preserve such a countenance as may become the body of Christ. Considering his original instructions to the ministry; "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves," &c. (Mat. x. 16), a great *Placidity*, *Evenness* or *Equability* of expression would become them in particular; or however, that the expression of our countenance should be always under good controul. If, having so lively an heart as our duty requires, we suffer every emotion to betray itself in our manner or countenance, we shall give encouragement to the more brutish part of the species, and opportunity to the more politic, to cheat, over-

reach and torment us. The purpose of an angry look and expression, is better answered in general, by an ingenious circumlocution, with a look that says nothing.

2. A further physiognomical restraint or silence of expression would make a becoming characteristic in this department, which we call *Gravity*: and an edifying characteristic too for the disposition, by keeping it more on an equilibrium than is naturally to be expected of our volatile kind, according to the Preacher's observation, "By the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better" (Eccl. vii. 3). Only it may be well to remember, at the same time also, a saying of our Saviour's, "Be not, as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance" (Mat. vi. 16). Do not take thought on this matter, to qualify your countenance for any foolish or fraudulent purpose; but let it be the index of your heart; and let your sadness, gravity or placidity be the result of honest feeling and an upright intention: otherwise it will not be a good characteristic, but a very bad one, being one of the tribe of hypocrisy.

It was the way of good men formerly to set a watch upon the mouth (Ps. cxli. 3), to make a covenant with the eyes (Job xxxi. 1), and keep a strict look out towards other avenues of feeling and expression; but our Lord has taught us to mind one point for all, which is the HEART; and if, as he observes, "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Mat. xii. 34), the countenance is even readier than the mouth in this respect; in this respect, therefore, the heart will require additional vigilance from those who wish to look well and defy criticism, which is the true Christian comportment, the most graceful that was ever invented. There have been teachers of modes and comportments, as well as of conduct on other principles, on principles that were not Christian; but the one sort must bow, as well as the other, to the Christian school and Christian Modes, however the same may have been underrated through an awkward exemplification in the respect here spoken of. For either a wilful stillness

and sanctimonious aspect on the one hand, or on the other, a constant grin and indiscriminating complacency, or a counterfeit discrimination either, "having men's persons in admiration, because of advantage" (Jude 16), are not according to these Modes, wear them who will.

However allowable THE SPEECH OF THE FEATURES may be in some cases, and their silence in others, in no case can a lying look or gesture be allowable, any more than a lying word or tongue. To put into one's countenance more cordiality or respect than one really feels, is not very different from tipping one's tongue with falsehood. It is not Christian like : it is not manly : nor it is not childish either. For

§: 4, &c. *Manliness, Dignity, Plainness and Sincerity*, both of countenance and gesture, however paradoxical it may seem, are all childish qualities, that shine like an expiring flame from about the first or second year of the subject's incarnation or earthly existence, and soon goes out. Therefore, when one has run a few years beyond that period, and gradually lost that expression, or it may be, lost that expression more precipitately, one must be born again, or relumined to recover it ; and *be* manly, dignified, plain and sincere, in order to have and enjoy the real appearance of these fine personal characteristics : looking "as bold as a lion," according to king Solomon, who has also well observed, that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth : but the righteous (says he) are bold as a lion" (Prov. xxviii. 1) : and so indeed they generally look ; which shews, that to look well, we must learn to live well : but it has been well observed, that more are ambitious of the first than of the last mentioned advantage, more of the shadow than of the substance.

It does not seem, as if there was any room for improving on such a material constituent as space or dimensions for the reason before assigned, v. g. that no man by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature.

§ 2. It will therefore be better worth the while, to notice

a sample of such good objective characteristics as may accrue on *spiritual* properties, or with a spiritual basis; whether they be

1. *Motive*, comprising such as these, v. g. 1, Freedom and energy; 2, Diligence and industry; 3, Expedition or dispatch; 4, Exertion and perseverance; 5, Calmness or peace, or others by which these are followed.

1. The first of the sample, *Freedom*, is not indeed confined to this class of constituents; but will extend likewise to the appetitive as well as to the motive, and also to the intellectual as well as to the spiritual department; taking in freedom of speech (*παρρησία*), as well as freedom of action; and free willing as well as free thinking. Freedom constituent is nearly the same state with moral perfection: and the same, it may be presumed, with that in which man was created. For we are not to suppose that man could be deficient in any good quality when God pronounced him, a good work (Gen. i. 31), and that not merely because it was one of his own operation. Therefore, being good, man was at that juncture a proper subject for internal as well as external, for constituent as well as incidental freedom; and enjoyed it accordingly. That internal constituent sort of freedom was the same with primitive rectitude; consequently rectitude like the primitive sort will ever bethe same with freedom. Moreover, corruption being a natural consequence of the other sort of freedom, because there could have been no guilt, if there had been no freedom to offend, it may also be said, that the corruption of mankind is a consequence, though not the only consequence of their pristine perfection; and original freedom, the first and most considerable cause of their present captivity. FOR THOUGH A MAN BE NOW FREE TO ERR, YET ERRING HE IS NOT FREE.

And therefore it may be said again, that the greatest phenomenon in human nature is that freedom of will or intention, that self-direction (if one might so say) whereby the regenerate are enabled to do what in the nature of

cause and effect they are not obliged to do ; acting independently of every cause, the First, of whom they hold their freedom, Himself only excepted, as freedom cannot be independent of Freedom ; answering voluntarily all his requisitions ; yielding him a voluntary as well as a reasonable service. And what may render such a phenomenon still more extraordinary is, that the same persons were not only dependent by nature, but dependent on causes the most opposite to those which favour their new line of conduct. However, this revolution therefore may be effected ; it is a certain fact, and that fact most wonderful. There is no phenomenon in nature perhaps that displays so much of the divine Power ; and certainly there is none so strikingly characteristic of divine Goodness.

The proper object of the characteristics that we are now considering is mere spiritual motion ; and not its refinement in thought and volition : yet the union of these three sorts is so strict in the present instance that one hardly knows how to separate them, although their distinction may be easily conceived. For if free moving be not free willing, or if free willing be not free thinking, it is nothing else. The thought goes into the deed, as the fountain goes into the stream, and "the wish is father to the thought" : so that we are obliged to let this excellent spiritual-motive characteristic, freedom, pass for the present as a general mode, and with little more than a general definition ; to wit, as the *doing freely* of that which a free spirit directs. This active freedom agrees nearly with heartiness, as in that saying of St. Paul's, "Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord, and not unto men" (Col. iii. 23) : it also agrees with efficiency and vigour ; but most intimately with *Energy*, the characteristic assigned as its correlative : which is not altogether the same with action unrestrained ; for that is madness ; but with strength well put out, i. e. freely and judiciously.

There ought to be a stress on the last mentioned quali-

fication; as strength may be put out too freely, and even in the sacred cause of freedom, seeing there are many cases in which freedom is not worth contending for; many in which it is not even desirable; many in which it were better away. Thus a freedom to do wrong is not desirable for those who only aim to do right; consequently, not worth contending for to them: and to those who aim to do wrong, however they may think it worth contending for, such freedom is better away. Further than this, it seems rather hard to determine in what cases a freedom of action may be worth contending for, and to what extent: but some general limitation may also be proposed on this head; as for example, to subjects under both an universal and particular allegiance, as all men are, except a very few, the freedom to preserve both sorts of allegiance in their respective degrees or relations—first the universal allegiance which they owe to God against every power on earth; and next the particular allegiance due to the government that owns and protects them against usurpation, corruption, and invasion—is desirable. Desirable likewise is a freedom to preserve and fulfil all our equal or collateral duties, first to those who bear the same universal allegiance with ourselves, that is, to all men; and next, to those who bear the same particular allegiance with ourselves as living under the same earthly government. The veriest slave, who works like an horse and fares no better, is not bound to rebel against his immediate ruler for the sake of freedom; but should rather submit willingly to any temporal hardships and privations so long as he can preserve his spiritual freedom in higher respects—freedom from infidelity and superstition, freedom from sloth and idleness, from lust, lying and drunkenness; in short from every sort of spiritual enemy or tyrant. A *free* slave will not easily abandon the interests of his earthly superiors; much less, the sacred cause of righteousness and truth, to which being free he is bound of course by his baptismal vow and engagement: but WHEN THESE

TWO INTERESTS CLEARLY CANNOT BE RECONCILED, IT WILL BECOME EVEN A SLAVE TO CHOOSE HIGHLY. For the terms of freedom in a spiritual and temporal, or a moral and civil respect, are often reversed; so that the civil slave shall be Christ's freeman perchance; and the civil freeman, a slave to Satan; and little room will the former have in that case for dissatisfaction or the latter for exultation. St. Paul's advice on this head is excellent, "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called—For he that is called in the Lord being a servant, is the Lord's freeman: likewise also he that is called being free, is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a price: be not ye the servants of men" (Cor. I. vii. 20, 22, 23): i. e. merely serving men, as men-pleasers, without any thought of pleasing God by an humble submission to his will, and a faithful discharge of your relative duties towards other men in every sphere, the only way in which you can actually serve Him. But SUCH A FREEDOM AS THIS IS WORTH CONTENDING FOR.

The virtue of freedom, as now described, is nearly allied to truth, honour and sincerity; and differs from candour only by the addition of energy: being, like candour, above dissimulation; and, going a step farther, apt also to blunt out what he thinks sometimes, regardless of consequences. In this case freedom will acquire the name of Frankness and Independence: which last has also properly two meanings or uses as well as Freedom, and may be referred either to internals or externals; to the will, meaning an independent spirit; or to the circumstances of the subject, meaning an independent fortune: or it may also apply to conduct, as at present, meaning an independent behaviour, a behaviour suiting an independent spirit, yet seen too often with its opposite, as in the case of some who are too proud to work, but not to be fed like cuckoos. Thus it appears, that while freedom and independence have hardly a shade of difference between them, they also agree in the conformity of each to its antithesis by a certain qualification that has

just been mentioned ; true independence being a true dependence, in the same manner as true freedom is proved to be a true subjection. So .

2, *Diligence* is strength or ability, payable on demand, cotemporary with occasion, or with our perception of the same. It has just been observed, how one good characteristic proceeding from the spiritual motive department, v. g. freedom, is liable to be diffused over every department of the kingdom ; over thinking as well as doing, and willing as well as thinking ; we may now observe another in this with its fellows, industry and alacrity, forwardness, promptitude, activity, expedition, and others proceeding to the same extent and by the same means. For diligence is not a mere outward property confined to visible effects any more than is freedom ; though, like freedom, it will issue or terminate in that point : but the will may be diligent, and the thought may be diligent, as well as the outward acting or process in the same manner that either may be free ; so that diligence with its kind may apply or be applied generally to every department of the kingdom ; while it properly stands forth as a good characteristic on the spiritual motive.

Few good properties are ever found alone in the kingdom, or ever suffered to be monopolized by one department : and this characteristic, diligence, is a decidedly good property for all the grades of intellectuals, for angels as well as men. Nay ; it is, if one might be allowed to say it, an attribute of God himself ; who with an eternal sabbath still worketh hitherto on sabbath-days as well as on others, and the Son likewise, as he says, " My Father worketh hitherto, and I work " (John v. 17). And for a standing rule to his disciples, he says, " Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in Heaven " (Matt. v. 16). " Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit ; so shall ye be my disciples " (John xv. 8). This is spoken particularly of fruit in the church or family of Christ : but even in private families, and also in single respects by

being diligent and industrious we may receive an extension of the divine blessing upon every thing that we do, and all our works be made to prosper. "The hand of the diligent maketh rich" (Prov. x. 4). Between the good objectives, diligence and *Industry* we do not find any material difference: but between these and

3, *Expedition* or *Dispatch* of the same class a difference is found, and difference enough to give the last mentioned an advantage in some respects. For diligence and industry do not necessarily imply any progress or effect, as expedition does: a man may be very diligent and industrious without forwarding any thing; but with expedition his work must be forwarded at least, if it be not finished. Expedition may also be considered more intellectual as well as more successful than diligence and industry in ordinary cases, which is another ground of preference. It may be so considered, because expedition depends, not on the rapidity or celerity employed in any undertaking, so much as on the skill and judgment with which it is directed. But while a general superiority is allowed to expedition, we should not omit one advantage on the other hand which its two partners before mentioned possess in a degree of perseverance that does not necessarily belong to expedition.

4, *Exertion* is another property of the same class with a greater impetus or proportion of spirit, which is kept up by *Perseverance*. And other excellent characteristics there are still that might be added to those already enumerated in the spiritual motive class; as activity, celerity and others, which are commonly spoken of, some more subjectively than objectively good, if not more essential than characteristic; and on either account not altogether so necessary to be here defined as to be more generally cultivated and practised. For how often has it happened, that a little more diligence and industry would have brought new forces into the field time enough to prevent defeat, a little more perseverance would have been crowned with opportunity, a little more exertion would have given victory to

the vanquished, and freedom to a captive country ! So our life is little else but a field of battle ; the end of which is spiritual freedom to be only won by hard strokes and great dispatch. But no one ever does what he might have done with the same hands and feet only, to say nothing of the head and heart ; so that we have little reason to complain of fortune. But to many, a life of strenuous exertion like that which our Saviour and his apostles recommended both by example and precept, may seem incompatible with another species of righteousness in the same department ; that is,

5, *Calmness* or *Peace*, a degree of composure and tranquillity in the midst of agitation, another sort of evenness, evenness of temper ; which the Christian will preserve among all his troubles and exertions, like a ship with good ballast in the midst of winds and waves. This calmness or peace is a delightful characteristic, and its possession a great advantage in life, which we owe to ourselves as well as to the benevolent Deity who formed us for happiness ; whatever may be thought of the incompatibility of such a characteristic with the active virtues above mentioned. And if any man will but consult his own experience on the two conditions of idleness and industry, he may soon find which is the most for peace, the most tranquillizing, the most conducive to inward repose. An industry in wickedness must be owned not very conducive to peace of mind, nor yet even tranquil in fact, like industry in good works : such is the industry of those who have “ an heart that deviseth wicked imaginations, and feet that be swift in running to mischief ” (Prov. vi. 18). But the industry of righteousness is tranquil in fact ; and the fruit of such industry is peace and tranquillity. “ Then judgment shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness remain in the fruitful field. And the work of righteousness shall be peace ; and the effect of righteousness, quietness, and assurance for ever ” (Isai. xxxii. 16, 17). “ O well is thee ! and happy shalt thou be ” (Ps. cxxviii. 2).

2. After the motive sort of good spiritual objective characteristics we meet with the spiritual *sensitive* in our upward progress, comprising such particulars, as 1, Temperance, abstinence, and the like; 2, Chastity, and some of a similar cast with that. There may be some doubt perhaps at first sight, whether the characteristics thus attributed to the sensitive class of constituents would not range more agreeably with the aversive, to be presently mentioned; as they rather seem to indicate a feeling of aversion: but further consideration will satisfy us that their general character is enjoyment, whatever may be their first appearance; and enjoyment of course cannot be altogether aversive, if it be not malicious.

1, It may also be questioned whether the first named, *Temperance* be a characteristic, founded on the forementioned essential constituents of the kingdom generally, or else on some of its incidentals; or whether it be not rather some foreign and independent property or power, something more divine than aught that can be implied in constituent characteristics whether founded on essentials or incidentals. But, whatever may be thought of the peculiarity, independence, or divinity of temperance, a man will be long to seek for a different principle or foundation for the same from what is found in any other property regarding two objects at once; as in judgment, decision, preference. Between the last of these and temperance the difference is chiefly in conception: it being the same in effect, whether between two objects compared, we prefer one or postpone the other: and the formation of preference being of acts by accidents like any other property, that of temperance will also be the same; whether it regard an external object or an internal, a lion or an inclination in one's path: in either case, temperance, keeping back will be the same property; and like other properties, its own proprietor. Therefore, whatever other properties this of temperance may be combined and form subject or squadron with, it will be temperance that tempers or governs

by itself, and not others by it; just as it is love that loves by itself, and hatred that hates.

At first sight, indeed, it would appear, as if temperance was a secondary or consequential property formed by the prevalence of one motive over another: but as this must needs happen on the exhibition or prevalence of any property, v. g. that the next for exhibition is restrained thereby, temperance would be a mere shadow, if it were no more than such a consequence. It is a positive and independent property, as much as any that we are endowed with, and signifies as much as any in the lump; so that the first apostle may be thought to have spoken very correctly where he talks of adding temperance to knowledge, &c.; as other good characteristics should be added to temperance. Yet there can be no impropriety in conceiving any good property or characteristic to be seasoned, qualified, or improved by an honest association; as justice for example, by an association with mercy, and temperance by an association with knowledge: neither can there be any false logic in supposing one property to act as a moderator, antagonist, or counterpoise to another; for such indeed is the case with all. All our properties, as elsewhere observed, being so many and various, and in constant force or existence, are poised against each other with various weight or in various degrees; as the fear of God, and the fear of man too against the destructive principles of lust, vanity, ambition, rage, impiety, and other manias; or against timidity and servility, weakness and overweening, doating and superstition, obstinacy and opposition, envy and avarice, with other weaknesses. Of these properties, or their sorts either, none should be allowed to weigh against such principles as have been mentioned and against the fear of God especially: but should this seem likely, and the wrong side about to preponderate, temperance would be apt to trim the scales afresh on the first appeal of judgment or knowledge, sending presently one up and the other down in a new direc-

tion : when that which weighs most, being the key-note as it were of our existence, will necessarily predominate as long as it continues such. Only we should observe, that temperance will not then be self-command, but the fear of God-command, or the fear of man-command ; i.e. the dominion of faith in the one instance, and of policy or cowardice according to circumstances in the other.

As for what may be further said of self-command, which is paralleled by temperance, and of which the several species are seemingly indicated by other coercive properties, with self prefixed—as self-abasement, self-accusation, self-correction, self-denial, self-pollution, and self-possession ; they all belong to the supposed internal government of the kingdom, the reality of which this is not a place to question. And we must rather confine ourselves here to that qualified sort of self-command which consists in temperance. It is temperance when either the appetite or the aversion towards one object is successfully thrown against the appetite for another ; as an appetite for power against the appetite for pleasure, or an aversion to the disgusting image of drunkenness against the appetite for debauchery. It is temperance when a man acts and speaks like one who has a thorough possession of himself ; being in a manner free from the control of any undue influence, any influence that might tend to captivate or degrade him ; like that of ambition, avarice, obstinacy or any other besetting sin (Heb. xii. 1), as the apostle styles it ; and it is the same apostle who reasons so beautifully on this principle in another place, concluding with an exhortation : “ after the manner of men ”, as he says ; but, in truth, after a manner that is seldom equalled by them. “ Know ye not (says he) that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness ? . . . I speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh : for as ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity unto iniquity, even so now

yield your members servants to righteousness unto holiness" (Rom. vi. 16—19).

Thus temperance will be an effect of freedom, as freedom is an effect of temperance, both approaching to the idea of an internal government. And herein we find one principal difference between the human and brute species, v. g. that with the former there is at least a show of self-government; as may be gathered from the peculiar irregularity of their conduct. For brutes, except in the case of two or three provident species, will never miss an opportunity of gratifying their hunger and thirst, their lust, animosity and other humours whenever they press them; while man on the contrary being endowed with all the same, is yet often seen to restrain them, when his faith, ambition, and other motives unknown to brutes appear to demand this sacrifice.

It is their greater ability that makes the good characteristic, temperance, more necessary for men than for brutes. For the same reason temperance will be rather more necessary to princes in some respects than to private persons, as to those who have not in so full a share the advantage of others to govern them, and so to take off the trouble in some measure from their hands. And if so trifling an elevation of one man above another may give a greater occasion for temperance, or self-government, there can be no doubt of pure intellectuals, or such as find but little temptation in the incidentals before mentioned, still, having ample room for temperance; because it is understood that they have ample room for enjoyment, and wherever that exists we may also apprehend some room for abuse, consequently for temperance to avert it. Indeed we are plainly informed of some angels which really did find but too much room for abuse even in a celestial condition, "the angels which kept not their first estate" (Jude vi.). They became intemperate, or something equivalent to it, and were hurried headlong by an insane ambition until they encountered the wretched fate that put a stop to their

career; "being reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day" (Ibid.), sad monuments through its failure of the value of this sublime property of temperance! of which there are also a few shades worth noticing.

—1: 2, So high indeed does this good characteristic stand among heavenly virtues, that it seems almost to enjoy not only the authority but also the retinue of a primate, being usually accompanied with several of the excellent properties before mentioned: as moderation, frugality, economy, with *abstinence* and *self-denial*; the first of which is considered by some an improvement on temperance: but not, as it seems, correctly; since to abstain is easier than to refrain, to exceed than to complete, to overdo than to do nicely; as it is easier to shoot either above the mark or beyond, than to hit. Abstinence is only a greater and not a better degree of temperance; respecting chiefly the lowest objects, such as eating and drinking for example: which can afford, one should think, no very great sacrifice; whatever we eat and drink, whether in the hollow of our veins, in their substance, or in any other channel, being intrinsically no more to us than as corn in a mill. And yet how many are there in the world who devote themselves in a manner to eating and drinking; sacrificing their noblest constituents to meat and vegetables: "whose god is their belly" (Phil. iii. 19); or who worship viands: being the same with "the evil world; (as David styles them) which have their portion in this life: whose bellies Thou (O Lord) fillest with thy hid treasure" (Ps. xvii. 14), i. e. with far-fetched dainties! But such things being only incidental, are not among the proper objects of temperance; they are only objects for a fastidious spirit; and that spirit is the object of temperance, with every other spirit that ought to be restrained. Among these anger is one of the more especial: here is the proper sphere of temperance, of its exertions, glory, and triumph. For, as Solomon finely remarks "he that is slow to anger is better than the

mighty; and he that ruleth his spirit, than he that taketh a city" (Prov. xvi. 32).

3. Another follower of temperance is more like it than abstinence, as having, like that, self for its object; which its naming *Self-denial* implies; at the same time that it also implies a flatter and more decided opposition to the same, or at least to flesh and blood, than its principal implies. For temperance does observe some measures; but self-denial will shew no quarter. It is like repudiating or putting off our own natural disposition: and perhaps disgracing and chastising it at the same time by self-abasement, with fasting, and real mortification, and more than mock discipline: rending our hearts; (as the prophet says) and not our garments (Joel ii. 13). And with some this self-repudiation would be a very serious effort to be consistent. For according to the discipline of the kingdom every man is required to put off according to what he takes on him: and so one who takes upon himself the weight of the ministry, would be required to put off more enjoyments than common for the sake of the ministry, that he might be the more entirely devoted thereto. "No man that warreth (says St. Paul) entangleth himself with the affairs of this life; that he may please him who hath chosen him to be a soldier" (Tim. II. ii. 4). "So, likewise, whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath (says the Master) he cannot be my disciple" (Luke xiv. 33). We owe this sacrifice to his example, and our own occasions.

The object of such a sacrifice, however, is the edification of the subject; to mortify and destroy all the wicked and unsocial principles of his soul; and not wantonly to macerate the poor harmless body: "for no man ever yet hated his own flesh" (Eph. v. 29) except with a view and as a likely way to macerate the haughty, insolent, and cruel spirit by which a man's soul is possessed. And, perhaps, some other method, as the less painful custom of throwing dust on his own head, practised formerly in Israel (Josh. vii. 6, &c.), or others throwing dust at him, which they say is still practised in the East, if

rightly understood, might have as salutary an effect in reducing the pride of the subject as any self-mortifications, or spontaneous inflictions with the scourge. For this ancient custom has a deep and very mortifying allusion perhaps; being apparently derived from the divine censure and judgment on Adam, "Dust thou art; and unto dust shalt thou return" (Gen. iii. 19). And it is not the effect of corporeal discipline that we rely on so much as that of a good spiritual feeling.

But it is to be feared, that a good deal of the austerity and self-denial that we read or hear of has taken its rise in carnal pride, and tended rather to inflate and confirm that evil principle than to correct it; degrading rather than improving, or any way benefiting the subject: which is very far from the true spirit of Christianity. Christianity is at once both a system of self-love and self-denial: of which the latter will signify nothing without the former. Self-denial is folly without self-love; therefore cannot be enjoined by God absolutely or alone, but always either directly or implicitly for the good of the sufferer, when he is induced to deny himself through a sense of duty. Our Saviour has given a clear idea of this combination, in which the duty and object of self-denial are both clearly intimated, v. g. "He that will come after me (a most desirable object) let him deny himself (a painful duty) and take up his cross and follow me" (Matt. xvi. 24). Yes; as the hunter follows his prey, and the merchant his gains; one through brakes and rivers, over mountains and precipices any how, and the other over seas and deserts, with immense toil and no small hazard of their life—so should we follow thee, blessed Redeemer! "And every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things (says St. Paul). Now they do it (says he) to obtain a corruptible crown; but we, an incorruptible. I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air: BUT I KEEP UNDER MY BODY, AND BRING IT INTO SUBJECTION; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-away" (Cor. I. ix. 25, &c.).

It is worthy of remark, as every mode proceeding from the Creator must be ; 1, what antagonist properties he has placed against nature or appetite ; serving as it were for a counterpoise to the same ; and restraining within bounds what would otherwise be more generally ungovernable and pernicious than we often find it. Such antagonists are hope and fear, and other spiritual properties in the first place : but secondly and more eminently some that are found in the intellectual class ; such as forecast, duty, discretion and the like. And a happy circumstance it must be too for any subject as well as for his relatives, when other properties are so justly poised in his composition against the more violent, and anger especially, as to keep these, sometimes necessary, companions within due bounds. It may indeed, be called a blessing, "when one's blood and judgment are so well commingled, that one is not a pipe for fortune's finger to sound what stop she pleases."

This happy mixture or control is equally remote from the extravagance of those enthusiasts who vainly strive to extinguish nature or inclination on the one hand, and the more common failing of such libertines as seem to degrade an already degraded nature by indulging its follies on the other ; giving about the same latitude to the lowest of our enjoyments as Christian modes allow. These modes allow us to enjoy the creatures which are assigned by nature for our support in a moderate way, but not to worship them ; as great drinkers, for example, looking upon the wine "when it is red, when it giveth his colour in the cup, when it moveth itself aright" (Prov. xxiii. 31) ; also as lascivious persons, "who commit adultery in their hearts" (Matt. v. 28) as our Saviour says, warning them also by an apostle not to deceive themselves. "Be not deceived : (says he) neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind (&c.) shall inherit the kingdom of God" (Cor. I. vi. 9). For by the same High Authority by which improper concessions to ap-

petite are forbidden, a due indulgence is allowed and even enjoined. Thus, when the bridegroom is with us (Matt. ix. 15), and we have no particular burden on our consciences, we are allowed to combine enjoyment with moderate repletion in company; and not required to "eat the bread of carefulness" (Ps. cxxvii. 3). And also when nature calls, or the appetite is duly developed, the same Authority ordains again as in the beginning, that it is time for the subject to contemplate a new association. Because (as he says) "He who made mankind at the beginning, made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh" (Matt. xix. 4, 5). "So that they are without excuse" (Rom. i. 20) as St. Paul observes, "who hold the truth in unrighteousness" (Ib. 18): or, as it may be said, who having been truly and kindly endowed by nature, will notwithstanding run counter to the benevolent design of their creation. For

2, *Chastity*, which may be stated as another characteristic of the same stock or family, and nearly related to temperance, if not born of it rather, is no more incompatible with enjoyment than that, nor less conducive either both to present and future happiness: though from a saying of One who knew other states besides the human we are authorized to doubt, whether there be any more room for the righteousness of chastity in an angelic sphere, than for the righteousness of neatness and frugality, or for any other righteousness having either earthly incidentals or the members that are upon the earth (Col. iii. 5) for its object. The saying alluded to is contained in our Saviour's reply to the Sadducees concerning the resurrection, "In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in Heaven" (Matt. xxii. 30): which seems decisive with regard to angels; but with regard to mankind rather ambiguous, or sufficiently so however to have furnished a pretext for the unnatural institution of what is considered a religious celi-

bacy in opposition to the Creator's first commandment to the species, "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth" (Gen. i. 28).

But this first commandment the favourers of monastic vows appear to have overlooked in their zeal for the second, or rather, to have set that aside intentionally for this; it being added by the Creator after his first commandment about replenishing the earth, "And subdue it" (Ibid): but not, it may be presumed, for religious uses merely. Thus however, to promote chastity direct, the medium recommended by St. Paul (Cor. I. vii. 9) is partly abolished; and pleasures "which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth" (Tim. I. iv. 3), pleasures which are not only allowable, but dutiful and necessary, and were therefore made pleasures, being set aside; other provision has been made for the flesh (Rom. xiii. 14) contrary to the apostle's precept, but agreeing with his prediction in the forecited passage (Tim. I. iv. 1, &c.).

The authors of such a monstrous schism between the two sexes must have had a very different view of their proper relation from what the Holy Spirit has delivered to us in different parts of Scripture, and in such terms as were enough to recommend a virtuous union, if nature herself did not plead so forcibly in favour of it; as e. g. in a passage of the Psalms for one: where the husband is indicated almost as an object of worship to his spouse, "Hearken O daughter, and consider; incline thine ear; forget also thine own people and thy father's house: so shall the king have pleasure in thy beauty; for he is thy lord god, and worship thou him" (Ps. xlv. 11, 12). Certainly a degree of mental worship is due from either sex to other as well as the worship of the body: and if such a worship appeared oftener, it would conduce to the virtue now recommended both in singleness and in wedlock more than orders and vows, or any other contrivance, religious or irreligious either, that has ever been invented.

The relation of the sexes is designed to be one of enjoyment mingled with affection and dignity, as appears from their equal qualification or endowment to this end; and if sense be its foundation, it stretches to the refinement of intellect. As the ethereal fluid rests upon the grosser atmosphere, and this again on earth or water; as wine rests upon the lees, and these again upon the wood—so pure, celestial, hallowed love will rest upon the kind allied to sense; and so the heavenly benediction may descend upon that state which religious fanaticism would describe as no fitter for men than for angels. But then; for affections that were created capable of divine love, to sink down, stagnate, and subside into mere connubial enjoyment, however lawful and just such enjoyment may be in itself, is like DOATING ON THE RED WINE, and unworthy of the source of the foresaid affections. To delight themselves in this lower region continually, is not a life for heavenly spirits: their life rightly understood is one continual round of heavenly enjoyment: their proper station is intellect; whence they may look up or down, or upon equals, as inclination leads and objects offer; or they may poise themselves in infinity or abstraction, like its proper tenants, when particular objects are wanting. Of intellectual spirits or affections, intellect is the proper station; and their proper safeguard is chastity, with its kindred characteristic, the last mentioned temperance: while the course of these pure affections is marked throughout with other properties of the same auspicious character.

3. It may be thought, that the difference is not great between sensitive and *appetitive* properties, between the enjoyment of any object and a good disposition towards it: but, that it is, and very great, however conducive one of these sorts may be to the other, will appear from a consideration of some characteristics of the last mentioned class: which apply to every sort of object, whether material or personal; to a good effect, or to the person or object for

which it is intended, and may be named accordingly either material or personal.

Good *material appetitive* characteristics, or characteristics applying to good effects, are generally known by such expressions as The love of righteousness, A sense of duty, &c.; while one of the sort might be called a good appetite, a regular appetite, yes, and a wise appetite, on account of the blessing which attends it, as our Lord declares, "BLESSED ARE THEY WHICH DO HUNGER AND THIRST AFTER RIGHTEOUSNESS: for they shall be filled" (Mat. v. 6). For we may observe, that there is both a regular and irregular appetite of the soul as well as of the body; an appetite of spiritual and intellectual, as well as of spiritual and material affinity or combination, and accordingly so ranged or considered. Good *personal* appetitive characteristics may generally be designated by the term Benignity; and other names are also found, to denote as many different species, shades, or degrees of the same. But more especially for a thorough comprehension of the subject of such good spiritual objective characteristics, the whole sort may be divided like the essential constituents on which it is founded, into three divisions, being the appetitive superior, equal and inferior, as before explained.

1, *The appetitive superior* division, or superior love, is that which looks downward upon objects either labouring under some temporary disadvantage, or else habitually inferior to the subject or lover. This superior love, in general called CHARITY, is also found to have its subdivisions distinguished also by their proper names; as Mercy, Pity, Sympathy, and the like: which would give a considerable latitude to the generic term, if fairly dilated, both in thinking and doing; and much beyond the meaning of a kind construction only in one department, and of an alms merely in the other; though by custom the meaning of Charity has been limited almost to these instances. Indeed the meaning of Charity is very properly limited by one circumstance, not belonging to the

general property of love or benignity, as the meaning of every specific term should be by some character or circumstance not common in its kind. This peculiar and characteristic feature of charity then is feeling, pleasant feeling too, and the more pleasant for being disinterested in its subject; by means of which an affinity is preserved between this class of good spiritual objectives and its sensitive class just considered, at the same time that the subject is also hereby repaid in some measure for any trouble or sacrifice that may be required of him on account of the object of his charity, whether such charity should emanate in the shape of Mercy, Pity, Sympathy, or any other particular cast.

To this should also be added as a farther characteristic and recommendation of the species, that neither this nor any of its particulars here alluded to will clash with any other kinds of righteousness, but rather help with them: and not only these but the two grand divisions of the same, righteousness of the head and heart, or wisdom and virtue are generally found so to harmonize and cooperate with each other. Thus,

—1, *Mercy* is not incompatible but rather concurrent with justice; as for example 1, in the case of avenging the innocent blood, and indeed in avenging or doing justice to any object of compassion; where mercy will have two parts to act in both tempering and inciting justice: 2, in disarming or deterring the violent for the protection of the meek: 3, and more remarkably, in the reformation of offenders; as it is written, "Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and her converts with righteousness" (Isai. i. 27). Then, and not before, may those who were only objects of charity become objects of esteem and friendship.

For it will be necessary to distinguish in every case between charity and esteem; considering that as a common, and this as a particular debt; that, as due to all men, without excepting even the worthless and the guilty; this,

as due only to the deserving and the innocent in proportion to their innocence and deserts. The flow of charity is spontaneous, and its fruit gratuitous; but the fruit of esteem must be earned, as well as paid. None but the doating and indiscreet will ever bestow their esteem any where without being well assured of the merit of its object, without being obliged thereto by his desert, without his extorting it from them in this way. In short, liking has its measures or qualifications as well as disliking; and to love without judgment were as bad in its kind as to hate without mercy. If we rightly wish well to an offender, we shall take as much pains to cross or correct him in a wrong course as we should to assist the same person in a right: the corrective part of charity must be included in mercy with the forgiving. But the fairest type of this amiable characteristic is found in

—2, The part of *Pity, Compassion, Sympathy*, and similar appetites to which the Creator has assigned so large a scope in this world of tribulation: "For he hath founded it upon the seas, and prepared it upon the floods" (Ps. xxiv. 2). The convulsions of life and its consequent sorrows are the basis on which an all wise, good, and powerful Creator has founded the generous sentiment of pity through an harmless deception, like that of making other men's sorrows ours by sympathy; though the mistake, alas! will be but of short duration, very little experience in the world sufficing to teach us the difference between ourselves and others. There is no one perhaps, but has some circumstances in common with some, and more with some than with others: but of no two will the common circumstances be equal to their common liabilities. To shew, therefore, the scope or extent allowed for sympathy and its kind; it ought to be determined in the first place, who are their proper objects: and that more especially as some are often excluded by mistake from the benefit of this association who want it as much as any; our superiors, to wit; who however often require, and

milarly sweet is the mild satisfaction, that one takes in lisping innocence, the high delight that one finds in a teacher from God, and the higher still in his blessed communion by the Holy Ghost, which are all of one in this respect, all portions of the good characteristic under consideration. So is the joy that one perceives in the fruit of good teaching, whether it consist in the edification of the righteous or reclamation of the wicked. This last species particularly is intitled to the epithet of heavenly, as well from the quality of the feeling, as from the superiority of its subject: and our Saviour plainly declares it to be an heavenly feeling, where he says, "That joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth" (Luke xv. 7, 10). But whatever may be the nature or foundation of their joy, on earth it is sympathy and friendly concern; it is the painful interest that we take in the sinner, like a mother's pangs on account of her offspring (Gal. iv. 19), that leads to heavenly joy on his account, when we have the happiness to see him regenerated. And were we to examine narrowly into the constitution of this (the good spiritual objective) class of characteristics, we should find in them generally perhaps an air of sweet melancholy, like that which painters have endeavoured to give to the portrait of the blessed Saviour of mankind; who "was wounded (as it said) for our transgressions" (Isai. liii. 5), suffering on account of others in mind as well as in person.

—B, A third scion of the same stock of charity, but rather more specific in its operation, is the divine property, as we often and justly call it, of *Forgiveness*: which indeed does not look so much like a property at first, as it does like an act or accident, but for want of a more proper denomination may stand for the property or habit of forgiveness, which is composed, like other properties, of habitual accidents, v. g. of habitual forgiving, just as love may be composed of habitual loving, or hate of habitual hating. But as the property, habit, or disposition to forgiveness is not usually

expressed by this term, a distinction or two may be given; to strengthen its meaning.

The best idea of the general property for its compass that was ever suggested perhaps, by any one, occurs in that heavenly effusion of our Saviour's, called "The Lord's Prayer:" where the two species, divine and human forgiveness or placability, are so linked together, and such a necessity is established between them, that the species which all are bound to desire, is not to be expected, it seems, without the other. That sacred clause, "FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS" (Mat. vi. 12), deserves to be made an universal text on forgiveness, and to be particularly enlarged on, but not in so general a discussion as the present. One principle or condition, however, of Christian forgiveness having been mentioned, it may not be irrelevant to mention here one or two more.

The principle just mentioned is, to forgive in consideration of the Good Being: and to that may now be added a forgiving also, in consideration of the evil one, who is justly considered among Christians as the secret Author of every provocation, the Ahithophel, the false counsellor, the Satan, the betrayer, the tyrant, the universal enemy of mankind; and therefore by right the universal object of their resentment: his dupes and captives being rather to be pitied sometimes for their subjection to the ruthless monster; though justice and prudence may require their chastisement, or even their abstraction from society, if they cannot be abstracted from his service. So Jesus wept over Jerusalem, instead of resenting its ingratitude, with this pathetic exclamation. "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem; thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not" (Mat. xxiii. 37).

Another principle of forgiveness, also worth mentioning as peculiar to Christian modes, depends on the supposition of the offence, and is that of considering every deli-

berate injury done to man as properly an offence against his Maker, and more or less heinous according to the holiness or innocence of the sufferer, which is his proximity to God in Christ. So that a sufferer on any occasion is not concerned to resent an injury done to himself more than one done to another, and not so much as one immediately aimed at his Maker, or which can be so considered; as implied in that exclamation of the Psalmist, "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? and am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee?" (Ps. cxxxix. 21); while of one's personal enemies one would rather say with our Saviour, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do!" (Luke xxiii. 34).

4. There are many circumstances and occurrences, which without amounting to injuries, may prove offensive to so captious an animal as man in prosperity. It is offensive, for example, not to be prosperous like the animal, or not to be of the same party, or of the same creed. All this is offensive to them who have their heart's wish in every other respect, and only want more matter of offence; it is enough to disqualify its hapless subject for any participation in the prosperous man's sympathy or confidence. But Christian modes or Christianity would require us to tolerate greater differences than these: it would teach mankind as one great family to practise generally without their walls that *Toleration* and mutual *Concession* which they are obliged to practise within, or the house could not stand. If we find manners and sentiments in those of our communion, which, without being flagitious, yet do not exactly please us, we are not therefore required to fall out with them immediately for it; nor yet with the building either in which we are wont to meet, as if there could be blasphemy in stone walls, and to be for separating at once them from us, or ourselves from the walls and them. Retaining our own liberty of sentiment and profession may be enough, without the liberty of forcing our

sentiments and professions upon others: or if such liberty be not enough for us, how can less be enough for them? If we happen to have more power or control than others, it does not hinder but we may consider others as ourselves, and make the same allowance to them that we should ourselves require in their condition.

—5, The same measure or mode ought also to be observed with respect to ordinary topics and on ordinary occasions, as with respect to the more serious topic of religion on which men are so apt to differ. We ought on all occasions, to be ready to afford a kind hearing and indulgent acceptation to others, though they might not be so well spoken, nor so well seen in their subject, nor so easy either in their circumstances as ourselves. This is the part generally known by the name of *Affability* and *Condescension*: though there seems to be some confusion in the use of the first mentioned term. For our superiors too often think it a piece of affability, if they only condescend to speak to us: but the property in fact is more amiable; inviting familiarity, instead of displaying it. An affable man, according to the derivation of the term is, not one who talks to us, but who by suitable manners will encourage us to talk to him as we can; or more briefly, he is, not one who speaks to, but one who may be spoken to, by any one.

—6, *Patience*, though more neutral than the forementioned sorts, as rather taking than seeking aught, may for a good appetitive property also rank with most in spirit, as well as in truth of character. For we may understand by Patience the equally enduring not only of injuries, privations, and sufferings, but also of labour, fatigue, opposition, danger, and whatever else is necessarily encountered in the way to excellence of any description; which indeed seems rather the better part of patience, making it look like fortitude. And of this property of patience too, admirable as it is, one might also aver, that

it is not admirable, but much otherwise without a good motive, and, to be perfect, should be tempered with Christian piety or the Spirit of Christ.

For patience is rather insipid ; it is more the patience of an ass than of an intelligent creature, without some motive from intellect. And what would that motive suggest or comprehend, but a regard to God and futurity ? Looking to the one, we say, "Thy will be done;" looking to the other, "Thy kingdom come;" willing and contented to rub through life any how, so as we may but end it happily. Thus by a pious deference to the will of the Supreme Being, patience takes again another turn, looking more like resignation ; which is more properly a part of godliness than of morality, and will deserve to be mentioned under that head accordingly ; its place being occupied for the present by two or three other moral properties and as perfectly Christian. Such are meekness and humility : meekness, which like charity, seeketh not her own ; and humility which knoweth not what her own is.

—7, *Meekness* seeketh not her own, in not being easily provoked. For this provocation is the same nearly with a thirst for reparation ; it is like challenging a debt which some one has incurred by either spoiling another of his virtue, fortune, reputation, or by affronting him with slander or disparagement respecting the same or some of them. But such a reparation meekness will not need in the first place so often as any opposite property like pride, anger, ostentation and others ; being itself generally less observed, and consequently more removed from aggression. While, in the next place, if such a reparation was due or required, meekness would not be so eager as either of those opposites to seek that reparation, nor, of course, so likely to aggravate its own troubles by provoking one trouble after another.

And while meekness is thus indifferent respecting wrongs and redress, modesty and humility, two shades, appearances or presentations of the same excellent pro-

perty will seem unconscious almost of their rights; not because they are fools, but because, if they had to estimate their own rights by their own worth, which seems a proper criterion, it would be more than they are aware of.

—8, But *Modesty*, the first of these properties, has also two shades or varieties; one more akin to chastity, the other to humility, being both good subjects of the heavenly kingdom, and too good sometimes for any other. For whether we consider the kingdom distinctly in persons, or collectively in social combinations, or abstractedly as embracing the forementioned good characteristics, in every case modesty of either kind will be one of the surest conservatives, as well as highest ornaments of the kingdom—in the male sex, the perfection of a manly character; in the female, a safeguard often more effectual than masculine courage and abilities. It is a safeguard both to their fortune and person; to their fortune in preventing an ostentatious expenditure and ruinous litigations with other wasteful habits to which the male sex is heedlessly addicted; and to their person by concealing from the superfluous gaze of insolence, attractions that ought to be reserved for modest worth.

In youth this becoming property may act as a counterpoise to the violent passions, weak judgment, and corrupt influence to which that period is so generally exposed: while in age it seems almost a matter of course; not only from the decline of passion, which is a physical reason, but also from long teaching and experience, which must prove a man to be as deficient in mental as in corporeal vigour at that period, if he have not learned to be modest: so that an immodest old man in either sense may be, if indeed he is not, generally regarded as something monstrous.

—9, As a companion or sequel to modesty, and intervening between that and humility, the property or habit of *self-correction* may be adduced: which from its affinity to self-restraint one might have been inclined to subjoin to temperance and its accompaniments, every act of

temperance being a correction of the natural appetite in some respect, and the opposite of self-indulgence, which is an unrestrained exercise or allowance of the same. But there are two shades or degrees of correction, as there are of discipline; one for castigation, and one for improvement; which last is also an improvement on temperance, and entitles the property to an higher rank among characteristics of a moral complexion: for having no particular respect to the Supreme Object of righteousness like some of its correlatives, it cannot rank with them in the highest class, or class of the highest respect, among good objective characteristics.

It has been much disputed, whether a man have the necessary means and ability for correcting himself, if he should have the grace to desire it. But there needs not be much disputing on this head; the desire is the only thing wanting: let that be strong, and the ability will not be weak; let that abound, and the means will not be deficient. For the desire of self-improvement, or a general appetite for righteousness, will grow like a young plant, if it may be permitted, and gather strength by indulgence, as the carnal appetite by temperance. If any one chooses to indulge an immoderate appetite for doubting, he may doubt whether an intellectual spirit be capable of acting upon itself any how; and then he may as well doubt too, whether the same spirit have any existence in nature, since every property of which it is composed will have its proper influence in the corps. For if some of the corps have names of a more reflected signification than others, as all for example that are compounded with self, those which have more proper names will still have the same common reflected operation, and one good characteristic on a constituent generally as much of it as another.

To indicate a sample of the endless host of intellectual spirits that might be conceived in the human form or combination only, may be almost enough for a general view of the heavenly kingdom, without a particular exposition on the

means of propitiating or encouraging every one of them separately ; the multitude of excellent characteristics that occur, if they seldom meet, only in this spiritual appetitive department which we are considering, is such as to preclude the opportunity of shewing how this or that especially might be promoted ; while the fairest means of doing it belong also to other heads than the present : yet the property or habit of self-correction only on moral principles may be improved to a certain extent. And it is better worth a man's while, or his time and attention, to correct himself than any other person in the world, or to save his own soul than all that he might have besides. " For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul ? " (Matt. xvi. 26.) There are those who can discern the face of the sky and of the earth, but not the importance of this consideration : there are those who have a remarkable talent for personal criticism, who can appreciate other characters whether public or private to a nicety, and seldom without finding good room for improvement : it were well if they, and others likewise, would consider and learn to appreciate their own too with the same view daily ; but not for a day only. " Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right ? " (Luke xii. 57) says our Saviour. " For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged " (Cor. I. xi. 31).

Self-judgment is the way to escape self-condemnation, and self-correction an easier way of going forward than being whipped to it by ill humours, like a wayward horse by those who are ill humours, or worse, poor beast ! to him. And if in general men have not the idea of correcting themselves that might be expected from their superior endowments, if they are less alive to their interest in this than in many lower respects, if the affairs of the spiritual kingdom are less interesting to them than the news of a paltry village ; there may still by chance be one here and there who can so far get the better of self-love as to see his own faults in the misconduct of others, as well he

might by bringing that home to himself; and learn to dress his inward man by this sort of reflexion, as others dress the outward by its reflexion in a glass. It is not often, perhaps, that the faults of others are observed by any with this view; v. g. to remind the observers of their own faults, and enable them to feel their deformity; but it seems a very likely way, if higher means be not wanting, both to enable them to correct what may be amiss in themselves and to add at the same time a property of positive excellence to those which they may have corrected; v. g.

—10, *Humility*, which is a shade beyond modesty in its own line; being also like that, besides its general pertinency, particularly adapted to the decline of life: where it is not only a becoming, but a nearly characteristic grace. Of all the graces that adorn mankind, or may be imputed to higher intelligences, there is not a fairer than this nor a more profitable to its owner as a means of grace. “For God resisteth the proud; but giveth grace to the humble” (Jam. iv. 6), says St. James. And this every one who knows himself must know to be an infallible truth, observing how he falls every day, on some days many times perhaps, by pride, and rises again by humility if he rises again. But the Master’s declarations on the quality of this characteristic are clearer than either the apostles’ or our own experience: who on a question that arose among certain of his disciples once, a question of precedency, “called them unto him, and said, Ye know that the princes of the gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you; let him be your servant” (Matt. xx. 25, &c.). And so on the general question once, when his disciples came to him, saying, “Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven? he called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them, and said, Verily, I say unto you, Except ye shall be converted and become as little children,

ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Whosoever, therefore, shall humble himself as this little child, is greatest in the Kingdom of Heaven" (Ib. xviii. 1—5). On another occasion he drew the same contrast between his disciples and the ecclesiastical authorities of Jerusalem, who talked much, and did nothing; loved reverence, and took no pains to deserve it (Ib. xxiii. 1, &c.): declaring at the same time a decree as sure as fate, "THAT WHOSOEVER SHALL EXALT HIMSELF SHALL BE ABASED, AND HE THAT SHALL HUMBLE HIMSELF SHALL BE EXALTED" (Ib. 12).

If we may judge from the general infection of pride so evident in the human race, and our Saviour's continual exhortations on the other hand to humility, it will seem probable, that even of his select followers, the twelve apostles, none were quite faultless in this respect before the memorable period of conversion which followed upon the descent of the Holy Ghost: but two especially of the number, James and John the sons of Zebedee, would seem, from repeated traits, to have inherited a larger share of pride than the rest; as it was not only they (or their mother Salome for them) who mooted the question of precedence abovementioned, but who would also have consigned a poor village of Samaria to the fire from Heaven for not receiving Christ; as many a village and many a city has been since consigned to fire and sword and famine on the same pretence by those who never knew him; "Lord, (said they,) wilt thou, that we command fire to come down from Heaven, and consume them, even as Elias did? But he turned, and rebuked them, and said, Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. For the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them" (Luke ix. 54—56).

According to another evangelist, our Lord's declaration above cited from St. Matthew was delivered by way of epiphonema to a parable, the admired parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, that was made, as it is said; "for certain which trusted in themselves that they were

righteous, and despised others" (Ib. xviii. 9, &c.). This was a striking though simple exemplification of two different characters, which were probably suppositious, i. e. imagined for the occasion: but it is possible to mention two that were real, and at the same time more different as well as more striking examples in point; which followed each other, but with different success; the first falling by pride, and the second rising by humility; Adam, who by exalting himself has degraded himself with all his posterity, and Christ, who by humbling himself has exalted himself and his to something beyond the primitive perfection of mankind.

Therefore humility on principle, or Christian humility, deserves to be ranked among the highest gifts of humanity. It is no let in the way of any inferior being, and has been shown to be no disgrace in the image of the Highest. To forget one's own individual importance, is a sort of civil duty; and to merge it in the honour of God, and the dignity of his kingdom, will be sure to make it rise with its objects. To forget themselves in this manner is most common with the most enlightened members of society, and indeed the very basis of merit and importance in all its parts. See how the orator gets on in speaking, when the thought of self is excluded by his theme; how the girded soldier will "ride on because of the word of truth, of meekness and righteousness" when his sense of danger is lost in these high considerations, and what terrible things his right hand will then teach him (Ps. xlv. 5); how the historian, poet, painter, musician, and every artist will triumph, when the art begins to triumph in each over his own particular image: so will it be with the humble always, and in every pursuit; his own image being with him, always least and undermost, while the image of others, and his duty towards them are held up and magnified. His humility, by making him think more of his defects than of his advantages, at once induces him to amend the former, and prevents him from foolishly swell-

ing on account of the latter. A good deal of time is lost by some in reviewing and doating upon their past achievements; but the humble man saves all that time, and more besides: his attention is not divided between his pursuits and himself, neither are his thoughts and energies wasted in vain exultation, but reserved for further employment. Not satisfied either with the quantum or quality of what he has done, his object is always to do more and better. Looking to his own qualifications and performances, he can say with St. Paul, "The good that I would, I do not" (Rom. vii. 19) to the extent that I would; "but this one thing I do; forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus" (Phil. iii. 13, 14).

Proceeding in this way, the humble man will gild his course through life, not only with fair achievement, but also with the respect, if not with the admiration of his contemporaries. For naturally esteeming others better than himself (Phil. ii. 3), he teaches others respect by example, the best way for dignified individuals, if not the only way for some, to teach it to the multitude; and thus it is that the truly great are distinguished from the truly little; who, on the contrary, would rather teach respect to their poor, and perhaps only, inferiors by distance, unaccommodation and insult. Oh, when will it please God, to let us see SUCH A STATE OF SOCIETY AS MUST NEEDS FOLLOW WHEN WORTH SHALL BE ESTIMATED BY UTILITY, AND HONOUR BY HUMILITY? It may be said, when He who giveth grace to the humble, shall give more wisdom to the many—who giveth grace to the humble, not as a return, but as a foundation for their humility, in the same way that "He giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding" (Dan. ii. 21).

For it should be observed, that in the distinction of humility there are two primary casts or species, inward and

outward, or absolute and comparative, following its inward and outward direction or manifestation : the former of which is the cast that has been chiefly indicated hitherto, while the latter is also worth noticing, and divides in like manner after its two objects into humility towards God, and humility towards mankind. Of the latter division, or outward and comparative humility, some good and agreeable features have been slightly noticed : but its principal species, cast, or direction, is that towards God ; and the principal argument for its general culture of more consequence than any human praise or approbation—is that above, which will make it one of our best securities for continuing in the divine favour and protection, being like the circumcision of the heart, “ whose praise is not of men, but of God ” (Rom. ii. 29).

If we ever boast our righteous dealing to those who have not so high a sense of their own merits, it must be either with a view to wound their feelings, or claim their adoration ; and such boasting cannot be disregarded by one who is said to be “ a jealous God ” (Exod. xx. 5) ; and also appears to be jealous of his creatures’ credit as well as of his own. We generally find the righteousness of such boasters, therefore, of but short duration. Some of them sin it away, others talk it away, and others may think themselves out of it in time, as they thought themselves into it. As long as a man only confesses to God among the gentiles (Rom. xv. 9) like David, he is as likely to be favoured with the divine protection, and kept in well doing : but when he shall reverse his practice, and confess to the gentiles before God, as some do, it is much but the man will be suffered to show himself presently in his true colours, and acquire more contempt among the strangers than respect or adoration. “ For not he that commendeth himself is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth ” (Cor. II. x. 18), says St. Paul. “ Humble yourselves in the sight of the Lord, and he shall lift

you up" (Jam. iv. 10. Pet. I. v. 6), say St. James and St. Peter.

It were endless to cite all the passages of scripture with any proportionable part of the natural reasons by which this grace of humility is recommended; and very much beside the present purpose were it also to exhaust either of these authorities on this or any other head: yet one other advantage must be observed of the general property, which we learn from reason and experience: it is an excellent preparative for what we must all come to. Humbling ourselves, and being always prepared for any degree of humiliation that God in his wise and gracious providence shall think fit to lay on us, is the way to prepare ourselves for that deep and unavoidable humiliation, the grave; WHICH MUST SEEM DEEP INDEED TO THOSE WHO ARE FALLING STRAIGHTWAY INTO IT FROM THEIR HIGH MIGHTINESS, WITHOUT EVER DESCENDING ONE STEP IN THE WAY OF HUMILITY TO BREAK THEIR FALL.

And after observing so much of this good objective characteristic independently, or alone, (and much less could not have been observed,) it may also be well to add concerning the same in relation to others of its class, that even humility will not stand alone any more than the good properties that were severally mentioned before it, but will require two special supporters to make it look graceful as it ought, being, 1, a love and respect in its owner for other men, without which a low opinion of ourselves will be no more than we deserve; and 2, an active endeavour in striving always for their good beyond our supposed ability, without which humility might degenerate into sloth and despondence. Humility and endeavour with a respectful consideration for our fellow men, and fellow Christians especially, are the arms, the springs, the axles of a Christian practice; neither of which will serve alone. "Herein is my Father glorified," (said Christ to them,) "that ye bear much fruit: so shall ye be my

disciples" (John xv. 8). "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another" (Ib. xiii. 35). "Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye ought also to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you" (Ib. 13—15). But we must not think too much of what we do either at the same time, to be humble: but on the contrary, as he says elsewhere, "When ye shall have done *all* those things which are commanded you; say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do" (Luke xvii. 10).

2, It would be fond, to expect, that in a general muster of spirits, or only in that of the good appetitive sort, there should be no room for misnaming or misplacing: but it is hoped, that there will be found at least a tolerable conformity among them as they here stand, if the station of each be compared with its respect and object, whether such respect be superior like the respect of those which have just been considered; or inferior, as of those which are reserved; or *equal*, as of the sort that we are now to consider.

—1, Among the good equal appetitive objective spirits there is one that must be owned very unequivocal in regard both of the appetite, its object, and respect; being that of *Self-love*: as in the very phrase one member will signify an equal respect of the subject to its object which are both one; and the other member, its objectively good appetite, being love; which St. Paul declares, to be the fulfilling of the law (Rom. xiii. 10).

It may seem much for so common a property, and so sordid too in the opinion of some, as self-love, to be dignified with the rank and title of a good objective characteristic; and also, considering its necessity to an animal being, that the same ought rather to stand with some of the lowest essentials of the Kingdom; indeed, that self-

preservation and maintenance, the fruit of self-love were better intitled to that dignity. But it should be remembered, that love, the essence of the characteristic, is not necessarily implied in self-preservation, neither is self-love so common and inevitable a property as it appears: if it were, there would be no meaning in that commendation of the same, "So long as thou doest well unto thyself, men will speak good of thee" (Ps. xlix. 18). And there would also be no necessity either in that case for laws against self-destruction implying a duty in self-love; which however, laws will not long be able perhaps to uphold against the growing influence of atheism. For laws cannot supply such a principle as self-love where it is wanting. But without such principle a man will not have much in him for either restraint or encouragement to lay hold of: as an indifference to life increases, the force of law must necessarily decrease; and there will be nothing at last but bolts and shackles, where there was law and religion. There is no restraint but bolts and shackles for the desperate; who are also self-haters in fact, if not in purpose or profession.

If, therefore, irreligion be a plague to society as well as to individuals, on the one hand, how unsocial, not to say unnatural and absurd on the other hand must we deem those institutions which make a duty, not of self-denial merely before commended, but of self-hatred; and it may as well be said, of general discord. For if we hate ourselves, we cannot love others; as it is notorious, that love begins at home: and that self-love is the foundation of universal benevolence seems no new doctrine, nor so unnatural as that of self-hatred, but one that rests on good experience. We may see proofs of this, though not so often as it were to be wished; and how it is possible to love another for one's own sake, or one's self in the person of another. What is more, we may find sometimes an instance of the secondary object gaining upon the first; when, and not before, the love of that object may be properly denominated after it. Thus, for example, with regard to the love of

wealth; a man considers, how many comforts this convertible thing can procure him; and, loving himself above all things, he sets about acquiring wealth as fast as possible, and by all the means imaginable: this is self-love. But by degrees the man forgets his own comfort, his duty, honour; and every other consideration that ought to weigh with him, postponing every thing that is essentially his—body, soul, and all their constituents separately, to this engrossing object: he values its integrity more than his own, and would as soon part with an eye or an hand, as with a bond or acceptance, or aught that may be severed from the bulk of his property: and now SELF-LOVE IS LOST IN THE LOVE OF WEALTH.

Whereas taking another object, but similarly for his own sake first, and for the good that he expects with better reason from that quarter—a man may be as much attached and devoted to God; until from looking upon Him continually as the source of every blessing, he forgets by degrees all the good expected, or every good expectation for himself, in its heavenly source and medium; and forgetting himself in another, his first object in his second, comes to love God only, as the miser loves his gold: and this is the love of God.

—2, The progress of genuine disinterested *Friendship* is also in the way of revolution, like the love of God and of gold: we begin with loving a friend for ourselves or for the pleasure that we feel in his society; and, from loving him for ourselves, may come by degrees to love him like ourselves; as if he and we were one, and in fact our regard had only one object: which is so far *Unity*.

We often mention unity and friendship together as if they were the same property, or near correlatives at any rate: and so David likewise seems to consider them where he says, “Behold, how good and joyful a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity!” (Ps. cxxxiii. 1.) But unity will signify more than friendship in one sense: for it is both easy and obvious to distinguish two casts or

species of this property by the matter, whether incidental or constituent on which it subsists; as an unity between two or more persons may be or subsist in respect of some transient feeling, as joy or grief; or in respect of some transient, because incidental, property or purpose; as name, family, or habitation, a trade, office, embassy, or the like: or an unity between two or more may be in respect of some one or more constituents; as a common nature, common spirit or disposition, common genius, or sentiments; and also enjoyed by multitudes who have not an incidental in common.

According to St. Paul one of these two species of unity, the incidental and constituent, may be made instrumental to the other; as where he exhorts the Ephesians to walk worthy of the vocation wherewith they were called; "endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace: (because, as he says) there is one body and one Spirit; even as ye are called in one hope of your calling: one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all; Who is above all, and through all, and in you all" (Eph. iv. 3, &c.). And it were well for us if our unity in such incidentals as calling, formal faith, and baptism were oftener followed by an unity of the Spirit cemented in peace.

The means and motives for drawing men together in society and the various bonds of union among them are wisely ordained by Providence; and it is the part of wisdom in men to use them accordingly. If, however, in the way of habit, or interest, or any other ordinary way our friends should happen to disappoint us, that should not be suffered to take such an effect on our hearts, as to render them either callous or distrustful; but only make us a little more careful in the choice of our acquaintance. It is almost proverbial with us, that a man may be known by the company that he keeps, agreeing with Solomon's remark, "As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man" (Prov. xxvii. 19): and therefore it may be no wonder, if "evil communications corrupt good manners".

(Cor. I. xv. 33). Society of that kind, instead of edifying or exalting a man, will be more likely to stupify or degrade him ; letting him down, as it is said, and very justly. For then a man will fall in his own estimation, as well as in other people's : and it is only by retiring within himself or to better company, that he can hope to regain his former pitch of character or credit.

So by commercial friendship, or traffic, as it is properly called, if fair and liberal, considerable benefit may accrue in this preparatory state, not only to the parties engaged therein, but to society at large. The material powers or properties of the species are recruited and improved by transportation from one house and one climate to another ; the spiritual, by new infusions of health and vigour ; the intellectual, by an exchange of knowledge, discoveries and inventions. Even the natural productions of the earth are beholden to commerce for an assimilation to the living system, and greatly improved by the circulation and commixture of their specific principles within the sphere that nature assigns them. So that in short every kind of friendship, society, and intercourse is naturally good in itself : the evil that results from any being less an effect of the property, than of its abuse, and of the indeliberate of its subjects, or supporters.

What men call their most valued friendships are often mere matter of habit : in fact the noblest or most generous that have been known among them, and celebrated accordingly in heathen records ought not perhaps to rank much higher. For heathen friendships are not much like friendship in themselves : and what is worse, will consort very well with some of the worst ingredients that could ever be heaped together in a human composition and some of the most abominable works that could ever be expected from such ingredients. " Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness : their feet are swift to shed blood : destruction and misery are in their ways : and the way of peace have they not known." But the first principle of Christian

friendship is a Christianlike disposition consisting in good will towards all men ; without which no principle can be Christian. The rule of Christian friendship seems to be this, " As we have therefore opportunity let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith " (Gal. vi. 10); including two species of personal regard ; one general, which is charity, seeking the good of all by all means independent of faith or perfection, and oftener mixed with pity than with esteem ; the other particular, which is properly friendship, *enjoying* the good of others, and more especially in a blessing of faith and perfection ; of faith not merely evinced by an unity of worship, nor yet of outward communion, but of mind and spirit, and of that sort of perfection which the apostle also intimates when he talks of "perfecting holiness in the fear of God" (Cor. II. vii. 1).

It was reserved for that system, by which the heavenly kingdom is so truly developed in every respect, to produce and bring to light a friendship of the highest class in that sacred Philadelphia or brotherly love which, like its proper subjects, is "born, not of flesh and blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man ; but of God" (John i. 13). This is a friendship founded on principle ; and not on principle only, but on right principle, on the only true and infallible basis, the Spirit and the Word of God. Happy were it for the church, if its members generally had a finer sense of the charms of unity in this relation, and could learn to prize as they ought the communion which they are here allowed with the Highest and his angels, as well as with each other ; if they could feel in this respect as a town curate might feel, to judge from these expressions ; " One thing have I desired of the Lord, which I will require ; even that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the fair beauty of the Lord, and to visit his temple " (Ps. xxvii. 4): and " O how amiable are thy dwellings, thou Lord of hosts ! My soul hath a desire and a longing to enter into the courts of the

Lord ; my heart and my flesh rejoice in the living God." (Ib. lxxxiv. 1, 2).

The first thing to be desired in Heaven and in earth is the Presence, Communion, or Fellowship of God, which is the Head ; and next, or rather with that, the communion of saints, which is the body—of this blessed communion ; making together one object of the highest enjoyment, such as " the great congregation " (Ps. xxii. 25) or " the congregation of the saints " (Ib. lxxxix. 5) ; as it is said, and as St. John proposes to the brethren in his epistles, " That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, (says he) that ye also may have fellowship with us : and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ " (John I. i. 3). As members of Christ we are individually no more than the fibres in a tree, or stones in a building ; though collectively, his body, temple, flock : and considering this solid unity, or unity on constituents, or still on the Word and Spirit of God, which are no constituents of mankind, as we ought, will have some excellent consequences likewise, besides those already noticed. It will, e. g., prevent a man from setting up too much for himself, when he considers that he is but a branch of the vine, and preserved therein by the same nourishment as pervades its other parts, having no advantage or benefit of his station but what is common to all the branches, and derived from the root to the farthest extremity or improvement. " For by one Spirit are we all baptized (says St. Paul) into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free ; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit " (Cor. I. xii. 13). By this " one body " is to be understood God's peculiar kingdom, the church ; and, besides its enjoyment, the advantage of its one Spirit will appear decidedly in the extension and prosperity of an establishment for which the greatest cooperation is required.

—3, The good equal appetitive characteristics *Politeness, Equity*, and other shows or demonstrations of out-

ward peace are very proper companions for inward friendship and unity. Only let us be careful to distinguish between the politeness which results from this peaceful relation and any that may spring from an opposite quarter; such as the turbulent man, for example, will often employ to cover his hostile intentions, like one of whom the Psalmist says, "He laid his hands upon such as be at peace with him; and he brake his covenant. The words of his mouth were smother than oil, and yet be they very swords" (Ps. lv. 21, 22). If this be politeness, it is not equity: which in the sense here supposed is equality in a consideration free or independent of circumstances. By nature all men are equal as brethren; and treating men accordingly, or the observation of such equality in all our intercourse with others is the good characteristic here understood by Politeness and Equity.

But if equality be natural and common to all men, its observance is supernatural, and peculiarly Christian. Christianity is a levelling system, which makes no distinction between orders and degrees in its consideration or intention; but among those who have put on Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free" (Gal. iii. 28): or rather, WE ARE ALL BOUND IN CHRIST TO EACH OTHER, or should be; as St. Peter exhorts us, "Yea all of you be subject one to another" (Pet. I. v. 5). Whether this doctrine be equally followed or not in the practice of politeness among Christians may be found by reversing the position of parties in almost every predicament. If, for example, a rich man should be walking by a poor man's cottage and overtaken by the rain, he would not think much of knocking at the poor man's door and asking a free entrance, or claiming it almost as a matter of right, if he did not rather mention it as a mark of his favour and condescension, and as if in taking shelter under the poor man's roof, he was really conferring an obligation upon him. But should the poor man when walking by the rich man's house be overtaken by rain with hail and thunder and

starvation besides, he would be thought more than rude, if he ventured to ask either for bread or shelter except in a suppliant tone, and for Christ's sake in the way of charity, and with a very good chance of being denied. It is the same too even with a place in church; where one should expect to find a degree of equity, if any where: "For (as St. James remarks) if there come unto your assembly a man with a gold ring in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment, and ye have respect to him that weareth the gay clothing, and say, Sit thou here in a good place, and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool, are ye not then partial in yourselves?" (Jam. ii. 2, 3, 4.) Is this Christian politeness and equity? This is not the way to "be the children of your Father which is in Heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil, and on the good; and sendeth rain on the just, and on the unjust" (Matt. v. 45). "Therefore, all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets" (Ib. vii. 12). This is true Christian equity, and the effect EQUALITY; when you do in every case as you would be done by. This is the levelling system of a Christian: so far his levelling goes, and no farther: it levels neither property nor capacity, but UNNATURAL DISTINCTIONS.

There is somewhat of a superior air in the good appetitives, politeness, equity, and the like; but as this relation may be mutual between parties on most occasions, the said appetitives cannot be ascribed to the superior class so properly as to this of equality, which we are considering.

—4, If, for example, not only politeness and equity, but *Gentleness*, *Pliability*, and other such characteristics have an air of superiority, especially as implying option on the one hand and expectation on the other, they will nevertheless, on examination, appear to be characterized by the same reciprocity; so as to be, if not equal appetitives, yet more equal than either superior or inferior.

But to whatever class these good appetitive objectives are assigned, the class will be enriched by their presence, v. g. by the presence of such good appetitive objective characteristics as gentleness, which is another word for gentility, and pliability signifying a deference for the wishes and opinions of others as far as it may consist with rectitude and discretion. And there may be as much of these in a pliant manner, as in a rigid and unbending, with more security: of which we have an acknowledged emblem in the reed, bowing before the wind, without going before it; still yielding, and still keeping its position. So it may appear at first as if these graces were rather external than internal, material rather than spiritual, in manner rather than in or upon sentiment; consequently, not such exalted graces of the kingdom as they are here represented: but this is a mistake, as it were easy to shew; and we have also a good authority for the rank assigned them in what is suggested of their heavenly origin or affinity by an apostle who says, "The wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, GENTLE AND EASY TO BE ENTREATED, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy" (Jam. iii. 17). That there may be a material objective or outward manner corresponding with these inward and spiritual graces, is not denied: but such manner, if separated from the properties it is meant to denote, will be no part of heavenly wisdom; but all farce, merest hypocrisy, and insipid grimace.

In reviewing the train of that good and amiable characteristic, yielding or gentleness, we are apt to consider its human bearing only; but the bearing of all the good appetitives of this objective class, and more especially of appetitives of the superior kind before mentioned, upon inferior animals, or brutes as they are oftener called, would deserve to be remembered, if only on account of the example set by brutes in these respects to mankind; were it not for the great length and interest of the argument precluding such an attempt at present, and making it seem more advisable to

expect another opportunity of doing justice to an argument so well worth dilating. For the same good appetitive, however scoffed at by some, is founded on a relation that may be to others of a more exalted understanding as great a source of pleasure and delight as it is to many more equal with its objects, the inferior animals or brutes aforesaid. And persons who cannot fancy brutes as companions of their pleasures and their leaders in the chace, may still find much to enjoy and admire in some of them: though the humane principle is often wounded by the sufferings of their order, and would be oftener if God, whose mercy is over all his works (Ps. cxlv. 9), did not set some limits to the sufferings of many an useful drudge in the ruin or removal of its merciless owner.

3; It is not necessary in considering the moral character only of spiritual constituents to impute to them any higher respect than the human: but it may be observed, that of the *inferior appetitive* sort; such as 1, Fidelity and obedience; 2, Respect; 3, Hope; 4, Gratitude, and perhaps of some others now to be mentioned, the aspect will be very deficient if it do not regard an Higher Object than human on the principle thrown out by St. Paul in his idea of voluntary subjection; "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; (says he) for there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1). And considering his ordinance, the good inferior appetitive objective, which is love looking upward, must be limited, imperfect, and deficient, if it stop short of the Highest Object to which it can aspire: lower objects than that cannot be wanting in any relation; but true upward love piercing through all the ascending zones of inferior relations by which it is surrounded, without overlooking any, will eventually fix its regard on the zenith, making every other object subservient to that, and that the crown of all: for it is that, which must give effect to all; whether they be reciprocal as those related in fidelity; which implies a mutual subjection, or direct with the

subjection on one side only, as in respect, hope and gratitude. All these derive their effect from one object and one principle, from God and godliness, severally converting them after the relations on which they are founded into honour and honesty ; social, conjugal, and every other sort of fidelity ; truth, and constancy ; obedience, patriotism, loyalty—and producing, in short, a good general characteristic on spiritual and intellectual properties in this relation, a characteristic which has not found a name yet ; but may be signified by a periphrasis, such as *TRUE HEARTEDNESS*, OR *RADICAL TRUTH*, the opposite of *falseheartedness*, or radical falsehood. And call it what we will, the sort of characteristic intended is both honourable to the owner and pleasing to its original Author and Object : Who according to the Psalmist will not dispense with it : “ Lo, Thou requirest truth in the inward parts ” (Ps. li. 6.), says he, i. e. constant and constituent truth. Viewing the sort, therefore, severally

—1, It is hard to distinguish the moral characteristic *Fidelity* from one or two other characteristics with which it has a near affinity ; as duty and *obedience*, especially : between which we find only a partial difference in respect of their calling ; the same being, with obedience loud and positive ; with duty and fidelity, silent and implied only ; but not the less effectual. Obedience is an inferior, uplooking characteristic ; and so is fidelity even when it regards an equal, if he have any rights to be respected. Respect unto right is the foundation of both : but with this difference, that obedience pays only on demand, if it pay never so cheerfully ; while fidelity will pay on a simple understanding of its debts.

Both fidelity and obedience is a moral tribute ; or as the apostle calls it “ a reasonable service ” : it is the custom, or a part of the custom, of righteousness ; “ holy, acceptable unto God ” (Rom. xii. 1) ; and which He, as Governor of the universe, will require at the hands of his viceroyals : who have also two parts to act in relation thereto.

For it is their part not only to pay and enforce the tribute of obedience ; but to make it lawful and right ; whereby to pay it upward in the lawful coin of the kingdom, which is righteousness ; not in tokens and counterfeits. A spurious, unauthorized obedience is no payment ; it will not acquit either party, i. e. either the payer or the collector ; and therefore both are interested in opposing it : if one should require, the other must not pay—and if one should offer, the other must not receive it ; but treat the fawning sycophants as Jehu treated the prophets of Baal (Kings II. x. 18, &c.), if he should have an opportunity.

We may also observe of these kindred characteristics, as we have observed already of some others, and might, perhaps, as well of most, that while their quality rises with the rank of their objects, as from domestic and conjugal fidelity to patriotism and loyalty, and still higher, from these to godliness or piety, it is still found that the higher species will not stand without the lower, any more than the lower without the highest. “ He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much ” (Luke xvi. 10) : and it would be absurd for any to pretend to the highest fidelity, who were deficient in common honesty. A man might as well pretend to be flesh at one time and spirit at another. We should therefore aspire to be perfect like Moses in point of fidelity, and who was, therefore, regarded by the Lord on different terms from an ordinary prophet, as Aaron and Miriam for example. For while such as these are enlightened in visions and dreams only : “ My servant Moses, not so ; (says he) who is faithful in all mine house (or in all the relations of my household). With him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches ; and the SIMILITUDE OF THE LORD shall he behold ” (Num. xii. 7, 8). And in point of obedience it should be our ambition to imitate as far as possible the example of one who was as much greater and more honoured than Moses, as he than Aaron and Miriam ; of whom it is circumstantially recorded, how he “ became

obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. ii. 8). In all our inferior appetitive properties, whether twofold and reciprocal like fidelity, or simple and direct like obedience, as well as in our equal and superior, we should endeavour and delight to imitate that blessed model of universal righteousness; who, as he left us an example generally, that we should follow his steps (Pet. I. ii. 21), so among other points humbled himself especially, and became obedient unto death, that he might give to mankind the most perfect example of fidelity and obedience.

—2, Only mentioning the good appetitive characteristic, *Respect*, which stands in our enumeration next to fidelity and obedience, may be enough to exemplify the importance, if not necessity, of one good spirit to the perfection of another. It must not be said, that fidelity and obedience may not be perfect to the letter by themselves: for if a man fulfil his obligations in either way, he cannot be required to do more; but he may to feel, he may to demonstrate; without which his fidelity and obedience would not be perfect as to the spirit. And no one can help feeling the difference only between duty discharged as a matter of course, and the same discharged with love and respect; much more, between a grudging and a voluntary, a respectful and a slavish obedience.

For respect may be either inward or outward in relation to its subject: the inward, being the true beginning of the outward, and consequently of a respectful obedience altogether, is the sort that we are chiefly to consider. By this principle or beginning as well as perfection of respect, is to be understood the feeling of a respectable presence before us: which does not always imply an inferiority on the side of the subject or sentient who looks up to such presence in any view; but rather a superiority over the depraved multitude in one respect at least, the principle of respect; of which depraved

characters generally are not susceptible in any degree. For there are in this property, as in most of those surrounding Perfection, steps or degrees: and without setting our foot on the lowest, we cannot ascend to the highest in either; consequently, not to the next property above. The lowest degree of this property is simply Respect, as we name it; of which, and also of the second or mean degree, named Reverence, the object is man: but the highest degree is named Worship, and its object properly, God alone. Therefore, if a man be incapable of respecting, not to say reverencing man, how shall he be capable of respecting God; since the query of St. John respecting the combination of the good appetitive characteristic in general is peculiarly applicable to this type or species. "He that loveth (or respecteth) not his brother, whom he hath seen; how can he love (or respect) God whom he hath not seen?" (John I. iv. 20.) If a man be so deficient in point of morality, what signifies his talking of godliness?

—3, Allied to respect, and frequently as its issue or production, is *Hope* with its shades and degrees also; such as expectation, reliance or dependence, confidence, and other characteristics, which, like they, may be thought rather foreign to the general property, although their appetitive quality is obvious enough. It must be owned indeed very possible for one of that abject sort, of which there are but too many who properly belong to the world, to hope for good, even from one whom he hates or at least for the time, and if it be only in hoping to overreach him; as there can be no thought of overreaching without a degree of hate. In such cases, however, it is not pure hope, but hope alloyed and debased; it is not hope proper for men, but for mongrels, for those who approach the canine species in disposition. Pure hope is the hope of its object's confidence, esteem, and friendship, of the sight of his virtues, of the music of his sentiments, the fra-

grance of his example, the beauty of his precepts ; in short of all the characteristic constituents of the person, which is the person himself ; rather than of any foreign property of his, or even of any domestic : for as the hope towards the object's foreign property is covetousness, and that towards his domestic, lust—in neither case can such hope be the purely good appetitive characteristic under consideration. The confidence, esteem, friendship, virtues, sentiments and example of a superior object will seldom go alone indeed, but be most likely to draw on material evidences of their existence in acts, information and edification suited thereto ; consequently these will be added as an accompaniment to the principal object even in purest hope ; but only as an accompaniment, and not as a part or share of the same.

So our Saviour comparing foreign advantages with constituent as objects of hope and research, tells his disciples thus, " Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness (i. e. the most desirable constituents) and all these things (foreign property or mere incidentals) shall be added unto you" (Mat. vi. 33). So David, " **THE LORD HIMSELF** is the portion of mine inheritance, and of my cup : thou shalt maintain my lot. The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground : yea, I have a goodly heritage" (Ps. xvi. 6, 7) : and again where he says, " Thou shalt shew us wonderful things in thy righteousness, O God of our salvation ; Thou that art the hope of all the ends of the earth, and of them that remain in the broad sea" (Ib. lxxv. 5). Persons on the broad sea could not well have God for their hope without a good liking towards Him, however desirous they might be of his salvation, and particularly in time of peril on that unstable element ; neither on the other hand would they be likely to esteem, trust and confide in him ; in short, to love him, without reckoning on his protection or salvation. " We love Him because he first loved us" (John I. iv. 19) ; this is gratitude ;

and as we hope in him especially, we hope especially to love him; this is hope or trust. "And such trust have we through Christ to God-ward" (Cor. II. iii. 4).

This trust, calculation, or reckoning gives an air of intellect to hope and the other properties of its class, rather beyond what appears in faith, and still further beyond what appears in charity; but not enough to affect the character on which its description turns of a more spiritual property. For if there be a calculation in hope, much more is there feeling; and which may be so intense as to destroy calculation, making a man fairly to hope against hope, as they say; or, as it would be better said, even desperately.

—4, Faith, hope, and charity, are generally considered as three peerless graces of the moral kind; and that as it were traditionally after the great authority of St. Paul; but is there not another grace as becoming in the same way that may deserve to rank with these three, and cannot be properly included with them, yes; there is that *Gratitude*; as amiable and becoming a characteristic as either, being also at the same time perhaps rather more intellectual on account of a property of that class, the memory which it implies more directly than they. FOR GRATITUDE CONSISTS IN LOVE WITH A GOOD MEMORY, with the remembrance of benefits, or a sense of obligations; a memory particularly applicable to One Object, and He, most lovely.

Gratitude is very compatible with the other two inferior shades of love before mentioned, and rather conducive to one of them; as a grateful recollection of past favours is very likely to raise and support a confidence in their author. Gratitude differs from hope as far as receiving differs from expectation: but however these may differ in themselves, we generally find them agreed in their objects; and if the more we receive from any one the greater object he will be to us of hope and expectation, so will he be likewise of gratitude when hope is well founded:

then the more we hope for, for the more shall we have reason to be thankful; and where hope goes gratitude will be likely to follow. Therefore, HOPE IN GOD AND BE GRATEFUL, is not a bad maxim of religion: for if you hope in him rationally, you will have reason to thank him heartily. "O, taste and see, how gracious the Lord is: blessed is the man that trusteth in Him" (Ps. xxxiv. 8).

But in relation to equals, gratitude is not necessarily joined with trust or esteem; that being rather a return for favours, the author of which may subsequently forfeit these by indeliberate, without cancelling our former obligation to him, or destroying its remembrance. In this respect however, the case of hope is different: Hope may be destroyed by the indeliberate of its object. But still this circumstance does not amount to a sufficient reason for considering it less an objective characteristic on constituents, or more on incidentals than the other; so they, that is hope and gratitude, may both stand in a line with the two forementioned excellent characteristics, faith and charity.

4. From the eulogium here bestowed on the good appetitive sort of moral characteristics we are not to infer any thing to the discredit of *aversive* characteristics, or characteristics founded on the opposite feeling of aversion. Through the natural reaction caused by this property, the same, being still as harmless an essential in itself as any, has gained a bad name somehow in the world, with all that belong to it; as if no good thing could come out of Nazareth. But it is evident, that aversions are not necessarily evil, either in the natural or in the moral department: if they were, it would go hard with us both in body and soul sometimes: they would both be likely to be poisoned. If we had not a natural and rooted aversion to some kinds of savours and to some unsavoury companions, there is no knowing what might become of us. "Do not I hate them that hate thee?" (Ps. cxxxix. 21) says David; implying a virtuous detestation of the detestable ingrates.

Thus much may be said for the cause of aversion in

general ; and to shew farther its admissibility into the choir of good and righteous characteristics, it may only be necessary to mention two or three of its moral productions as a specimen, v. g. 1, Resolution ; 2, Fortitude ; 3, Caution and Vigilance : all members of the aversive tribe, the goodness of which needs not be questioned, if any one should be disposed to question their descent ; and that is the most important particular at present.

1, The first characteristic property or sort, most properly called *Resolution*, is founded on the more spiritual than intellectual essential, courage, by a greater accession of intellect than we expect in courageous brutes ; and particularly of that kind of intellect which relates most to judgment. Resolution in general, is judgment mounted on courage, or courage directed by judgment. It combines firmness with intention, and stability with conviction ; as its antithesis, irresolution divides them ; exhibiting judgment without courage, intention without firmness, and conviction without stability.

And it is remarkable, that the particulars of the property in question are not dependent on the same qualifications as the abstract ; but a resolution may be conceived without any of those which are said above to be necessary to resolution ; so that there would be no incongruity in talking of a timid, weak and wavering resolution ; though the abstract property itself can never be either, nor any thing like it ; any more than ideal beauty can be like the beauties that are occasionally seen in our species. A resolution may perish in the birth, without ever living to complexity : but where there is a power of keeping as well as framing resolutions, they may be highly useful. For a resolution is formed by associating some contingent action or purpose with its object, in such a way, that whenever the object shall present itself again to our attention, the action will naturally meet and enter along with it ; and so the doing part is forwarded without any additional expense

of thinking. We cannot always have the reasons that determined us to adopt any particular line of conduct in view ; and therefore we may be glad of this auxiliary, which we call a Resolution, sometimes, to indicate its necessity.

It is a happiness to be as resolute in performance, as forward in determination : and some can go so far as to keep a resolution against any thing but sin. But why not keep it there, too ? Why cannot they subdue every bad, as well as every good and indifferent habit by dint of resolution ? And why not support a good habit too, as well as subdue an evil one ? Nay, why not subdue every evil, and support every good habit ; as well as one, two, or three ? It is

—1, Because another chooses to have the merit of doing all this for us, and God allows it ; as that other tells his disciples, “ I am the vine, ye are the branches ; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit ; for WITHOUT ME YE CAN DO NOTHING ” (John xv. 5). We dare not name even a good request to God, but for His sake who is dear to the Father ; as we to Him : much less can we promise unto the Lord our God, and keep it (Ps. lxxvi. 11). Before a man resolve any thing extraordinary, therefore, he had best consider its agreement with His gospel, and pray for His grace to proceed, if he find such agreement ; or else either not resolve, or unresolve, if he have resolved improperly, and the sooner the better. It seems of consequence, to know when or in what case a resolution is better broken than kept ; and this, to be as just a rule for it as can be given. If any one would have also an example in point, let him read the parable of the two sons, who both broke a resolution in the matter of filial obedience ; where we find one obeying and the other disobeying contrary to resolution or promise (Mat. xxi. 28, &c.) : and there can be no doubt which was right, if the principle above intimated be correct. But

—2, If a man wish to keep his resolutions generally,

he should not only consult an higher power, as stated above, but also take care at the same time to avoid two things; 1, over-large professions, that his good resolves may not evaporate in words; 2, over-large resolves, that his good deeds may not be discharged in empty resolutions. In short, he should join another grace already mentioned with his resolution, which is patience, to make it good.

2, But resolution with patience, or tried resolution, has found another name in *Fortitude*; a property that has been always justly admired, and sometimes possessed; especially by the Stoics, who seemed to take the lead among philosophers in the polite society of Greece and Rome for ages on this account, together with his indifference to ordinary, inferior, and as it appears, merely foreign properties. For while others were hunting abroad for sources of gratification, the Stoics would look at home, to his own heart or highest constituents, and find therein a source for every thing, a substitute for every comfort, a plaister for every sore, a remedy for every evil and inconvenience; it was his cloak, his purse, his friend, his house, his every thing. So Stoicism became fortitude; a proud distinction for the Stoics as long as it was so considered. Yet fortitude never shone forth from the Picture-Portico at Athens with the lustre that it drew from the Mount of Olives at Jerusalem; nor ever looked so amiable before it was engrafted on the meek and lowly form of Christianity; nor was ever so true in itself before she tempered it with a resignation to the will of the Supreme Being and a firm reliance on his protection, being the peculiarity of Christian fortitude. And without these qualifications, it may be added, fortitude is no virtue for a Christian; but rather an insolent, not to say atheistical disposition. For where was ever the human being that could vie with such a spirit as Lucifer in the essential aversion on which this property is founded? perhaps none, nor yet in atheistic fortitude; but in the essential beatified, in the

fortitude of faith, a Sampson, a David; aye, and many an humble Christian, might shame the proud spirit, and all his generation.

3, There are properties allied to fortitude, as *Caution* and *Vigilance* for example, which do not seem to rank so high as that; but whether it be for want of the high dependence properly belonging to fortitude, or on account of the less active complexion of these two properties, it will not be necessary to determine. If these properties were free from aversion, they would not consist with the class of righteous characteristics now under consideration, neither would they, nor any other sort indeed be able to rank in the same line with them, or to stand (as it may be said) in the congregation of righteous spirits, if they were necessarily devoid of the excellent gift of charity. But caution and vigilance, though of the aversive class, do not imply a dislike to their object; if they did, the great exemplar as well as preacher of charity would never have inculcated these properties as he did, first to his followers generally, and next more particularly to his chosen apostles at the point of their departure on the mission, saying, "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves" (Mat. x. 16). Which shews, by the way, what use of policy is allowed to Christians, being the same as the use of war, v. g. defensive.

And thus it has also been shewn in a general way what modes or characteristics of the spiritual class may be considered as morally good, or as good moral objectives. We use the material expressions lines, ranks, classes, congregations, and the like in speaking of them for want of more spiritual, as they are also used in Scripture; where we read not unfrequently of the same objects in similar terms, as the "heavenly host" for example. In comparing spirits or spiritual characteristics we also talk of one as excellent, and of another as more excellent, like

marshals of the heavenly field; but all this only in a loose way of speaking, as we have need. For any one may conceive, that if particular or concrete spirits are not material, the abstract here alluded to certainly cannot be so, in the first place; and next, that no one who was not particularly vain or fanatical could ever presume to draw a strict comparison between good spirits only of the moral order or complexion: he might as well pretend to state the comparative worth of every individual in the right or left wing of a victorious army, in which every private should be an hero.

Therefore the adverse objects of comparison in this case will generally be extraneous rather than intrinsic with respect to the kingdom; as for example, comparing some good and amiable spirits which the gospel prizes highly with those which the world chiefly prizes, we shall find a mighty difference in their two estimates. Especially we shall find that such humble spirits as those of pity and sympathy; lenity, forgiveness, placability; toleration and mutual concession; affability and condescension; patience; meekness; modesty; self-correction; and in short, humility; with politeness and equity; gentleness and pliability on the one hand—and fidelity and obedience; respect; hope; gratitude on the other, however dear they may be to God and Christ, are not so popular as some in the world: but on the contrary there are multitudes in the world with whom no commendation would ever make them take, for want of the necessary affinity. Hence they will regard some of these properties; forgiveness, patience and meekness particularly, which are taught so decidedly in the Christian school, as weak and effeminate, pitiful and absurd. That a disposition framed on such principles may frequently conduce to its owner's comfort; or at least, to a diminution of his misery in a case past remedy they cannot deny; but at the same time will resolutely maintain, that the avenging of an affront, and procuring the redress of outward grievances, real

or imagined, is a duty incumbent on every man as a member of society; HOWEVER IT BE WITH THE INWARD SORT. And the very same persons who can submit implicitly to the harrows of an infernal enemy, will spurn the yoke of Christ, and regard a peaceful submission to their own brethren as an argument of pusillanimity; as no part of civic virtue, nor conducive by any means to public happiness: which is just what St. Peter says of them; "For when they speak great swelling words of vanity, they allure through the lusts of the flesh those that were clean: escaped from them that live in error. WHILE THEY PROMISE THEM LIBERTY, THEY THEMSELVES ARE THE SERVANTS OF CORRUPTION; for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage" (Pet. II. ii. 18, 19). "They corrupt other and speak of wicked blasphemy; (says the Psalmist) their talking is against the Most High. For they stretch forth their mouth unto the heaven; and their tongue goeth through the world. Therefore fall the people unto them; and thereout suck they no small advantage" (Ps. lxxiii. 8, &c.). And many in the world, who do not fully answer this description, whom it may esteem more justly perhaps in certain respects, are still of the same principle with those above described, if they do not perceive it themselves, in relation to the unchristian preference of revenge and other violent spirits before the mild and amiable which have been commended, and that by the best authority.

"Blessed are the poor in spirit; (says Christ) for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Mat. v. 3). But nothing can be more diametrically opposite to the opinion of the world; which admires a fine spirited fellow above all things. In the world courage is generally esteemed the highest, and most primitive virtue (*virtus*); in the kingdom of Christ not courage, or not worldly courage however; but patience and resignation, gentleness and forbearance, meekness and humility, or even timidity; properties all opposite to worldly courage. Nothing can be

more foreign to the character of this kingdom, than the noisy, rending, vindictive courage which the world approves: for the kingdom of Christ is a common concern of its subjects more than appears in any other kingdom or connexion; and there cannot be out of it so general a motive as it presents to all the peaceful virtues before enumerated. If men professing this dominion, empire or kingdom, considered always the good of the service as they ought, they would not be standing upon trifles with each other so often as they are; while the business which should chiefly concern all parties—the growth, honour and interests of the kingdom are shamefully neglected.

And only in a temporal view it would be easy to shew, that if the mild virtues aforesaid prevailed more in the world, it would be better for all ranks from highest to lowest; for the governors first, and also for the governed in every rank and degree. But the wider the sphere of the governor, the more provocation will he be likely to receive, and consequently the more occasion to have for these virtues as well as for the more dazzling properties of resolution and fortitude with others of their class before mentioned. As an example; the resolution and fortitude of the great leader of the Jews were sufficiently proved by his taking them all the long and wearisome way of that terrible march through the wilderness; or at least, to the end of it: but meekness, faith and obedience, the mild companions of fortitude, were what served him best, and what that eminent leader was most celebrated for, even by divine authority, the spirit that both gave him such meekness, and dictated its record to him as a lesson for rulers. "The man Moses was very meek above all the men which were upon the face of the earth" (Num. xii. 3). And if his Governor had not endowed him so largely with this virtue, Moses, bold and persevering as he was, would have had but small chance of governing that untractable race, and bringing the divine expedition with which he was entrusted to a successful issue.

Considering the freedom and equality that must have reigned in the camp of the Israelites, as usual with "those who dwell in tents," the meekness of Moses will appear the more prodigious; making one to wonder where he could learn it; as the properest class to learn meekness and all the milder virtues from, is not our equals, and still less our superiors; not from any class that will not bear our haughtiness and ill humour; but from the class that often cannot help it; from our inferiors and dependants, from those who have no remedy, from those who are obliged to bear such conduct as often as we may be sufficiently base and ungenerous to avail ourselves of our superiority in this unchristian-like manner. For if we can govern ourselves, and behave with becoming meekness before our inferiors, there will not be much danger of our breaking out in better company: our betters will take the charge of that upon themselves.

The importance of both these sorts of virtues, the manly and the mild, is therefore here generally asserted: but that all of them, at the same time, have their vices as well as their antitheses must also be confessed; and as other virtues may be eclipsed, obliterated, or even transformed into evil by evil accompaniments, so likewise may these. Patience, e. g., is evil when accompanied with sloth; resignation, accompanied with levity; meekness, with apathy; humility, with meanness perchance, as well as apathy; and forgiveness with partiality and injustice. Every action has also its proper season and circumstances. There is a time to resent, as well as to endure; to strive and pray, as well as to be resigned; to be warm and zealous, as well as to be passive and meek; lofty and indignant, as well as humble and conciliating. If, therefore, the original, essential, or fundamental properties be oftener called virtues than otherwise, they still are not absolutely and universally good any more than their antitheses are universally evil: but they seem to be for the most part as we generally find them designated; and that may be enough to entitle them

to the exalted place or station which they occupy among good moral characteristics of the more spiritual and intellectual sort.

And having now gone the round of good characteristics founded objectively, i. e. by practice, on the various essential constituents of the material and spiritual classes or kinds, those founded on the higher, intellectual, class may deserve our attention.

§ 3. The constancy of accidents or latency of properties, which will amount to the same thing, appears in this department of the heavenly kingdom more decidedly than in the other two which we have just perambulated : so that however paradoxical it may seem to expect a constancy of doing, and that wickedly too by nature, in the human subject, sphere, or composition, it will not appear so to assert the constancy of thinking ; for this is no more than has been often asserted already, and never successfully contradicted. Indeed to this discovery may be owing, perhaps, the doctrine of Socrates the Athenian, and other heathen philosophers, on the soul's pre-existence ; which meant nothing more with them than the latency of our intellectual properties ; for little idea had they of pre-existence in fact, or of posthumous existence either. But having made the discovery of latent properties in the human understanding, our spiritual midwife, as he used to call himself, had only to apply the charm of his discourse, even to persons who had not thought much outwardly before, and produce a fine flow of thinking.

But we Christians may boast a very superior sort of excitement to that practised by Socrates, which we have in the all powerful word of God, a word that not only quickens or produces reflection, as the Psalmist observed, "Thy word hath quickened me" (Ps. cxix. 50) ; but produces also just reflection, or right wisdom with its proper reward of happiness ; as the Psalmist also observes, speaking this time of particulars, "More to be desired are they than gold ; yea, than much fine gold, sweeter also than

honey and the honey-comb. Moreover, by them is thy servant taught, and in keeping of them there is great reward" (Ib. xix. 10, 11). And what the word does rightly and effectually, it also does smartly and expeditiously, according to the author of the epistle to the Hebrews. "For the word of God is quick and powerful (says he) and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. iv. 12): by which it may be seen what **THE WORD** is.

By dint, therefore, of great obligation to the life, the truth, and the quickness of God's Word, we are able to perceive not only the essential properties of intellect, as continuance in latency, or latency in continuance; but also the two general characteristics, good and evil, which have been traced hitherto, still proceeding together for the present through this, as through the two forementioned classes of constituents; also how they are commonly acknowledged, if little understood, in the world by such epithets as wisdom and truth on the one hand, and folly and falsehood on the other; and also, how custom has adopted particular characteristics for some of the intellectual constituents before mentioned, as well as the aforesaid general characteristics for all. It were to be wished that custom had been more precise in the use of the terms it has adopted; but we must take things as we find them, and build as we can on old foundations, carrying up one side of the edifice at a time, and the front or fairest side first, being *wisdom* and *truth*.

The high principle of truth or free thinking is here subjoined to the higher principle of wisdom or right thinking; in the same manner as wisdom or right thinking was before subjoined to righteousness or right doing: and when these are compared, not only wisdom and righteousness will appear to be one, but wisdom, righteousness, and truth. For we are not here to understand by truth merely

its verbal type, its utterance or expression ; which, according to the proverb, is not always requisite nor convenient ; not this assumed shape, nor any other accident of the property is here spoken of, but the property itself—the high property or principle of truth ; which goes through heaven and earth, proceeding from the intellectual sphere ; and is not found to differ substantially from righteousness, any more than it differs from wisdom, or wisdom from righteousness. For what is truth in any operation or production, but righteousness or right wiseness in that respect ? And what can wisdom or wiseness effect beyond truth, righteousness, or itself ? Wisdom, righteousness, and truth, if not made the same, were, however, made for each other : which shows the propriety of equalizing these terms and considering them reciprocally ; wisdom and truth as particular casts of righteousness, and righteousness as the truest wisdom. This is an union something like that which our heavenly Teacher requires, when he says, “ Be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves ; ” no easy part for his followers ! and also like the affinity generally observed in their respective subjects or the depositaries of these inestimable gifts ; as the wise of head will not disdain the conversation of the pure in heart ; nor the pure in heart the precepts of the wise. The clashing and disdainful part indeed will lie between the subjects of wider distinctions ; and not between subjects of which, as of wisdom, righteousness, and truth, the distinctions are scarcely perceptible. It is between the opposite subjects or depositaries of good and evil intellect, or of truth and falsehood, and of wisdom and folly, that the opposition lies, as Solomon justly observes, “ An unjust man is an abomination to the just, and he that is upright in the way, abomination to the wicked ” (Prov. xxix. 27).

And though wicked persons are so far from the substance of wisdom, righteousness and truth, being made up themselves of clean contrary materials ; yet they will dispute the title to these excellent properties, or to one of

them at least, not perceiving their identity—they will dispute the title to things that they hate particularly—hate above all things—with their actual worshippers, with those who love, cherish, and enjoy them. Thus the fool will have his folly to be wisdom, his falsehood to be truth, and his captivity to be freedom. But as Moses told his foolish emulators, “To-morrow the Lord will show who are his, and who is holy; and will cause him to come near unto him” (Num. xvi. 5), so does he now continually: if there be any room for doubt the morrow shall decide. It is God’s word, the word of the master, as before observed, that must indicate his work, showing what he owns by the riches of his grace, and by other unequivocal marks of his approbation; as David says, “O come hither and hearken, all ye that fear God; and I will tell you what he hath done for my soul” (Ps. lxvi. 14). “The Lord ordereth a good man’s going, and maketh his way acceptable to himself” (Ib. xxxvii. 23). “He giveth wisdom to the wise” (Dan. ii. 21). “The works of his hands are verity and judgment: all his commandments are true” (Ps. cxi. 7); and his service, or obedience to the same commandments, is perfect freedom.

The same submission to the divine will that constitutes freedom in one department will constitute the same in another; and as the subjection of the will to God’s makes righteousness, so that of the understanding will make wisdom: one, a free-will; the other, a free understanding. “And I will walk at liberty (says the Psalmist) for I seek thy commandments” (Ps. cxix. 45). This godly inclination is a sure sign of the Spirit of God, or of his spiritual presence: “and where the Spirit of the Lord is, (says St. Paul,) there is liberty” (Cor. II. iii. 17). This spiritual enjoyment of the Lord should be carefully distinguished from his empty profession; which is often found to be either an engine of tyranny, or a pretext for sedition. It has been said, and truly, that Christianity and slavery could never exist together: but it cannot be said, that the empty pro-

fession of its divine truths may not exist with slavery, nor that it may not be promoted thereby. TRUE FREEDOM IS TO SERVE GOD FREELY, AND NOT TO USE OUR FREEDOM AS A CLOAK OF MALICIOUSNESS (Pet. I. ii. 16).

But the fool will have it, that his mode is freethinking; when he hates its very foundation, the word of God afore-said; and will never look into it, without knowing why; except that he hates it. Of course he considers, that taking God's word cannot be thinking for himself as not being that to which he is addicted: but taking the way of the world is; taking the word of its infernal tyrant and his own must be, because to them he is addicted. It were well, if a fool could know something, that he might know whose word he takes before God's; it were well, if a fool could consider, that he might consider whose property he becomes by undoing, before his undoer shall put in a claim for the rubbish that may not be disputed. For, as Moses said of those before mentioned, "To-morrow the Lord will shew who are his, and who is holy;" so may it be said of a foolish self-named freethinker, "To-morrow the devil will shew who are his, and who not holy."

The term Freethinking has been usually confined to the subject of religion: but there seems no reason, why it should not be applied likewise to any subject to which Wisdom can be applied, as it means no less. For Free thinking does not mean a boundless apprehension, nor an infallible memory, not an inevitable judgment, nor a spontaneous will, nor ceaseless imagination; but a wise apprehension, a wise memory, a wise judgment, a wise will, a wise imagination; an apprehension of the truth, a remembrance of the truth, a conviction of the truth, an enjoyment of the truth, an imagination of the truth; which however God reveals: it means in short A SUBJECTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL DEPARTMENT TO ITS RIGHTFUL SOVEREIGN, THE FOUNTAIN OF WISDOM AND TRUTH.

It would not be an unprofitable task, to trace the ves-

tiges of wisdom or freethinking through every quarter of the intellectual departments minutely at present, if the present undertaking admitted of such a task; but as it is, the most that can be reasonably attempted is a very slight survey of the characteristic in either of the five principal divisions above mentioned as they follow successively, beginning with the first and fundamental particular: that is

1. *Wisdom, or Truth of apprehension*: a property in which may be found great room for miscarriage as well as improvement, and consequently for the use of precaution and diligence in respect of both. Its essential kinds were described as two under that head; external and internal: both of which are highly important in themselves, in the divine allotment on which they depend, in the effect of every individual life in which they are combined; and in the measure of retribution according to each respectively from the Almighty Creator, by Whom they are variously apportioned.

For in the particular quality of a man's external apprehension only, is often laid the foundation of his fortune here and his happiness hereafter; this being, as it were, the beginning of intellect. And the improvement of this beginning, as far as the subject is improveable, seems to be a duty that every man owes to his Maker as well as to himself and others; that his light may shine to the glory of God and the good of society as well as to his own honour and comfort. In this imperfect state of the human understanding, a selection and apprehension of objects convenient for the exercise and development of its interior properties, is as liable to be interrupted by mists and illusions, as the vision or any other sense by which objects are supplied to the outward apprehension, and even more than these. Therefore, to rectify the beginning of intelligence is a very material point; and no less is it to attend likewise soberly and anxiously to the inward process by which what were first only outward objects, and

then ideas, are converted into opinions and sentiments. If we proceed in this way, by God's providence, by the help of his holy Spirit and the direction of his holy Word, we may go on still from a correct to a wise apprehension, and thence to the good characteristics on other intellectual processes or constituents; as discernment, prudence, discretion, and wisdom of every kind in short. But besides the natural infirmity of the understanding there are also other things against it: there is an enemy . . . "Be sober, be vigilant, because your adversary, the devil, as a roaring lion walketh about, seeking whom he may devour" (Pet. I. v. 8).

2. Considering the application of wisdom and truth to the second named intellectual constituent, to make a *true and wise Memory*; it will appear, that there are more sorts of this constituent than people generally contemplate when they talk of good and bad, and that there are also in a moral or objective view, both better and worse than in a natural or subjective: yet the natural will afford the greatest variety. For of the moral sort there are no more varieties than there are of a peaceful conscience which is founded thereon; v. g. wise and unwise, or just and mistaken. With those men whose memories are so very flattering as to hush the recollection of an offence almost as soon as it is committed, a peaceful conscience must needs be a mistaken conscience: and vice versâ, the memory of real offences that never yields to time, nor business, nor blandishments, nor FALSE PROMISES (Ezek. xiii. 22), nor to any other consideration till duly relieved by grace, bringing the sufferer to repentance, which is known to be godly by fruits meet for repentance—such a memory, being just itself, is usually attended with satisfaction to the subject and peace of conscience, or peace in the central or interior department of the kingdom. There may, indeed, be anomalies in this respect through the excessive meekness or susceptibility of the subject, perchance, producing horror and devastation where comparative peace

and security ought to reign, or through a spiritual tyranny (Ib.) as bad as blandishments; but this temporary disorder, it is to be hoped, will not make any essential difference to such a person in the end; when "the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain" (Isai. xl. 4). In the meantime a good moral memory may be formed, and a bad one improved by a virtuous and charitable apprehension; and a pleasant memory may be formed, and an unpleasant improved by a pleasant, just and charitable demeanour: or else it must continue; as there can be no sweet sauce in a memory that is loaded with vexatious, vicious, and uncharitable actions.

3. Among the different essentials which serve as a fund for character, or a foundation to moral characteristics, and on the right use of which as much will depend as on the right employment of two, five, or any other proportion of talents that may be confided to us (Matt. xxv. 15) the property of judgment is not the least considerable, nor at the same time least precarious. For whether we use this privately for our own direction, or publicly for the direction or correction of others, we shall find much required to its success, and many chances of failure in this respect. One prime requisite to a *wise Judgment*, and indispensable too perhaps, is charity: indeed, all our doings without charity must be defective, and of no intrinsic worth. But it is not so clear in every other way as in this, how charity tends to edification (Cor. I. viii. 1): and here it will seem most evident, if we consider how there are generally two ways of viewing the same object as the same object will generally have two sides; and it is wonderful how an habit of viewing objects on the most favourable side will improve the judgment as well as general character of the observer; or on the contrary, how a regularly ill-natured view may continue to deprave the ill-nature from which it proceeds. Therefore, "judge not (says our blessed Saviour) that ye be not judged" (Matt. vii. 1): meaning unfavourably. An unfavourable opinion

of others does not present an edifying model for a man's own conduct. Think rather, therefore, of other men's good qualities than of the evil which they also have. With regard to scripture-characters especially; as the sacred history is most candid in exposing the faults of its subjects along with their perfections; we should consider the proper use of this information to be, the correcting of our own faults by theirs, and checking exultation by the sense of their superior worth: not judging or inferring evil things of prophets, patriarchs, and apostles; but the best that we can, with a view to support ourselves under the pressure of inevitable failings by the consideration of God's mercy displayed in them. It is thus, that the candour of this inestimable record deserves to be repaid.

If we should be called to judge officially respecting the conduct of others, the same charity will be most likely still to lead us to just conclusions: and even if we should err on this side, the ill consequences would probably be lighter than those of erring on the side of severity. Where the evidence of any crime is incomplete, however strong the presumption, we ought to let it pass as a case not within our jurisdiction; but his who is the proper judge of secrets, "WHO WILL BOTH BRING TO LIGHT THE HIDDEN THINGS OF DARKNESS, AND MAKE MANIFEST THE COUNSELS OF THE HEART" (Cor. I. iv. 5).

Many other rules might be found for righteousness in judging, or for a construction by habit of the good objective characteristic, a righteous judgment; shewing how such construction must proceed both generally and particularly, to enable us to fulfil our Saviour's precept, "Judge righteous judgment" (John vii. 24). For as the essential property is formed only by judging, so the moral characteristic thereon is formed by judging righteously. But this invention is a part that belongs rather to lawyers and casuists; to one sort, as judges of outward actions chiefly; to the other, as judging chiefly of inward actions, or cases of conscience. While the discoveries of

either sort are generally worth considering; and the more so, as the judgment being a more voluntary part of intellect than some, will have in consequence a larger share of responsibility attached to it.

On the same account this property in a moral view may also be more particularly distinguished than some others by its effects and circumstances; as into true and false; wise and unwise, charitable and uncharitable, honest and corrupt. But we must advance a step in the concretion or specification of the essential property before we can make this counter-distinction: "And why? God is the Judge: He putteth down one, and setteth up another" (Ps. lxxv. 8). Therefore, it will be necessary to understand also with the objective characteristics on judgment the same distinction that was lately understood for the sake of its good subjectives, v. g. into divine and human, before we can give it so much as indifference—leave alone, an evil characteristic. And with this understanding to every good characteristic of a human judgment must still be added the alloy of fallibility: so that whatever difference may be found among human judgments in other respects, they will all—just or unjust, wise or unwise, charitable or uncharitable, honest or corrupt, agree in one; they will all be naturally and universally fallible: it cannot be otherwise. And hence the most that can be said of a wise human judgment is, that it is AS WISE AS IT CAN BE. For only consider, how apt the human judgment is, and almost certain, to be biassed occasionally; and if biassed only once, it is sure to judge wrong. In no man, therefore, can this property be right altogether; but mixed, adulterated, made up of two sorts of materials or modes of judging: unless a man's judgment should happen to be always wrong, and then it will be simple enough; for there is no mixture in alloy.

If an habitually right judgment was to be found any where, one should expect to find it with those who make judgment their profession, and from their particular study and experience ought to excel in that department, as they

will, no doubt, when they can keep clear of the thing called Bias. But that is not so easy a matter as some may imagine : and often they, who seem good judges enough of other things, are but plain judges of this. Judges may persuade themselves, that they are men of honour and integrity ; because they are, as they think, above the influence of money as a bribe : but is money the only means of corruption ? Not the only means indeed, though very common : there is such a thing as favour and preferment ; there is such a thing as a difference of principle, as party-spirit, and private pique ; each as efficacious as the love of money, and each as bad, if not as mean a corruptor. And frequently without the grand medium of commerce men can barter their commodities by taking payment in kind ; as judgment for persecution, and a double tongue for a two-edged sword. Then will they "strain at a gnat and swallow a camel" (Matt. xxiii. 24). You would think, there were no men so scrupulous with regard to evidence as they : and yet the end of evidence, which is the eliciting of justice and truth, will go down whole with them at such times by means of some quibbling conceit. And it were well for them, though not to be expected from men of such habits, if lawyers would apply their acumen fairly sometimes to the evidence of other matters, as well as the forensic : it were well, if they who make such a point of minute evidence in temporal questions could think the broadest of some consequence in the claims of religion : (punctilious hypocrites as they are) and not be carried away by their innate corruption, with the sanction of fashion to the side of infidelity and atheism !

4. From its particularly instrumental and relative nature there can hardly be any kind of objectively characteristic will, whether good or bad ; though the sort may not all appear so decidedly as the general spiritual appetitive characteristic by the name of Charity aforesaid, or by the more specific name of Good-will or Benevolence. Yet in the midst of this scarcity the same root will also furnish a good

intellectual objective as well as a spiritual; a *Free-will* being as much a virtue on this property as a good, also one that requires as much grace from above and as much rectitude in the subject, to make it good. The virtue has a sufficient relation to intellect, to give it the character here assigned; and yet differs nothing in substance from the good spiritual; a free-will being a good-will and vice versa, a good-will, as free as possible. A free-will is willing freely, or primitively, according to the will of God; uncaptured, unbiassed, unshaken by terror, uninfluenced by temptation. It is a straightforward process without reference to any object beyond that on which it is employed; which on the contrary there is in good-will. And if free-will takes the air of a subjective from its accidentality, donation, or dependence, good-will and every other good characteristic is as dependent as that. Therefore, we need not scruple to assume free-will as a part of moral righteousness, though it should be given or decreed to its happy owner from above.

To reconcile the supposed contradiction between absolute fate and free-will, has often been thought impossible; but is in fact one of the easiest impossibilities that could ever be thought of; if the querist will please to observe, how free-will may be allotted to any one inevitably, or written in his fate: for that may be just as well as free agency; that being only a freedom in respect of evil spirits, as this in respect of evil men.

And likewise with regard to the especial need of divine grace, which we feel for every good thought and work; so that we cannot even will, much less do any good thing without it—with regard to the consistency of this good principle too with free-will; it needs only be observed as before, that if either free-will or free-agency may be the effect of grace, there will seem no absurdity in supposing their coexistence, if not equal necessity in the subject. For what may be the effect of grace? It is the doing of one by another's efficiency; as things beyond a man's single

ability are generally done. And (as our Saviour told his apostles) herein is that saying true, "One soweth and another reapeth" (John iv. 37). One wears the laurels, and others win the victory. If it should seem contradictory, therefore, again, or at least not a little presumptuous, considering this dependence, for any one to talk of what he will do, if it be only to explain a seeming contradiction in terms—for in such a case it would not be I; (as St. Paul says) but another by me (Cor. I. xv. 10)—let it be supposed that the Higher Power or Principal having taught us in the first place to make good resolutions, should be further pleased to add or restore to us the blessing of free-will also, which is a general licence to perform them, together with the gift of means necessary for their performance—surely it might then be possible indeed, and we might also then be fairly said, to keep our resolutions.

Therefore, it seems, that subject to divine grace or goodness, the first thing required for human freedom and ability is, to know the will of God, and have A RIGHT DEPENDENCE. Then we may be truly said, to enjoy the rare privilege and invaluable blessing of a free-will, a will exhibiting the agreement of reason and inclination, or THE IDENTITY OF FORE AND AFTER-THOUGHT. For a man's will must needs be considered free as long as it is subject to his understanding, and his understanding as free as ever. But there can be no free-will, nor any other species of freedom without free-thought; which is wisdom and truth as it was in the beginning. "And the truth shall make you free" (John viii. 32), says our Saviour. Or else our choice of actions, though we may be pleased to call it voluntary or free, would have to depend, not on the pattern of primitive perfection, but on the bias of a particular constitution, which is generally defective; or on the casual motives or objections persuading or dissuading, which, to be received, must be analogous to the constitution. And what is to be done where these are wanting? Threats and promises will not produce their natural effect on those who

are insusceptible of hope and fear: which if they be not actual virtues or good objective characteristics, are at least a good foundation for them—like mother of pearl, matrices of gold and precious stones, and so accounted in the Gospel. Therefore, “whosoever hath to him shall be given” (Matt. xiii. 12).

Whoever is happy enough to enjoy that illumination towards God which infers or consists in the union of just hope and fear, may be said to be endowed with a free-will and a free understanding; with a will directed by wisdom, and an understanding by goodness: with free-will, of every species of freedom, the purest and safest; the farthest removed from human control, and the farthest from human encouragement; what God only can give, and no being that is not more than human can take away. Freedom of action and freedom of speech have nothing to do with it: free-thinking is not so safe. For what can be restrained must needs be enjoyed by licence: and there are several performances of this sort. Thus doing may be restrained by fetters; speaking, by mutilation or seclusion; thinking, by superstition and prejudice—to a certain extent: so that freedom on these heads, v. g. on thinking, speaking, and doing, or freedom in relation to these performances, may be regarded as half incidental; which free-will is not. For there are no bonds able to restrain a free-will: the bird will die in its cage before it will be reconciled to confinement. Absolute free-will is superior to any natural force; it never will yield.

5. The last in ascending, and consequently highest production of good characteristics on intellectual bases, is the sort founded on imagination; a property like other delicate structures, more liable to disorder and derangement, than any of a grosser quality; but not the less worthy to be dignified in comparison, as the immediate link between human and higher intellects in the order of the heavenly kingdom. And one should think, that many persons could not be ignorant of the existence of a property that is more

constant and universal, perhaps, as well as more dignified than any of the highest class; but it is very presumable, that many are not aware either of the derangement or improvement of which this property is susceptible. Very few, especially, perhaps, have ever felt the advantage which this property derives from its vicinity, or—to use a still more material expression, contiguity to the Fountain of wisdom: whence proceed by this avenue, medium, or foundation, such characteristics as *Inspiration, Illumination, Light, and Life*.

For it may be proper to observe that there are two avenues of wisdom extending towards the centre of the intellectual department, whatever that may be considered, from either hand; one, external, proceeding first by sensation; then 1, by external; 2, by internal apprehension; the other, internal, proceeding by the way of the imagination first, then by conception and FAITH: so that, however commendable this last mentioned property may be considered, imagination, being otherwise of the same quality, will be still more commendable in one respect, as standing next to its divine Object. As the senses are material messengers or messengers for material intelligence; so the imagination is an intellectual messenger, or a messenger for the conveyance of intellectual impressions, not only from intermediate beings but from the Highest by his word to beings of our low degree. Or (to use a more spiritual phrase) imagination may be regarded as the breath of intellect, subject, like that of the spirit, to a double motion, or flux and reflux, properly called Expiration and Inspiration, as it comes and goes continually by either avenue of intellect, without leaving its hold in the body or subject.

The excursions of the imagination are also made in such a way, that upon conceiving some heavenly vision it shall go forth, as it may go back again, not singly and unattended; but with other intellectual properties, its ordinary companions; not with delusive imaginations in their stead, but with all or any of the intellectual corps that

may be required, truly and identically, or as it may be said, in *PROPRIIS PERSONIS*. Hence the intimation, not uncommon in Scripture, of the human heart going forth of its dwelling; when divers central properties as well spiritual as intellectual with the imagination at their head, stretching themselves far beyond the material association, proceed to visit distant objects, perhaps, very distant in the line either of space or occurrence. We read of such visits being paid in the former line, or line of space, by Elisha to the spot where his mercenary attendant overtook the Syrian general with his company: "And he said unto him; Went not mine heart with thee, when the man turned again from his chariot to meet thee?" (Kings II. v. 26)—also by Jesus to Nathanael, that amiable, excellent man, "an Israelite, indeed, in whom is no guile" (John i. 47) as he said; which shews what Israelites should be. "Nathanael saith unto him, Whence knowest thou me? Jesus answered and said unto him, Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee" (Ib. 48). And in the latter line, or line of occurrence, are recorded visits of the prophetic imagination as well backward as forward; as well to events or dispensations appearing before the time of the observers as after; of which last, many have since been fulfilled, and others are daily fulfilling. Thus, Moses in spirit goes backward to the period of creation, and forward to that of salvation (Gen. i. 1, &c. . . xlix. 10, &c.): St. John still farther each way, shewing in his Gospel, how the prophetic imagination begins and proceeds; and exemplifying in his Revelation a visit of the same far, very far, into the recesses of futurity (John i. 1, &c.—Rev. i. &c.)

The most convenient terms, therefore, for the good objective characteristic on imagination, if it should not rather be called a Gift, are Illumination and Inspiration according to the forecited passage of St. John, describing its derivation from the Eternal Word, the Light and the Life of men. As David also says, "The Lord is my Light and

my salvation ; whom then shall I fear ? the Lord is the strength of my life ; of whom then shall I be afraid ?" (Ps. xxvii. 1.)

* It should here be observed, that while one property is common to every good objective characteristic, being that of a twofold object, namely the internal on which such characteristic is founded, and the external to which it relates ; there will be this peculiarity in the present class, that of good moral objectives, or good objectives in a moral relation, compared with the class which follows—that they are good for the external as well as the internal object ; for the parties casually affected by them, as well as for the subject or owner who depends on them continually.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER IV.

GOOD *OBJECTIVE* CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 3.

RELIGIOUS—ON INCIDENTALS.

1, Persons.—2, Places.—3, Things.

“Take heed to thyself, that thou forsake not the Levite as long as thou livest upon thy earth.”—DEUT. xii. 19.

THE entire course of righteousness, or of good objective characteristics, having two species, forms or aspects, moral and religious; that by the name of morality, this of religion, or more properly of godliness, answering to the two principal objects of objective good, being man and his Maker but unequally affected by the said characteristics, as just observed; and the first or moral aspect of this fair course having also been just exhibited—hastily, it is true, and more according to licence and opportunity than according to the merits of the subject in some particulars, it will now be convenient to repeat or go over again the same fair course with a religious aspect; considering this time “what manner of persons we ought to be in all holy conversation and godliness” (Pet. II. iii. 11)—a fair flight beyond mere morality, and a step even beyond that which is properly called divine; namely, the Christian. For mere morality is an *IGNIS FATUUS*—a very

unsettled rule—a sort of EMPIRIC PRACTICE : which may be beneficial by chance ; or it may be otherwise, and most likely will be on great occasions, like the practice of an empiric. And even the divine species of morality above described we shall find defective if we stop at it—“having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof” (Tim. II. iii. 5). For it cannot be said of morality alone, as of godliness, that it is great riches (Ib. I. vi. 6) ; since any one thing that requires another thing to make it perfect must be poverty and not riches : for morality will not include godliness : but godliness will include morality, being “profitable unto all things” (Ib. iv. 8).

Therefore to combine a perfect view of godliness, it would be necessary to recall our ideas of all the forementioned inferior appetitive good characteristics ; fidelity, respect, hope, gratitude, with some more intellectual like their present object—light especially ; “as God is light” (John I. i. 5) ; and collect them to a point, directing all their virtue towards that adorable object which is implied in the title of the characteristic or sort. And in this review it will also be convenient, to recommence and pursue the order of detail before pursued in our corresponding view of moral characteristics just completed ; as in that we had previously pursued the order of the essential constituents which are the foundation of both, v. g. of both the moral and religious forms or species.

There is a great disparity, as there had need to be indeed, between the composition of godly objective characteristics on the incidental class of essentials, and on the constituent : and yet, that the former sort should hardly have found a general name, while of the latter there are names both general and particular, as we shall soon have occasion to observe, may seem remarkable ; more especially considering, that even the opposite of this, the ungodly sort of objective characteristics on incidentals, has found its proper terms for two distinctions at least. This seems a remarkable desideratum for godly objectives on in-

incidentals, and rather hard on their subjects. For if a man was ever so just in maintaining and liberal in bestowing his means of any sort, with reference to their bountiful donor, and ever so frugal, orderly, and discreet in the care and management of the same, for God's honour and service, we could not give his goodness a proper epithet in either case: though if a man should be the reverse of this in either respect; was he a plunderer of incidentals that ought to be held sacred, or a debaser of the same by unworthy usage; we might say of his conduct, that it was sacrilege in one case, and profanation or profaneness in the other—profanation, if displayed in actions—profaneness, if in words.

The nearest general term that can be assigned perhaps for godliness, or godly objectives on incidentals, may be *Piety*: and for its inferior distinctions, if there be none in proper terms, we may conceive a distinction however in realities notwithstanding, and name accordingly, as e. g. in respect of object; 1, a special sort, consisting in such moral actions only as have a more immediate and direct allusion to the Deity; 2, a general sort, consisting in any kind of moral actions, performed with the same concern and respect towards him, as if they naturally had that view or reference: we have noticed many of this sort under the head of moral characteristics, as some of that may be noticed under the head of godly, making a sort of godly characteristics on incidentals. In a general way the use of all that we have, and of all who are either lent or given to us, as well the stranger as the home-born, may be referred to the part of godliness or to the will of God, let who will be its immediate object, or the party chiefly benefited thereby: but what we are now considering is the use of our incidentals, with an especial view to their Donor: wherein there are these two parts to be regarded chiefly, the manner and the matter of such use

First, the *manner* of godliness on incidentals will consist, as before intimated, either in a true devotion, gift or dedication of the matter to God's honour and service, or in some

marked esteem or worthy usage of the same. When we come to consider the subject of the Kingdom relatively, we shall have occasion to observe how every offering of righteousness to God is offered and made by a certain medium ; wherein consists the power of godliness, and without which, righteousness can never go beyond morality or the form of godliness, if that may be called righteousness : but at present the matter of such offering, or the substance of godly objectives on incidentals, will chiefly claim our attention.

And what makes this *matter*, or the substance of godly objectives on incidentals both easy and interesting is, the convenience of dividing it by a division of the essential incidentals on which it is founded into three sorts or portions ; being godliness 1 on persons, 2 on places, 3 on things.

§ 1. It would seem as if the first of these three criterions, namely, *Persons*, could not be reckoned among the incidentals of the kingdom. To enumerate men as the property of men, as a part of their cattle, does not seem consistent with Christian modes of thinking, however common it may be found in practice : but that the lowest men in the kingdom should be considered as relatives of the same, and correlatives of the highest ; all being alike the property of One who is higher than all, all being His common property. For the right or property of the objects of godly characteristics generally is ascribed to him to whom they are dedicated ; and being once dedicated to him, they are his indefeasible right, His property by return as well as by egress, and HIS FOR EVER : but the property of the characteristics themselves which are founded thereon, by much the best part, He kindly concedes to their subjects : which the Psalmist notices : “ And that thou, Lord, art merciful (says he) for thou rewardest every man according to his work” (Ps. lxii. 12) ; being for them a profitable exchange. But we find a convenience in this distinction ; which does not on consideration appear so unnatural as at first sight. Considering persons therefore as incidentals, if it be only for the occasion, let us observe what may be

godliness or piety in relation thereto from those on whom they depend, whether it be themselves as their own property, or others.

1. Reason and the example of all nations then may teach us, that if we owe any attention to our Creator; to learn his will, to implore his favour, to acknowledge his goodness, to deprecate his displeasure, as well collectively as individually; to be his in short, and to have him for our God, there must be those who can minister for such purposes, being duly instructed, dedicated, and ordained to that end or object. Considering the dignity of the employment, it may also be inferred, and judging by the example just mentioned would likewise seem to be universally agreed, that the objects dedicated to such a Ministry should be neither few nor foul; but enough and to spare, and that of the very best.

2. It is not to be supposed that in an ordinary state with a dense population, so large a portion as a tenth of the people can be dedicated to the service of religion and a tenth of its wealth to their maintenance; as it was in that particular state which God selected and ordained for a leaven to others; but there might be in every state in Christendom a dedication corresponding with the munificence of the Jewish institution at the same time that it was regulated by the spirituality of the Christian and the circumstances of the country in which it was made. Nothing can be too good for this service however high in birth and talent, or in talent without birth. If among heathen nations it has been thought no disparagement for sovereigns to bear the title of Priest, it should not be thought any for a Christian family, however noble or princely*, to devote one or more of its members, not nominally or titularly, but virtually and effectually, to that sacred office. Nor should they be deterred from so pious a devotion in any particular case by the seeming want of

* As authority for such an appropriation, the calling of the moral young man, (Matt. xix. 20, 21,) deserves to be remembered.

a provision for such member or members suitable to their family connexions and former enjoyments: they could not if they considered fairly the example of the universal High Priest, who was so infinitely higher born than the highest family upon earth. "For (as St. Paul tells the Corinthians) ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich" (Cor. II. viii. 9). The greater their poverty therefore, the greater would be their dignity in respect of outward circumstances, from the greater resemblance of their circumstances to his: but to be governed merely by the prospect of temporal advantages in devoting a son to the priesthood, would be degrading for him, insulting to God, bad policy for the state, and in fact no devotion to God, but to his rival, Mammon; by which many an excellent subject is stolen, no doubt, from his proper destiny, and from a service that he might have adorned. If fathers thought correctly, they would prefer even on their children's account an honourable poverty in the church with the peace that should accompany the same, to any troublesome accumulation of preferment otherwise. It is the only line by which the higher orders can descend to the lower without any disparagement: and it requires no great wisdom to shew, what advantage such a mixture, if followed with good doctrine and example, must produce to all classes in the state: the advantage of spiritual peers or commoners either could have nothing to do with it; as they cannot depend on the temporal interest without lowering their own, nor overpass it without being troublesome neighbours.

§ 2. Of essential incidentals the two proper species, real and personal, which have been already enumerated may serve as a foundation to the two remaining sorts of pious objectives, v. g. on places and things: on the first of which, *Places*, understanding thereby what is usually understood by Real property, it may be averred, that every man without accounting much of the dedication of more fugitive

means, should consider his houses and lands whatever they may be and wherever situated as a substantial provision, by gift or entailment from above to be administered by his hands for the general service of the bountiful Being from whom he received them, and who graciously deigns to employ him for good.

But besides this general use of the more lasting and substantial sort of incidental property, a special dedication of different conveniences may be required for its enhancement; and, if not from every one separately and individually, yet from numbers collectively, where separate means are insufficient for a common object, whether it be little or great, a single sacrifice, or a lasting edifice; according to the terms of the divine institution in the Passover, "saying, in the tenth day of this month they shall take to them every man a lamb according to the house of their fathers, a lamb for an house. And if the household be too little for the lamb, let him and his neighbour next unto his house take it according to the number of the souls," &c. (Exod. xii. 3, 4).

This rule of the Passover may serve generally for religious appropriations, only substituting, perhaps, a church for a lamb, and a twentieth for a tenth. And an house or place of meeting and communion between God and his peculiar people, or church, with other property thereto belonging, seems as necessary an appendage of the union in this material state collectively, as the form or person of its members individually: which house or meeting place, being so used for a blessed medium of communication between two parties, may be ascribed as an incidental to either or both, and also named indifferently from either; as e. g. 1, the House of God; 2, the House of the church, or elliptically, the Church. In either case too we should understand the metonymy of one for a kind; as it must be an house, indeed, to hold all the church of God; and still more, to hold him whom "the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain" (Kings I. viii. 27). It is true

that one house may contain all the Commons of a mighty empire by representation ; so it may, all the commons of the earth, and nobles too : but there is no appearing in the house of God by representation. To the well of life, which is here discovered in the vale of misery, every one must approach individually for himself ; as our business “ in the courts of the Lord’s house ” must not be done by attorney, but always and by all in person. Thus, “ they will go from strength to strength ; and unto the God of gods appeareth (personally) every one of them in Sion ” (Ps. lxxxiv. 7).

How different is a congregation coming regularly to appear before God in this manner and steadily progressing towards God, from one either transfixed and nailed as it were to the ground by empty forms, or stupified by sound without meaning, or bewitched with “ great swelling words ” drawn daily from “ wells without water ” — “ murmurers, complainers,” who separate themselves like “ the angels which kept not their first estate ” (Jude) ! how different their drinking of the brook in the way and lifting up their heads (Ps. cx. 7), or rejoicing to edification before God, as they ought ! A more glorious appearance than the GREAT CONGREGATION when so engaged is not to be witnessed on earth : it deserves to be celebrated as a sort of intermediate society, and a train extending from earth to heaven. “ It is well seen, O God, how thou goest : how thou, my God and King, goest in the sanctuary. The singers go before, the minstrels follow after, in the midst are the damsels playing with the timbrels. Give thanks, O Israel, unto God the Lord in the congregations from the ground of the heart. There is little Benjamin their ruler, and the princes of Judah their counsel, the princes of Zabulon, and the princes of Nepthali. Thy God hath sent forth strength for thee : stablish the thing, O God, that thou hast wrought in us, for thy temple’s sake at Jerusalem ” (Ps. lxxviii. 24, &c.).

§ 3. The glory of the visible church founded on character, not on show and appearance, is a fair matter of

exultation and a laudable object of ambition to all its members individually; provided it be the great CATHOLIC, or common concern that we regard, and not the concerns of our own church merely, or, what may be worse, of a mere party within the same; or, worse again, because it is truly Satanic, of our own dear selves. A man who can intentionally detach his own splendour and credit from that of the community to which he belongs is as good as lost, and deserves to be "cast forth as a branch" (John xv. 6), or an excrescence, and fairly disowned by every member of that community. But in minding the honour of the visible church we should also have a constant and more espectral regard to the invisible, governing ourselves chiefly by its interests; and then we could not greatly err on either side of its incidental objectives, as in allotting either too much or too little to it particularly for visible effects and decorations: which belong to the description of *Things*, and as such are a part of the third and last mentioned foundation. And here,

1. In the same manner as the house of the church is an incidental common to God and his people, the *Revenue* of the same ought also to be regarded, i. e. as common property between God and his people for ever. So that the general devotion of a state unto God as his people will imply a particular separation and devotion of persons and places for its sake; and such separation a particular allowance also for the sake of that; not being of any certain amount, but regulated by the exigences that may arise compared with the amplitude of the resources of that state, and with the merits of the ministry likewise in some measure, if one might venture to mention them. For as the apostle says, "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?" (Cor. I. ix. 11). It is what fewer would be inclined to refuse, perhaps, than may be generally imagined. It must be a bad case however for the devotion of any state, when the mass is unwilling to contribute their temporal quota, and the mi-

nistry as unable to contribute their spiritual to the general service: for it is possible, that the means of one party may be too carnal or too scant as well as those of the other. And with regard also to the investment of such quota or subscription; whether it should be more absolute and unconditional on one side than on the other, and while on one side it is only secured on the grace and good will of the subject, a portion of land or some other solid basis should be set off as an additional security on the other, are points that have been and may be seriously disputed, but not on this precious occasion. Let it only be remembered, that the objects of an ecclesiastical revenue either way are of more importance than the revenue itself; as the life is more than meat, and the body than raiment (Matt. vi. 25): the said objects being too distinctly, v. g. on one side twofold, or the church and poor: on the other indivisible, as all the elect people of God. With the first-named church and poor, are included of course their respective places and other accommodations: and these altogether, i. e. the church and poor with their places and things were also the original objects of the piety of the Christian Church; of which two parties, the former soon began to have the largest share in the establishment, but the latter has the largest now in some countries, and is like to increase it also continually, if new restrictions be not thought of, or ancient doctrines be not again enforced, until our Saviour's precept on that head (Matt. xix. 21), shall be more extensively fulfilled than he probably intended; and the majority or main of the elect shall hardly be distinguishable from that overgrown branch.

For the rule of forsaking all for Christ could never have been proposed by him as a duty incumbent on all his followers, or as a general duty at any period of his institution. Else what should eventually become of the helpless poor and also of the laborious, if our principal miners, manufacturers, agriculturists, and others should throw up all their means of employment, and employment with them

of course ; or in other words, if they should sell what they have, and give the produce to the poor ? It may be well for the poor, that instead of doing this, industrious capitalists seem more disposed to keep what they have and increase it. But the probability is, that our Saviour's self-denying ordinance here alluded to was only intended for the ministry in a literal sense ; though it might apply to the whole church substantially, meaning that we should not any of us be slavishly addicted to wealth, but "ready to give and glad to distribute" (Tim. I. vi. 18) of the same to others. And when "Peter began to say unto him, Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee" (Mark x. 28), he could only have meant, that himself and the other apostles had left all for Christ ; and not the multitude of believers : for that could not have answered one good purpose ; but this might many. Among other good purposes, e. g. such a renunciation of temporal advantages might be very essential to the equality of brotherhood, which ought to subsist among persons of the same calling and acting under the same direction, by reason of the unfavourable influence of such advantages in a relation of this kind : so that we might infer, if it was only herefrom, the views of Providence in this behalf. "For the rod of the ungodly cometh not into the lot of the righteous, lest the righteous put their hands unto wickedness" (Ps. cxxv. 3). It is hard to hold back with the rod in our hand : it is hard to resist the motions of pride when backed by opportunity ; and Christianity, as the genius of freedom, is therefore very consistent in enjoining even poverty to its special professors, that their sentiments might not by a common interest be biassed in favour of oppression ; as people naturally incline to the cause of their quality or kind.

If therefore a distinction of orders should be thought necessary in the church for its internal administration and more effectual co-operation, it would not follow that there should be a distinction of circumstances ; or such a distinction however, as would leave more wealth at the dis-

posal of one than of another, even if one had double or treble the other's income: it would not for the sake of the parties themselves; that their spiritual services might rather be repaid in kind, as well as on account of the evil influence of what may be called wealth in the church before mentioned: all receiving not in proportion to their respective merits from men, but from men according to their lawful occasions, and according to their merits from God.

Moderation in the revenue of a Christian ministry is as imperative as its adequacy, as far as may be, to proper demands. It is particularly remarkable, as showing the wisdom of our Saviour's institution, how many ways the smallness of the pittance that he allowed to his apostles and their successors in the consolidation or direction of the ministry is advantageous to its effect, and how terribly the same is impeded by a fixed or independent and immoderate income. One instance of this has been mentioned already, in its promoting harmony and equality among ministers; and another may be mentioned, in its lessening what for them would be an improper responsibility.

And we need not suppose a misapplication of means in the case, to support this position: we may suppose the best application that we can, and still find harm enough in the responsibility that such means will create, a responsibility most unfavourable to the duties of a spiritual trust; and to be blamed, even when it arises only from a passive acquiescence in the party, without his either seeking or striving for it. For so it was determined in a pure synod of the apostles, and the first that they are known to have held; when the twelve called the multitude of the disciples unto them, and said, "IT IS NOT REASON, THAT WE SHOULD LEAVE THE WORD OF GOD AND SERVE TABLES" (Acts vi. 2). No more was it, that the apostles should be served like noblemen.

That an ampler revenue was allowed to the ministry by their master from the time of his departure than he allowed them before, is very probable, from the circumstance

of the wants of his church being miraculously supplied during his presence in cases of need : and the same may be also inferred from that saying of the Lord to his disciples after asking them, "when I sent you without purse, and scrip, and shoes, lacked ye any thing? and they said, nothing. But now he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip : and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one" (Luke xxii. 35; 36.) The case was now going to be changed : though not so soon as Peter expected, nor yet in the way contemplated by some of his successors. The purse and scrip were to be established in due time on the security of the state ; but not to swallow it up whole, or three-tenths of it at least, like Daniel's "LITTLE HORN ; WHICH HOWEVER HAD A MOUTH SPEAKING GREAT THINGS" (Dan. vii. 8).

The quality of the first ordination in the church was that of a self-supporting ministry : which, if it had not been continually weakened by persecution, might soon have come to subsist without a necessity of stooping either to manual labour, or to any other sort of secular employment. At the same time it might be a great trial for any man's virtue, however ambitious of perfection, to sell what he had ; and after giving a surplus of the produce to the second object of the Christian institution, to fare with the first, as hardly as its founder, on the pittance that was left : such a sacrifice as that, if very considerable too in its amount, might be too great even for one who had kept all the commandments from his youth up (Matt. xix. 16, &c). But if, after leaving all for Christ, throwing up his trade, customers, and all ; or if it were only a manual employment, an apostle could still trust generally to the fruit of his own labour and industry under Divine Providence, without pressing much on the fund to which he had given all, such a trust would be great indeed ; yet is not without precedent in the example of St. Paul : who must have bestowed the greater part of his substance in this manner, and without claiming a maintenance thereafter from the

ecclesiastical fund ; as appears both from the account of his acts (Acts xviii. 3), and also from his striking farewell to the bishop and elders of the church at Miletus, "Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood. For I know this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock, &c. . . . I have coveted no man's silver, or gold, or apparel ; yea, ye yourselves know, that these hands have ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me. I have showed you all things ; how that so labouring ye ought to support the weak ; and to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, it is more blessed to give than to receive" (Ib. xx. 28, &c.).

If any man, by taxing his own industry or ingenuity, can find the way to assist a neighbour in distress, it is well : but if a man should tax his neighbour for such a purpose, whose charity would that be ? and above all things to tax him severely, that his spiritual pastor might have the means of showing hospitality, and leading subscriptions if he chose it ! What were this, but to mingle heaven and earth ; as the proper subscription of a spiritual pastor must be of a spiritual kind, if he be suitably endowed ? "Silver and gold have I none (said St. Peter to the man who was lame from his mother's womb)—Silver and gold have I none (said he), but such as I have, give I thee : IN THE NAME OF JESUS CHRIST OF NAZARETH, RISE UP AND WALK" (Acts iii. 6). This was a spiritual donation ; but silver and gold, the means of showing hospitality, &c., are temporal and material : this was a gift from above ; the other is one from beneath. Surely, therefore, ministers may be satisfied, and satisfy their congregations too, if they have their gifts in the higher department, without involving themselves or being involved in the trammels of the lower.

2. It is not, however, for the sake of hospitality nor of any other benevolent practice that wealth is usually desired

either in the church or out of it, but more for the sake of a little paltry consequence which it confers on paltry owners among little paltry spirits. And this is a compensation for the high and beneficent authority of a spiritual order, is it! That a suitable *authority* is due to that order, if not in respect to the body or members, yet in respect to their Head, is evident enough; and evident enough it also is, that the end of its institution cannot be answered any how without such authority. But the proper authority of the church is spiritual, like its armour and weapons. Let the produce of the earth be authority for men of the earth; earthly too be their harsher weapons: but so are not ours. If we "walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh. For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strong-holds; casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God; and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ" (Cor. II. x. 3—5). Seeing, therefore, that the authority of the church, as well as the claim of all its matters and dependencies to a decent respect, will afford another foundation for piety, the good objective characteristic or class of which we are now considering, it may not be amiss to notice the same, both generally and particularly, yet in a few words only.

1, First then all the authority and importance that is conceded to the church, and to church matters, must be conceded in respect to God, its Chief, and their chief object, in order to yield the characteristic of godliness or piety, or any other characteristic indeed that is more than moral or temporal, like the particulars before mentioned. And this being understood, it may seem as orderly and regular, to derive all the spiritual authority in a state from God's Word, as all the temporal from its constitution, or government, if there be no constitution; allowing no more latitude to the ministers of one authority, than to those of the other; which is merely that of construing, declaring, and enforc-

ing the same. No doctrine of Scripture owes its origin, nor consequently should owe its interpretation to any man: these doctrines all come from the perpetual Head of the church; to the church they are directed, and by the church they are to be interpreted, as St. Peter declares, "NO PROPHECY OF SCRIPTURE IS OF ANY PRIVATE INTERPRETATION. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved, by the Holy Ghost" (Pet. II. i. 20, 21). By church, in this acceptance, is, however, to be understood THE CHURCH UNIVERSAL AND INVISIBLE; not any visible, or particular church; as the Hebrew, Syrian, Greek, Roman, and others, for example; as it cannot be expected, that an implicit belief should be yielded by one of these to either of its rivals in the slightest peculiarity. For the interpretations of particular churches are like "private interpretations," or but one degree beyond them, and to be estimated accordingly on the principle above mentioned; which was laid down by the Holy Ghost, and promulgated by St. Peter. The interpretations of councils and synods too, what are they, but often any thing rather than the interpretations of the church? And where then may the COLLECTIVE WISDOM and *general authority* of the church be to be found, but in its COLLECTIVE ACTS? It is not found in the acts of one council, nor of another, nor of any two, nor of ever so many; but generally in the acts of the church, such councils being included among them. Or we may say, that the collective wisdom of the church, as well as its errors, and divisions, and crosses, and triumphs, is found in their record, the sacred Scriptures, sacred histories, and other religious documents; and to be extracted therefore by sound criticism and other human means with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Here is the record of the collective wisdom of the church and a Christian man's authority in a great measure for believing as he does.

For as every effect in the visible or material department is brought about by ways and means, and no effect is ever

produced without them; we must not expect it to be otherwise in the spiritual and invisible department which forms the main object of our present consideration: but as one is produced by its congenial means, so is the other; as houses for shelter, and temples for worship are built for example with craft and instruments, so is piety by faith, and faith by evidence, and evidence by records with the interpretation aforesaid. Such means, therefore, as these are a part of the objects of piety: so are all the signs, symbols, and other institutions by which the constituent graces of the visible church may be preserved and propagated through the very small beginning of piety in respect thereof. For the written word may be regarded as symbolical of the word conceived, and the word conceived of the pure eternal Word which is one with God. And hereby we may also observe the involution of one mean to the kingdom within another, and how one is symbolical of another continually; as for example, four-and-twenty letters first, are symbolical of so many sounds; then these combined are symbolical of words; which are symbolical of ideas; which are symbolical (sometimes) of the truth delivered to mankind from above.

2, In a due respect to these matters from all consists the general authority of the church, and the foundation of general piety, the good objective characteristic under consideration: besides which, as before intimated, the subject will also deserve to be considered *more particularly* in two different relations, internal and external, or the authority within and without.

—1, And first, for an *internal tribunal* or seat of spiritual authority, it may be recommended to every member of a Christian congregation severally and individually to judge himself before all others: "For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged" (Cor. I. xi. 31). In addition to which every member of a congregation is here also advised and exhorted, to judge for himself, as a better way than putting it to the vote, what he shall believe or

do: LET HIM HEAR THE LIKELIEST, AND JUDGE WHAT IS BEST.

2; Enjoying then so pure a government in one's self, one should not need to seek, if one was disposed to accept, the benefit of an *external authority* for the regulation of one's faith and manners, whatever one might submit to for the sake of peace: much less should one feel inclined to dictate to others. It were vain and usurping for any single person, or any single congregation, or any number of congregations, united, to pretend a spiritual authority over others against their consent, or in matters that are not regularly submitted to their decision by the parties concerned; as the question of circumcision was, for example, to the apostles and elders by the church at Jerusalem, and by them satisfactorily determined on the liberal side. For while it rested with the Hebrew church either to withhold its communion from the Gentiles altogether, or to fix its own terms, it still did not become the body, as St. Peter alleged, "to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples; which neither our fathers, nor we (said he) were able to bear" (Acts xv. 10).

Assuming therefore so moderate a jurisdiction only in their own, that is, in a spiritual way, and within their own pale or community, if the council of the apostles and elders, or any one of them perhaps had been required to decide on a question either of facts or opinions that was foreign to their spiritual character, it is most likely, that they would have answered like the Chief Shepherd himself, when one of the company said unto him, "Master, speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me:" and he said unto him, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?" (Luke xii. 13, 14.) And if an unbeliever had applied for a judicial interference either to the Lord or to one or more of his apostles, the answer would have been most likely somewhat in the words of St. Paul, taken perhaps from the forecited of our Saviour's, "What have I to do to judge them also that are without?" (Cor.

I. v. 12.) Or it may be a good excuse for any spiritual person, in case of such an appeal, which is not very probable from "one without" to answer somewhat like Dinah's brethren to Hamor and Shechem, "In this will we consent unto you, if ye will be as we" (Gen. xxxiv. 15).

This has no relation to the civil authority ; which owes equal justice to all. And no one, though he were a very heathen and worshipped strange gods, if he had any of the principle of piety within him, could bring himself to threaten or constrain any spiritual person acting or retiring in a manner so consistent with his professions. A PIOUS DEFERENCE to the authority thus described, which is the authority itself in fact, or its essence at least, and also an incidental of the kingdom, will include of course many other incidentals either as auxiliaries or embellishments ; the principal of which has been already mentioned as the word of God, with signs, and symbols, and other records answering thereto ; and more might be added to these not unworthy of the regard of piety, but in some cases worthy of its most favorable attention ; as different supplementary institutions and ceremonies, which have been thought convenient, also forms of prayer and belief, with psalmody, readings, and exhortations for the ear ; carvings, statues, paintings, and other monuments for the eye ; holy days for remembrance ; and something in short, to exercise every gift and faculty in the way of godliness. But these matters could not be conveniently handled at present, though there are none of them that did not deserve to be enumerated as objects of piety belonging to the sacred place and service in which a communication is kept up between God and his people.

*Sacred with all thereto belonging, be that sacred place for ever!—Favoured with the protection of the divine Being to whom it is consecrated, and honoured in the right of men beyond castles or palaces, or any other sort of habitation, long may it remain regularly attended, and fully frequented. Or, should it be otherwise ; should our

humble but well meant endeavours in the holy place be repaid with desertion, rejection, reproach, and persecution; these afflictions, however serious in themselves, may yet be supported, with God's help, by "the little ones," if we remember continually our never failing dependence. "God is our hope and strength, a very present help in trouble. Therefore will we not fear; though the earth be moved, and though the hills be carried into the midst of the sea; though the waters thereof rage and swell, and though the mountains shake with the tempest of the same. The rivers of the flood thereof shall make glad the city of God, the holy place of the tabernacle of the Highest" (Ps. xlv. 1, &c.).

But for the most part congregations, like individuals, die naturally on the retiring of the Spirit by which they were animated and sustained. For when the Spirit has gathered a visible association any where, and made a selection from it of such members as were to be taken for the invisible church, it goes on to form other congregations for the same selection; and as the Spirit departs out of any of them, a mere form or lifeless trunk, the bare semblance of a church only, will remain. In this way too as fast as one congregation or community shall exhibit symptoms of formality, another more free and substantial will start up in the neighbourhood, and divide if not supersede it. Thus the old dispensation first, and then the new, are brought in upon the overthrow of natural religion, in order to restore to man the feeling or apprehension he then lost, and to heaven a lost subject; while, again, under that dispensation, the temple yields to the synagogue; and under this, first the cathedral yields to the parish church, then our parish church to the meeting, perhaps, then one meeting to another, and what these may yield to in time there is no foreseeing, unless it should happen, or have been ordained, for the abandoned places to come round again, and all return to paradise, according to that passage of Isaiah, "For the

Lord shall comfort Zion: He will comfort all HER WASTE PLACES, and he will make her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of the Lord" (Isaiah li. 3)—and according to the apocalyptic similitude of a new heaven and a new earth (Rev. xxi. 1). But whatever form may be taken in future ages by the visible church, the invisible will not be bound to it otherwise than temporally, as the visible is bound to the earth. And pending that final revolution the general cause is not suffered to flag; the disadvantages of every infant church being more than counterbalanced by the choice of the spirit, by which it is properly raised up and called into action, as David says by the same Spirit, "Out of the mouth of very babes and sucklings hast thou ordained strength because of thine enemies" (Ps. viii. 2): and again the same Spirit by another prophet, "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground" (Isaiah xlii. 3). Against this regular progression of the Spirit there is no remedy, however it may be desired by those who love his services more than his superintendence. But still, that is, notwithstanding, when a church is profaned by the misconduct of some of the congregation, or even by the misconduct of its minister, (and what church can ever hope to escape entirely from such profanation,) the church should not therefore be forsaken immediately: for who knows WHETHER CHRIST MAY NOT STILL BE IN IT as he was in the temple continually, knowing and declaring as he did at the same time, that its character was sunk to the lowest pitch by the infamous traffic allowed therein: "It is written (said he in the very same temple) my house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves" (Matt. xxi. 13)—meaning THE TEMPLE—that they had made the temple A DEN OF THIEVES. It is not until the service has completely degenerated into form, and the body of a church is proved to be lifeless with no hope of reanimation, the only means thereto being obviously withheld, that another place of worship is to be thought

of, and THAT the Holy Ghost will take good order for, as usual. So we need not trouble: for THE CHURCH ITSELF IS NEVER EXTINCT (Matt. xvi. 18).

"The Lord hath said, I will bring my people again, as I did from Basan: mine own will I bring again, as I did sometime from the deep of the sea" (Ps. lxxviii. 22). "And again, when they are minished, and brought low, through oppression, through any plague or trouble; though he suffer them to be evil intreated through tyrants, and let them wander out of the way in the wilderness; yet helpeth he the poor * out of misery, and MAKETH HIM HOUSEHOLDS† LIKE A FLOCK OF SHEEP" (Ps. cvii. 39—41).

* Curate, we may suppose, among others.

† Or congregations.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.



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